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The commercialisation of sport in Europe raises important questions concerning
the most appropriate method of regulating sporting activity. The development of
the European Union and the internationalisation of sporting competition has added
an international dimension to this debate. Yet sport is not simply a business to be
regulated in the same way as any other industry. It is also a social and cultural
activity. Can regulation at EU level reconcile this tension? Adopting a distinctive
legal and political analysis, this book argues that the EU is receptive to the sports
sectors claims for special treatment before the law. The book investigates the birth
of EU sports law and policy by examining:
• the Bosman ruling and other significant European Court of Justice decisions;
• the relationship between sport and EU competition law; 
• the possibility of sport being exempt from EU law;
• the relationship between sport and the EU Treaty;
• the development of a EU sports policy.
This book is essential for those interested in the major issues facing sport and its
relationship with the EU. It is essential for those interested in sports law, the politics
of sport and EU integration. It offers important insights into these debates and
raises key questions concerning the appropriate theoretical tools for analysing
European integration.
Richard Parrish is a lecturer in Law at Edge Hill College.
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Introduction
Sports Law and Policy in the European Union is a deliberately provocative
title. It is not widely accepted that a discrete body of sports law has emerged
or is emerging within the European Union (EU) or within national jurisdic-
tions. Furthermore, given that the EU has no legal competence to develop a
sports policy, one might ask (as I was by an eminent ‘sport and the law’
lawyer), ‘what the bloody hell has the Common Market got to do with
sport?’ Browsing through the list of EU activities contained in Article 3 of
the EU’s Treaty, it is clear that sport has no place in the Treaty. Nevertheless,
Article 3 does state that the EU is to establish an area where goods, persons,
services and capital can freely circulate and where competition is not dis-
torted. As an activity of undoubted commercial significance, sports bodies
must therefore ensure that their activities do not contradict these Treaty pro-
visions. As the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) ruling in Bosman demon-
strated, EU law can have a profound impact on sport. Although this brief
explanation does not justify the label ‘EU sports law’, it does explain why
there is a relationship between sport and EU law. 
The EU’s policy involvement in sport extends beyond legal regulation.
Article 3 also expresses the EU’s desire to expand into more social arenas.
Since the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit, the EU has attempted to extend
European integration beyond the economic field by establishing a ‘people’s
Europe’. In order to do so the EU intends to use sport to implement a range
of social, cultural and educational policy objectives outlined in Article 3.
However, the excessive commercialisation of sport combined with legal reg-
ulation at EU level threatens to undermine these political objectives. Without
more co-ordinated action in the field of sport, EU policy towards sport risks
being pulled apart by competing policy tensions. 
Traditionally, the sports sector has developed rules which have attempted
to maintain a competitive balance between participants. Given the extent of
commercialisation in European sport, the maintenance of these rules is con-
sidered by many as essential. However, many of these alleged pro-competitive
rules have been regarded as anti-competitive by the EU. Again, the policy
tension within the EU is evident. On the one hand, the EU has a regulatory
policy interest in sport as a result of its commitment to protect the legal foun-
dations of the Single Market. On the other, the EU harbours political policy
aspirations for sport, particularly in the field of the people’s Europe project.
The research agenda concentrates on this policy tension. In particular, this
tension has contributed to the development of a more co-ordinated EU
sports policy in which these tensions can be reconciled. The glue binding this
policy is not however derived from primary or secondary legislation but
rather case law. In short, the defining characteristic of EU sports policy is the
construction of a discrete area of EU sports law. EU sports law extends
beyond the mere application of law to sport, to the construction of a legal
approach for dealing with sports disputes which allows both the EU’s regu-
latory and political policy objectives for sport to co-exist within the EU
sports policy framework. This research agenda is particularly fascinating
because the twin concepts of EU sports law and EU sports policy have
emerged in the absence of a Treaty base for sport. They have therefore devel-
oped without the engine of legislation. For lawyers and political scientists
alike, this poses many interesting questions about the dynamics behind
policy change in the EU. 
The emergence of a co-ordinated EU sports policy held together by a dis-
crete area of sports law is a new development in the EU. It has its roots in
the post-Bosman political debate about the future of EU involvement in
sport. The theoretical method of investigation employed in this text reflects
this political impetus behind the birth of EU sports law and policy. The
approach, drawn from policy analysis, stresses the need for ‘subsystem
analysis’. Within the EU operate numerous policy-specific subsystems, one
of which concerns sport. Operating within them are rival advocacy coali-
tions attempting to steer policy in a direction consistent with their belief
system. The identification of the coalitions composition and belief systems is
therefore an essential methodological starting point. However, policy
changes as a result of the activities of the advocacy coalitions and their
success depends on their ability to influence policy in numerous institutional
venues. Coalitions who are institutionally well resourced will be able to
exploit legislative, budgetary, legal and other venues in order to ensure their
belief system prevails. 
The sports policy subsystem is composed of two advocacy coalitions. The
Single Market coalition has a regulatory policy interest in sport. Actors
within it seek to ensure the legal foundations of the Single Market are pro-
tected. As a significant economic activity, sports rules should comply with
EU law. The socio-cultural coalition pursues more political policy objectives
for sport. In particular the actors within it want the specific characteristics
of sport to be recognised in the application of EU law. As such, sport is seen
less as an economic activity and more as a social and cultural pursuit. Both
coalitions are relatively evenly matched institutionally. This means that they
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are both able to pursue their respective policy interests in sport in a manner
which has the potential to undermine each others fundamental beliefs. For
example, the ECJ’s ruling in Bosman undermined efforts to have sport clas-
sified as a social and not commercial pursuit. Given that the member states
are closely aligned to the socio-cultural coalition, the coalition possesses the
ability to amend the Treaty in order to grant sport an exemption from EU
law. For the Single Market coalition, this would set a dangerous precedent
and would undermine the legal foundations on which the EU is based. In
circumstances where both coalitions possess the ability to undermine each
other’s fundamental policy beliefs, a learning process within the subsystem
takes place. In order to protect their fundamental beliefs, coalitions are pre-
pared to compromise within the secondary aspects of their belief systems.
This learning inspired compromise is promoted by a culture of mutual
adjustment within the EU. 
From within this mediation has emerged a more co-ordinated sports
policy. The construction of the separate territories approach for dealing with
legal disputes involving sport is the defining characteristic of this policy.
Separate territories refers to the definition of a territory for sporting auton-
omy and a territory for legal intervention. By reconciling these two tensions,
the EU has facilitated an approach to sports policy which allows the EU’s
regulatory and political policy interests in sport to co-exist. The future
debate over the relationship between sport and the EU will focus on the
boundary between the two territories. By developing a particular legal
approach to sport which treats sport differently to other sectors, the EU has
in effect established a discrete body of sports law in the EU. The field is
however very new and the future definition of the territories is potentially
confused by many variables. Nevertheless, by following the methodology
developed in this text it is suggested that changes in the landscape of the sep-
arate territories and hence sports law and policy more generally, will be con-
fined to measures that will not undermine the fundamental beliefs of the two
coalitions. Until such time as the institutional balance of power changes
within the subsystem, change will be confined to the secondary aspects of the
respective belief systems. As is explained later, this clearly has implications
for the future of EU sports law and policy. 
In writing this book I was mindful of Beloff et al.’s warning that ‘any book
on sports law carries with it the danger that it will contain little more than
information’ (Beloff et al. 1999: 15). I have kept the descriptive passages to
what I consider an appropriate and necessary level. In the absence of wide-
spread academic attention on the development of EU sports law and policy,
it is important to write a text which pulls together the mass of available
information. However, this is not a textbook. Information alone will not
advance our understanding of this relatively new field. The theoretical
framework alluded to above is my contribution to the next stage of the
sports law debate. As an academic subject taught at growing number of
Introduction 3
universities, sports law needs theoretical underpinning. The search for
theory within sports law is a growing yet nascent field. Without it, this rich
area of socio-legal study will become stunted. 
Whilst the text is designed to be as comprehensive as possible, it is natu-
rally limited in its scope. In particular, I have chosen to separate the issue of
doping from the wider sports law/sports policy debate. The future debate on
the relationship between sport and the EU will be dominated by the issues
of sports law and doping. The two domains naturally collide. For instance
in August 2002 the Commission rejected a complaint against the Inter-
national Olympic Committee by swimmers banned from competition for
drug offences.1 The Commission took the view that the rules on doping did
not fall within the scope of the EU’s competition rules. Whilst the analysis
contained within this text may have implications for the doping debate, I do
not wish to claim doping as a central theme of this text. 
Notes
1 IP/02/1211, ‘Commission Rejects Complaint Against International Olympic
Committee by Swimmers Banned from Competitions for Doping’, 09/08/02.
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The birth of EU 
sports law and policy
Despite the absence of a Treaty base, the EU currently operates a sports
policy. This policy is the product of activity within the EU’s sports policy sub-
system, a subsystem formed in response to the infamous Bosman ruling.
Prior to that the EU operated a highly polarised and fragmented sports policy
characterised by two conflicting policy approaches to sport. First, the EU
took a fleeting regulatory interest in sport. The ECJ and the Competition
Policy Directorate intervened in sport to correct free movement and compe-
tition restrictions and distortions within the Single Market. These interven-
tions were not however informed by the EU’s other main policy strand and
as a consequence EU sporting actions were not co-ordinated. The second
strand of policy involvement in sport involved the EU pursuing a political
interest in sport. In particular, sport was identified as a tool through which
the EU could strengthen its image in the minds of Europe’s citizens. As the
two strands of policy involvement in sport did not relate to one another, a
policy tension characterised EU sports policy. 
Today, the regulatory and political policy strands of EU involvement in
sport relate to one another in a more co-ordinated manner. The construction
of the separate territories approach to sport has allowed both policy strands
to co-exist within the framework of a more co-ordinated sports policy. The
practical effect of separate territories is a shift in the nature of EU regulatory
involvement in sport. Single Market regulation has become tempered by
socio-cultural regulation. In other words, the EU is moving from a market
model of regulation towards one in which the EU recognises the social and
cultural characteristics of the sports sector within its regulatory approach.
By establishing separate territories of sporting autonomy and judicial inter-
vention, the EU has in effect established a distinct legal approach for dealing
with sports-related cases. The recent application of law to the sports sector
is deeply influenced by the political values embedded within sports policy.
Accordingly, current legal interventions in sport balance the EU’s regulatory
and political policy interests in sport. The development of the separate ter-
ritories therefore marks the birth of EU sports law. 
EU sports law is therefore a product of the EU’s sports policy. The EU
lacks the necessary Treaty base to develop a fully fledged common sports
policy underpinned with primary and secondary legislative actions. Sports
policy is therefore primarily regulatory in nature. It seeks to alter the values
which underpin the regulation of sport. In other words, sports policy
attempts to balance the classic Single Market regulation of sport with a form
of regulation which respects sports social and cultural nature. The clarifica-
tion of the legal environment allows for the EU’s other political policy inter-
ests in sport to be pursued without being undermined by Single Market
regulatory actions. EU sports policy can then develop through sports inte-
gration into a number of socio-cultural policy subsystems such as education,
youth and health. 
For those seeking to develop a socio-cultural sports policy, the involve-
ment of law is viewed with unease. Sport is an essentially private pursuit
which fulfils important social, cultural, educational and physical functions
within society. Furthermore, sport and the law are often considered ‘separ-
ate realms’. In other words, the law operates in a manner totally incompat-
ible with the operation of sport. ‘Legal norms are fixed rules which prescribe
rights and duties; relationships within the social world of sport are not seen
in this way’ (Foster 1993: 106). However, sport has never claimed to operate
above the law. After all, sport could not operate without law. Rather, it has
developed an internal legal structure of its own. On the one hand, this legal
system specifies the rules of the game such as the offside law in football. On
the other, it also concerns the organisation of the sport. ‘Organisational’
laws regulate important issues such as access to the competition, the rights
of players and the exploitation of broadcasting rights. 
Throughout the 1990s sport developed into a significant industry in its
own right. The extent of this commercialisation contributed to the ‘juridifi-
cation’ of sport, ‘where what are intrinsically social relationships between
humans within a social field become imbued with legal values and become
understood as constituting a legal relationship – social norms become legal
norms’ (Gardiner et al. 1998: 66). Juridification therefore refers to the
process through which the general laws of the land penetrate the internal
laws of sport. The juridification of sport accelerated interest in the idea of
sport and the law as an area of legal study. Established general legal princi-
ples deriving from, for instance, criminal law, contract law, the law of torts,
public law, administrative law, property law, competition law, EU law,
company law, fiscal law and human rights law, have been applied to a wide
number of sporting contexts including: public order and sport, drugs and
sport, safety in sport, disciplinary measures in sport, conduct in sport and
wider issues relating to restraint of trade and anti-competitive behaviour in
sport. 
The extent of the relationship between sport and law has lead some aca-
demics to extend their legal analysis beyond the confines of sport and the law
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by identifying a distinct body of sports law (Gardiner et al. 1998, Beloff et
al. 1999). As Beloff et al. claim, ‘the law is now beginning to treat sporting
activity, sporting bodies and the resolution of disputes in sport, differently
from other activities or bodies. Discrete doctrines are gradually taking shape
in the sporting field’ (Beloff et al. 1999: 3). In other sectors the weight of leg-
islation and case law combined with the development of discrete doctrines
has led to the creation of other activity-led fields of law. As Gardiner et al.
explain:
labour or employment law is a subject area that has only achieved recent rec-
ognition. It has its origins in contract law in the employment context, but no
one would doubt that with the plethora of legislation during the post-war era
regulating the workplace, it has become a subject area in its own right. Passing
through various incarnations such as industrial law, it is now a mature legal
subject. (Gardiner et al. 1998: 73)
The concept of sports law is not universally accepted. Grayson argues
that:
no subject exists which jurisprudentially can be called sports law. As a sound
bite headline, shorthand description, it has no juridical foundation; for
common law and equity create no concept of law exclusively relating to sport.
Each area of law applicable to sport does not differ from how it is found in any
other social or jurisprudential category. (Grayson 1994: xxxvii)
Critics of sports law argue that cases involving sport are grounded in the
well-established fields of law such as contract and tort. Indeed, ‘the tradi-
tionally minded, purist lawyer, may indeed distrust any activity-led “verti-
cal” field of law, preferring the surer, traditional ground of rule-led
“horizontal” law’ (Beloff et al. 1999: 3). 
In recent years, the sport and the law versus sports law debate has taken
on a new dimension. Commercial pressures and the public’s desire to see top-
class competition has fuelled the internationalisation of sport. To regulate
this cross-border activity, sports governing bodies have established rules gov-
erning relations between participants. The international and non-
governmental character of modern sport has not however ushered in for
sport a new form of international autonomy insulated from law. The growth
of the EU’s Single Market has been central to the internationalisation of
sports law. The re-regulation of sport has taken place within the context of
the Treaty of Rome’s fundamental economic freedoms. As the EU is keen to
ensure these freedoms are protected, it has applied the Treaty’s free move-
ment principles to a growing number of sports-related cases. The ECJ rulings
in Walrave, Donà, Heylens and Bosman illustrate the growing relationship
between sport and the EU. However, the relationship between sport and the
EU has a relevance beyond the narrow confines of regulating economic activ-
ity within the Single Market. The EU has social and cultural aspirations and
sport has been identified by the EU institutions as one of the tools through
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which these goals can be achieved. Following Bosman, political arguments
have penetrated the world of sport and EU law. A new approach for dealing
with sports cases is emerging in which the EU is establishing the boundaries
of judicial penetration in sport – in other words the birth of EU sports law.
The construction of EU sports law allows the EU’s regulatory and political
policy objectives for sport to co-exist within the context of an embryonic EU
sports policy. 
The observation that a distinct body of law known as sports law is emerg-
ing in the EU requires both empirical and theoretical justification. One of the
weaknesses of the sports law argument is the lack of theoretical underpin-
ning. Although the literature on the emergence of sports law is descriptively
strong, it remains unclear at what point the concept of sport and the law
loses its relevance and the distinct area of sports law emerges. Furthermore,
beyond the assertion that commercialisation has driven juridification, little
has emerged on the dynamics driving the birth of sports law. Although sports
initial linkage to the EU’s legal framework was driven by legal/regulatory
norms, the emergence of a distinct field of sports law within a wider sports
policy has been politically driven. Within the context of the EU, political
science and public policy therefore offer a fruitful venue for analysis. Law
should not shy away from the insights offered by other disciplines. One of
the most refreshing developments in both law and political science has been
the interest shown in ‘judicial politics’. As Wincott argues, ‘somewhat belat-
edly the Court of Justice is now being subjected to sustained political anal-
ysis and taken into account in the general political science literature on
European integration’ (Wincott 1996:170).
The birth of EU sports law and policy offers both political science and law
the opportunity to further develop this research agenda. Although the poli-
tics of sport is a well-developed area of research, the politics of sports law
remains largely untouched by political science. As such, political science has
been slow in recognising the empirical and theoretical significance of the
growth in the EU’s sporting activity. It has been law that has colonised this
new research terrain. However, law has been equally slow in underpinning
its work with theoretical strength, partly because of the practitioner-based
focus.
Single market sports regulation: sport and the law 1970–1995
The EU’s first excursion into sporting issues occurred in the 1970s. Two ECJ
rulings established important principles governing the relationship between
sport and the EU. In Walrave (1974) and Donà (1976) the ECJ established
that sport is subject to EU law in so far as it constitutes an economic activ-
ity within the meaning of Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, although exemptions
from the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality are
permitted but linked with the practise of sport on a non-economic basis.1 A
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number of years later in Heylens, the ECJ addressed the issue of the recog-
nition of qualifications for sports trainers.2 However, it was not until the
seismic Bosman ruling of 1995 that the full implications of previous case law
became apparent.3 In the case, Jean Marc Bosman, a Belgian footballer, suc-
cessfully challenged UEFA’s use of nationality restrictions and the interna-
tional transfer system.
Walrave, Donà, Heylens and Bosman are examples of cases where the
subject matter just so happened to be sport. The well-established principles
of the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide services simply
became applied to sporting contexts. Although the ECJ did make reference
to the specific characteristics of sport, particularly in Bosman, the principles
were applied in a manner irrespective of the subject matter. 
The European Commission’s attitude towards discriminatory/restrictive
practises in sport in the aftermath of Walrave and Donà was somewhat
contradictory. Despite condemning restrictions on player mobility, the
Commission’s negotiated settlement approach with the sports world initially
resulted in sport and competition law operating in separate realms. The
Commission appeared keen to avoid confrontation with the sports world. A
number of factors altered this position. The ruling in Bosman acted as an
important watershed. Even though in Bosman the ECJ did not address the
question of competition law and sport, instead focusing on free movement
principles, the Commission used the ruling to justify greater scrutiny of
sporting activity. Furthermore, competition law offered individual litigants
a more cost-effective venue for redress than the private enforcement route
via national courts and the ECJ. The Commission’s sports-related competi-
tion law caseload swelled considerably following Bosman. Finally, the
change in the economic status of sport undoubtedly contributed to juridifi-
cation. 
The juridification and commercialisation of sport are parallel develop-
ments in Europe. The commercialisation of European sport is one of the
major reasons why a relationship between sport and the EU exists at all.
Sport in Europe has traditionally operated in an environment dominated by
public service television and in a context where the actions of governmental
and non-governmental organisations have co-existed. In organisational and
competitive terms, European sport has been organised on a ‘pyramid’ struc-
ture. Organisationally, sports clubs support a structure comprising regional
federations, national federations and European federations. Competitively,
clubs move up and down a pyramid of competition on the basis of promo-
tion and relegation, i.e. merit-based criteria as opposed to economically
based criteria. Since the 1980s, this European ‘model’ of sport has come
under sustained pressure due to the television-led commercialisation of
sport.4
Until the 1980s the regulation of broadcasting was a matter of purely
national jurisdiction. In Britain, for example, competition in broadcasting
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was minimal, often taking the form of a monopoly or a ‘comfortable
duopoly’ (Collins 1994: 146). At the beginning of the 1980s there were very
few commercial television broadcasters in Europe, yet by the early 1990s
there were 58 (Collins 1994: 146). Technology-driven changes in the field of
trans-frontier satellite broadcasting altered the nature of broadcasting in
Europe (Collins 1994, Humphreys 1996). With a trend in the 1980s towards
the deregulation of national broadcasting markets, new forms of interna-
tional regulation concerning the new ‘Europeanised’ broadcasting market
took shape. In particular the EU emerged as the key new regulatory actor.
The new broadcasting opportunities offered by new technology such as sat-
ellite broadcasting greatly benefited the sports sector in Europe. Football in
particular was able to sell the broadcasting rights to events to the new wave
of commercial operators who had embraced the new technology. As most of
these new operators were financed on a subscription basis, revenues were
higher than from the public sector broadcasters. This allowed the sports
sector in Europe to maximise profits by selling rights to the highest bidder.
However, sport’s new found wealth merely confirmed the operation of the
sports sector in Europe as an economic activity subject to supranational reg-
ulation. Nowhere are these above developments better illustrated than in
modern European football. 
In 1996 Rupert Murdoch, Chairman of News International and leading
pioneer of satellite television in Britain remarked, ‘we have the long-term
rights in most countries to major sporting events and we will be doing in Asia
what we intend to do elsewhere in the world, that is, use sports as a batter-
ing ram and a lead offering in all our pay television operations’.5 For broad-
casters, sport is an ideal lead-offering, due to its popularity. The new
commercial operators have recognised this. Murdoch added, ‘sport abso-
lutely overpowers film and everything else in the entertainment genre and
football, of all sports, is number one’ (World Soccer 1997).
The introduction of new broadcasting technology greatly changed the
English football broadcasting market. In the 1987–1988 season the rights
for live league football were sold for £3.1 million (Spink and Morris 2000:
167). In 1988, British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) challenged the ‘comfort-
able duopoly’ of the BBC and ITV by negotiating a four-year deal with ITV
worth £11 million per season. Having contributed more financially, ITV
acquired the exclusive sole rights to league football for the four-year period
and by 1991 were broadcasting 18 live matches per season. Evidence there-
fore suggests that in the UK market up until 1992 with the creation of the
Premier League, broadcasters dominated the relationship with the football
sector. A number of factors served to redress the balance. First, the football
authorities saw the potential benefits of maximising income through the
introduction and maturation of a new player, BSkyB. As Parry remarked,
‘two is a cartel and three is a market’ (Parry 1996: 21). Second, football
required wholesale modernisation both on and off the pitch. On the pitch
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top British players were increasingly moving to foreign clubs with no recip-
rocal flow. This led to fears that the national team would suffer and clubs
would not prosper in European competitions. Off the pitch, in the aftermath
of the Hillsborough disaster, the Taylor report imposed a large financial
burden on clubs by requiring ground modernisation.
In 1992, the newly formed Premier League negotiated a broadcasting con-
tract from a position significantly stronger than in previous years. The deal
finally concluded was with the BBC and BSkyB and was worth £214 million
over five years, a significant rise from the previous ITV deal. BSkyB held the
exclusive rights to screen live Premier League matches whilst the BBC could
screen highlights. Under the terms of the contract, every team was to be
broadcast at least once a season. The total number of live games to be broad-
cast was 60 per season. This compared to 54 in the five years of ITV/BBC
coverage. By 1996, the cost of football rights once again rose sharply. The
Premier League signed a new £743 million four-year agreement with BSkyB
and the BBC with BSkyB contributing £670 million. As more broadcasters
entered the bidding process so the cost of football rights rose. The launch of
digital and cable television services towards the end of the 1990s further
increased competition in the rights sector and provided a platform for the
development for pay-per-view football. The presence of NTL and ITV
Digital in the bidding process for the re-negotiation of the 1996 agreement
saw the total value of the rights rise to £1.1 billion for three years, with
BSkyB paying £720 million to broadcast English Premiership games for a
three-year period.
The broadcasting sector and sport have therefore revolutionised each
other. ‘This marriage between sport and television is one made in heaven’
(Griffith-Jones 1997: 289). That was until the collapse of ITV Digital. ITV
Digital went into administration and returned its broadcasting licence fol-
lowing the signing in 2000 of the £315 million contract to broadcast lower
league games in England. In July 2002, BSkyB and the Football League
signed a £95 million contract to broadcast Football League games for a four-
year period, an amount considerably less than ITV Digital agreed to pay in
2000 to broadcast the games over three years. This left the Football League
with a considerable shortfall in revenue. The Football League sued Carlton
Communications and Granada Media arguing that they guaranteed the
liabilities of ITV Digital. In Carlton Communications PLC and Granada
Media plc v. Football League (2002), the court rejected the Football Leagues
claim by finding that the contract between the parties contained no such
guarantee.6 The resulting recession within the English Football league illus-
trates the extent to which football relies on broadcasting. 
The finances of top-flight football in England and across Europe are not
as precarious. The continued mass appeal of top-flight football has resulted
in many clubs becoming listed on the stock market. Clubs across Europe are
also entering into agreements with media companies. In Italy for instance
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media companies own a share or control AC Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio,
Parma and Roma. In Britain, media companies own a stake in Manchester
United, Leeds United, Sunderland, Chelsea, Manchester City (all BSkyB),
Newcastle United, Aston Villa and Middlesborough (NTL) and Liverpool
(Granada). A similar picture is emerging in Europe’s other major leagues.
The eleventh edition of the ‘Deloitte and Touche Annual Review of Football
Finances’ shows that the income of top-flight European football clubs con-
tinues to grow. In 2000/2001 the English Premiership operating profits
increased by 51 per cent to £81 million (134 euros). However, the report
found that only the top-flight English and German leagues consistently make
an operating profit with broadcasting remaining the single largest source of
income for the main leagues in Europe. Despite the difficulties experienced
by the English Football League, the report remains positive about the future
financial wealth of top-flight football in Europe. New commercial opportu-
nities in the new media remain untapped and the tide appears to have turned
regarding cost control in football. In this connection the report argues, ‘there
is now a remarkable convergence of views across Europe and a real window
of opportunity to address the issues around football’s cost base’.7 In partic-
ular salary capping is top of many clubs agendas (see Chapter 5). 
The politicisation of Single Market sports regulation 1995–1999
The commercialisation of sport in Europe was therefore an essential pre-req-
uisite for international juridification. Although Walrave and Donà had
established the potential for sport to be linked to the EU’s legal framework,
the Commission had not completed juridification by applying the EU’s com-
petition laws to sport. Following Bosman, the Commission was compelled
to respond. The initial post-Bosman relationship between EU competition
law and sport was characterised by considerable confusion and great legal
uncertainty. Usually acting on a complaint, the Competition Policy
Directorate launched a series of high-profile investigations into the opera-
tion of sport in Europe. These investigations have included examinations
into re-structured transfer systems, competition between sporting federa-
tions, rules preventing the multiple ownership of sporting clubs, rules pre-
venting club re-location, the operation of Formula One motor-racing,
ticketing arrangements for major sporting events and restrictive practices in
the sale and purchase of broadcasting rights and the transmission of sport-
ing events. The extent to which the EU only appeared to acknowledge sports
economic potential resulted in the EU attracting considerable criticism from
those who thought this approach paid insufficient attention to sports social
and cultural significance. The EU’s Single Market regulatory approach to
sport therefore became politicised. 
The relationship between sport and politics is not unique to the EU. The
nation state has traditionally pursued a political interest in sport. Work on
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the relationship between sport and the nation state has been subject to
numerous studies (Allison 1986, 1993, Cashmore 1996, Houlihan 1997,
Greenfield and Osborn 2001). Distilling the main themes from these works,
it is possible to identify four main explanations as to why there is a relation-
ship between sport and public policy. 
The first broad explanation concerns the use of sport as an instrument of
domestic policy in a political system. Governments have used sport as a
means through which particular policy objectives can be achieved. Within
this category, a number of themes are evident. First, governments have used
sport as a means of social integration and control. Governments have used
sport as a means of assimilating recent immigrants and of reconciling sectar-
ian, cultural or political differences (Houlihan 1997: 107). Governments
have actively promoted sporting activities as a means through which social
tensions can be reduced. Not only has sport the potential to tackle the
‘problem’ of excessive leisure time, it can also promote discipline and self
esteem. For example, In Britain the Thatcher government used sport as a
means to implement its social policy objectives following urban unrest in the
early 1980s. Leisure expenditure was targeted in favour of specific social
groups and urban areas. Monnington explains that this policy was a contin-
uation of an approach adopted by the previous Labour government, ‘but the
significant difference now was that justification swung away from provision
“as need” in support of welfare principles to provision “as a means”;
a means to maintain public order’ (Monnington 1992: 144). The re-
generation of urban areas through sporting provision allows governments to
address more than just social issues. Sport can also be used as a locomotive
for economic development and health promotion. 
The second explanation concerns the use of sport as an instrument of
foreign policy. Sport has traditionally been employed as a means of interna-
tional protest and boycott. Since the overtly political Berlin Games of 1936,
all Olympics have been contested in a political context and boycotts are a
common feature. For the first post-war games held in London in 1948,
Germany, Italy and Japan were all excluded. The Netherlands, Egypt, Iraq
and Spain boycotted the 1956 games in protest at the Anglo-French invasion
of Suez. South Africa was suspended from the Olympic movement in 1964
and expelled in 1970, a fate shared by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1972
having unilaterally left the Commonwealth. In 1976, 20 African nations
boycotted the Montreal Olympics in protest at New Zealand’s participa-
tion.8 The USA boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics and most Soviet bloc
countries reciprocated by boycotting the Los Angeles Games in 1984. In
1988, Cuba and North Korea boycotted the Seoul Games in protest over
South Koreas refusal to share events with North Korea. In addition to
protest, sport has also been used as an instrument for promoting a country’s
international prestige and image. Government’s calculate that they will
benefit domestically from a positive external image. 
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The third explanation concerns the indirect and often unintentional
nature of state involvement in sport as a consequence of state policy rather
than an instrument of state policy. Although generally disinterested in sport,
other than as a means of social control, the activities of Margaret Thatcher’s
Conservative government in the 1980s had a profound impact on the sports
sector. Monnington remarked that ‘sport has experienced the consequences
of “Thatcherism”’ (Monnington 1992: 148). The reform programme of
Thatcher, which included compulsory competitive tendering, local manage-
ment of schools, the opting out of schools from local authority control and
more generally local authority restructuring and national curriculum reform,
all have had a significant impact on the operation of sport in the UK.
Compulsory competitive tendering effectively privatised many publicly
owned leisure facilities and forced local authorities to adopt market-based
practices for leisure provision. As Monnington reminds us, ‘sport is affected
in these instances as a consequence of policy, rather than being used as an
instrument of policy implementation’ (Monnington 1992: 149). 
A final theme straddling all of the above explanations concerns an essen-
tial pre-requisite for the success of any political system – legitimacy. Sport
can be of enormous symbolic benefit to politicians and political systems.
Sport can give politics a human face and can reconnect the politician with
their constituency. The size and quality of the national stadium reflects the
importance of the state itself. Participation, if not success in international
competitions such as the Olympics is a defining characteristic of nationhood.
Political systems need to be held together by more than the glue of econom-
ics, they need to be socially constructed. The EU has acknowledged this
problem. Whilst the elitist and bureaucratic path to integration in the 1950s
and 1960s created the ‘new Europe’, the lack of popular involvement in the
project failed to create ‘new Europeans’. The crisis of European integration
in the 1970s contributed to the birth of the people’s Europe agenda in the
mid-1980s.9 The failure of the people’s Europe agenda to establish itself
resulted in widespread public opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. The
Danes rejected the Treaty in a referendum and over 49 per cent of French
voters rejected it. The British government was forced to call a vote of no con-
fidence to pass the Maastricht Bill through Parliament. In short, the lack of
popular support for integration was limiting the ability of governments and
the EU more generally to realise their political policy objectives. The sense
of remoteness from the EU felt by many of Europe’s citizens therefore needed
political attention. 
The essentially economic approach to sport adopted by the EU sat uncom-
fortably with the general theme of a people’s Europe. Through Bosman the
EU became associated with emancipating very rich footballers, thus making
them even richer. The EU was seen as a venue through which the full com-
mercial potential of sport could be exploited at the expense of the real values
of the game. As such, the EU was not reconnecting itself with its citizens, it
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was taking the people’s game further away from them. A body of opinion
emerged within the EU seeking to give the socio-cultural and integrationist
qualities of sport a higher priority and for sport to be afforded a higher level
of protection from EU law. The European Parliament emerged as an impor-
tant venue through which such ideas were discussed. Both the 1994 ‘Larive
report’ on the European Community and Sport and the 1997 ‘Pack report’
on the ‘Role of the European Union in the Field of Sport’ demonstrated a
desire to balance the economic regulation of sport with the promotion of
sports socio-cultural and integrationist qualities.10 Furthermore, the
Parliament has been successful in inserting an amendment into the second
Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWF) in 1997, guaranteeing public
viewing access to major sporting events on television.11
Sport also received the attention of the member states. Following
Bosman, calls intensified for sport to be granted a legal base within the
European Treaty. The proponents of such a move hoped that a legally based
Article for sport would limit what was perceived as the insensitive applica-
tion of EU law to sport whilst granting the EU a legal base to develop a socio-
cultural common sports policy. Despite the strength of support, the Heads
of State and Government meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997 decided only
to attach a non-binding Declaration on Sport to the Amsterdam Treaty
which called on the institutions of the EU to recognise sports social signifi-
cance.12 Although the Declaration disappointed those who wished to see a
legal competence for sport established within the Treaty, the Declaration is
significant in that by implicitly criticising Bosman it has served to politicise
sport and the law in the EU. Member states have followed up the Declaration
by releasing important political guidelines on sport and the EU in the form
of Presidency Conclusions. In this connection, the member states confirmed
their determination to see the regulation of sport balanced by a socio-
cultural agenda at Vienna (December 1998), Paderborn (June 1999), Helsinki
(December 1999) and during the Portuguese (first half of 2000) and French
(second half of 2000) Presidencies of the Council of the European Union.
The Commission’s institutional response to the Amsterdam Declaration
came throughout 1998 and 1999. The Education and Culture Directorate
(then known as DG X) published series of papers on sport. ‘The Development
and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport’ and ‘The
European Model of Sport’ stressed the multi-dimensional nature of sport and
established dialogue with the sports world.13 Attached to the ‘The European
Model of Sport’ document was a questionnaire designed to canvass opinion
on the future direction of the EU’s involvement in sport. The findings of this
exercise were used by the Commission to prepare the first EU conference on
sport held in Greece in May 1999. The conclusions of the Conference were
then used by the Commission to prepare a report, at the European Council’s
request, on an approach to safeguarding current sports structures and main-
taining the social function of sport within the EU framework. The report
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was submitted to the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. At the
heart of the ‘new approach’ embodied in the Helsinki report is a framework
for applying EU law to sport. The report claims that ‘this new approach
involves preserving the traditional values of sport, while at the same time
assimilating a changing economic and legal environment’.14 The Helsinki
report therefore represents the EU’s first attempt to co-ordinate the Single
Market and socio-cultural policy strands of its involvement in sport. In
essence, the report establishes an embryonic EU sports policy. However, it is
a policy which is curiously unattached to the Treaty. In the absence of spe-
cific primary and secondary sports legislation, the glue binding the policy
strands together is sports law.
Socio-cultural sports regulation: the birth of EU sports law 1999
The assertion by Beloff et al. that a discrete area of sports law exists is sup-
ported by their observation that the English courts have established the
parameters of judicial intervention in sport. 
The cornerstone of what could be called the founding principles of sports law
is the definition of respective territories of the courts and the bodies which
govern sport. The courts in England and elsewhere have firmly established a
region of autonomy for decision making bodies in sport, a region which –
unless the reasons for doing so are compelling – the courts decline to intervene.
Equally firmly they have charted the outer limits of that region and insisted
that those limits be observed by the decision makers in sport, on pain of judi-
cial intervention. (Beloff et al. 1999: 4)
Beloff et al. note that the ‘courts in England and elsewhere’ have estab-
lished these territories. Although it is unclear exactly what ‘elsewhere’ refers
to, it is argued in this text that similar territories are beginning to appear in
the EU. Of course, placing too much distance between the English legal
system and that of the EU would be misleading. EU law is supreme and can
carry direct effect and direct applicability. In other words, EU law takes prec-
edent over national law where the two come into conflict (supremacy) and
EU law can take legal effect into the national legal systems without the need
for national implementation measures (direct applicability) whilst giving rise
to rights or obligations on which individuals may rely before their national
courts (direct effect). Furthermore, Article 234 of the Treaty creates an
organic link between the two systems by providing for a preliminary refer-
ence procedure for national courts to seek clarification from the ECJ on
matters concerning the interpretation and validity of EU law. Clearly there-
fore this distinction between national patterns of sports law and EU sports
law is somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, the EU is not a state in the classic
mould of nation states. As an organisation it blurs the boundaries between
the executive, legislative and judiciary. The Commission for instance pos-
sesses quasi-judicial powers in relation to the operation of competition law.
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The ECJ works under the threat of sanction from the European Council.
Furthermore, the EU is a curious hybrid of political, bureaucratic and legal
styles and cultures. It is, in short, a system without direct comparison in
Europe. As a source of English sports law, EU sports law therefore merits
separate attention. 
EU sports law was born out of the post-Bosman political discussions on
the future of sport in the EU. It is an essential component of modern EU
sports policy. Accordingly, it is a very recent development. The argument
that a distinct area of EU sports law has emerged therefore risks the chal-
lenge that this is a premature claim. Soft law is included within the defini-
tion of EU sports law. Soft law refers to rules of conduct which in principle
have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have a significant
effect on policy and legal developments. Soft law refers to non-binding meas-
ures adopted by the EU institutions such as Treaty Declarations, Presidency
Conclusions, political guidelines and Commission orientation papers,
comfort letters and notices. 
The use of soft law stems from the peculiarities of the EU’s system of law
and governance. The EU is obviously a multi-national organisation. The size,
complexity and diversity of the EU results in protracted decision making at
the best of times. In the absence of unanimity, member states often favour
the use of soft law when they are unable to agree upon binding measures but
nevertheless wish to place political pressure on the EU institutions for a
change in policy direction. As such, soft law can be employed by the member
states as an implied threat of taking further harder measures unless EU insti-
tutions change their approach. Soft law has therefore offered important
guidance as to the interpretation and scope of the application of EU law. The
Amsterdam Declaration is increasingly a frequently sourced reference in
Commission competition law cases and ECJ cases. The Commission (in this
context the Competition Policy Directorate) also favours the use of soft law.
Politically, the Commission must be sensitive not only to the interests of the
member states, but also to the requirements of business operating in the
Single Market. Soft law is therefore often used as the politically pragmatic
option. The voluntary notification system used in competition law also lends
itself to the use of soft law. Furthermore those seeking clearance often favour
informal negotiated settlements. The Commission is also hampered by
resource limitations which results in the use of administrative rather than
judicial measures to resolve cases. In addition, it is not uncommon for soft
law to be used as quasi-legal justification by EU institutions for the develop-
ment of policy initiatives. Again, the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport has
informed much of the EU’s recent sports-related activity. Soft law has there-
fore characterised much of the development of EU sports law. The lack of a
formal Treaty base to take ‘harder’ measures in sport clearly also necessitates
the use of soft law. 
The Commission’s first formal post-Amsterdam review of the application
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of competition rules to sport came in a policy paper in February 1999.15 In
the paper the Competition Policy Directorate made a distinction between
purely sporting situations which are not covered by the scope of competition
law and wholly commercial situations to which Treaty provisions will apply.
Even though the distinction between sporting rules and commercial rules is
problematic, the Commission recognised that even concerning commercial
rules the particular characteristics of sport must be taken into account. The
paper represents the first attempt to establish the respective territories of
sporting autonomy and judicial intervention. Through Commission case
law, attempts have been made to further define these territories. The
Commission’s recognition of the specificity of sport has been demonstrated
in cases concerning the collective sale of sports broadcasting rights, collec-
tive purchasing agreements, restrictions on the cross-border transmission of
sport, ticketing arrangements, issues concerning the maintenance of the
single structure model of sport, multiple club ownership, club relocation, the
operation of Formula One motor racing, the granting of state aid to sport
and the operation of the international transfer system for players.16 Whilst
the Commission has closed some of the above cases through formal deci-
sions, in many instances it has relied on informal negotiated settlements and
other soft law measures. 
The absence of black letter law in the field of sport is on the one hand
understandable. ‘Sporting bodies continue to argue that, while competition
law is generally an adequate mechanism for regulating normal markets, it
can often be too crude to be applied to markets touched upon by sport,
because sport operates under different market conditions to other sectors’
(Kinsella and Daly 2001: 7). The use of informal soft law measures can
therefore be defended on the grounds of flexibility and sensitivity to the con-
cerns of sport. As such, the use of soft law represents a distinct quasi-legal
approach in its own right. Of course, soft law poses a number of problems.
Although sport favours the negotiated settlement approach, the lack of clear
precedents leaves the regulatory environment as confusing as ever. The adop-
tion of harder measures would arguably benefit sport through the establish-
ment of legally binding respective territories of sports autonomy and legal
intervention. The Commission’s proposal to increasingly share the burden of
applying competition law (including the exemption procedure) with national
regulatory bodies and courts rests on the assumption that sufficient case law
has been acquired to facilitate this decentralisation.17 As Kinsella and Daly
observe, the lack of harder measures adopted by the Commission in the field
of sport means that this case law experience has not yet been acquired
(Kinsella and Daly 2001: 13). Given the lack of hard sports law and the
general vagueness of Article 81, the future of the competition law compo-
nent of the separate territories is uncertain. 
The recent activities of the ECJ further illustrate the extent to which polit-
ical arguments have permeated traditionally legal domains. The ECJ’s
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sports-related rulings in Deliège and Lehtonen further develop the concept
of respective territories.18 Although in Walrave, Donà and Bosman the ECJ
recognised the special characteristics of sport thus acknowledging the dis-
tinction between economic and social activities, the rulings essentially
attempted to extend the scope the of the free movement principle. By con-
trast, Deliège and Lehtonen established sports specific limitations (albeit
limited ones) on the scope of the principle of free movement. It is worth
noting that in Deliège and Lehtonen the ECJ took the somewhat unusual
step of referring to the Amsterdam Treaty’s Declaration on Sport. 
The impact of this soft law Declaration has therefore been significant. The
member states have subsequently declined the invitation made by the
Parliament and representatives of the sports world to harden the Declaration
into a Treaty Article or protocol for sport. Meeting during the Nice Summit
in December 2000, the member states did however re-visit the Declaration
in light of the on-going discussion between the Commission and FIFA/
UEFA on the re-modelling of the international transfer system. The Nice
Declaration on Sport (released as a Presidency Conclusion) represents the
member states contribution to the debate on the birth of EU sports law as
part of a wider EU sports policy. Whilst the Amsterdam Declaration ran to
just 58 words, the Nice Declaration was over 1,000 words. The significant
passage read,
even though not having any direct powers in this area, the Community must,
in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social,
educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in
order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of
its social role may be respected and nurtured.19
Without formally granting sport a Treaty base, the above passage in effect
launches an informal member state commitment to launch an EU sports
policy in which the construction of EU sports law is the defining character-
istic.
Conclusions
The birth of EU sports law is essential to the viability of a EU sports policy
which is not legally rooted to the Treaty. EU sports law allows the EU’s reg-
ulatory interest in sport to co-exist with its other political sporting objec-
tives. The birth of EU sports law and policy is further promoted by the arena
in which the debate on sport is taking place in the EU. A sports policy sub-
system has emerged in the EU composed of coalitions of actors attempting
to steer sports policy in a direction consistent with their belief system. The
Single Market advocacy coalition pursues a regulatory policy interest in
sport. It stresses the economic significance of sport. Sport and law therefore
collide whenever sport is practiced as an economic activity. The activities of
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the Single Market coalition established the Single Market model of sports
regulation in the EU. The socio-cultural advocacy coalition has, by contrast,
pursued a more socio-cultural and educational policy interest in sport. Sport
should therefore be treated differently to other economic sectors before the
law. Furthermore, sport should be much more closely integrated into the
EU’s system in order to enhance the prospects of achieving a people’s Europe.
The activities of the socio-cultural coalition have shifted the nature of the
EU’s regulatory involvement in sport towards a socio-cultural model. The
birth of EU sports law has taken place within the context of this socio-legal
and essentially political discussion between advocacy coalitions over the
direction of sports policy. The development of sports law is an approach
favoured by both coalitions as it allows them to protect their fundamental
belief systems. 
Chapter 2 explores the theoretical basis for this claim. As politics is con-
sidered to be the mid-wife in the birth of EU sports law, the approach
favoured is drawn from political science/public policy. Policy subsystems and
advocacy coalitions are considered key arenas in which policy change takes
place. Yet, in order to appreciate the dynamics of policy change it is impor-
tant to locate the work of advocacy coalitions within an institutional
context. The institutional resources at a coalition’s disposal have a conse-
quential impact on its ability to shape law and policy in the EU. 
Chapter 3 analyses the operation of the sports policy subsystem by exam-
ining the composition of the two central advocacy coalitions and by specify-
ing the institutional powers they have at their disposal. Unable to influence
policy in one venue, a strongly resourced coalition will be able to go ‘venue
shopping’ in order to try its luck in others. The control of venues by advo-
cacy coalitions is problematic in the EU. The contemporary EU is a multi-
level organisation. Treaty change has altered the balance of power between
the EU institutions. As such, the EU is now considered a paradise for the
agenda setter. Even subsystems traditionally dominated by legal and techno-
cratic norms are no longer insulated from wider political and public policy
concerns. 
Chapter 4 begins the review of the legal context of sports relationship
with the EU. The ECJ rulings in Walrave, Donà, Heylens, Bosman, Deliège
and Lehtonen receive particular attention. The chapter traces the develop-
ment of ECJ jurisprudence from the initial application of general EU legal
principles such as the right to free movement to the emergence of a more dis-
tinct area of EU sports law. 
Chapter 5 continues the case law analysis by examining the relationship
between sport and EU competition law. The method of disposing of its
sports-related caseload tells us much about the Commission’s approach.
Faced with administrative and political pressures, the Commission has
sought to establish an approach for dealing with sport which differs from
the general approach to market regulation. 
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Chapter 6 explores the political context of sports relationship with the
EU. A combination of sport’s popularity among Europe’s public and the EU’s
wider political/public policy objectives for sport has served to politicise the
sports policy subsystem. Previously dominated by legal norms, the sub-
system has become penetrated by political arguments over the direction of
sports policy. The peculiar multi-level nature of the EU combined with the
public law nature of the EU’s legal system allows for the expression of wider
public-interest justifications for prima facie restrictive sports rules. In other
words, the EU and its legal system exists for reasons other than simply to
resolve disputes between sports economic stakeholders. The ‘state’, defined
broadly to include the EU institutions, has interests in this field as well.
However, just as the EU’s institutional structure can act to promote agenda
expansion, so it can frustrate and constrain actors. The birth of sports law
has not been legislatively driven as the EU has no Treaty base to develop
sports legislation. The non-legislative politicisation of law has therefore been
at the heart of the socio-cultural coalition’s approach. The use of soft law as
a counterweight to the unavailability of legislation has therefore been a pre-
ferred tactic.
Chapter 7 examines the future of EU sports law and policy. The future is
as open ended as it has ever been. The claims of predictive breakthroughs
traditionally perpetuated in political science is rejected. Nevertheless, by
establishing the analytical methodology employed in this text it is possible
to make some conditional assumptions on the future of sports law and policy
in the EU. 
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2
Towards a theory of
EU sports law and policy
Traditionally in Britain, sports law has not been a theorised area of study.
To some extent this unsatisfactory state of affairs still persists despite the
teaching of sports law as an academic discipline on a growing number of
University programmes. Sports law programmes are run by the Anglia
Polytechnic University, Kings College, the Manchester Metropolitan
University and the University of Westminster. The reporting and analysis of
sports law is improving. Since 1993 the British Association for Sport and the
Law based at the Manchester Metropolitan University has published the
Sport and the Law Journal. Since then a growing number of journals have
contributed to the reporting and analysis of sports law. Among the main
publications are the Sports Law Bulletin, Sports Law Administration and
Practice Journal and the International Sports Law Review. The maturation
of sports law as an academic discipline is also reflected in the growing
volume of academic texts on the subject. In addition to Grayson’s seminal
Sport and the Law (1994), recent additions to the sports law catalogue
include, Gardiner et al.’s Sports Law (1998, 2001), Beloff et al.’s Sports Law
(1999), Caiger and Gardiner’s Professional Sport in the European Union:
Regulation and Re-regulation (2000), Greenfield and Osbourne’s Law and
Sport in Contemporary Europe (2000), McArdle’s From Boot Money to
Bosman: Football, Society and the Law (2000), O’Leary’s Drugs and
Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives (2000) and Greenfield and
Osbourne’s Regulating Football (2001). Others do exist and more are
planned. 
The expansion in this interest shown to sports law has undoubtedly
served to theoretically strengthen the discipline. Nevertheless, much of the
attention on sports law has been written by practitioners with practitioners
in mind. Whilst this has underpinned sports law with insightful legal analy-
sis, the academic discipline of sports law remains theoretically fragile. As
Gardiner explains, ‘what is now needed is increased examination of why law
is involved increasingly in sport – a legal theory of sports law’ (Gardiner
1997: 12). Furthermore, as Beloff et al. recognise, sports law is ‘a field which
has yet to be subjected to thorough treatment from a theoretical perspective’
(Beloff et al. 1999: 15). 
The theorised field of sports law is however far from barren. Given the
apparent relationship between the commercialisation of the sports sector
and juridification, the emerging dominant theoretical approach has con-
cerned regulation (for a review of the literature see Gardiner et al. 2001).
Foster’s presentation of a typology of different models for regulating sport
proves particularly useful when examining EU involvement in sport (Foster
2000b). Foster examines five models of sports regulation. The first is the
pure market model in which sport is seen purely as a business, subject to
the same type of regulation experienced by other businesses. Although an
essentially non-interventionist model, the actors within sport are seen as
economically maximising individuals and as such the normal form of regu-
lation is through the market and the predominant legal instrument is regu-
lation. The danger with the free market approach is that sporting
competition will be eliminated as the weaker participants struggle to
compete with the strong. With the defective market model of regulation,
competition law can be employed to ensure monopoly does not result from
the market approach. The consumer welfare model addresses other limita-
tions of the pure market model. Regulation can protect the rights of the dis-
advantaged within sport. Foster notes that historically fans and players have
had limited economic power against their clubs. This model gives these
groups legislative protection from sporting federations. The natural monop-
oly model assumes that sport is organised as a natural monopoly and that
statutorily backed regulation is required in order to regulate its activities.
Due to the existence of monopoly, competition law is viewed as an inappro-
priate regulatory tool. Finally, Foster identifies the socio-cultural model in
which sporting values are considered more important than profit. The social
and cultural significance of sport and indeed sports autonomy is protected
from commercial pressures. Clearly the commercialisation of sport has
implications for the adoption of such a regulatory approach to sport. The
maximisation of profit by sports bodies is arguably as important as the pro-
tection of the socio-cultural aspects of sport. Foster argues a form of ‘super-
vised self-government’ may reconcile these commercial and sporting
interests (Foster 2000b: 269).
Foster’s typology has implications for the analysis of EU involvement in
sport. Lowi’s classification of policy types – regulatory, redistributive and
distributive policies – has been adapted for use within the EU by Pollack
(Pollack 1994). Pollack argues that the EU pursues policy involvement in
each of these areas. As Pinder acknowledges, due to the EU’s constitutional
predisposition for negative integration, the forces of regulation are strong in
the EU (Pinder 1993). Furthermore, as the EU lacks a Treaty base to develop
a legally rooted common sports policy, it has emerged as a EU competence
as a regulatory policy. Nevertheless, as Hix indicates, regulatory policy
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making can involve more than removal of barriers to trade (Hix 1999: 215).
Such ‘de-regulatory’ policy making is often accompanied by ‘re-regulatory’
policy making in which regulation is underpinned with policy values. EU
environmental policy is one example of the interplay between regulation and
values. As Bell and McGillivray explain,
it is an inescapable fact that environmental law and environmental lawyers do
not operate within a value-free vacuum . . . environmental law is for the real
world, where political, social, scientific and economic factors influence the way
that law works in practice. Thus, when environmental rules are placed into a
practical context there is a need to be aware that law is not some stand-alone
monolith which can be interpreted in isolation from external issues, in partic-
ular values. (Bell and McGillivray 2000: 28)
Consequently, it is not uncommon for regulatory policies to become pene-
trated by political and other values. 
Foster poses (and answers) a number of important questions in relation
to the regulation of sport. First, why regulate? The commercialisation of
sport, the unequal power distribution within sport and the monopolistic
structure of sport all point to reasons why sports should be regulated.
Second, who is to be regulated – the clubs or the governing bodies? Third,
what kind of regulation is preferred? Foster argues that sporting self-
regulation can be justified on three grounds. First, sport is best placed to reg-
ulate its own activities due to the specialism it has acquired. Second, the cost
of regulation is borne by sport itself. It is therefore cheaper. Third, self-
regulation is likely to produce better compliance. The case against self-
regulation essentially concerns public interest arguments. First, sporting
structures are undemocratic and do not evenly distribute power to all stak-
eholders. Regulation has the potential to address many problems in sport
such as excessive commercialisation. Governing bodies have been unwilling
or unable to tackle these wider public interest issues. A related concern is the
lack of accountability and the absence of good practice in sport. Regulation
can impose good governance on sport, a claim which fundamentally chal-
lenges the ‘sport knows best’ argument for self-regulation (Foster 2000b:
270–280). 
These arguments are equally as applicable in the context of the EU as they
are in national jurisdictions. Traditionally a distinction has been made
between regulation and law. In other words, as Foster argues, ‘law is seen as
adjudicating between different private interests and regulation as protecting
the public interest against private self interest’ (Foster 2000b: 277). This dis-
tinction loses its relevance in the context of the EU. Both competition law
and the law of the four freedoms are heavily influenced by both private and
public interest concerns.1 In the absence of a Treaty base for sport denying
the EU the opportunity to pass sports legislation, law has become an essen-
tial component of the EU’s regulatory policy interest in sport. 
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Flowing from Foster’s analysis is an additional question relevant to reg-
ulation at the EU level. Beyond the questions of why regulate, who is to be
regulated and what kind of regulation is preferred is a potentially more
problematic question. Why has the regulation of sport changed in the EU?
The review of EU activity in sport conducted in Chapter 1 indicates the
extent to which the nature of the EU’s regulatory approach has changed. A
review of pre-1999 case law in the EU locates the EU’s regulatory involve-
ment in sport towards the ‘market’ end of Foster’s spectrum – in other
words Single Market regulation predominated as the EU employed free
movement principles and competition law to correct market failures and
distortions. The commercialisation of sport was used to justify this
approach. Yet, the EU pursues political policy interests in sport which
extend beyond the issue of market regulation. The EU has a political inter-
est in the social and cultural dimensions of sport. The activities of the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition have been successful in changing the nature of
regulation to locate it more towards the ‘socio-cultural’ end of Foster’s reg-
ulatory spectrum – socio-cultural regulation. This begs an obvious question.
How do regulatory policies change in the EU? The methodology employed
to answer this question is applicable for understanding why policies change
at all in the EU.
These questions go to the heart of the debate on European integration
theory. In the context of this text, the questions are, how has the EU devel-
oped a sports policy in the absence of a Treaty Article for sport and what
drives sports policy change? Central to these questions is the further issue of
why the content of EU sports policy has been dominated by the development
of sport law? The short answer is that sports law has emerged as a tactic to
enable the EU’s competing policy has objectives for sport to co-exist. In the
absence of guiding legislation, sports law provides stability and the neces-
sary legal certainty for the EU to continue to pursue a regulatory interest in
sport without undermining its socio-cultural policy objectives for sport. It is
argued below that policy analysis can be employed as a tool for theoretically
strengthening the sports law argument. 
The literature on European integration falls, very broadly, into one of two
categories. The roots of integration theory lie in the post-war attention paid
to the EU as an emerging political state. Political science and international
relations theory filled the theoretical void by attempting to understand the
motivations for establishing the new political system (the transactionalist/
communications approach) and the aspirations for its development (federal-
ism and functionalism). As the EU evolved, intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism emerged as the dominant paradigms, explaining both the
nature of the organisation and predicting the future of integration. Both
approaches focused particularly on the major constitutional decisions to
have shaped the EU. However, ‘it is important to focus, not simply on the
process through which major institutional change takes place in the EU, but
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also on the day to day functioning of the EU as a polity’ (Cram 1996). As
such, a body of literature drawn from comparative politics and policy anal-
ysis has emerged which examines the governance of the EU. Therefore,
whilst intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism attempt to explain the
process of integration, approaches drawn from policy analysis focus their
attention on the politics of governance. 
Sport is not unique in becoming linked to the operation of the Single
Market in the absence of a Treaty base. At its inception the EU lacked a cul-
tural, media, education and environmental policy. Today, the EU has exten-
sive involvement in these and other important policy sectors. How does the
EU acquire an interest in these areas despite the lack of a Treaty base? What
processes are at work that give rise to the development of distinct areas of
law such as environmental law? Essentially, what is being examined is ‘task
expansion’. Pollack offers a definition. ‘By task expansion I mean (a) the
initial expansion of the Community agenda to include new policy areas and
(b) the subsequent development and growth of substantive policies in each
of these new policy areas’ (Pollack 1994: 96). 
This two-stage process has been evident in the development of sport as a
EU competence. Initially, general legal principles were applied to sport thus
giving sport a EU dimension. The ECJ rulings in Walrave, Donà, Heylens
and Bosman stemmed from the general application of law of the four free-
doms. Post-Bosman sports case law has taken place within the context of a
political debate concerning the substantive development of sport as an area
of competence. Evidence indicates that the ECJ and the Competition
Directorate are increasingly recognising the specificity of sport in their case
law. The shift in the regulatory approach to sport has given rise to a distinct
area of jurisprudence known as EU sports law. 
The birth of EU sports law has wider implications. As an emerging feder-
ation the EU is involving itself in a growing range of policy sectors, some of
which are extra-constitutional – they lack a formal Treaty base. This chal-
lenges the assumption that the EU is not omni-competent or cannot become
omni-competent without huge Treaty reform. Of course the EU may not
wish to become omni-competent in its truest sense, but in an environment
where consensual decision making over Treaty reform is becoming increas-
ingly laboured (particularly with the prospect of enlargement), now is an
opportune time for researchers to (re)examine ‘creeping competence’
(Pollack 1994, 2000).
It is the contention of this chapter that approaches focusing on the process
of integration are ill equipped to deal with the complexities of modern EU
governance. The arguments forwarded by intergovernmentalists and neo-
functionalists are reviewed in the first section of the chapter. The favoured
approach is drawn from the body of literature examining the politics of
governance. The second section reviews this literature and establishes the
analytical framework of the book. 
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The process of integration
Intergovernmentalism
For intergovernmentalists, state actors control policy evolution in the EU.
Far from diminishing the influence of the nation state, European integration
is resisted by the ‘obstinate’ state (Hoffmann 1964, 1966), strengthens the
nation state (Milward 1992) or it depends on inter-state bargains (Moravcsik
1991, 1993).
Hoffmann’s obstinate nation state restricted itself to uncontroversial eco-
nomic integration. Although observable in some sectors, such as welfare,
Hoffmann saw the neo-functional concept of spillover as being empirically
flawed (see below). Rather than embarking on positive integrative steps, the
EU found it easier to follow the negative integration route of removing
obstacles to trade. Perversely for Hoffmann, the success of spillover is likely
to be its undoing since ‘the more each partner has already obtained through
past measures – the less he will be incited to make new concessions in antic-
ipation of further gains’ (Hoffmann 1965: 85). Furthermore, the more inte-
gration progresses from the economic field (low politics) to the political field
(high politics) the greater the chance of failure. In the realm of high politics
nation states were not prepared to be compensated for their losses by gains
in other areas. Instead, the nation recoils from these difficult decisions pre-
ferring instead the tried and tested nation state approach in which uncer-
tainty is perceived to be minimised. Hoffmann’s observations in this
connection are supported empirically by two events, the failure of the
European Defence Community in 1954 and the Luxembourg Crisis of
1965/1966. In both cases the Community failed to break new ground
because integration had tried to break out of the narrow confines of eco-
nomic integration. For Hoffmann therefore spillover is limited in its appli-
cability and once applied outside its boundaries becomes no more than an
act of faith.
Milward’s historical intergovernmental account of European integration
does not begin with the assumption that European integration has been an
altogether modest affair (Milward 1992, Milward et al. 1993). Instead, he
asserts that the institutional and constitutional development of the EU was
not an attempt to erode the nation state, and as such a move to be resisted,
but an attempt at strengthening it. Milward argues that the EU became an
external support system for Europe’s nations, creating a new political con-
sensus capable of rescuing the nation state but requiring a limited transfer of
sovereignty. The policy competencies acquired by the Community reflected
the desire by Europe’s nations to underpin and stabilise the consensus on
which the European nation was rebuilt. The motivation for the post-war
rescue of the nation state was therefore economic, but within that frame-
work existed the greatest political barrier to this rescue – the German ques-
tion. Milward suggests that European integration developed at the
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intersection between these two ambitions. By examining this intersection,
Milward explains how national policy became internationalised, a clear
acceptance by Europe’s nations that the rescue of the nation state could not
be achieved within traditional national borders. As such Milward attempts
to re-assert the role of the historian within explanations for post-war
European integration. In effect, Milward accuses political science and inte-
gration theorists as having been unmasked by history. Empirically the work
of Deutsch, Haas, Lindberg and Lipgens is flawed because central to their
diverse theses is the assumption that the nation state is being superseded by
a new form of governance promoted by increased communications
(Deutsch), spillover (Haas and Lindberg) or a federally directed change in
political consciousness spurred by the war (Lipgens). 
Moravcsik’s accounts of European integration focus on the preferences
and power of the member states. Moravcsik refined his earlier work on
intergovernmental institutionalism by adding to his theory of interstate bar-
gaining an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in
liberal theories of international interdependence (Moravcsik 1991, 1993).
Moravcsik employs these two theoretical approaches to test his claim that
European integration depends on macro-level interstate bargains negotiated
by member states with the aim of managing economic interdependence.
Moravcsik treats the key intergovernmental players as essentially rational
actors seeking to maximise their rationally conceived interests, constrained
by domestic societal forces and the international environment. Moravcsik
employs a liberal theory of state–society interaction and national preference
formation to explain how governments define interests. He then employs an
intergovernmental theory of interstate strategic interaction to account for
the bargain which takes place between member states in order to realise
those interests. The political outcomes of these intergovernmental bargains
reflect the preferences and bargaining power of the various member states.
Moravcsik sees the supranational institutions as having little influence in
shaping these outcomes. Rather, institutions in the EU are used to facilitate
intergovernmental bargains and improve decision-making efficiency.
Moravcsik’s rejection of neo-functionalism is two-fold. Empirically, neo-
functionalism has mis-predicted the course of European integration. The
emphasis on functional and political spillover has been misguided.
Functional linkages can only sporadically be detected, fundamentally calling
into question the gradual and automatic nature of integration. Indeed, events
such as the 1965 Luxembourg crisis and resulting compromise of 1966 have
demonstrated the resilience of the nation state in the process of integration.
Rather than the smooth process outlined by neo-functionalists, European
integration has proceeded in fits and starts through intergovernmental bar-
gains that have set the agenda for ‘an intervening period of consolidation’
(Moravcsik 1993: 475). Similarly, Moravcsik sees the concept of political
spillover as flawed. He sees the autonomous influence of supranational
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officials as increasing ‘slowly and unevenly, if at all’ (Moravcsik 1993: 476).
Second, Moravcsik makes a theoretical criticism of neo-functionalism.
Rather than employing general theories of international political economy,
neo-functionalists attempted to explain European integration as a unique
process. As a result, neo-functionalism lost the benefit of comparability and
testability.
Neo-functionalism
From a neo-functional perspective, policy evolution in the EU is functionally
determined and supranational actors play a key role in defining policy alter-
natives. Two strands of neo-functional thought are relevant in this respect –
functional and political spillover. From Ernst Haas’s early neo-functional
work in The Uniting of Europe to more contemporary revisions, the concept
of functional spillover has been an enduring centrepiece of neo-functional
theory (Haas 1957). The content, timing and nature of this functional spill-
over has been questioned yet it continues to be employed by integration theo-
rists as an intervening variable between functional action and European
political integration, a dynamic absent in Mitrany’s functionalist account
(Mitrany 1943 [1966]). Functional integration is essentially economic in
nature. It refers to the build up of pressure created by incomplete integration
by modern interdependent economies. 
The focus on the economic rationale for integration in the face of mount-
ing international pressures is a strand of neo-functional thought similar in
conception to other theoretical accounts of regional integration. Moravcsik,
a leading critic of neo-functionalism remarked, ‘the focus on economic inter-
ests may still be viable. It remains plausible for example, to argue that inte-
gration is a distinctive policy response of modern welfare states to rising
economic interdependence’ (Moravcsik 1993: 476). 
Despite the similarity, neo-functionalism remains clearly distinct from the
intergovernmentalist camp in that neo-functionalism de-emphasises state
capabilities in the regional integration process. Furthermore, the economic
rationale for integration as developed by neo-functionalists was seen as
merely one dynamic in the integration process, the others being political and
societal factors (see political spillover). For the neo-functionalist, the eco-
nomic decision to integrate one sector creates pressures for further sectoral
integration. Only by following this incremental logic can the policy maker
ensure the maintenance of the gains achieved by the initial decision to inte-
grate. The decision to harmonise coal and steel policy in Europe in 1952 for
example, created pressures for further sectoral integration in functionally
linked areas. The realisation of the benefits of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) necessitated a wider, more general level of economic
integration as embodied in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. As Haas explained,
‘policies made pursuant to an initial task can only be made real if the task
itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises made among the states
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interested in the task’ (Haas 1961). From this perspective, incremental task
expansion becomes a necessity as a half way house between integration and
sovereignty would be unsustainable. Clearly, therefore, neo-functionalists see
this as a crucial dynamic, perpetuating task expansion as ‘problems in one
area will raise problems or require solutions in another’ (Muttimer 1989).
In its original form, functional spillover was portrayed as a theoretical
breakthrough, a plausible explanatory and predictive account of how
European integration would become self-sustaining. In essence functional
spillover was regarded as automatic and essentially inevitable, ‘sector inte-
gration . . . begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy
even in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies’
(Haas 1957: 297). These alleged self-sustaining properties of European inte-
gration have however never been universally accepted as representing reality.
Even though occasional functional linkages could still be detected, progress
has been patchy and far from smooth. By 1961, Haas had called into ques-
tion his original expectation concerning the inevitability of spillover. Instead
he argued, ‘functional contexts are autonomous. Integrative forces that flow
from one kind of activity do not necessarily infect other activities, even if
carried out by the same organisation’ (Haas 1961). The experience of the
1965 Luxembourg crisis followed by the retrenchment of the 1970s forced
neo-functionalists into even greater retreat. Less than 20 years after com-
menting on the unsustainability of a ‘half-way house’ between integration
and sovereignty, Haas, in 1976, described the EU as exactly this (Haas 1976).
In addition to functional spillover, neo-functionalists also identified a
complementary process, political spillover. ‘Political spillover, in short, con-
sists of a convergence of the expectations and interests of national elites in
response to the activities of the supranational institutions’ (Cram 1997: 16).
At the supranational institutional level, political spillover is promoted by the
independent, autonomous and essentially creative actions of the European
Commission, Parliament and the ECJ. From this perspective, political beha-
viour and policy outcomes in the EU are shaped endogenously through
a process of supranational institutional creativity. The Commission,
Parliament and ECJ can detach themselves from tight member state supervi-
sion to expand the policy remit of the EU. This might be achieved through
the exploitation of institutional powers, the exaggerated interpretation of
Community goals, the seizing upon of crises to expand policy, the creative
use of brokering or a combination of all of these backed up by considerable
personal skill on the part of leading figures. For Haas, this institutional ingre-
dient is central to neo-functional theory: ‘the existence of political institu-
tions capable of translating ideologies into law is the cornerstone of the
definition’ (Haas 1957). 
Haas also identified a societal dimension to European integration. Acting
as agents of European integration, supranational institutions promote dia-
logue between the central authority and relevant interest groups. As more
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sectoral areas are brought under supranational control within the regional
integration process, so traditionally nationally centred belief systems would
change. ‘As time went by, these interest groups would come to appreciate the
benefits of integration, and thereby transfer their demands, expectations and
loyalties from national governments to a new centre, thereby becoming an
important force in favour of further integration’ (Pollack 1994: 99). 
Haas’s example of shifting societal expectations was drawn from the
experience of the ECSC which was viewed with scepticism by most indus-
trial groups in 1951 yet by 1955 became the focus for demands for more
supranational powers. Good experience of integration therefore breeds
familiarity, trust and crucially demands for more action. The task of the
supranational institutions is to develop channels of communication facilitat-
ing this bottom-up demand shift and ultimately translate such demands into
legislative (or indeed judicial) action, thus expanding the institutional and
policy remit of the Community. The supranational institutions thus provide
the home for shifting societal demands. 
As with functional spillover, the concept of political spillover has also
been re-examined. Haas, drawing on the work of Lindberg and Scheingold
(1970, 1971) explained how different integration outcomes are likely.
Lindberg and Scheingold identified three such possible outcomes, ‘the fulfil-
ment of a postulated task on the part of practices and/or institutions created
for integrative purposes, the retraction of such a task (i.e. disintegration) and
the extension of such a task into spheres of action not previously anticipated
by the actors’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). 
The ‘crisis’ of neo-functionalism in the 1970s and early 1980s became
replaced by renewed theoretical optimism with the launch of the Single
European Market project. Clearly, however, any revised concept of func-
tional and political spillover would have to take into account the role of key
actors in shaping political outcomes. In particular, the failing of early neo-
functionalism lay in it de-emphasising state actors. As such, although a move
towards some kind of supranational political integration could be detected,
the process was unpredictable, depending in large part on the calculations of
self interest made by the member states. From an internal perspective the
relationship between the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and
the Amsterdam Treaty can be functionally examined. Externally however the
collapse of Communism and the re-unification of Germany point to an
equally persuasive set of dynamics. The danger is that spillover becomes a
term conceptually stretched over a set of events to which the concept may or
may not be applicable. ‘Spillover, then, is rather like a mirage; it is there if
you want it to be’ (O’Neill 1996: 129). 
Implications for EU sports law and policy
Largely absent from the analytical foundations of intergovernmentalism and
neo-functionalism has been a focus on the role of the ECJ in the integration
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process. This gap in the literature became populated throughout the 1990s
(see for instance Burley and Mattli 1993, Volcansek 1992, Weiler 1993,
Garrett and Weingast 1993, Wincott 1996; also see Chapter 4 where a more
comprehensive review of legal approaches is conducted).
Burley and Mattli’s classic neo-functional analysis of the role of the ECJ
places heavy emphasis on the cultivation of integration by the Court. The
ECJ has constitutionalised the Treaty through a process in which law has
spilled over from purely economic sectors to new spheres. Making the obser-
vation that the law governing the free movement of workers spilled over into
the sphere of sport via Bosman is, on the face of it, appealing. Furthermore,
the ECJ’s rejection of member state submissions supporting the maintenance
of the transfer system appears to further undermine the intergovernmental-
ist argument on state supremacy. 
By contrast, intergovernmentalism rejects the idea of a Court able to engi-
neer integration in a manner inconsistent with member state preferences.
The member states power of sanction over the Court has the effect of reign-
ing in the ECJ’s judicially active impulses. Occasionally governments may be
prepared to accept short-term losses in order to secure wider long-term
gains. The ‘defeat’ in Bosman, can therefore be viewed in this light. In other
words, even though the ruling was unpopular within national capitals, it did
not fundamentally undermine member state interests. Indeed, by strengthen-
ing the principle of the freedom of movement, the ruling was in fact consis-
tent with the member states wider interests. 
Given the depth of theoretical and empirical material provided by inter-
governmentalism and neo-functionalism, why not employ these tools to
examine the birth of EU sports law and policy? Two central reasons have
already been discussed above, namely the level (macro in nature) and insu-
larity of the approaches. However, taking each approach in turn, further
related weaknesses are evident.
First, intergovernmental analyses of policy evolution overstate the impor-
tance of state actors within the EU whilst under-estimating their commit-
ment to achieve ‘positive’ integration. Clearly, the member states are
important to the development of policy in the EU but they do not monopol-
ise the process. The EU is far more multi-layered and complex than inter-
governmentalists claim (Marks et al. 1996). As such, an approach is needed
that can capture the real nature of EU subsystemic, systemic and super-
systemic governance (Peterson 1995). Indeed, when tracing the emergence
of a de facto EU sports policy, member state involvement at the Amsterdam
Summit represents only the tip of the iceberg and the first formal involve-
ment of the member states. Since Amsterdam, the member states have
become more active. If a post-Amsterdam snapshot of sports policy devel-
opment were to be taken covering the period 1998–2000, an intergovern-
mental analysis may become more appealing. However, this would be to
exclude an analysis of the messy development of sports policy prior to
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member state involvement. Accordingly, an approach is required that not
only captures the real nature of EU governance, but also adopts an histori-
cal, not snapshot approach. Intergovernmentalism may therefore have some
value in accounting for policy ‘decision’, but it is more limited in terms of
explaining ‘agenda setting’ and ‘issue definition’ (Hogwood and Gunn
1984). At best, state actors are merely one (albeit powerful) policy advocate
within any given policy subsystem. 
If intergovernmentalism is of limited applicability, what of neo-
functionalism? It has already been noted that Burley and Mattli’s neo-
functional analysis of legal integration provides potential insights into the
birth of EU sports law. Furthermore, Pollack’s neo-functional analysis of
task expansion in the field of regulatory policies is also useful in forging a
link between the operation of the EU’s Single Market and the development
of new policies. In relation to regulatory policies, Pollack argues that the
initial decision to establish a common market set in motion a dynamic
process of functional spillover in relation to regulatory policies. He argues,
‘the existence, timing and content of Community regulatory policies are
explicable primarily in terms of functional spillover from the common
market’ (Pollack 1994: 118). As Pierson argues, the huge range of closely
related policy sectors in which the EU involves itself increases the likeli-
hood of new policy sectors being drawn into the regional integration
process as an unintended consequence of activity in related fields (Pierson
1996). Functional spillover can therefore develop out of ‘high issue density’
(Pierson 1996: 139). The proximity of sport to many of the fundamental
economic activities of the EU therefore increases the potential of sport
being caught within the scope of the law of the four freedoms. For
example, Article 42 (ex 51) relating to the adoption of measures in the field
of social security necessary to provide for freedom of movement for
workers has provided the basis for functional spillover into education
policy. In particular, in the mid 1970s, the Commission launched an action
programme aimed at facilitating the movement of migrant workers. This
resulted in a Council Directive in July 1977 on the education of children
of Community migrant workers.
It may be that neo-functionalism only possesses descriptive qualities. The
concepts of functional and political spillover are contestable. The notion that
functional spillover is automatic is empirically flawed. Although spillover is
a useful tool to describe the linkages between policy sectors, it struggles to
account for the dynamics driving the connections. Political spillover is also
questionable. Neo-functionalism de-emphasises the important role played
by state actors. As demonstrated by the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations
on sport, the member states have been influential in establishing a EU sports
policy. In this connection, neo-functionalism over-emphasises the autonomy
of supranational players. The relationship between the ECJ and the
Competition Directorate has been influential in linking sport to the EU’s
34 Sports law and policy in the European Union
legal framework but their role cannot be divorced from the wider political
context within which they operate. As such, political spillover, although not
totally dismissed, is uneven at best. It is clear that individual litigants have
been important in bringing sports-related cases before the ECJ and
Competition Directorate, however there is little evidence suggesting that
this form of bottom-up litigation has been encouraged by EU officials.
Indeed, given the increasing caseload of the under-resourced Competition
Directorate, it is unlikely Commission officials would want to increase their
caseload further. Rather than characterising bottom-up litigation as political
spillover, it can be better characterised as legal opportunism. 
What lessons need to be drawn when constructing an analytical toolkit
for examining the birth of EU sports law and policy? First, an approach is
needed that is best able to capture the real nature of EU governance. The EU
is becoming a more flexible and multi-layered organisation than intergovern-
mentalists and neo-functionalists recognise. As such, policy-shaping and
making capabilities are dispersed and not monopolised. In addition, the
traditional forums for agreeing policy, such as Council/European Council
meetings are becoming less dominant as alternative venues for policy devel-
opment emerge. An intergovernmental decision to grant a policy Treaty
status rarely signals the birth of a new policy. Rather, such a move usually
formalises pre-existing developments, even if these developments have taken
place outside the context of the Treaty. As such, an analytical toolkit must
be able to capture the role of these alternative policy and institutional venues
and the role played by key policy advocates within them. If no one actor
dominates, how are conflicting approaches to policy managed within the
formal and informal institutional structure?
The second feature the analytical toolkit needs to capture is an historical
approach to understanding policy change. A snapshot of European integra-
tion is unlikely to capture the true nature of policy change. Nor is an
approach that attempts to scientifically map out integration likely to capture
the differences between different policies. Rather, what is required is a meth-
odology for analysing European integration rather than a grand theory, in
particular a methodology that examines policy change over time.
The third feature required is an approach that cuts across the insularity
of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. State actors and non-state
actors are both central to policy evolution. Analysing interstate bargains
must remain central to the methodology but must be properly located
within the context of a multi-layered EU. In addition, spillover need not nec-
essarily be discarded, rather spillover needs similarly placing in correct
context. Constitutive politics or key events, such as a change in the eco-
nomic status of a sector, can spark spillover. Spillover may also be generated
by high issue density or may be encouraged as policy advocates exploit a
growing number of institutional venues. However, the inexorable logic of
spillover is rejected.
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The politics of governance
Given the limitations of the political science approaches reviewed above, the
researcher must step outside this toolkit for studying European integration
and turn to an approach that examines the governance of the EU. This
research agenda is more modest. Rather than explaining the big picture of
European integration, studying the governance of the EU illuminates the
day-to-day detail of integration. In this connection, researchers usually turn
to either an actor-based or an institutions-based approach. The approach
adopted in this text attempts to bridge the two whilst acknowledging the
useful but limited insights offered by intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism. As such, to address the need to examine the role of key actors,
the study employs the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1988,
1991, 1998). In order to capture the crucial role played by institutions, the
study uses new institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Armstrong
and Bulmer 1998). Alone, the Advocacy Coalition Framework fails to rec-
ognise the importance of political institutions in policy evolution. Hence the
need to take an ‘institutional turn’ (Jessop 1990, 2000). However, alone,
new institutionalism fails to capture the nature of competition between rival
policy advocates. Taken together, they both add theoretical depth to the
important yet largely descriptive findings of multi-level governance (Marks
et al. 1996). 
Multi-level governance
An essential starting point for this research agenda is an acceptance that the
EU can be characterised as a multi-level organisation. As explained above,
macro theories of European integration have traditionally tended to over-
state or under-state the role played by intergovernmental and supranational
actors. By seeing decisional ‘power’ as dispersed within the EU’s policy
process we can explain a growing phenomena in the EU, best described as a
‘control deficit’. Given a sharing of competencies in decision making, one set
of actors, be they intergovernmental or supranational, find it more difficult
to control policy development in the EU. Due to a changing institutional
balance of power promoted by recent Treaty changes, policy advocates find
themselves able to exploit a growing number of institutional venues to shape
policy. However, this fragmentation of policy ‘influence’ need not necessar-
ily lead to analytical fragmentation. A review of multi-level governance
(MLG) provides the starting point to illustrate this argument. 
The MLG school of thought provides an alternative account of European
integration to that of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. The
empirical, if not theoretical, strength of MLG lies in the recognition that
member states remain the key actors in the process of European integration
but increasingly share policy-making competence across multiple levels of
government, including sub-national and supranational. In explaining why
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member states no longer monopolise European level policy making, Marks,
Hooghe and Blank make three assumptions (Marks et al. 1996: 346). First,
decision making in the EU is shared by actors at different levels rather than
being monopolised by the member states. Second, individual member state
control is diminished by collective decision making in the European Council
and Council of Ministers. Third, political arenas are interconnected rather
than nested. As such, the state does not act as a gatekeeper between domes-
tic and supranational politics.
Marks et al. use these assumptions as the basis on which to answer the
central intergovernmental criticism of why member states would tolerate a
slippage in their control. Two broad responses are supplied. First, multi-level
governance assumes that the maintenance of sovereignty is just one goal of
many for member states. As such, it is not inconceivable that this goal might
be sacrificed for the attainment of other goals such as efficient policy provi-
sion. The costs of such an action may be felt by the member state but may
be offset by the expected benefits, be they economic or political. In addition,
life in an electoral marketplace means that member states may tolerate losses
in their control if these losses only manifest themselves in the long run. For
politicians, the short-term gains are prized whilst long-term costs are dis-
counted (Marks et al. 1996: 349).
Second, member states may use the EU as a shield to insulate themselves
from domestic criticism. Furthermore, a member state may accept a loss of
control if that is the price that must be paid in order to control the actions
of other member states. The strict regulatory ethos of the Single European
Market programme reflects the mistrust between member states. Finally,
member states may also accept a loss of control in order to limit future
reform attempts once they have left office. This ensures a degree of perma-
nence for their original architecture (Marks et al. 1996: 349–350).
Marks et al. go beyond explaining the logic of shifting decision making
to supranational institutions to explain why this would entail a loss of indi-
vidual and collective member state control. The most obvious constraint on
individual member state control is the use of qualified majority voting
(QMV) in the Council, even though consensual decision making remains a
popular informal institutional device (Marks et al. 1996: 350–352). The
ability of member states to control supranational institutions collectively is
also constrained. The chief opportunity for member states to assert them-
selves in the policy-making process comes with the negotiation and signing
of new Treaties. Although unanimity is the rule, member states do not start
with a clean slate. Collectively, unanimity can act as a barrier to policy and
institutional reform and even where agreement is possible the ratification
process can act as a constraint. Furthermore, the mapping out of the rules of
the game can lead to considerable discretion on the part of the supranational
institutions as to how to operationalise these general principles. Day-to-day
EU governance is therefore an arena intergovernmentalists tend to ignore.
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One of the reasons for this is that intergovernmentalists assume the princi-
pal–agent theory will guarantee that if the agents (supranational institutions)
are operationalising Treaty principles in a manner undesired by the princi-
pals (member states), then the latter will simply replace or reform the agent
(Marks et al. 1996: 352–354). 
Marks et al. provide four reasons why the principal–agent theory might
not necessarily hold. The first constraint on the ability of the principal to
control the agent stems from ‘the multiplicity of principals’. The existence of
15 principals with different agendas, constrained by unanimous voting,
means altering the agent is not straightforward. Indeed, this scenario can
further strengthen the agent due to the nature of the Treaties negotiated
under these constraints. Disagreements between principals can lead to
ambiguous Treaties that reflect compromise and sensitivity. This allows for
a diverse and creative interpretation of the Treaty by the agents, whose del-
egated task is to operationalise the Treaty principles (Marks et al. 1996:
354).
A second constraint stems from ‘informational asymmetries’, the privi-
leged access to information supranational institutions enjoy. Being involved
extensively in day-to-day EU governance gives the supranational institutions
an advantage over intergovernmental actors in terms of expertise and access
to information. The European Commission in particular benefits from wide-
scale consultation with interest groups, a process Commission officials
attempt to develop and consolidate whenever possible. A superior knowl-
edge of EU processes can allow the supranational institutions to distance
themselves from tight member state supervision (Marks et al. 1996: 355).
A third constraint limiting the validity of the principal–agent theory
results from the use of ‘detailed regulation as a response to mutual mistrust.’
In cases where member states cannot trust each other to adhere to the rules,
for instance in relation to the granting of state aid, rigid regulation of a
highly detailed nature tends to be the response. Under these conditions, the
Commission and the ECJ have a particularly crucial role to play in develop-
ing and overseeing this regulation. In effect, the member states allow them-
selves to be locked into a particular institutional and policy design because
they mistrust one another (Marks et al. 1996: 355).
A final constraint is the emphasis on ‘unintended consequences’. Member
state rationality is bounded by time, resources, knowledge, multiple values,
precedent and organisational limitations (Hogwood and Gunn 1984: 50).
Stripped of the ability to continually scan policy horizons, assessing the
likely consequences of individual and collective action, member states are
forced to gamble with the possibility of unintended consequences. European
integration can develop as a result of unintended consequences, especially if
supranational actors seize upon them to develop integration and their own
remit. Furthermore, if policy or institutional powers develop as a result of
unanticipated consequences, member states may be constrained in their
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ability to limit the impact due to the above reasons. Because of the existence
of unanticipated consequences, decision making in the EU tends to be incre-
mental. Although this incrementalism may reflect an increased ability of the
member states to learn from previous experience, incrementalism can result
in a form of path dependence that insulates supranational actors from
member state control (Marks et al. 1996: 355–356).
Marks et al. examine four stages of the EU’s policy process – policy initi-
ation, decision making, implementation and adjudication – in order to draw
three main conclusions regarding the applicability of multi-level governance.
First, the member states share decision-making authority with supranational
actors. Second, member states are individually and collectively constrained
in EU decision making. Third, sub-national interests are active at the
European level as well as in the national arena. At all levels of EU decision
making, competence is shared. The Commission has a powerful, although
not dominant role in policy initiation. The Council shares decision making
with the European Parliament in some cases and is constrained by QMV. The
implementation of policy is shared and highly restrictive regulatory policies
often restrict member state control. In terms of adjudication, the judicial acti-
vism of the ECJ, backed up by the Commission and national courts, ques-
tions the validity of the principal–agent theory (Marks et al. 1996: 356–371).
Multi-level governance provides the descriptive context within which
policy evolves. Decision making and influencing capabilities are shared by
actors across numerous levels resulting in no one set of actors dominating.
As such the EU is a paradise for those wishing to influence policy. As Peters
argues,
agenda setting in the EU is significantly different from that process as it is prac-
tised in most national political systems. In particular . . . the existence of a
number of points of access, of a large number of influential policy advocates,
and of a wide range of policy options that have been legitimised in one or more
of the constituent political systems makes agenda setting substantially easier
than in most other environments. (Peters 1996: 62)
Agenda setting, issue definition and agenda expansion
Pollack’s definition of task expansion as ‘(a) the initial expansion of the
Community agenda to include new policy areas and (b) the subsequent
development and growth of substantive policies in each of these new policy
areas’ (Pollack 1994: 96) implies new policies in the EU emerge as a result
of a two-stage process. First, an issue emerges on to the agenda (agenda
setting) then it is subsequently defined and developed (issue definition). For
the purposes of this work the ‘agenda’ is taken to mean the list of subjects
the EU is capable of pursuing an interest in. It refers to a set of issues or prob-
lems to which EU officials may have paid some attention, but no policy or
set of policies has yet emerged (Kingdon 1995: 3). The term issue definition
is taken to mean,
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the process by which an issue (problem, opportunity, or trend), having been
recognised as such and placed on the public policy agenda, is perceived by
various interested parties; further explored, articulated and possibly quan-
tified; and in some but not all cases, given an authoritative or at least provi-
sionally acceptable definition in terms of its likely causes, components, and
consequences. (Hogwood and Gunn 1984)
The definition of an issue also implies some action. Usually, this will be in
the form of a policy decision. By distinguishing the systemic agenda from
the institutional agenda, Cobb and Elder have made an important contribu-
tion to the task expansion debate (Cobb and Elder 1972). The systemic
agenda is composed of ‘all issues that are commonly perceived by members
of the political community as meriting public attention and involving
matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental author-
ity’ (Cobb and Elder 1972: 85). By contrast, the institutional agenda is ‘that
set of items explicitly up for the active consideration of authoritative deci-
sion makers’ (Cobb and Elder 1972: 86). A clear similarity exists between
the notion of the systemic agenda and the agenda setting stage of the EU’s
policy process and between the institutional agenda and the issue definition
stage.
Accordingly, task expansion refers to (1) the movement of an issue on to
the EU’s systemic agenda and (2) the movement of the issue from the sys-
temic agenda on to the institutional agenda for definition and development.
From a pluralist perspective, agenda setting and issue definition can be
explained in terms of open competition between interested groups.
Functionalist accounts of the political system devised by writers such as
Easton, and Almond and Powell, tended to stress how inputs were converted
into outputs in the political ‘system’ in a rational, non-discriminatory
manner (Easton 1965, Almond and Powell 1988). In his New Haven survey,
Dahl found no evidence of a ruling elite (Dahl 1961). Indeed observing New
Haven, Polsby concluded that, ‘in each issue area different actors appeared,
their roles were different and the kinds of alternatives which they had to
chose among were different’ (Polsby 1993: 15). The ‘openness and neutral-
ity’ (Parsons 1995: 125) of agenda setting from this pluralist perspective has
more recently been called into question by writers observing how access to
the political agenda is controlled. 
An early and influential critic of the pluralist perspective was provided by
E. E Schattschneider in the Semi-Sovereign People (Schattschneider 1960).
Schattschneider examined how conflict can escalate beyond the original con-
fines of the dispute leaving those originally involved with little or no influ-
ence over unfolding events. Agendas therefore have the potential for
expansion, yet crucially, for Schattschneider, agendas are controlled and
structured by those players (pressure groups, parties or institutions) best
able to control this expansion. Whilst the weaker groups seek to expand
conflict by recruiting new participants to its support, the stronger side will
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normally seek to suppress conflict. Whereas the ‘strong’ may seek to restrict
participation by adopting narrow technical or procedural definitions of
alternatives, the ‘weak’ may try and link issues to major themes.
Accordingly, the same issue may either be ‘routine and procedural’ or it may
‘go to the heart of democracy’.
Schattschneider’s work highlights the distinction between agenda setting
and issue definition (alternatives). For Schattschneider, ‘the definition of
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’, and ‘he who determines
what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of alternatives
is the choice of conflicts’ (Schattschneider 1960: 69). Indeed, once an issue
is on an agenda, the way it is subsequently defined may escalate the conflict.
As Rochefort and Cobb explain, ‘the outside audience does not enter the fray
randomly or in equal proportion for the competing sides. Rather, the unin-
terested become engaged in response to the way participants portray their
struggle’ (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 5). Although Schattschneider’s work
focuses on how issues are controlled in the policy process whereas this work
examines the openness of EU public policy, his focus on conflict expansion
is particularly useful. Schattschneider argued that the ‘losers’ in the policy
process would adopt strategies to topple the ‘winners’. Such strategies would
involve appealing to those currently not involved in the debate. In such
circumstances, Sabatier argued that ‘losers’ would construct ‘coalitions of
convenience’ (Sabatier 1998: 119). Schattschneider’s focus on conflict
expansion is broadly accepted in this study, although the nature of this is
expansion is queried. Within more open, ‘multi-level’ political systems the
researcher must examine the role multiple institutional venues play in the
strategies of those wishing to escalate the agenda. Before this can examined
an examination of the nature of the agenda is first required.
Systemic agenda setting
Before an issue is considered on the institutional agenda, it first must have
been on the systemic agenda. How does an issue expand to such an extent
where governmental action is seen as necessary? For Hogwood and Gunn an
issue, especially a new one, will be more likely to reach the systemic agenda
if one or more of the following circumstances apply. First, the issue has
reached crisis proportions and can no longer be ignored. Second, the issue
has reached particularity (for example acid rain). Third, the issue has an
emotive or human-interest angle that attracts media attention. Fourth, the
issue seems likely to have a wide impact (for example health scares). Fifth,
the issue raises questions about power and legitimacy in society. Finally, the
issue is fashionable in some way which is difficult to explain but easy to rec-
ognise (for example inner-city crime) (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). However,
these factors do not guarantee access to the public policy agenda. In order
to explain this, Hogwood and Gunn argue that the actions of key players
need examining. In particular these include, the agenda setters (organised
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interests, protest groups, party leaders, influentials) and the gatekeepers of
the mass media such as newspaper editors and television producers.
Cobb and Elder identify numerous reasons accounting for why an issue
may reach a political system’s systemic agenda (Cobb and Elder 1972).
First, an issue may be well defined. Second, it may possess social signifi-
cance. Third, it may have a long-term relevance. Fourth, it may be relatively
non-technical. Finally, the issue may lack a clear precedent. Like
Schattschneider, Cobb and Elder argue that agendas are structured by
certain players. Strategies for controlling issue expansion include group
strategies and issue strategies. Group strategies may involve the discrediting
or co-option of leaders, whilst issue strategies may involve the use of
symbols. If a conflict is made sufficiently prominent (most likely with the
assistance of the media), access to the formal institutional decision-making
process will be facilitated (Richardson and Jordan 1979: Chapter 4). For
both Schattschneider and Cobb and Elder, agenda setting is therefore con-
cerned with how conflict is managed, more specifically how conflict is either
suppressed or expanded.
Hogwood and Gunn’s approach implies systemic agenda setting is exter-
nally determined. In other words social, economic and political forces exter-
nal to the political system compel governments to act. Without rejecting the
significance of such forces, is it possible also to identify a set of internal
dynamics shaping systemic agenda setting? Paul Pierson’s study of the evo-
lution of EU social policy makes an important implicit contribution to the
study of systemic agenda setting (Pierson 1996). Employing an historical
institutionalist analysis (although in places resembling a more rational
choice strand in institutional thought) Pierson examines how unanticipated
consequences and high-issue density in the EU may result in the emergence
of new issues. Pierson notes that growing issue density has two conse-
quences. First, it generates ‘overload’ (Pierson 1996: 137). Overload greatly
complicates EU decision making for the member states. In such circum-
stances, member states are more likely to delegate responsibility to suprana-
tional actors. Member state ‘grip’ over an issue may therefore slip. Second,
issue density promotes spillover. Due to the huge range of policy issues in
which the EU pursues an interest, new policy issues may be unintentionally
drawn into the regional integration process, thus giving that issue a EU
dimension. Externally generated factors may increase the potential for this
to occur. For instance a change in the ‘image’ of the issue may serve to give
it a EU dimension. 
Institutional agenda setting
External and internal forces may pull an issue on to the systemic agenda. The
interplay between these two forces may also prove influential in moving the
issue on to the EU’s institutional agenda for active definition and policy deci-
sion. For example high-issue density in the EU may create a ‘latent’ regula-
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tory environment for a particular industry operating within the Single
Market. The regulatory environment may be latent due to the underdevel-
oped economic status of that industry. In such circumstances the issue will
remain on the systemic agenda. However, an externally generated change in
the economic status of the industry may activate regulatory interest from the
EU. Accordingly, the issue is dragged on to the institutional agenda in a par-
ticular form. Pinder argues that in the EU the ‘free trade ideology is firmly
built into the system, but the planning ethic is no more than a possibility for
the future’ (Pinder 1968: 98). Although undoubtedly the balance has shifted,
the force of the four fundamental freedoms remains strong. The movement
of an issue from the systemic to institutional agenda will often therefore be
promoted by the logic of negative integration (Pinder 1968). New policy
issues are therefore frequently introduced on to the EU’s institutional agenda
with definition bias. For example legal/regulatory norms held together the
sports policy subsystem.
The manner in which an issue reaches the institutional agenda is signifi-
cant for policy definition and for eventual policy outcomes. It is no great
insight into EU policy making to observe that individuals and groups ‘frame’
issues differently. Those who were instrumental in an issue reaching the
agenda may feel their definition is most appropriate. Others may be drawn
into the policy process at the issue definition stage in protest at the original
definition. As Rochefort and Cobb suggest, ‘the uninterested become
engaged in response to the way participants portray their struggle’
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 5). As the post-Maastricht EU has attempted to
develop a more social and cultural dimension within the spirit of Adonnino
(see Chapter 1), so subsystems dominated by legal and technocratic norms
and values are becoming penetrated by broader political arguments. The pol-
iticisation of law and regulation has occurred in a wide range of policy sub-
systems including the single currency, tax policy and media ownership policy
(Radaelli 1999a). The sports policy subsystem has witnessed similar politic-
isation. Issue definition is therefore greatly influenced by value judgements,
but with value judgements comes conflict. However, rather than being an
obstacle to policy evolution in the institutional agenda-setting stage, conflict
can represent an important resource (Harcourt 1998). In this connection,
Sabatier’s work on competition between policy advocates within policy sub-
systems is important.
An actor-based analysis: the advocacy coalition framework
For those wishing to explain policy evolution/agenda escalation in the EU,
Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provides an excellent
starting point (Sabatier 1988, 1991, 1998). Sabatier’s focus on the dynam-
ics of non-incremental policy change has important implications for those
seeking to explain a similar phenomena–task expansion. Although not
applied to the EU, the ACF’s focus on competing advocacy coalitions
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within policy subsystems effectively captures the real nature of EU govern-
ance. Sabatier begins his analysis of policy change by examining the growth
of public policy (air pollution) environmental programmes in the United
States (Sabatier 1988). Sabatier notes that, in the 1950s federal pro-
grammes were very limited, yet only a decade later federal expenditures had
risen more than 20-fold and by 1970 Washington had instituted a massive
regulatory programme designed to improve air quality. Despite this
clamour, progress in combating air pollution in the 1970s was slow as other
issues such as energy prices emerged and as the technical and political dif-
ficulties of action became known. Sabatier’s approach to understanding
such change is based on three basic premises. First, that in order to fully
understand the process of policy change a period of at least ten years should
be examined. Second, throughout this period a focus on ‘policy subsystems’
can help explain policy change. Third, public policies or programmes can
be conceptualised in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value
priorities and causal assumptions about how to realise them (Sabatier
1988: 131).
First, on time span, Sabatier argues that policy change is the result of
cumulative effects. For example, as new findings and ideas are fed into the
policy process, so policy gradually changes. Indeed it often takes consider-
able time to implement and evaluate policy once agreed. In short, ‘policy
analysis has a long-term ‘enlightenment’ function. Policy analysis gradually
alters the arguments surrounding policy problems’ (Parsons 1995: 195).
On the second premise, Sabatier views the policy process as comprising
more than the ‘iron triangle’ of administrative agencies, legislative commit-
tees and interest groups at a single level of government policy (Sabatier 1988:
131). For Sabatier, the ‘policy subsystem’ will involve many more actors at
various levels of government such as interest groups, bureaucrats, academ-
ics, politicians, think tanks and journalists. These actors generate and
exchange ideas in relation to policy problems. Subsystems tend to be auton-
omous due to their specialised nature yet they may involve a large number
of actors who are involved in dealing with a problem. For example, Sabatier
identifies ten sets of actors involved in the US air pollution control sub-
system. These include the governmental bodies, consumer groups, environ-
mental groups, manufacturers groups, academics and researchers and
journalists. In the case of acid rain, other countries become involved in the
subsystem. These groups are termed ‘advocacy coalitions’. 
Finally, on belief systems, Sabatier argues that within subsystems lie ‘value
priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of
world states, perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments’ (Sabatier
1988: 132). Given that individuals attempt to translate their beliefs into
public policy, it becomes clear that beliefs can play an important role in
structuring politics. Beliefs are also important because actors are attracted
to one another on the basis of shared beliefs. As Sabatier explains,
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actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of
people from various organisations who share a set of normative and causal
beliefs and who often act in concert. At any particular point in time, each coali-
tion adopts a strategy(s) envisaging one or more institutional innovations
which it feels will further its objectives. (Sabatier 1988: 133)
Therefore, for Sabatier, operating within an organisation such as the EU
are numerous policy subsystems. A subsystem consists of various actors who
are seeking to influence policy. Operating within policy subsystems are com-
peting advocacy coalitions, each composed of a group of like-minded indi-
viduals seeking to re-direct policy in line with their particular belief system.
Beliefs within an advocacy coalition are organised hierarchically. At the
highest level, fundamental ideological beliefs form the deep core. At the next
level, policy core beliefs comprise fundamental policy positions and strate-
gies for attaining core values. Sabatier describes policy core beliefs as the
‘fundamental glue’ of coalitions (Sabatier 1998: 103). At the base of the hier-
archy lie a range of narrower concerns such as implementing decisions and
policy preferences known as the secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief
system. Changes in beliefs are more likely to occur in the secondary aspects
of a belief system. The empirical although not normative elements of the
belief system within the policy core are subject to change through learning
over a period of time, whilst beliefs in the policy core remain resistant to
change.
Advocacy coalitions attempt to translate their beliefs into public policy
through the use of guidance instruments such as changes in rules, budgets,
personnel or information (Sabatier 1998: 104). Policy brokers attempt to
mediate between conflicting coalitions within a policy subsystem. Policy
outputs result from this interaction between competing advocacy coalitions.
However, for Sabatier policy making within subsystems is affected by exter-
nal factors and the internal structure of policy subsystems. Sabatier’s
approach for examining external factors affecting policy change within sub-
systems distinguishes between (1) parameters that are relatively stable over
decades and (2) those aspects of the system that are susceptible to significant
fluctuations over the course of a few years and thus serve as major stimuli to
policy change (Sabatier 1988: 143).
The relatively stable parameters (both internal and external to policy sub-
system) include:
• Basic attributes of the problem area (or ‘good’): Institutional policy
options are affected by the issue under consideration. Some issues lend
themselves to governmental regulation whilst others can be left to the
market. 
• Basic distribution of natural resources: A focus on this can help us explain
why during the 1970s the USA could encourage utilities to switch from
oil to coal whilst the coal-deprived French turned to nuclear power.
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• Fundamental cultural values and social structure: It is apparent that due
to prevailing cultural values and norms that some policy options are not
feasible at a given time. Similarly the social structures structure access to
politics. Change in these areas is likely to take considerable time.
• Basic legal structure: The constitutional structure of a political system
affects both policy change and policy-oriented learning (see below). Basic
legal norms tend to be resistant to change thus minimising policy change
in this area. Policy-oriented learning can be affected if the policy style of
a system is closed preventing learning from taking place. 
The dynamic (system) events (external to policy subsystem) include: 
• Changes in socio-economic conditions and technology: Public opinion
can affect policy change as it did with environmental policy in the 1970s.
Major events also have a profound impact on policy. Sabatier notes that
the Arab oil boycott of 1973–1974 contributed to calls for a relaxation
of car pollution controls, even from groups previously supportive of such
efforts.
• Changes in systemic governing coalitions: It is clear that with changes of
government come changes in policy approaches.
• Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems: Sabatier notes that
policy subsystems are only partially autonomous. The argument
advanced here echoes the logic of functional integration. Sectors cannot
be integrated in sectoral isolation. Coal and steel production, for
example, cannot be isolated from energy policy, which cannot be isolated
from transport policy and so on.
For Sabatier, the internal structure of a policy subsystem is particularly
important. This is why Sabatier extended the definition of a subsystem to
include journalists, analysts, researchers and other important players.
Sabatier makes five observations relating to the internal structure of policy
subsystems. First, although members of policy subsystems may be easily
identified, it is also important to identify the ‘latent’ constituency. If this con-
stituency can be activated and brought into the subsystem, this may have a
significant effect on policy change.
Second, new policy subsystems are capable of emerging, particularly if
actors are dissatisfied at either the way the issue is being defined or by the
neglect of an issue. Sabatier notes that in the USA a food safety subsystem
emerged from the agriculture subsystem due to the laissez-faire approach to
food safety within it.
Third, subsystems usually contain a large number of diverse actors.
Methodologically, Sabatier notes that some way of categorising different
interests is required. Sabatier points out that within the US air pollution sub-
system in the 1970s two sets of advocacy coalitions could be identified, the
‘Clean Air Coalition’ and the ‘Economic Feasibility Coalition’ (Sabatier
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1988: 140–141). Advocacy coalitions may be diverse but they do share a
particular belief system. For instance, the Clean Air Coalition shared a belief
(amongst others) in the primacy of human health over economic develop-
ment. The Economic Feasibility Coalition believed that a balance between
the two should be struck. These shared beliefs ‘glue’ subsystems together.
Usually within a policy subsystem, only between two and four advocacy
coalitions exist. This is because in order to gain prominence, coalitions need
to be made. Fewer coalitions may be expected to survive as a subsystem
matures and coalitions are formed. Some actors may not be aligned to an
advocacy coalition. These may include actors such as academics who may
be able to offer some expertise or actors known as ‘policy brokers’. ‘Policy
brokers’ attempt to find compromises between the positions advocated by
coalitions. These brokers may be civil servants, elected officials or courts.
Policy brokers are not necessarily neutral.
Fourth, the key objective of an advocacy coalition is to translate their
beliefs into public policy. Clearly advocacy coalitions seek to steer policy in
a direction compatible with their belief system. However, having a belief
system does not guarantee influence. The ability of an advocacy coalition to
influence policy depends on resources. Such resources include money, exper-
tise, number of supporters and legal authority. 
Fifth, belief systems within advocacy coalitions are hierarchical.
Fundamental norms and beliefs form the deep core. Within the policy core
are found fundamental policy positions and strategies for attaining core
values. Finally, instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to
implement the policy core, forms the secondary aspects. Change is more
likely to occur in the secondary aspects than it is in the policy core or in the
deep core. Changes at the level of the policy core are due to factors such as
changes in macro-economic conditions, changes in fundamental cultural
values and social structure or new systemic governing coalitions. Change
takes place at the secondary level as a result of ‘policy-oriented learning’
between advocacy coalitions. Policy-oriented learning is a form of learning
which leads actors to make alterations to their thought patterns or behavi-
oural intentions as a result of past experience. Sabatier argues that, ‘policy-
oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a
forum which is (a) prestigious enough to force professionals from different
coalitions to participate and (b) dominated by professional norms’ (Sabatier
1988: 156).
Richardson sees this trend as emerging in the EU. For example the EU has
a history of establishing forums, such as the environmental or consumer
forum to bring together a wide spectrum of interests to discuss policy evolu-
tion (Richardson 1996: 18). This has also been the case with sport. The
European Commission has established dialogue with European sporting
interests through the establishment of the European Sports Forum. In addi-
tion a European Conference on Sport, organised by the Commission, was held
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in Greece in May 1999. Such occasions are designed to force debate among
professionals in an attempt to achieve some convergence of views regarding
the nature of the problem and thus the content of the policy solution.
In summary, Sabatier identifies a number of factors affecting the develop-
ment of policy within a subsystem. First, policy subsystems are affected by
significant perturbations external to the subsystem. Sabatier identifies two
such forces, both of which provide constraints and opportunities for sub-
system actors. On the one hand, ‘relatively stable’ factors such as the basic
constitutional structure, socio-cultural values and natural resources of a
political system are unlikely to radically change even in the face of coalition
strategies (Sabatier 1998: 102). Similarly, ‘external events’ such as major
changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in
the systemic governing coalition and policy decisions and impacts from other
subsystems are likely to significantly affect policy subsystems. Although sig-
nificant, Sabatier views such external forces as insufficient to cause changes
in the policy core attributes of a governmental programme. 
Second, external ‘perturbations’ provide opportunities for policy entre-
preneurs to exploit. Such entrepreneurs wish to change policy in some way. 
Third, policy change may stem from competition between coalitions.
Although external perturbations may result in conditions which lead to the
replacement of one dominant coalition by another, a more likely scenario is
that a minority coalition increases in importance to such an extent that it can
exploit a window of opportunity to challenge the dominant coalition.
Usually, the minority coalition lacks the (legislative) resources to push for the
adoption of its policy objectives. Under such circumstances the coalition will
develop coalitions of convenience with other groups (Sabatier 1998: 119).
Fourth, compromise rather than conflict may lead to policy change.
Sabatier notes that ‘in situations in which all major coalitions view a contin-
uation of the current situation as unacceptable, they may be willing to enter
negotiations in the hope of finding a compromise that is viewed by everyone
as superior to the status quo’ (Sabatier 1998: 119). Under such circum-
stances a power-sharing arrangement will be established. 
Fifth, the ACF contends that policy change can also result from a learn-
ing process described as policy-oriented learning. This learning process
across belief systems is likely to be facilitated by the establishment of a pro-
fessional forum (Sabatier 1998: 106).
The ACF is not the only actor-based approach able to capture the role
played by key policy advocates within the process of policy change. Kingdon
uses the concept of a ‘stream’ to explain the processes involved in agenda
setting. Occasionally, the streams align to allow a ‘policy window’ to open.
Policy change takes place within this window (Kingdon 1995). Alternatively,
other researchers have employed network analysis to explain policy change
(Rhodes 1988). A policy network implies a symbiotic relationship between
an interest group(s) and the public policy maker(s). A network is the arena
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for mediation and bargaining between the two. Networks are policy specific.
Policy networks are a useful tool for understanding issue definition in the
EU, particularly if we distinguish between policy communities and issue net-
works. Policy communities tend to have a stable membership, are highly
insular and have strong resource dependencies. An issue network by contrast
has fluid membership, is highly permeable and possesses weak dependencies
(Rhodes 1988, Peterson 1995). Within the context of the EU several policy
networks may be in operation, some resembling policy communities, others
issue networks. A related realm to that of policy networks is the idea of epis-
temic communities. Such communities are essentially knowledge based
(actual or perceived) and are comprised of experts. Being thus composed,
epistemic communities are highly influential and seen as legitimate. 
Kingdon’s main contribution is his focus on the power of ideas and on
how solutions ‘search’ for problems rather than on pressure and influence.
Hence given certain propitious conditions, solutions within an organisation
are joined to problems. The opening of a policy window increases the like-
lihood that the ‘solution’ will be adopted. Although appealing, Kingdon’s
work suffers from two flaws. First, he puts ‘too much distance between the
policy and the political stream’ (Sabatier 1991: 151). He therefore de-
emphasises the crucial role played by competing policy advocates and as
such his work lacks an advocacy analysis. Sabatier’s ACF is an attempt to
view Kingdon’s ‘streams’ as more closely related. Second, Kingdon’s work
lacks an institutional analysis. Kingdon does note that ‘institutions, consti-
tutions, procedures, governmental structures, and government officials
themselves affect the political, social, and economic system as much as the
other way around’ (Kingdon 1995: 229). Furthermore, Kingdon notes that
‘federalism also enhances possibilities for innovation – if a new idea isn’t
possible in one venue, it might be possible in another, and entrepreneurs can
shop around for the most favourable venue’ (Kingdon 1995: 230). Kingdon
is correct in his analysis, even though his brand of institutionalism merely
examines the constraints institutions place on individuals. However, like
Sabatier who also briefly notes the importance of institutions, it is not clear
why Kingdon does not explicitly attach an institutional analysis to his actor-
based analysis of policy change. 
Policy networks and epistemic communities are useful for analysing
policy change in the EU as they act as a mechanism to order and describe the
range of actors involved in the policy process and describe the relationship
between them. However, Sabatier’s ACF performs this function even better.
Furthermore, policy networks suffer from a number of flaws. Network anal-
ysis places too much emphasis on pressure and influence within the policy
process and not enough on the power of ideas and belief systems. Sabatier’s
work addresses this. Furthermore, are policy subsystems characterised by
stable and symbiotic relationships between policy makers and advocates, a
particular feature of the policy communities approach? Even the looser
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conception of issue networks and epistemic communities fail to capture the
true nature of competition between advocates of which decision makers
form a part. Finally, network analyses pay insufficient attention to the
exploitation of institutional venues for the ‘outsider’/‘losing’ advocacy coali-
tions. Network analysis may prove useful for accounting for the reconcilia-
tion/mediation that often takes place between rival coalitions, but even here
network analysis lacks an important institutional dimension. 
There is in effect much similarity between the actor-based approaches
reviewed above. Although the language differs they all seek to move away
from an old institutional analysis and relocate their analysis on the individ-
ual. Sabatier’s framework is preferred because it best captures the real nature
of competition between rival advocacy coalitions operating within the
context of policy subsystems, a particularly pronounced feature of EU
governance. 
Despite the strength of Sabatier’s work, the ACF is not without its critics.
The key criticism is that the ACF pays insufficient attention to the problem
of collective action. Schlager notes that although the ACF (and indeed work
on policy communities and policy networks) has shed considerable light on
the dynamics of policy change, it has tended to ignore this problem of col-
lective action (Schlager 1995). The ACF has proved useful in explaining the
structure of coalitions, the importance of coalition competition in sparking
policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning, yet it does not explain
‘why actors holding similar beliefs form coalitions to collectively press their
goals, how coalitions maintain themselves over time, or the strategies coali-
tions adopt to pursue policy goals’ (Schlager 1995: 244). Furthermore,
Olson questions why actors with shared interests will act together when a
‘rational’ course of action would be to free-ride on the back of the actions
of others who would bear the cost of action (Olson 1971). However, this
may prove an unanswerable question given that all action, even those deter-
mined by particular incentives, involves the payment of some costs from
which others will benefit (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Olson’s other conten-
tion – that successful collective action is more likely where small groups will
be strongly motivated to act – may however have relevance to the EU and
have implications for explaining the dynamics of coalition action (Peterson
and Bomberg 1999: 27). 
For the ACF to assume increased relevance to the EU, the issue of coali-
tion strategies must be addressed. The multi-level institutional structure of
the EU described above has profound implications for actor strategy. The
ACF is strong on providing ‘external’ reasons for policy change within a sub-
system but considerably weaker on integrating the activities of advocacy
coalitions into the explanation of policy change. In other words, ‘for coali-
tions to take their rightful place in the policy process requires an explana-
tion of action’ (Schlager 1995: 248). The actor selectivity inherent in
institutional design is crucial to this action. 
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An institutional analysis: belief systems and political institutions
How can the crucial issue of coalition action be addressed? As Schlager
notes, ‘if the ACF is to better account for action, the institutional structure
and characteristics of the situation in which coalitions form and act need to
be better specified. The institutional setting which both constrains and pro-
motes action must be further developed’ (Schlager 1995: 259). 
In essence therefore Sabatier’s work, like other actor-based approaches,
lacks an institutional analysis. The correct deployment of such an analysis
can provide that crucial missing ingredient in Sabatier’s work: the explana-
tion of action. Sabatier notes that the ACF’s ‘ability to deal with complex sit-
uations and its model of the individual derived from psychology make it
attractive to scholars looking for an alternative to the institutional rational
choice models currently dominating much of policy scholarship’ (Sabatier
1998: 122).
However, Sabatier also notes that actors are driven by a more complex set
of factors than rational calculations of self-interest. In particular, he claims
that ‘actors suffer from a variety of cognitive biases and constraints’
(Sabatier 1998: 109). First, in the face of time and psychological constraints,
actors resort to ‘satisficing’ (Hogwood and Gunn 1984: 50) or guideline
behaviour consistent with their general belief system, particularly in the
policy core. Furthermore, ‘actors’ perceptions are strongly filtered by their
pre-existing normative and other beliefs’ (Sabatier 1998: 109). Although
Sabatier notes that ‘financial resources and institutional rules are critical’
(Sabatier 1998: 117), the ACF does not attempt to fully examine the rela-
tionship between satisficing behaviour, pre-existing beliefs and institutions.
Through a closer examination of the influence exerted by political institu-
tions on policy subsystems it is possible to identify institutions as not only
constraining subsystems but also structuring belief systems, strategies and
policy outputs within them. Without an institutional analysis of policy
change and development it becomes tempting merely to emphasise how the
political agenda is ‘pushed and pulled’ around by societal, economic or polit-
ical forces (Kingdon 1995: 229). Implicit in this approach is an assumption
that political institutions are merely neutral arenas in which these forces are
played out. However, as Baumgartner and Jones remind us, policy advocates
seek to influence agenda setting and issue definition within ‘institutional
venues’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1045). Institutional venues may
affect social, economic and political forces as much as these forces affect
institutional venues. Kingdon notes that examples of both state autonomy
and the state as a reflection of society can be found in cases of agenda setting
(Kingdon 1995: 230). Sabatier’s actor-based framework should not there-
fore be seen as an alternative to institutional analyses, but as complimentary. 
The benefits of actor-based institutionalism are increasingly being recog-
nised within political science. In The Games Real Actors Play, Scharpf devel-
ops an explicit brand of actor-centred institutionalism in which institutions
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are portrayed as creating opportunity structures and constraints for pur-
poseful and resourceful actors to navigate within (Scharpf 1997). Similarly,
Kiser and Ostrom claim that individual action in the policy process is a func-
tion of both the attributes (values and resources) of the individual and the
attributes of the decision situation of which the prevailing institutional
make-up is central (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Moe’s structural choice
approach examines the effect political institutions have on the choices coali-
tion’s make in their attempts to re-direct public policy (Moe 1990). Schlager
seeks to integrate both the institutional analysis and development frame-
work and the structural choice approach into Sabatier’s ACF in order to
address the issue of coalition formation and action (Schlager 1995).
Furthermore, Fenger and Klok seek to strengthen further Schlager’s contri-
bution to the ACF by examining the interdependencies between actors
(Fenger and Klok 2001). Additionally, Mintrom and Vergari suggest in the
policy entrepreneurs model that policy changes as a result of the actions of
policy entrepreneurs who do not treat institutional configurations as fixed
but as malleable (Mintrom and Vergari 1996). 
In the context of the EU, Pollack similarly recognises the importance of
institutional configurations. He argues that member states created EU insti-
tutions for particular self-serving reasons and allowed for certain procedu-
ral mechanisms such as QMV and decision-making delegation to
supranational actors in order to facilitate progress towards their rationally
conceived preferences (Pollack 1996). However, reform of institutions, once
created, may be difficult to achieve by the member states. First, member
states may regard the uncertainty of reform and the transaction costs asso-
ciated with reform as being an unacceptably high price to pay. Second, the
institutions themselves may be resistant to reform and may be shielded by
institutional procedures such as unanimity requirements. Although reform
is not impossible, Pollack suggests it is infrequent, leading to a state of ‘punc-
tuated equilibrium’, long periods of stability followed by infrequent (Treaty)
change (Pollack 1996: 438). When change (integrative or disintegrative) is
negotiated, it is likely to be infrequent and, due to the constraints previously
described, unlikely to be major. A path-dependent process of integration is
likely to result because change will be greatly affected by existing institutions
and institutional decision-making rules.
In effect Pollack is describing a process whereby institutions and policies
become locked-in. Pollack identifies two brands of lock-in. The first has been
developed by Scharpf who identified two conditions, intergovernmentalism
combined with unanimity that result in the ‘joint decision trap’, a condition
resulting in institutions and policies becoming entrenched despite pressures
for reform (Scharpf 1988). For the second lock-in, Pollack dips into Pierson’s
historical institutionalist account of micro-level lock-ins (Pierson 1996) (see
below). Thus institutions and policies can become locked-in from above
(Scharpf) and from above and below (Pierson).
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The work of Baumgartner and Jones also has implications for the ACF
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Their work is important because their meth-
odology also asserts the importance of examining both actors and institu-
tions. Baumgartner and Jones analyse how public policy often evolves
through long periods of stability, punctuated by short bursts of rapid change.
Rather than applying different analytical tools to explain the continuity and
change of public policy, Baumgartner and Jones retain analytical cohesion
by arguing that a single process can explain both periods of extreme change
and short bursts of rapid change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991:
1044–1045). Baumgartner and Jones argue that this single process com-
prises the policy image and the institutional venues of policy action. The
policy image describes the ‘interaction of beliefs and values concerning a par-
ticular policy’ whilst the institutional venues refers to the ‘venues of policy
action’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1045). The choice of institutional
venue is clearly important for with it inevitably comes the ability to shape
policy in a direction compatible with an advocate’s belief system. However,
even though an issue may emerge on the public policy agenda with defini-
tion bias, alternative institutional venues often exist ‘that can serve as
avenues of appeal for the disaffected’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1045).
This focus adds clarity to actor-based approaches that seek to explain
agenda expansion. As Baumgartner and Jones stress, ‘as venues change,
images may change as well; as the image of a policy changes, venue changes
become more likely’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991: 1047). 
Although Baumgartner and Jones do not examine the policy process of
the EU, their methodology is applicable for studying EU policy evolution.
Within the context of the EU it is important to examine the influence of key
actors, be they intergovernmental or supranational players. Yet to complete
the investigation into agenda setting and issue definition, it is also necessary
to examine the role of these institutional venues. Institutional venues may
affect social, economic and political forces as much as these forces affect
institutional venues. An analysis of agenda setting and issue definition would
therefore be incomplete without some examination of the importance of
institutions. This is particularly important when investigating institutional
venues in the EU.
It has traditionally been assumed that the EU is very receptive to the ideas
of lobbyists and that these groups were capable of manipulating the EU’s
agenda. Accordingly, agenda setting in the EU was considered externally
generated. This analysis may be valid, but it ignores the influence of the insti-
tutions of the EU. Not only do the institutions mould and even structure lob-
bying activities, but institutions pursue their own agendas as well. Political
institutions may well ‘talk up’ a problem in order to see movement of that
issue on to the institutional agenda in preparation for action. For example,
in order to ensure the success of the White Paper on the EU’s institutional
agenda, Delors exaggerated the extent of economic decline in Europe. This
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would, he believed increase the chances of member state approval (Sandholtz
and Zysman 1989). Furthermore, as the EU is a very open system, agenda
control is made problematic. If policy advocates fail to make progress in one
institutional venue, they may go ‘venue shopping’ and attempt to influence
policy in another. The ability of policy advocates to expand the definition of
a policy beyond its original confines is greatly enhanced by this openness. 
The focus on the role of political institutions in shaping policy is
the concern of new institutionalism, an approach that attempts to ‘bring the
state back in’ to policy analysis. Rather than simply concentrating on the
formal administrative, legal and political dimension of institutions, a char-
acteristic of old institutionalism, new institutionalism widens the definition
of an institution. Although still accommodating the formal rules, procedures
and practices of institutions, new institutionalism also highlights the impor-
tance of informal arenas such as informal rules, norms, symbols, beliefs and
codes of conduct. New institutionalism therefore better reflects the ‘real’
culture of institutions than its ‘old’ variant (March and Olsen 1989).
New institutionalism is useful in the study of European integration
because it can help explain not only policy and institutional inertia, but also
change. As such it does not represent a macro-theory attempting to scientif-
ically map out future integration. Rather, new institutionalism attempts to
re-focus methodology by bringing institutional factors back into the analy-
sis of European integration. In essence, therefore, new institutionalism
asserts that institutions matter (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 50). From
within the broad scope of new institutionalism can be distilled two institu-
tionalist categories relevant to the debate about policy and institutional
change and inertia in the EU. The main difference between rational choice
institutionalism and historical institutionalism is the emphasis they place on
the deterministic effect of institutions on political outcomes. 
The rational choice element in this category of new institutionalism
derives from the emphasis of the importance of utility-maximising individu-
als with clear intentions within the policy process. The institutionalist
element emphasises the importance of institutions in affecting and constrain-
ing an individual’s choice within that process. Armstrong and Bulmer
describe rational choice institutionalism as being at the thin end of institu-
tionalism, as institutions and their rules only modify an essentially rational
choice model of politics (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 53). 
At the ‘thicker’ end of institutionalism lies historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalists ascribe a greater role for institutions within the
policy process. Rather than simply constraining individual action, institu-
tions, as defined in the broadest sense encompassing formal and informal
practices, can shape and determine individual preferences. As such, histori-
cal institutionalism stresses how policy evolution is structured by prevailing
institutional configurations and norms. Furthermore, institutions structure
access to the political process, thus further influencing policy evolution
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(Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 52–60). In short, institutional configurations
and norms can create a governance regime capable of structuring a policy
debate and hence policy development and evolution. Two studies employing
an historical institutionalist analysis have added depth to our understanding
of systemic and institutional agenda setting. Pierson’s analysis of the devel-
opment of EU social policy examines the historical development of EU insti-
tutions and how prevailing institutional norms and configurations
contribute to path-dependent policy evolution (Pierson 1996). Bulmer’s
study of the governance of the Single European Market similarly employs an
historical institutional analysis. However, rather than examining how insti-
tutional features constrain actors, Bulmer examines how prevailing institu-
tional norms and configurations structure policy debate within the EU
(Bulmer 1998). 
Taking an institutional (wrong) turn? 
The danger with the above approach lies in falling into the trap of placing
too much distance between state and society whilst claiming to do the oppo-
site. The actor/institutions methodology employed in this text does not
simply assert that both actors and institutions matter. To do so risks brack-
eting off the role of actors or institutions and focusing the analysis accord-
ingly. A methodology which does this can hardly claim to integrate both
actor-based and institutions-based approaches. In other words, the actor-
based and institutions-based components should closely relate to one
another. Alone the ACF is unable to capture the crucial role played by the
formal and informal institutional decision-making context. As such, the
researcher needs to take an ‘institutional turn’ (Jessop 2000). However, does
the reliance on new institutionalism represent an institutional wrong turn?
An institutional turn refers to, ‘the more or less consistent elaboration of the
intuition, hypothesis, or discovery that institutions matter in one or more
theoretical, empirical, or practical contexts where their existence and/or rel-
evance had previously been overlooked, denied or ignored’ (Jessop 2000: 1).
According to Jessop, academics usually take one of three institutional
turns. Those taking a thematic turn simply acknowledge that institutions are
important. Those taking a methodological turn may acknowledge that an
institutional analysis is an essential starting point for research but in addi-
tion chose to examine other variables. Those taking an ontological turn
assert that institutions ‘are the primary axis of collective life and social order’
(Jessop 2000: 4). Lying at the ‘thicker’ end of new institutionalism, histori-
cal institutionalism can be interpreted as an ontological institutional turn. 
Making some kind of institutional turn is crucial to understanding task
expansion in the EU. The complex multi-level structure of the EU provides
opportunities for actors to exploit. Institutional design privileges one set of
actors and their strategies over another. However, to take an ontological
institutional turn would in effect downplay the role of key policy actors in
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the process of policy change. Although institutions affect the strategies of
actors through the actor selectivity inherent in their design, actors ‘have
some freedom of manoeuvre more or less skilfully and reflexively to choose
a path of action’ (Jessop 2000: 10). This is particularly pronounced in the
EU.
Consequently, the researcher needs to develop a methodology capable of
recognising the importance of formal and informal institutional configura-
tions on policy development, without over-emphasising path dependence,
whilst recognising that actors in the EU possess significant room for tactical
manoeuvre. Jessop’s strategic relational approach (SRA) provides some
guidance for those wishing to explore the role of actors in the policy process
but who want to make an institutional ‘turn’ (Jessop 1990, 2000). Applying
the SRA to the task expansion debate in the EU would involve examining
how the institutional structure privileges certain actors whilst also examin-
ing how actors ‘take account of this differential privileging through strate-
gic context analysis when choosing a course of action’ (Jessop 2000: 9). In
other words institutional design is important but so also is how actors
respond to this. Actors may for instance attempt to influence policy in venues
in which they are privileged or they may adopt ‘reflexive’ strategies in which
case they adapt in order to take advantage of the channels of access that insti-
tutions provide. In other words the methodology developed in this chapter
seeks to analyse actors and institutions in terms of how they relate to each
other rather than placing too much distance between them.
Conclusions
Approaches attempting to explain the process of integration (including the
legal variants) struggle to capture the nature of day-to-day EU governance.
As such, the analytical framework employed in this text is drawn from
approaches examining the politics of governance. This methodology has
been developed in three stages. First, it is important to characterise the EU
as a multi-level organisation. Decision-making capabilities are shared rather
than monopolised. This institutional description establishes the context
within which policy change takes place. Policy evolution and change within
this multi-level organisation takes place through a two-stage process, best
defined by Pollack as involving the initial expansion of the EU’s agenda to
include new policy areas and the subsequent substantive development of
these policies. As Cobb and Elder remind us, this means that an issue must
first appear on the systemic agenda before being actively considered on the
institutional agenda. Elite writers such Schattschneider argue that conflict
can lead to agenda expansion but this expansion is controlled by elites.
However, because of the multi-level nature of governance in the EU, agenda
control is more problematic. The initial definition of an issue on the institu-
tional agenda may take place with heavy definitional bias due to the venue
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within which the issue is considered. Many policy subsystems (including
sport) are initially heavily influenced by legal and technocratic norms due to
the constitutional predominance of negative integration. However, as
Rochefort and Cobb remind us, others will be drawn into the issue defini-
tion stage in protest at the initial definition. Frequently this involves the
weaker advocacy coalition attempting to re-define an issue by penetrating
the subsystem with political argument. In a multi-level organisation, if they
are unsuccessful in one venue they will go ‘venue shopping’. 
The second stage in the construction of the approach analyses the crucial
role played by competing policy advocates working within policy sub-
systems. Although a range of actor-based approaches could be employed for
the purposes of this analysis, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework sits
most comfortably with the conception of EU governance employed in this
study. According to Sabatier policy evolves as a result of competition
between rival policy advocates. Advocates seek to steer policy in a direction
consistent with their belief system. The focus on the power of ideas as
opposed to the power of pressure and influence is an important contribution
but alone is insufficient to fully account for the real nature of policy change
in the EU. The third stage in the construction of the approach seeks to con-
front this ‘reality’.
This third stage involves linking the strategies of key policy advocates to
the prevailing institutional structure of the organisation in question. This
involves taking a methodological as opposed to an ontological institutional
turn. To give Sabatier’s work relevance to the EU and to address the issue of
how to explain coalition action, the taking of such an institutional turn is
crucial. However, the finding that ‘institutions matter’ in the context of coali-
tion action refers to more than just the observation that key institutions are
players (actors) in the game. One should not confuse institutions with actors.
To do so would negate the need to build into Sabatier’s framework an insti-
tutional theory. The institutional characteristics of the EU’s policy process
and political system, such as the existence of a multi-layered and multi-venue
EU structure, have profound effects on the dynamics of policy change. The
elaboration of these characteristics is crucial if Schlager’s criticism concern-
ing the explanation for coalition action within the ACF is to be addressed.
In this connection, the work of Baumgartner and Jones is important because
it alerts us to the relationship between policy image and institutional venue.
In ‘open’ political systems such as the EU, policy subsystems can be chal-
lenged by actors exploiting other institutional venues. The venue in which a
policy is discussed will have a significant impact on how the policy is dis-
posed of in terms of outputs. To add analytical depth to the work of
Baumgartner and Jones, this study employs new institutionalism as an essen-
tial institutional ingredient. Institutions, defined in the widest sense, con-
strain and empower actors whilst also actively shaping and even determining
actor strategies. As such the brand of institutionalism employed throughout
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this book has a strong actor-based component which sits at the intersection
of rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Without
an institutional analysis of policy change and development it becomes tempt-
ing merely to emphasise how the political agenda is pushed and pulled
around by societal, economic or political forces. As such, political institu-
tions cannot merely be seen as neutral arenas in which these forces are played
out.
The interplay between actors and institutions creates policy-specific
governance regimes within policy subsystems. In order to operationalise the
analytical methodology, these governance regimes need identifying. This
involves identifying the range of actors involved in the subsystem, identify-
ing their prevailing belief system and calculating the institutional resources
they have at their disposal. By doing so the researcher can assess the viabil-
ity of coalition strategies and therefore allow for assumptions to be made
concerning the future direction of policy within the subsystem. It therefore
becomes clear why macro approaches have limited utility in this respect. The
analytical methodology employed is not designed to be a predictive tool, it
simply allows the researcher to identify possible future policy directions. The
predictive quality of the approach is limited by the possibility of perturba-
tions external to the subsystem. External perturbations cannot easily be built
into the methodology. For example, the change in the economic status of
sport throughout the 1990s proved crucial in forging a link between sport
and EU law. A dramatic slump in the economic status of sport or a sudden
(although unlikely) fall in the public’s interest in sport would, for example,
limit the political salience of the issue. 
Although governance regimes differ between policy subsystems, they are
likely to share certain systemic qualities. First, they are influenced by the con-
stitutional structure of the EU. Treaties not only determine the institutional
balance of power within subsystems, they also shape the working logic of
integration. For example, embedded within the Treaty of Rome is a commit-
ment to advance both economic integration and socio-cultural/political inte-
gration. Such a commitment has resulted in the emergence of competing
advocacy coalitions seeking to direct policy in either a market-based or
socially based direction. The institutional balance between these advocacy
coalitions varies according to institutional power. As Pinder remarked
observing the EU in the 1960s, the ‘free trade ideology is firmly built into the
system, but the planning ethic is no more than a possibility for the future’
(Pinder 1968: 98). Since then, the institutional balance has shifted. The
Parliament has for example acquired enhanced powers over legislation and
the budget. Furthermore, the Single Market has been completed and since
Maastricht the planning ethic is more deeply ingrained. Accordingly, socio-
political arguments advanced by advocacy coalition’s within subsystems pre-
viously dominated by legal and technocratic norms have strengthened over
time. 
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Second, they are likely to be influenced by ECJ jurisprudence and the
quasi-judicial role played by the Competition Policy Directorate. In particu-
lar, Court rulings frequently establish important legal principles guiding the
development of policy. In this connection, it is possible to identify a relation-
ship between judicial and legislative/policy processes. However, just as
policy initiatives are influenced by judicial or quasi-judicial actions, so the
activities of the ECJ and Commission can be influenced by political activity. 
Third, governance regimes are likely to be influenced by soft law. Political
declarations of intent, although not legally binding, do shape policy evolu-
tion and do provide institutional actors with some guidance. In addition, the
office of Council Presidency allows member states to push individual
agendas. Continuity is ensured by the troika system but agendas can expand
as the incumbent continues the predecessor’s agenda whilst also developing
their own. 
Fourth, deeply ingrained within the EU’s general approach to policy
development is a desire to mediate between conflicting positions. This
reflects the complex multi-dimensional and multi-national nature of EU
decision making. Through a learning process over time, the EU has devel-
oped a range of mediating tools and practises. As Sabatier reminds us, ‘in sit-
uations in which all major coalitions view a continuation of the current
situation as unacceptable, they may be willing to enter negotiations in the
hope of finding a compromise that is viewed by everyone as superior to the
status quo’ (Sabatier 1998: 119). However, mediation will only take place
where competing advocacy coalitions are relatively evenly matched or the
activities of one coalition do not directly pose a threat to the deep and policy
core belief system of the rival coalition. If an advocacy coalition has monop-
olistic or near monopolistic control over policy evolution, it is unlikely they
will mediate. In situations where one coalition is institutionally underprivi-
leged mediation is unlikely unless that coalition can form a coalition of con-
venience with other groups. Where two coalitions seek to influence policy
through a variety of tactics and institutional venues, policy coherence is lost.
Under such circumstances policy brokers will seek to mediate between coali-
tions. 
Finally, governance regimes are likely to be influenced by major develop-
ments both internal and external to the subsystem. A change in the institu-
tional balance of power prompted by a Treaty change has the potential to
fundamentally alter the institutional resources available to actors. External
changes also affect subsystems. For example, the collapse of communism
greatly affected the content and timing of the Maastricht Treaty. Similarly,
the Danish rejection of Maastricht in a referendum affected the nature of the
subsequent Amsterdam Treaty. Both Treaties fundamentally altered the
balance of power within numerous policy subsystems. 
On the face of it the above framework appears disproportionately over-
size in order to explain the apparently straightforward question of why EU
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policy towards sport has changed? However, the shifting focus of regulatory
attention away from a Single Market model of sports regulation towards a
socio-cultural model raises many complex issues concerning the dynamics of
policy change in the EU. In particular, in the absence of a specific legislative
framework for sport, the interplay between the formal arena of law and the
informal arena of political pressure and conflicting value systems becomes
an important focus for analysis. How does theory capture this interplay?
This is a far more complex question. The remaining chapters of the text
analyse the shifting focus of EU sports policy in light of these theoretical
insights. The next chapter analyses the composition of the sports policy sub-
system – an essential methodological starting point for understanding sports
policy change in the EU. 
Note
1 The four freedoms are the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital.
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The sports policy subsystem
Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) proves a useful starting
point for those wishing to conceptualise the EU as comprising a myriad of
policy subsystems. Operating within these subsystems is a wide range of
actors who attempt to steer policy in a direction compatible with their belief
system. Sabatier’s broad concept of subsystem actors stresses the political
nature of subsystem activity. Sabatier defines a policy subsystem as a ‘set of
actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem’ (Sabatier 1988:
138). The policy ‘problem’ under investigation is the relationship between
sport and the EU. Sabatier notes that ‘the most likely reason for the emer-
gence of new subsystems is that a group of actors become dissatisfied enough
with the neglect of a particular problem by existing subsystems to form their
own’ (Sabatier 1988: 138). The emergence in the EU and national capitals
of consumer-based subsystems in relation to agricultural produce developed
out of the failure of the agricultural subsystem to fully address consumer
concerns over food safety. Similarly, a subsystem may also emerge as new
actors become involved in issue definition in protest at how actors in another
subsystem define the policy (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Both Sabatier’s and
Rochefort and Cobb’s explanations are clearly related and both are evident
in relation to the emergence of a EU sports policy subsystem. 
Prior to the ruling in Bosman, sport was associated with a wide range of
policy subsystems, many of them underpinned with economic and legal
values. No clearly identifiable sports policy subsystem existed. A growing
body of opinion recognised that these subsystems were inappropriate for
dealing with the particular characteristics of sport. Whilst those subsystems
dealing with general market regulation were appropriate for most economic
sectors, sport was considered different. The traditional rules of market com-
petition did not apply to sport. The ruling in Bosman confirmed the view of
many who believed that sport needed to be dealt with on its own merits. This
was a particularly pressing issue as sport was beginning to develop into a sig-
nificant economic sector. The potential for sport to be unsympathetically
treated within such economic subsystems was therefore increased. It was
perceived that the consequence of operating in multiple (economic) venues
was the gradual erosion of sports autonomy and fundamental values. In par-
ticular, Bosman contributed to the emergence of a sports policy subsystem
as advocates unhappy at the explicit economic definition of sport adopted in
the ruling emerged as a more co-ordinated force. 
Consequently, following Bosman, a more holistic approach to sport
began to be discussed in a more co-ordinated forum. EU sports policy devel-
oped within this context. Within this nascent subsystem two advocacy coali-
tions emerged. Whilst the Single Market coalition define much sport
economically, the socio-cultural coalition, composed of a diverse body of
opinion, stress the importance of balancing this economic approach with one
that recognises the socio-cultural and integrationist qualities of sport. Each
coalition attempts to steer subsystem activity in a manner consistent with
their belief system. Their success in achieving this depends on the institu-
tional resources they can draw on. 
This chapter examines these themes in four sections. The first section
reviews the pre-Bosman environment where no sports subsystem operated.
The second, analyses the emergence and composition of the post-Bosman
subsystem. The belief systems of the two advocacy coalitions are examined.
The third section explores the institutional resources at the coalitions dispo-
sal. Where each coalition possesses and can yield sufficient institutional
resources to fundamentally challenge the deep and policy core belief system
of their rival, the conditions for coalition mediation have been met. In
essence therefore, coalitions are prepared to compromise the secondary fea-
tures of the belief system in order to protect their fundamental beliefs. The
final section provides concluding comment.
The pre-Bosman environment
Prior to the emergence of a post-Bosman sports policy subsystem in the EU,
sporting issues were discussed in a range of other subsystems. A 1995 study
on ‘The Impact of European Union Activities on Sport’ conducted by
Coopers and Lybrand for DG X of the European Commission, reviewed EU
involvement in the sports sector (Coopers and Lybrand 1995). The study
detailed the extensive involvement of the EU institutions in sport whilst also
conveying the lack of a co-ordinated policy approach. The study did
however reveal a growing institutional awareness of this problem and illus-
trated moves designed to confront this fragmentation through the growth of
a range of sporting institutions (see below). The lack of a Treaty competence
to develop a common sports policy did however act as an obstacle to a more
co-ordinated approach to sports policy.
Prior to Bosman, sporting issues were discussed in connection with a wide
range of policies. The first of these areas concerns the right of free movement
for workers/the self-employed within the Single Market. Since the signing
of the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent piecing together of secondary
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legislation, players, coaches, instructors and even fans have rights of free
movement guaranteed by EU law. Walrave, Donà, Heylens and various dis-
putes concerning, for example, the operation of ski instructors, illustrate the
relationship between sport and issues of free movement. Clearly EU provi-
sions on the right of establishment and the right to provide services have
similar consequences for sport. Beyond the issue of worker/self-employed
mobility, the Commission has also sought to establish a free market in insu-
rance, sponsorship, advertising and broadcasting services. Sporting activities
became linked to these subsystems through such issues as tobacco advertis-
ing in sport and the development of the Television Without Frontiers project. 
A second arena in which sporting issues emerged concerned the principle
of the free movement of goods. EU legislation in this field has had an impact
on a range of sports-related activities including: the cross-border transpor-
tation of sports equipment, the standardisation of equipment specifications,
the commercial exploitation of the Olympic Symbol, the production and
marketing of sports food, footwear labelling, quantitative restrictions on
sport footwear and certification, testing and technical requirements.
The third economic venue which sport became linked to concerned the
application of EU competition law. Following the ruling in Bosman, this
issue emerged as one of the most extensive areas of EU involvement in sport.
However, this relationship did have a pre-Bosman history. The main
Commission investigations into the compatibility between EU competition
law and sporting rules have centred on the sale and purchase of broadcast-
ing rights, the trans-frontier broadcasting of sports events, product endorse-
ment, rules relating to competition between federations, ticketing
arrangements for sports events, rules relating to transfers and restrictions
placed on foreign players, restrictive trading practices, anti-dumping meas-
ures and state aid to sports organisations. 
In addition to these essentially economic/legal venues, sport was also
linked to a range of socio-economic and cultural policies. Sport was dis-
cussed as a health, safety and ethics issue. In this connection, anti-doping
measures are of greatest significance. Although more systematic anti-doping
measures have been agreed post Bosman, doping issues were on the agenda
in 1990 when a Council Resolution examined measures to combat doping
within the structure already established by the Council of Europe.1 The EU
has also been involved in sports in related measures designed to promote
health, training, the protection of young people at work and spectator safety.
From this activity emerged the development of EU funding initiatives for
sports. Funding for sports-related projects were financed through a variety
of mechanisms including the generic structural fund and education and
training programmes and the more specific Eurathlon programme.
Launched in 1994, the Eurathlon programme was designed to promote
increased communications between European citizens, thus contributing to
increased solidarity between different nationalities. The EU also made funds
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available to promote the sporting participation of those with disabilities.
Activity in these socio-cultural fields is therefore closely related to the
people’s Europe project formally launched in 1985.
Finally, a range of other policy initiatives in the EU had an impact on
sport. For example, legislation covering the use of horses, dogs and pigeons
has been passed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the 1985
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (in force 1988) compels those
developing sporting infrastructure to take into consideration the environ-
mental effects of the event.2 In particular, the construction of ski lifts, cable
cars, yacht marinas, racing circuits and test tracks are specifically covered
by the Directive. In 1991 a European Parliament report criticised the prep-
arations for the French Albertville Games for ignoring the provisions of the
Directive (Coopers and Lybrand 1995: 108). Water sports have also taken
note of the provisions of a Directive designed to conserve natural habitats
and wild fauna and flora.3 Finally, sport was affected by EU monetary and
fiscal policy. Before the launch of the euro, the European Currency Unit
(ECU) could be used by the organisers of European sports events rather
than the US Dollar for money flows from one member state to another.
Prize money could also be paid in ECU. To a lesser extent EU secondary
legislation on fiscal policy (particularly on tax exemptions) has affected
sport.
From within these ‘areas’, it is possible to identify a range of specific
policy subsystems where sporting issues are considered. In the pre-Bosman
era, sport was therefore linked to a wide range of subsystems including: free
movement of workers policy, competition and industrial policy, audio-
visual policy and media policy, doping and drugs policy, public health policy,
youth policy, education and training policy, employment policy, environ-
mental policy and equal opportunities policy. 
The post-Bosman sports policy subsystem
A growing body of opinion within and outside the EU recognised that the
frequency in which sport was being discussed within the EU necessitated the
adoption of a more co-ordinated approach. Essentially, sporting issues were
being discussed within two types of subsystem. Socio-cultural subsystems
discussed sport within the context of the people’s Europe theme. Single
Market subsystems discussed sport in terms of market regulation.
Dissatisfaction was felt by some advocates who thought that sport was
receiving an inappropriate and insensitive hearing within the Single Market
subsystems. These market-based subsystems were not the appropriate venue
within which the social significance of sport could receive proper attention.
After all, competition in the sports sector differed from competition in others
sectors in that the objective of participants is not to eliminate opposition.
For many, the ECJ ruling in Bosman confirmed the inappropriateness of dis-
cussing sport in such venues. For those more committed to sport’s social
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significance, sporting activities needed to be extracted from the disparate
subsystems and an independent sports subsystem needed creating. 
The task of identifying the internal structure of the subsystem is proble-
matic. Reviewing participant lists at Commission organised sports confer-
ences such as the May 1999 EU Conference on Sport or the annual meeting
of the European Sports Forum provides one method. These lists tend to
reflect the more active involvement of socio-cultural actors. This coalition
is active due to their desire to challenge the prevailing economic definition
of sport. The onus is therefore on them to assert themselves in as many
institutional venues as possible. Less obvious are members of the Single
Market advocacy coalition. As many members of this coalition do not
pursue a specific sports-related agenda, their involvement in the coalition is
discrete.
Table 1 (overleaf) summaries the composition and institutional resources
of the sports policy subsystem.
The Single Market advocacy coalition
The Single Market advocacy coalition within the sports policy subsystem is
primarily composed of the Competition Policy Directorate and the ECJ.
Secondary members may enter the coalition depending on the topic under
consideration. This includes legal and commercial interests. Lawyers have
been active in promoting the EU as an avenue for litigation. Members of
commercial broadcasters such as commercial television and radio broadcast-
ers and commercial sports bodies are also associated with the Single Market
coalition. Commercial interests can use EU law as a means through which
the full commercial potential of sport can be exploited. For example, com-
mercial operations in the field of broadcasting require the EU to lift restric-
tions on market access. Some sports organisations also require free market
conditions in order maximise income by freely negotiating with all market
providers. In this connection, it is not therefore unusual for some actors to
operate in both advocacy coalitions. For example, a sports federation may
align itself to the Single Market coalition over an issue such as Article 3a of
the Television Without Frontiers Directive whilst operating alongside the
socio-cultural coalition over the desire to maintain restrictions on player
mobility. Furthermore, the Parliament – considered a leading socio-cultural
actor – has consistently called for restrictions on player mobility in European
sport to be lifted. The composition of the Single Market coalition is there-
fore fluid and complex. Nevertheless, certain features of the belief system can
be identified.
Deep core beliefs A belief in the primacy of negative integration is central
to the deep core belief system of the Single Market coalition. The promotion
and protection the four fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty is
central.
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Table 1 The sports policy subsystem
Single Market coalition Socio-cultural coalition
Belief system Belief system
Deep core beliefs: A belief in the primacy of negative integration. The Deep core beliefs: The promotion of positive integration. Successful
promotion and protection of the four fundamental freedoms. No deep European integration rests on an effective balance being struck between
core assumptions on sports policy. economic forces and socio-cultural (and political) forces. Not all 
Policy core beliefs: Sport is subject to EU law when practised as an 
members share these assumptions concerning European integration
economic activity. No general exemption from EU law can be permitted. 
(see moderate and minimalist members below).
Secondary aspects: Scope for compromise with socio-cultural coalition.
Policy core beliefs: Acknowledgment that sport is not above the law.
Generally the Single Market model of sports regulation is preferred 
Nevertheless, sport possesses social and cultural characteristics which
although sensitive to the need for socio-cultural integration. 
merit a soft touch application of law.
Secondary aspects: Belief in the socio-cultural model of sports regulation.
Differences over the precise relationship between sport and the EU exist,
indicating that the coalition is a ‘coalition of convenience’.
Actors Actors
Pragmatic Single Market regulators: Competition Policy Directorate and Maximalists: Strong supporter of People’s Europe concept. Support 
the ECJ are primary actors. European Parliament Committee on Legal Treaty inclusion for sport in order to (1) protect sports rules from EU law
Affairs and Citizens Rights is secondary actor. Although sport is viewed as and (2) develop common sport policy (with legal and budgetary base).
a significant economic activity and both the Commission and ECJ have Strong support within European Parliament (particularly Party of 
sought to uphold the four freedoms, both actors have acknowledged the European Socialists) and elements within Education and Culture DG. 
socio-cultural dimension of sport. Scope therefore exists for sport’s unique Support from EU Governments (excluding Britain, Denmark and 
characteristics to be taken into account in the application of law as long Sweden). In the absence of Treaty base the maximalists demonstrate
as the deep and policy core beliefs of the Single Market coalition are not commitment to the socio-cultural dimension of sport by seeking to use
undermined. sport to strengthen subsystems such as education, health, youth, social
Ultra Single Market regulators: Elements within legal profession. 
exclusion and media. In absence of unanimous support from member 
Commercial interests seeking to maximise sports ‘real’ market potential.
states to include sport in the Treaty, soft law is preferred tactic. Wide
Sport is primarily an economic activity to be regulated in the same manner
range of European sports bodies broadly share this agenda as it clarifies
as any other.
the legal environment and allows them to compete equally with other
sectors for funding. 
Moderates: EU should not challenge the autonomy of the European
sports sector. Decisions affecting the sports world are best taken by the
sports bodies themselves. Moderates support closer links between sport
and the Treaty in order to protect sport from EU law (sports protocol
rather than Article preferred). Little interest in common sports policy
with legal and budgetary base. Clarification of legal environment a
priority. Tactical differences exist. Sports bodies of significant economic
size are members (UEFA, FIA).
Minimalists: Support the modest use of sport to implement certain EU
policy goals and support attempts to limit the application of EU law to
sport. However, cautious of extending EU influence in sport further. Do
not favour granting sport a Treaty base (either protocol or Article). Belief
in subsidiarity and national cultural diversity. Christian Democratic
politicians and MEP’s generally hold this view. British Conservative forces
employ subsidiarity as a vehicle to retain national control over policy
areas. The governments of the UK, Denmark and Sweden resist calls for
Treaty incorporation for sport. Belief that sufficient flexibility within the
EU exists to recognise the specificity of sport. Soft law preferred tactic.
Institutional venues Institutional venues
Competition Policy DG and ECJ have strong and insulated role in Right of sporting ‘initiative’ in Education & Culture DG; EP’s 
acting as the guardian of the EU’s legal framework. Individual legislative, scrutiny and budgetary powers; primary and 
litigants support this through the provisions of directly effective secondary law-making functions of member states; soft law 
law, Article 234 and complaints procedure with the Commission. including Treaty Declarations, Presidency Conclusions, political 
ECJ and the Commission are sensitive to prevailing political guidelines, Commission policy papers; Council Presidency agenda 
context. Resource limitations of Competition Policy DG. setting; the use of formal forums/conferences; the strength of
positive (socio-cultural) integration post-SEM; exploitation of
related policy subsystems.
Policy core beliefs Neither the deep or policy core belief system of the
Single Market coalition contains core assumptions about sports policy spe-
cifically. The fundamental objective concerns protection of the EU’s four
freedoms. As such, the policy core belief system goes no further than stress-
ing that sport is subject to EU law when practised as an economic activity
and that no general exemption from EU law can be permitted. Sport must
abide by the fundamentals of EU primary and secondary legislation. 
Secondary aspects It is within the secondary aspects of the coalitions belief
system that flexibility exists. Generally the Single Market coalition favour
the Single Market model of sports regulation, although flexibility within the
secondary aspects of the belief system exists. The Competition Policy
Directorate and the ECJ are pragmatic Single Market regulators in relation
to sport. Although sport is viewed as a significant economic activity and both
the Commission and ECJ have sought to uphold the four freedoms, both
actors have acknowledged the socio-cultural dimension of sport. Scope
therefore exists for sports unique characteristics to be taken into account in
the application of law as long as the deep and policy core beliefs of the Single
Market coalition are not being undermined. On policy specific issues, ultra
Single Market regulators have consistently argued since Bosman that sport
should be treated as any other economic activity within the Single Market.
Elements within the legal profession have articulated this thought although
this is an anecdotal claim.4
The socio-cultural advocacy coalition
The composition of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition is complex. Three
key actors operate at the EU institutional level. First, the European
Parliament has strong socio-cultural tradition. The Parliament is keenly sup-
portive of the people’s Europe agenda. However, as described above, the
Parliament has been a critic of restrictions on player mobility imposed by
sports-organising bodies. Second, the mandate of the Education and Culture
Directorate also closely aligns it to the people’s Europe project. Finally, the
member states working through the European Council, the Council
Presidency and informal Sports Councils have emerged as the most signifi-
cant addition to the socio-cultural coalition. 
Other actors operating within the subsystem include: (1) sports bodies,
federations, confederations and associations; (2) government-related bodies
responsible for sport in the EU, EFTA and applicant countries, including the
‘quango’ equivalent; (3) National Olympic Committees and related bodies;
(4) public service television and radio interests; (5) campaigns such as equal-
ity issues in sport; and (6) the Council of Europe. 
Deep core beliefs Whilst the belief in the primacy of negative integration
forms the deep core belief system of the Single Market coalition, central to
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the belief system of the socio-cultural coalition is a concern for the promo-
tion of positive integration. Whilst negative integration is not rejected by the
coalition, successful European integration rests on an effective balance being
struck between economic forces and socio-cultural (and political) forces.
Although a strong force within the socio-cultural coalition, not all members
of the coalition share a concern for the promotion of European integration
(see below). 
Policy core beliefs The socio-cultural coalition acknowledges that sport is
not above the law. Nevertheless, sport possesses social and cultural charac-
teristics which merit a soft touch application of law. 
Secondary aspects A unifying theme within the coalition is for the socio-
cultural model of sports regulation to be more widely employed, although
differences over the precise relationship between sport and the EU exist.
These differences in the secondary aspects of the coalition’s belief system
suggest that the socio-cultural coalition is a ‘coalition of convenience’
(Sabatier 1998: 119). Within the socio-cultural coalition exist three broad
schools of thought.
The maximalists consist of those EU institutional actors who are supportive
of attempts to establish a people’s Europe in the EU and recognise the futil-
ity of attempting to establish one merely through the force of economic inte-
gration. They support the inclusion of sport within the Treaty. Not only
would such an Article for sport limit the application of EU law to the sports
sector, it would also act as the basis for the development of a socio-culturally
based common sports policy with a legally based budgetary line. The Party
of European Socialists (PES) within the Parliament generally holds this view
(Henry and Mathews 1998: 5). However, on the issue of limiting the appli-
cation of EU law to sport, this agenda may conflict with their traditional
concern for protecting citizens’ rights in the Single Market. As such, the max-
imalists have indicated that a balance should be struck between removing
restrictive practices in European sport and harnessing the socio-cultural fea-
tures of sport for pro-integrative purposes. Their sporting belief system
stresses the important social function sport performs in people’s lives and as
such important sporting events should be broadcast on free-to-air television.
Members of the Parliamentary Committee on Culture, Youth, the Media and
Sport are strongly associated with the maximalists, although a moderate
element is also evident. In addition, the Education and Culture DG has a
strong maximalist agenda running through it. As one of the smaller DG’s,
Education and Culture would benefit politically from expanded EU involve-
ment in sport. The EU governments (excluding Britain, Denmark and
Sweden) also support Treaty inclusion for sport. In the absence of such
a legal base, the maximalists seek to strengthen the role of sport within
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subsystems such as the education, health, youth, social exclusion and media
subsystems. In the absence of a legal base, soft law is the preferred tactic to
limit the application of law to sport. A wide range of European sports bodies
are supportive of the maximalist agenda. A Treaty base for sport would not
only help clarify the legal environment in which they operate, it would also
allow them to tap into a new budgetary line for sports funding. Organisa-
tions such as the European Non Governmental Sports Organisation
(ENGSO) have traditionally favoured an Article for sport as a means
through which sporting autonomy could be safeguarded and EU funding
opportunities secured.
Not all sports bodies support the maximalists’ agenda. The moderates
include those members of sports bodies such as sporting federations, confed-
erations, associations, campaign groups and National and European
Olympic Committees who do not wish to see the EU further extend its influ-
ence in sport but who do want the legal environment clarifying. This encom-
passes organisations such as UEFA. The sporting belief system of these actors
stress that EU law and the EU institutions should not challenge the auton-
omy of the European sports sector and that decisions affecting the sports
world are best taken by the sports bodies themselves. This autonomy refers
not only to issues concerning the ‘rules of the game’ but also to commercial
issues. As such, the moderates tend to argue that the collective sale of televi-
sion rights should be maintained and sports federations should be free to
realise the full value of sports rights by negotiating with a range of broad-
casters, both terrestrial and satellite/cable. Members of public service televi-
sion and radio broadcasters do not share this aim. The moderates support
measures to protect sport from EU involvement through the incorporation
of sport into the EU Treaty through a protocol for sport. This would have
the effect of insulating sport from EU law by placing a legal requirement on
the EU institutions to recognise the specificity of sport within its legal frame-
work. UEFA support the protocol approach as a method of safeguarding
current sports rules without further extending supranational involvement in
sport. In the absence of a protocol, the moderates support the use of soft law
to achieve these aims. For instance a strengthened Declaration (along the
lines of the Nice Declaration) would establish political guidelines for EU
involvement in sport. 
The minimalists share the idea that sport is a social activity as well as an
economic activity. They support the modest use of sport to implement
certain EU policy goals and support attempts to limit the application of EU
law to sport. However, the minimalists are generally cautious of extending
EU influence in sport further. In particular, they do not favour granting sport
a Treaty base (either through an Article for sport or a protocol). The mini-
malists are particularly attached to the concept of subsidiarity. The applica-
tion of this principle naturally limits EU involvement in sport as national
cultural diversity is prized above pan European cultural issues. Christian
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Democratic politicians and MEP’s generally hold this view. British
Conservative forces employ subsidiarity as a vehicle to retain national
control over policy areas (Henry and Matthews 1998: 5). The governments
of the UK, Denmark and Sweden resist calls for Treaty incorporation for
sport. Successive British governments have retained a generally consistent
view that the EU has no competence to involve itself in sport. The British
government hold the view that sufficient flexibility exists within the EU’s
legal framework to recognise the specificity of sport. Some sports bodies
such as the English Sports Council expressed the view that EU involvement
in sport runs the risk of inefficiently duplicating the role of national sports
councils thus undermining their autonomy (Henry and Matthews 1998: 14). 
The identification of the above two advocacy coalitions forms an essen-
tial component of Sabatier’s methodology. Other than the effect of external
perturbations on the subsystem, Sabatier argues that competition between
rival advocacy coalitions within the subsystem can generate policy change.
He suggests that usually one coalition dominates, although in some instances
compromise takes place and governmental programmes are built through
an accommodation between rival coalitions (Sabatier 1988: 148).
Compromise is an important feature within the EU. As a multi-national
organisation encompassing many political, administrative and cultural
strands, compromise is essential. Although the main actors are partisan, they
are not blindly so. To be so would undermine the initial reason for interna-
tional co-operation. Compromise and mutual adjustment between advocacy
coalitions is only likely where the coalitions are both institutionally privi-
leged. In other words, the conditions for compromise are met only if both
advocacy coalitions possess the ability to take measures which would fun-
damentally undermine the deep and policy core beliefs of their rival.
Sabatier’s work on the role of policy-oriented learning, policy brokers and
the role of professional forums tells us much about the dynamics of coali-
tion compromise (Sabatier 1988: 156). If only one coalition possessed such
institutional resources, it would dominate the subsystem. Under such
circumstances, the rival would need to expand the range of venues within
which it operates in order to mount a successful challenge. Frequently this
entails attempting to politicise the debate and draw actors into the subsystem
who were previously latent. 
Institutional venues
With any brand of actor-centred institutionalism comes the problem of how
to define actors and institutions. The EU ‘institutions’ are actors within the
sports policy subsystem. They seek to steer policy in a direction consistent
with their belief system. This insight does not however amount to an insti-
tutional analysis. The institutional element of the actor-centred institution-
alist approach developed in this book derives from an analysis of the formal
and informal institutional characteristics such institutional actors bring to
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the subsystem. Without such an analysis, it becomes tempting merely to
point out that institutions have an effect on the strategies of actors. As
Sabatier notes, although belief systems will determine the direction in which
an advocacy coalition will seek to move a governmental programme, its
ability to do so will be critically dependent upon its resources (Sabatier 1988:
143). Institutions and institutional venues are one such critical resource.
Institutions constrain and empower actors operating within subsystems. The
range of institutional venues open to advocates wishing to influence EU
involvement in sport is sizeable but highly dispersed. Sporting issues are dis-
cussed in nearly all the Directorate Generals of the European Commission.
As has been demonstrated above, policy advocates with an interest in sport
can push their agenda in a wide number of policy subsystems. 
This venue exploitation has however not been without challenge. In UK
v. Commission, the ECJ held that each budget item must have a legal base.5
As a result, the Commission was forced to abandon its Eurathlon pro-
gramme. As part of a review into the impact of the ruling on sports pro-
grammes in the EU, the Commission asked Deutsche Sportbund (the
German Sport Federation) to carry out a study into the way in which sport
can be integrated into Community aid programmes. The result once again
demonstrated the huge range of activities within which sport plays or could
play a part. Both the Coopers and Lybrand and Deutsche Sportbund reports
demonstrate how fragmented EU involvement in sport is. However, some
effort has been made on the part of the EU to co-ordinate sporting activity.
The activities of most of the Commission’s Directorate Generals have an
impact, direct or indirect, on the operation of sport. The activities of the
Competition Policy Directorate (formerly DG IV) have the greatest impact.
The formal responsibility for sport within the Commission lies with the
Education and Culture Directorate (formerly DG X: Information,
Communication, Culture and Audio-Visual). Within the Directorate, the
Sports Unit has been created to organise the sporting activities of the
Commission. 
The Parliament’s influence on sport is two-fold. First, the EP can exert
influence through its formal legislative, scrutiny and budgetary powers.
Although no legal Treaty competence exists for the EU to act directly in
sporting matters, much EU legislation has a major indirect impact on sport.
The Parliament has been influential in shaping such legislation as it did, for
example, via the tabling of amendments to the Television Without Frontiers
Directive. Within the Parliament’s committee structure, sporting issues are
discussed in the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and
Sport. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights also has an
input. The Parliament can further influence sporting issues through debates,
questions, writing to relevant parties and tabling resolutions. The
Parliament’s ability to modify and approve the EU’s budget grants it some
influence over the modest amount spent on sport by the EU. The second
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mechanism by which the EP can influence sporting issues is via the EP’s
Sports Intergroup, a cross-committee, cross-party discussion forum for
sports-related matters (currently inactive). Established in 1992, the
Intergroup has no formal power, although it has become a popular point of
access for representatives of not only the EU but also many governmental
and non-governmental sports organisations. The Committee of the Regions
(COR), a 222 member advisory assembly on regional matters has some input
into sporting issues through its Subcommission for Youth and Sport. The
COR gives its opinions on sports-related Commission proposals. 
Member state activity in sport has increased since Bosman. The
Amsterdam Declaration and subsequent Presidency Conclusions illustrate
this trend. The general legislative activity of the Council of Ministers does
affect sport in Europe, even though sport is not the intended target of its
action. As the EU has no Treaty competence in sports, the Sports Ministers
do not pass legislation but do occasionally (informally) meet. In addition to
ministerial meetings, member states also co-operate through meetings of
European Sports Directors (national ministry officials).
Finally, ECJ rulings have incrementally established the legal principles
regulating the relationship between the EU and European sporting interests.
Walrave, Donà, Heylens, Bosman, Deliège and Lehtonen confirm the ECJ’s
importance.
Advocates operating within policy subsystems or working through the
range of institutional venues mentioned above usually find themselves able
to exploit institutional rules to their advantage. Put another way, advocates
find it difficult to control the agenda, and hence policy evolution by mono-
polising institutional rules and procedures. As Marks et al. remind us, in
each of the four stages of the EU’s policy process they examine (policy initi-
ation, decision-making, implementation and adjudication), decision making
capabilities are shared by a range of actors and not monopolised (Marks et
al. 1996). 
In terms of policy initiation (both legislative and ‘think-tank’ in nature)
the Commission has a privileged position. Article 211 of the EU Treaty
grants the Commission the sole right of legislative initiative. As such policy
must be drafted by the Commission and during the policy process the
Commission has the right to amend or withdraw its proposal. This power
grants the Commission considerable influence over the political agenda,
although it should not be assumed that the Commission works totally auton-
omously in this respect. Other EU institutions exert influence on the
Commission. First, the Commission itself should not be considered as a
monolithic entity. Embedded within the Commission’s architecture are
numerous Directorates General, each with its own organisational style and
culture and each able to exert influence over policy making in its early stages
(Cram 1994). Second, the Commission must be sensitive to the wishes of the
member states, particularly as the Commission’s network of consultation
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channels includes representatives of the member states. Article 208 permits
the Council to request the Commission to undertake any studies and submit
proposals the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the Treaties
common objectives. European Council meetings and Presidency Con-
clusions frequently place pressure on the Commission to submit or revise
proposals. Soft law measures attached to Treaties have a similar effect as of
course do legally binding Treaty Articles. Third, the Parliament can exert
influence on the Commission. Article 192 permits the Parliament to request
Commission action in a policy area covered by the Treaty. The Parliament’s
budgetary and supervisory powers can also be employed to either compel or
cajole the Commission to act. In the area of non-compulsory expenditure the
Parliament has equal budgetary authority with the Council and Commis-
sion.
In addition to the influence of other EU institutions, the Commission’s
right of initiate is also influenced by pressure group activity. Most academ-
ics would agree that interest groups exert influence over the composition of
Commission proposals, even if they disagree over how to precisely account
for this. Interests are increasingly becoming institutionalised within EU deci-
sion making, be that through the establishment of informal networks of
actors or formally through new consultative institutions such as the
Committee of Regions. Citing Commission figures, Peterson and Bomberg
claim that 20 per cent of Commission proposals originate as a response to
requests from other EU institutions, member states or interest groups; 35 per
cent stem from international obligations; 25–30 per cent from amendments
to or codifications of existing law; 10 per cent as a result of Treaty obliga-
tions; and 5–10 per cent as a result of spontaneous Commission initiatives
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 38). A general lack of resources contributes to
the size of spontaneous initiatives. A general conclusion to be drawn in terms
of policy initiation is that, although the Commission has a strong position,
plenty of avenues exist for advocates to push their own particular idea. 
Decision-making competences are even more dispersed. The process of
agreeing legislation in the EU is a function shared by the Council and the
Parliament. Prior to the signing of the Single European Act (SEA), the
Parliament could only give a non-binding opinion on Commission proposals
prior to the Council disposing the legislation. Following the SEA the
Parliament acquired a second reading and greater scope to influence legisla-
tive proposals (the co-operation procedure). Since the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties, the Parliament is now considered the Council’s legisla-
tive equal (the co-decision procedure). Furthermore, the use of qualified
majority voting (QMV) in the Council further reduces the amount of veto
points in the policy process. In budgetary matters, competences are also
shared between the Parliament, Commission and Council. 
Although the Commission holds considerable powers in relation to the
implementation of policy, yet again it does not monopolise this function. The
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Commission shares this function with national, sub-national and non-state
actors such as interest groups. The same is true of adjudication. The ECJ is
supported by the Commission, national courts and individual litigants. 
Of course, a focus only on the formal institutional venues open to advo-
cacy coalitions will only give a one-dimensional insight into coalition strat-
egies. An examination of the informal/normative dimension of institutions
also reveals many useful insights. As March and Olsen remind us, ‘the polity
is something different from, or more than, an arena for competition among
rival interests’ (March and Olsen 1989: 159). However, norms can take
many forms and identifying them, let alone explaining the impact on coali-
tion strategies and policy evolution is not always easy. Some of the most
important are as follows:
Legal norms The build up of legal norms is crucial to the construction of
a policy environment (governance regime) within which policy evolution
takes place. In particular, ECJ jurisprudence or the Competition Policy
Directorates quasi-jurisprudence shapes this environment. The relationship
between the ECJ’s work and that of the Commission is very close. The
Commission’s use of the Court’s Cassis de Dijon judgment to promote
mutual recognition is one example.6 The close relationship between the
Bosman ruling and the Commission’s testing of sporting practises against
competition law is another. The use of soft law by the member states and the
Commission is a further legal norm to have evolved within the EU. Soft law
refers to rules of conduct which in principle have no legally binding effect
but which in practise may have a significant impact on policy. Soft law fre-
quently offers guidance as to the interpretation and scope of application of
EU law and in some circumstances it has acted to progressively ‘harden’
policy areas on the margins of the EU’s legal remit. The use of soft law has
characterised much of the development of sports policy. This reflects a lack
of a formal Treaty base to take ‘harder’ measures. 
Institutional cultures The culture of an institution can have a profound
affect on policy evolution (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: Chapters 2 and 3).
Institutional culture may be ‘open’ thus privileging all advocates, ‘selectively
open’ thus privileging some advocates or ‘closed’ thus denying all advocates
access. The culture of smoke filled rooms and fireside chats within the
European Council is just one example of this. Different institutions also have
varying dispositions. Some Directorates General within the Commission
have a particularly dirigiste disposition whereas others operate in a more
laissez faire manner. Armstrong and Bulmer point to the conflicting cultures
within the Transport Directorate and the Competition Policy Directorate
that led to a divergence of opinion over the granting of state aid to airlines
(Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 60). Similarly, the Competition Policy
Directorate’s economic approach to sport conflicts somewhat with the
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Education and Culture Directorate’s more socio-cultural approach. The
same is true of the committee system within the Parliament. Sporting discus-
sions taking place within the EP’s Committee on Culture, Youth, Education,
the Media and Sport take a different course to those discussed within the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights. 
Institutional norms Institutions also develop routinised patterns of beha-
viour. Despite the widespread provision for qualified majority voting in the
Council, consensual decision making is still preferred. In particular, the
Council frequently employs the principle of relative stability to decision
making. Under such circumstances, the Council ensures that ‘losers’ in a
policy decision are compensated by concessions in another part of the policy
or indeed in another policy altogether. Package deals and issue linkage have
therefore become a standard practise in Council decision making. Norms
such as relative stability can have profound effects on policy. It is becoming
usual each year for the Council to be faced with a proposal from the
Commission recommending a reduction in fishing effort. If the proposal rec-
ommends a 10 per cent reduction in catch size for a certain species, the effect
of relative stability is to greatly reduce this reduction or to allocate the
‘losers’ higher allocations elsewhere. Environmentalists wishing to influence
the Commission proposal may take this decision making norm into account
when formulating their suggested reduction figure. Partisan mutual adjust-
ment is another important norm. Although decision makers are partisan,
they are capable of compromise. The EU has developed sophisticated mecha-
nisms to manage conflict. Issue linkage and package deals are two examples
of this. Others include conciliation procedures, co-ordinating mechanisms
and policy forums. Peterson and Bomberg identify other institutional norms
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 53–58). ‘Negotiated enforcement’ as opposed
to imposed enforcement is frequently preferred by the Commission in cases
that are politically sensitive. Finally, an increasingly institutionalised norm
is the use of the subsidiarity principle. This norm became associated with the
greater devolution of policy-making functions to national and sub-national
authorities.
Conclusions
The sports policy subsystem was created as a result of Bosman. Prior to that
sport was discussed in a wide range of policy subsystems, many of them
underpinned with Single Market as opposed to socio-cultural values.
Bosman emerged from one such interaction between sport and a non-sports-
related Single Market subsystem. Dissatisfaction with the lack of a more
holistic and co-ordinated approach to sport led to the creation of the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition. The coalition has been successful in creating a
sports policy subsystem in which the previously dispersed discussions on
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sport have become more co-ordinated. The formation of a separate sub-
system is an essential pre-requisite for policy change. However, alone it is
insufficient to change the direction of policy. The institutional resources of
the rival coalitions determine the extent to which coalition competition
results in policy change.
Peterson and Bomberg describe the EU’s policy process as containing
‘multiple sources of unpredictability’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 58). This
supports Armstrong and Bulmer’s assertion that the EU represents ‘a classic
case of governance without formal government’ (Armstrong and Bulmer
1998: 71). Within the context of EU subsystems this frequently means that
advocacy coalitions are able to go shopping in multiple venues in order to
affect policy. The Single Market coalition is institutionally strong. The logic
of negative integration is firmly enshrined in the Treaty. Furthermore,
through Walrave, Donà, Heylens and Bosman the ECJ has enshrined the
economic definition of sport in law. The Single Market actors have therefore
already undermined the policy core belief system of the socio-cultural coali-
tion. Unless the socio-cultural coalition is able to respond in order to protect
their policy core beliefs, the subsystem will become monopolised. However,
as illustrated above, the socio-cultural coalition is also institutionally privi-
leged. Since Maastricht, the logic of positive integration has more firmly
established itself within the culture of integration and this has been sup-
ported by institutional moves to strengthen socio-cultural actors. In partic-
ular, the Parliament has benefited from institutional reform. The most
significant development for the socio-cultural coalition has however been the
involvement of the member states within the subsystem. 
The member states are able to assert themselves within the subsystem
through a variety of non-legal, semi-legal and legal manoeuvres. The
member states are able to exert political pressure through the adoption of
soft law measures. Furthermore, they alone possess the ability to amend the
Treaty. Institutions and policies are not immune from reform, even though
unanimity is often required to do so. The ECJ and the Commission operate
under the threat of sanction. As Craig and De Búrca argue, the ECJ is not
immune from political pressures.
It is certainly aware of the political environment in which it acts and its judge-
ments are at times influenced by relatively non-legal arguments made by the
member states before the Court – often when they relate to the potential finan-
cial impact of a ruling – or by critical responses from national and from
Community sources. (Craig and De Búrca 1998: 81)
The decision by the member states to insert the Barber protocol into the
Maastricht Treaty stemmed directly from their concern over the ECJ’s ruling
in Barber.7 The Protocol has subsequently affected ECJ decision making in
this field. The member states possess various options for safeguarding sports
structures within the legal framework of the Treaty. A Barber style protocol
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approach is one method. In addition, the member states could amend the
Treaty itself through inserting an Article for sport or by exempting sport
from individual passages within the Treaty. These powerful institutional
resources are keenly resisted by the Single Market coalition as the wielding
of such powers has the potential to undermine their deep and policy core
beliefs.
A situation has therefore emerged within the sports policy subsystem
which allows the rival coalitions to take measures which could undermine
each other’s deep and policy core belief systems. Past experience, calcula-
tions of future losses and the EU’s culture of mutual adjustment between
actors contributes to policy-oriented learning within the subsystem. Policy-
oriented learning takes place as actors seek to protect their deep and policy
core beliefs. It results in the rival advocacy coalitions compromising their
secondary beliefs. Channels for such learning and compromise have been
established within the EU. In terms of sport, the EU has established forums
through which compromise can take place such as the 1999 EU Conference
on Sport and the annual meeting of the European Sports Forum. The
Education and Culture Directorate has also emerged as an important policy
broker. 
Throughout this text it is argued that compromise has been essential to
the birth of EU sports law and policy. Compromise within the sports policy
subsystem has taken place within the secondary aspects of the coalitions
belief system. The ‘separate territories’ approach has emerged from this com-
promise. Separate territories is a concept developing within national legal
jurisdictions for dealing with sports-related cases. As Beloff et al. argues,
English courts are increasingly favouring public law principles to resolve
cases which on the face of it concern private transactions between economic
agents (Beloff et al. 1999: 3–4). Accordingly, the courts are defining territo-
ries of sporting autonomy and judicial intervention. The construction of a
similar separate territories approach within the context of the EU allows
both advocacy coalitions to safeguard their deep and policy core belief
systems. Increasingly therefore the subsystem argument concerns the respec-
tive size and definition of the territories. If compromise within the secondary
aspects of the belief system proves mutually beneficial, conflict over policy
core beliefs will not develop. 
The development of the separate territories approach within the sports
policy subsystem is significant. As Beloff et al. argue, ‘the cornerstone of
what could be called the founding principles of sports law is the definition
of the respective territories of the courts and the bodies which govern sport’
(Beloff et al. 1999: 4). By constructing separate territories within the context
of the EU’s legal system, the EU has acknowledged the existence of a body
of law dealing specifically with sport (EU sports law). Rather than EU sports
law flowing from legislative activity, the birth of sports law is a tactic
employed to avoid the use of legislation specifically directed at sport (such
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as a Treaty Article). A curious situation has therefore arisen in which the EU
pursues a de facto sports policy, defined not by primary or secondary legis-
lation but by legal doctrines specific to sport. 
The next three chapters develop these themes by examining the nature of
the debate within the sports policy subsystem. Chapter 4 examines the role
of the Court of Justice in establishing important principles governing the
relationship between sport and the EU. Chapter 5 examines the movement
of sport from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda as a result of
the actions of the Competition Policy Directorate. Chapter 6 examines
attempts by the socio-cultural coalition to politicise the sports policy sub-
system and re-focus the prevailing regulatory model to one in which the
socio-cultural aspects of sport are more widely recognised and protected. 
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4
Sport and the European 
Court of Justice
The ECJ is an important agenda setter. Court rulings play an important part
in defining the content of the EU’s systemic agenda and the conditions under
which an issue is transferred to the institutional agenda for active policy
development. The ECJ’s line of reasoning in relation to sport has been devel-
oped within the context of a number of important institutional relationships.
As such, the ECJ’s role in establishing the boundaries of EU sports regula-
tion is not deterministic. 
In Walrave, Donà and Heylens, the ECJ established important principles
concerning the relationship between sport and EU law.1 In the event, the lack
of enforcement from the Commission limited the scope of these rulings. In
Bosman, the principles established in previous case law were extended. As
the Commission was more energetic in enforcing Bosman, so the ruling took
on enormous legal significance for sport.2 The rulings in Deliège and
Lehtonen, which placed some limit on the application of EU law to sport,
took place in the context of an on-going political discussion within the EU
on how to reconcile EU law with sports social significance.3 Whereas
Walrave, Donà, Heylens and Bosman took place in an environment where
the construction of the Single Market was seen as paramount, Deliège and
Lehtonen reflected greater sensitivity to the socio-cultural dimension of
European integration. Deliège and Lehtonen therefore represent the ECJ’s
contribution to the construction of the separate territories. 
This chapter examines the ECJ’s sports-related jurisprudence in six parts.
The first part reviews the role of the ECJ in the process of European integra-
tion. The second examines the Treaty provisions relating to the free move-
ment of workers and the right of establishment and the freedom to provide
services. The third section analyses the significance of the ECJ rulings in
Walrave, Donà and Heylens. Section four examines the impact of the
Bosman ruling and section five reviews the case law in Deliège and
Lehtonen. The final section draws some conclusions. 
The European Court of Justice and European integration
Most writers agree that the ECJ’s activities have made an important contri-
bution to European integration. The ECJ has successfully extended the scope
of EU law through the establishment of the principles of direct effect and
supremacy.4 This has equipped the ECJ (supported by national courts and
individual litigants) to develop substantive law in the field of the free move-
ment of goods, labour, services and capital. Whilst the influence of the ECJ
on these issues is not questioned, no consensus exists on how and why the
ECJ has been able to achieve this. A vibrant debate has ensued enriching
both political science and law. Distilling the essentials of this debate, four
broad approaches can be identified.
Activism The first approach sees the ECJ as an autonomous political
actor seeking to strategically advance its own position and European inte-
gration in a manner consistent with its belief system. Not all writers agree
that this has had a positive impact on integration (see for example Weiler
1981 and Rasmussen 1986). In particular judicial activism contributed not
only to a reluctance of the member states to integrate through supranational
channels, but also to disruptions and blockages in the EU’s political
decision-making process. Other writers have been more positive on the
effect of ECJ jurisprudence on integration. Burley and Mattli have argued
that the ECJ has incrementally constitutionalised the Treaty of Rome, a
process that has ‘laid the foundations for an integrated European economy
and polity’ (Burley and Mattli 1993). Adopting a neo-functional analysis,
Burley and Mattli argue that law has spilled over from the purely economic
sector to new spheres, including new policy areas such as occupational
health and safety, social welfare and education. Just as Haas argued eco-
nomics acted as a mask for political integration, so Burley and Mattli argue
law acts as a mask for politics. Furthermore, this mask is protected by a
shield that insulates the ECJ from political interference. This is because
policy makers view law as technical and the ECJ couches its judgments in
apolitical terms. In addition to analysing economic to political functional
spillover, Burley and Mattli examine functional spillover in terms of legal
principles. To illustrate this point the relationship between the Van Gend
and Loos case and the Costa v. Enel case is examined.5 Once the principle
of direct effect was established by the ECJ, it became necessary and indeed
logical to establish the principle of supremacy. Without supremacy, direct
effect could not be fully realised, an example of incomplete integration.
Burley and Mattli also detect a strong political spillover dimension in the
work of the ECJ. In particular, they detect a bottom-up shift in expectations
and responses to cases from member governments, national courts and indi-
vidual litigants. The preliminary reference procedure assists this connection
between legal jurisdictions.6
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Legalism The second approach rejects the notion of judicial activism. The
ECJ operates above politics and simply applies the law in a neutral manner
consistent with the role ascribed to it under the Treaty. If the ECJ has
advanced integration through its jurisprudence, it has done so in a manner
consistent with the pro-integrative logic of primary and secondary legisla-
tion. 
Intergovernmentalism The third approach (very broadly referred to here
as intergovernmentalism) also rejects the idea of a judicially active and
autonomous ECJ. ECJ rulings reflect the interests of the member states and
do not run contrary to them. If they did, member states hold the power of
sanction over the ECJ through the revision of the Treaty, which could alter
the structure and role of the Court (see for instance Garrett and Weingast
1993). Occasionally governments may be prepared to accept short-term
losses in order to secure wider long-term gains. This interpretation accounts
for instances where ECJ rulings appear to run contrary to member states
interests, yet the governments do not retaliate. 
Multi-level governance The final broad interpretation (and one consistent
with the approach adopted in this text) seeks to locate the ECJ’s contribution
to European integration in a wider context. For example, Wincott claims that
whilst it is misleading to see the ECJ as an institution that has forced or engi-
neered integration it is similarly misguided to see the ECJ as an agent of the
member states (Wincott 1996: 170–184). Wincott claims ‘an analysis which
attributes a rational and synoptic control of European integration to a single
institution or group is likely to be misleading’ (Wincott 1996: 170). As such,
even though the ECJ has had an impact on European integration, it remains
one actor among many. For example, the ECJ is dependent on a number of
relationships in order for it to advance integration.
• ECJ–member state The ECJ’s role in the integration process was ini-
tially sanctioned by the member states and can be changed through Treaty
revision. Furthermore, the member states can exploit a number of venues
in order to limit the impact of past and future ECJ rulings. Changes to
secondary legislation agreed by the Council of Ministers represent the
most formal method, although political pressure can be imparted on the
ECJ through soft law measures. Political Declarations released as annexes
to Treaties or in the form Presidency Conclusions are often influential. In
the case of pension rights, the member states added a protocol (the Barber
Protocol) to the Maastricht Treaty preventing the retroactive application
of the ruling. It has been noted that following the protocol, the ECJ ‘mod-
erated its activism in this area’ (Hix 1999: 128). 
• ECJ–European Parliament Given the expansion of the European
Parliament’s legislative capabilities, the ECJ has the potential to be
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influenced by legislation agreed jointly between the Council and the
Parliament.
• ECJ–Commission The ECJ has formed a close supranational alliance
with the Commission. For instance in terms of widening the scope of the
free movement of goods principle, the Commission made legislative use
of the ECJ’s Cassis judgement. In relation to gender equality, the ECJ
played a crucial role in giving expression to the Commission’s calls for the
implementation of Article 141 (Wincott 1996). Furthermore, the emer-
gence of a merger control policy demonstrates the interplay between judi-
cial and legislative actions (Bulmer 1994). 
• ECJ–national courts Without the support of national courts, the ECJ
would have been unable to develop many of the legal principles which
today define the EU’s legal order. Article 234 creates a bridge between the
two legal orders by allowing national courts to seek guidance from the
ECJ. This procedure has allowed the ECJ to issue preliminary rulings on
the correct interpretation of EU law. 
• ECJ–individual The principle of direct effect has enabled individual lit-
igants to defend their rights under EU law before national courts.
Individuals, including companies, therefore have a stake in the EU’s legal
order and in this capacity are supported by lawyers. 
Whilst therefore the ECJ plays an important role in developing legal princi-
ples and substantive law, its role should be placed in context. The ECJ con-
strains and is constrained by multiple actors operating within the EU’s legal
community. The development of new substantive areas of EU policy results
from a complex interplay of forces involving many actors. The ECJ’s role in
sports regulation illustrates these complexities. 
Free movement in the European Union
Article 3(c) of the Treaty requires ‘the abolition, as between member states,
of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’.
According to Article 12, for this to be achieved, ‘any discrimination on
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. Three further Articles elaborate
this goal in the specific fields of employment (Article 39), establishment
rights (Article 43) and service provision (Article 49). 
The free movement of workers
Article 39 provides for: 
1 Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.
2 Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3 It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health:
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a to accept offers of employment actually made;
b to move freely within the territory of member states for this purpose;
c to stay in a member state for the purpose of employment in accordance
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
d to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed
in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implement-
ing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4 The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.
The passing of secondary legislation has served to implement Article 39.
For instance Directive 68/360 ensures rights of entry and residence.
Regulation 1612/68 regulates access to and conditions of employment.
Regulation 1251/70 establishes the right to remain in the territory of a
member state after employment there. Directive 64/221 establishes the rights
of member states in connection with the derogations outlined in Article
39(3). 
Article 39 is directly applicable.7 Furthermore, in Walrave and Koch and
more recently Bosman, the ECJ established that Article 39 is capable of
having horizontal as well as vertical direct effect. In Walrave the ECJ held
that the ‘prohibition of such discrimination does not only apply to the action
of public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed
at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and the provision
of services’.8 Also in Walrave the ECJ held that Article 39 would apply to
work situations carried out outside the EU if the legal relationship of
employment was entered into within the EU. Similarly, the reverse applies to
instances whereby the legal relationship was formed outside the EU but the
effect of the measure is felt within it. The prohibition on direct discrimina-
tion based on nationality extends to indirect discrimination in circumstances
in which nationality neutral measures act as restrictions to free movement.9
Article 39 and subsequent secondary legislation establishes the rights of
workers. The Treaty itself does not attempt a definition of a worker,
although the ECJ has employed the word widely. In Lawrie-Blum the ECJ
defined a worker as someone who performs services for and under the direc-
tion of another in return for remuneration during a certain period of time.10
In Walrave the ECJ held that the work must constitute an economic activity
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty.11 The ECJ regards most forms
of non-trivial work as genuine work. 
The right of establishment
Article 43 provides for: 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a member state in the territory of
another member state shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to
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restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nation-
als of any member state established in the territory of any member state.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activ-
ities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in par-
ticular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law
of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions
of the Chapter relating to capital.
The right of establishment refers to the right of individuals and firms to
establish a business in a member state other than their own. Article 43 is
directly applicable and directly effective.12
Freedom to provide services
Article 49 provides for:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom
to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of
nationals of member states who are established in a State of the Community
other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third
country who provide services and who are established within the Community.
The term ‘service’ is defined in Article 50(1) as being ‘normally provided
for remuneration, insofar as they are not governed by the provisions relat-
ing to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons’. Such services
include industrial and commercial services and the activities of craftsmen
and professionals, excluding transport, insurance and banking for which
alternative Treaty provisions exist. The right to provide services is afforded
to individuals and firms. The right of establishment and the right to provide
services is limited by the public policy, public security and public health lim-
itation contained in Directive 64/221. 
The Walrave, Donà and Heylens cases
As the EU is not an omni-competent organisation, it must be established that
sport falls within the scope of the above Treaty Articles. The case law of the
ECJ has established that Articles 39, 43 and 49 apply to sport. The
Commission has also established that Article 81 and 82 dealing with com-
petition law also apply (considered in Chapter 5). 
Walrave v. Union Cycliste International 1974
Bruno Walrave and Noppie Koch were two Dutch professional pacemakers
in motor-paced cycle races. Participants in these races ride pedal powered
cycles. Each participant has a pacemaker on a motorcycle whom he follows.
The pacemakers, who wear special clothing, aim to create a moving vacuum
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for the cyclist (stayer) to ride in. This enables the stayer to achieve speeds in
excess of what a ‘normal’ cyclist could achieve. This can be as much as 100
kilometres per hour. The role of the pacemaker is therefore central to the
sport, unlike the role of pacemakers in many other sports such as athletics.
The pacemaker enters into a contract with the stayer, a cycling association
or a sponsor. Until 1973, the pacemaker did not have to be of the same
nationality to that of the stayer. 
In November 1970, the Union Cycliste International (UCI, the interna-
tional association for cycling sport) reviewed its rules on the conduct of
motor-paced races for the forthcoming medium distance world cycling
championships. From 1973, the pacemaker and the stayer had to be of the
same nationality. UCI justified this action on the grounds that World
Championships are intended to be competitions between national teams.
Believing there to be a paucity of good Dutch stayers, Mr Walrave and Mr
Koch acted as pacemakers for non-Dutch stayers, including Belgians and
Germans. Faced with a restriction on their livelihood, they regarded this rule
change as being discriminatory and a breach of EU law. Having failed to
secure the repeal of the rule change, the two pacemakers initiated proceed-
ings against the UCI, the Dutch cycling association and, because the cham-
pionships were to be held in Spain, also the Spanish cycling association.13
Walrave and Koch wanted the rule to be repealed and wanted an injunction
requiring the UCI to allow the pacemakers to take part in forthcoming
events. The case was brought before the Arrondissementsrechtbank (District
Court) in Utrecht in 1973 and referred to the ECJ using the reference proce-
dures outlined in Article 234 of the Treaty. In answering the questions posed
by the referring court, the ECJ came to the following conclusions.
First, the District Court asked the ECJ to rule on the compatibility of
UCI’s rule with Articles 12, 39 and 49 of the Treaty and Regulation No.
1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on the freedom of movement
for workers within the Community. The ECJ initially had to establish
whether EU law was applicable to sport. Paragraph 4 of the ruling estab-
lished that, ‘having regard to the objectives of the Community, the practice
of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an eco-
nomic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty’. 
Second, flowing from this general principle, the ECJ held that when the
purpose of this ‘economic activity’ is to gain employment or remunerated
service, it comes within the scope of Articles 39 to 42 or 49 to 55 of the
Treaty, depending on the individual circumstances of the case.14 These
Articles give effect to the general rule of Article 12 prohibiting discrimina-
tion on nationality. No distinction was therefore made between sport as an
economic activity and other forms of work or services. Only when the prac-
tice of sport is of ‘purely sporting interest’, did the ECJ make such a distinc-
tion. As such national teams can discriminate on the grounds of
nationality.15
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Third, the prohibition of discrimination applies not only to the actions of
public authorities but also to rules of any other nature aimed at collectively
regulating gainful employment and services.16 Articles 39 and 49 therefore
carry horizontal direct effect. 
Fourth, relating to the applicability of EU law to events of world-wide sig-
nificance, such as the cycling championships in question, the ECJ ruled that
the rule on non-discrimination applies to all legal relationships in so far as
these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into
or the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the
EU.17
In accordance within the division between interpretation and application,
the ECJ referred its answers back to the national court leaving it to deter-
mine whether EU law applied to the case and whether the pacemaker and
the stayer were a team. In the event, Walrave and Koch declined to press for
a judgment by the Arrondissementsrechtbank because the UCI had allegedly
threatened to withdraw paced cycle racing from the World Championships
(Weatherill 1989).
Donà v. Mantero 197618
The second occasion on which the ECJ dealt with a sports-related case con-
cerned nationality rules in Italian football. The Italian Football Federation,
the Federazione Italiana del Gioco del Calcio (FIGC) controls the game of
football in Italy. Under its rules, players are required to hold a federation
membership card. Only the FIGC can issue such a card. Article 28(g) of the
federation’s rules stated that normally only players of Italian nationality,
residing in Italy could be issued with the card. An exemption was made for
foreign nationals who have never been members of a foreign federation who
are resident in Italy and ask to be enrolled as youths, amateurs or for recre-
ational purposes. For all other players the FIGC had total discretion as to
whether a card was to be issued.19 The rules effectively placed a heavy
restriction on non-Italian footballers playing professional football in Italy. A
challenge to these rules was brought by an agent who had attempted to
recruit players from abroad. The agent had been hired by the chairman of
an Italian league football club who wanted to explore the possibilities of
bringing foreign players to the club. The agent, Gaetano Donà placed an
advert in a Belgian sports newspaper. When, however, he claimed the costs
of this advert back on expenses, he was refused on the grounds that he had
acted too soon and Italian league rules prevented the use of foreign players.
Mr Donà sued for the amount of the advert before the Giudice Conciliatore
di Rovigo. 
The Giudice Coniliatore di Rovigo referred the case to the ECJ. In partic-
ular, the national court asked the ECJ to establish if the nationality require-
ment for playing in professional football matches in Italy was compatible
with EU law. The national court asked for clarification, initially on two key
Sport and the European Court of Justice 87
questions. First, whether Articles 12, 39 and 49 of the Treaty confer upon
all nationals of the member states of the EU the right to provide a service
anywhere in the EU and, secondly, whether football players also enjoy the
same right where their services are in the nature of a gainful occupation.
Depending on the answers to these two questions, a further two were asked.
First, the national court asked the ECJ to rule whether this right may also be
relied on to prevent the application of contrary rules drawn up by a sport-
ing federation that regulates football on the territory of a member state.
Second, the national court asked the ECJ whether the right in question is
directly effective. On first sight, these four questions appear disproportion-
ate for the purposes of the case. Some commentators have suggested the case
was contrived for the purposes of opening the Italian football league to
foreign players (Blanpain and Inston 1996).
Previously in Walrave the ECJ had established that sport is subject to EU
law when it is practised as an economic activity and has the character of
gainful employment or remunerated service. In particular, Articles 39 to 42
or 49 to 55 are applicable in this connection. These provisions give effect to
Article 12 of the Treaty, prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nation-
ality.
Trabucchi, the Advocate General appointed to the case, appeared to
suggest in his opinion delivered on 6 July 1976 that restrictions on nation-
ality in football matches may be justified. He argued:
there is, in my view, nothing to prevent considerations of purely sporting inter-
est from justifying the imposition of some restriction on the signing of foreign
players or at least on their participation in official championship matches so as
to ensure that the winning team will be representative of the state of which it
is the champion team. A condition of this kind seems all the more reasonable
when it is borne in mind that the team which wins the national championship
is often chosen to represent its own state in international competitions.
Trabucchi was therefore of the opinion that even the rules of sporting organ-
isations run as an economic concern may be exempt from the application of
non-discriminatory Treaty provisions. Sport may be a business, but it may
still also be simultaneously practised as an activity of purely sporting inter-
est. The question is whether these restrictions are appropriate and propor-
tionate to the end pursued. In answer to the referred questions, the ECJ
partly confirmed the main thrust of Trabucchi’s argument. The ECJ held:
1 Rules or a national practice, even adopted by a sporting organisation, which
limit the right to take part in football matches as professional or semi-
professional players solely to the nationals of the State in question, are
incompatible with Article 12 (ex 7) and, as the case may be, with Articles
39 to 42 or 49 to 55 (ex 48 to 51 or 59 to 66) of the Treaty, unless such rules
or practice exclude foreign players from participation in certain matches for
reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular
nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only.
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2 Article 39 (ex 48) on the one hand and the first paragraph of Article 49 (ex
59) and the third paragraph of Article 50 (ex 60) of the Treaty on the other
– the last two provisions at least in so far as they seek to abolish discrimi-
nation against a person providing a service by reason of his nationality or
the fact that he resides in a member state other than in which the service is
to be provided – have direct effect in the legal orders of the member states
and confer on individuals rights which national Courts must protect.
Once again, the ECJ referred its answers back to the national court for appli-
cation. 
UNECTEF v. Heylens 198720
Although players are the most important feature of the sporting contest,
many other individuals are involved in its production. In this connection,
sports clubs also employ physiotherapists, coaches, dieticians, psychologists
and trainers. Member states impose restrictions on foreign nationals wishing
to take up such posts. For example, the individual in question is normally
expected to be suitably qualified. In instances whereby qualifications are not
awarded by bodies within the member state, member states are under a EU
obligation to recognise equivalent qualifications gained in other member
states. For some professions the EU has established specific mutual recogni-
tion standards. However, in many instances no such standards exist.
Member states must therefore take appropriate measures to assess an indi-
vidual’s suitability. This is achieved by comparing the candidate’s credentials
with those required by national rules. The exercise of this judgement has
however been called into question. 
The Heylens case concerned a French requirement that in order to be a
football trainer in France, a person must be the holder of a French football-
trainer’s diploma or a foreign diploma which has been recognised as equiv-
alent by the French government. George Heylens, a Belgian national, trained
the Lille Olympic Sporting Clubs football team, a French club. His applica-
tion for recognition of a Belgian diploma was rejected by the French Ministry
of Sport. In the statement of reasons, the Ministry referred to the negative
opinion of a special committee. However, the special committee gave no
reasons for their negative opinion. The French football-trainers’ trade union
(UNECTEF) prosecuted Heylens and the directors of the football club before
the Lille Criminal Court because of his continued employment with the club.
The question of the compatibility with EU law of the French system for
deciding on the equivalence of diplomas law was referred to the ECJ.
The ECJ referred to the fundamental right of workers to move freely
within the EU. In this connection, the ECJ reiterated that member states must
take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations
arising from the Treaty. Nevertheless, the ECJ held that in the absence of har-
monisation of conditions of access to a particular occupation, the member
states are entitled to lay down the knowledge and qualifications needed in
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order to pursue it and to require the production of a diploma certifying that
the holder has the relevant attributes.21 However, the ECJ held that a deci-
sion refusing to recognise the equivalence of a diploma must be reviewable
to see whether it is compatible with Article 39 and to allow the person con-
cerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision. 
Comment on Walrave, Donà and Heylens
Combining the answers provided by the ECJ in Walrave, Donà and Heylens,
it is possible to draw a number of conclusions relevant to the question of the
pre-Bosman relationship between sport and EU law:
1 The ECJ has clearly established that sport is subject to EU law in so far
as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of
the Treaty. Exemptions from the principle of non-discrimination are per-
mitted but linked with the practise of sport on a non-economic basis. As
such, Article 39 does not concern itself with the composition of national
teams. 
2 Footballers are considered to be workers (employees of clubs) and as such
are protected by Article 39. The broad definition of a worker adopted by
the ECJ means that not only professional but also semi-professional and
amateur players are included if they provide services in return for remu-
neration. Players who are not remunerated by the club but are financially
rewarded indirectly (for instance through sponsorship) are not considered
workers. Solo players who are not employed and remunerated by a club
are also not considered workers in the context of Article 39 (but see
below). 
3 Article 39 is not only vertically directly effective, it is also horizontally
directly effective. As such, Article 39 covers the activities of private sports
associations. 
4 Articles 43 and 49 dealing with establishment rights and freedom to
provide services also apply to sport. Sportsmen and women who provide
services but are not employed by clubs are afforded protection from dis-
crimination by these Articles. As with Article 39, the discriminatory rule
in question must be economic in nature and not of purely sporting inter-
est. Two cases in English law illustrate this. In Wilander v. Tobin the Court
of Appeal indicated, without deciding, that the sanction of suspending
players who failed drug tests in tennis falls outside the scope of Article 49
as it concerned a rule governing sporting conduct.22 The players in ques-
tion argued that the rule prevented them from supplying services within
the EU. Similarly in Edwards v. BAF and IAAF, no breach of Article 49
was found concerning the International Amateur Athletics Federation’s
doping rules.23 These rules were also considered to be essentially con-
cerned with sporting conduct and as such fell outside the scope of Article
49. However, as Lord Woolf argued in Wilander, EU law still has the
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potential to apply to the rules concerning the conduct of sport as well as
to rules affecting the economic activity of sport. 
5 Sports associations are entitled to lay down the knowledge and qualifica-
tions needed to take up employment but they must provide reason why
they refuse to recognise a foreign diploma as equivalent. Furthermore,
such decisions must be reviewable to establish compatibility with Article
39.
URBSFA and others v. Bosman24
Despite the growing body of case law relating to discriminatory practices in
sport, the European Commission appeared unwilling to fully enforce the
Walrave and Donà rulings. Consultations between the Commission (Internal
Market DG) and UEFA on the continued use of nationality restrictions in
European football continued unsuccessfully until the Bosman judgement. In
1978, an agreement between Commissioner Davignon and UEFA was con-
cluded by which the federations had to modify their internal rules in order
to abolish discrimination on the grounds of nationality. A temporary agree-
ment was reached permitting first and second division clubs to restrict non-
nationals to two per match. Despite objections from the Commission and
the European Parliament, the restrictions remained in place. In December
1984, the Commission once again requested that discriminatory rules be
amended to conform to EU law, this time by 1 July 1985. The response of
UEFA and the national football associations was piecemeal. At the confer-
ence of the national Football Associations of EU member states held in July
1985, the associations approved a four-point plan proposed by UEFA.
1 Maximum of two non-nationals to be fielded per match.
2 ‘Sporting’ nationality to be granted after five years’ uninterrupted activ-
ity for a single association.
3 Qualifying period for applications for ‘sporting’ nationality to commence
1 July 1984.
4 Re-examination of the problem in 1989 to analyse the results obtained.
In September 1985, Commissioner Sutherland signalled his dissatisfac-
tion with the agreement. Not only had UEFA failed to abide by the July dead-
line, but fundamentally UEFA’s plans still contravened EU law. It was
Sutherland’s view that, ‘players have their rights under Community law . . .
if a player has the chance to secure his own future during a relatively short
career then who are the Commission to stop him? We are trying to ensure
that there is no restriction on freedom’ (Grayson 1994: 274).
Accordingly, the Commission once again requested that discriminatory
practises in sport be abolished. At a further meeting between the
Commission and UEFA/national federations in June 1987 the Commission
proposed:
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1 The participation of three nationals from another member state in all offi-
cial matches during the 1988–89 and 1989–90 seasons.
2 Continuous progress towards the achievement of total freedom of move-
ment, to be completed by 1992.
3 The creation of an evaluation group to consider the problems surround-
ing the free movement of professional players and its impact on profes-
sional football in general.
The proposals proved unacceptable to UEFA, although in 1991, after
further consultations between the two parties, UEFA adopted the 3+2 rule.
From July 1992, clubs could play not more than three non-nationals in the
team and two ‘assimilated’ players who have played in the country in ques-
tion for five years uninterruptedly, including three years in junior teams.
Initially, this rule applied to top division sides and was to be extended in the
1996/1997 season to all other non-amateur league’s. Individual associations
could frame rules allowing more foreign players to play. However, the 3+2
rule applied universally in club matches organised by UEFA. The Bosman
ruling brought an abrupt end to the 3+2 formula.
The Commission’s attitude towards discriminatory practises in sport
throughout this period was somewhat contradictory. The Commission
adopted a generally consistent view that discriminatory practises in sport
should be abolished. However, they failed to ensure compliance with EU law
and instead favoured a negotiated settlement with UEFA in the form of a
gentleman’s agreement. How can this be accounted for? First, the
Commission recognised that, although sport could be defined as an eco-
nomic activity, it still possessed certain qualities necessitating a softer inter-
pretation of the law. Despite previous ECJ cases, European football in the
late 1970s and early 1980s was regarded as a marginal economic activity at
best. Second, the Commission appeared reluctant to use the direct sanction
of competition law against UEFA. The status of the Competition Policy
Directorate in the 1970s and early 1980s was not as established as it is today
(see next chapter). Furthermore, the question of the relationship between
sport and competition law was nascent. However, by ‘sanctioning’ the 3+2
nationality rule, the Commission was effectively sanctioning discriminatory
practises. 
Background 
On 10 May 1988, Jean Marc Bosman, a Belgian national, signed a two-year
contract with the Belgian first division football club, SA Royal Club Liégeois
(RC Liège). His contract with the club guaranteed him a gross basic salary,
excluding bonuses of 75,000 Belgian Francs (BFR) a month, up until its expi-
ration on 30 June 1990.25 Under Article 5 of his contract with the club, it
was agreed that on expiry, either naturally or prematurely, the football club
would retain the player’s registration. Any future transfer of the player at the
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end of his contract would then be regulated by the rules of the Belgian
Football Association.
In April 1990, two months before the end of the Bosman’s contract, RC
Liège offered the player a new one-year contract at BFR 30,000, the Belgian
leagues (URBSFA) minimum wage.26 Bosman rejected the new terms as it
represented a significant pay cut. In accordance with Article 46 of the
Associations rules on transfers of professional and non-amateur players on
expiry of their contracts, the club placed him on the transfer list as a ‘com-
pulsory transfer’ at a price of BFR 11,734,000, a price fixed by a calculation
made on his last wage and the minimum in the event of him being transferred
without the agreement of RC Liège. This means that if the player and the
acquiring club agree to the transfer and the transfer fee set by the associa-
tion’s rules is paid, the transfer can go ahead even without the agreement of
the vendor (the ‘compulsory’ transfer). 
No club showed an interest in signing Bosman on a ‘compulsory’ transfer.
On 1 June, the ‘compulsory’ element of the transfer came to an end and the
period of ‘free’ transfer started. In this period a transfer fee can be freely nego-
tiated as long as all three parties, including the vendor agrees. Bosman
attempted to set up his own exit from the club by contacting an interested
second division French league side, SA d’Économie Mixte Sportive de L’Union
Sportive du Littoral de Dunkerque (US Dunkerque) who were prepared to
offer the player BFR 90,000 a month. On the 27 July 1990, US Dunkerque
and RC Liège agreed on the terms of the player’s temporary transfer. The
player was to move to US Dunkerque for one season in return for a payment
of BFR 1,200,000, payable on receipt of the transfer certificate from URBSFA.
US Dunkerque were given an option to purchase the player on a permanent
basis at the end of the initial period for a further fee of BFR 4,800,000. The
contracts between Bosman and US Dunkerque and US Dunkerque and RC
Liège were conditional on the Belgian Association issuing a transfer certifi-
cate that was to reach the French Football Federation by 2 August.
Concerned about the solvency of Dunkerque, RC Liège did not seek the
necessary international certificate from the Belgian Association. The trans-
fer collapsed and under Article 46(5)(a) of the Belgian Association rules, RC
Liège secured his suspension from the Belgian Football Authority on 31 July
1990. In its letter to the Association and to the player, the club explained,
‘since no Belgian or foreign club has wished to transfer you and you have
refused to sign that contract we find ourselves obliged to suspend you’ (cited
in Blanpain and Inston 1996: 62).
Unable to play professional football, Bosman applied to the Tribunal de
Première in Liège on 8 August 1990. In addition to his main claim, Bosman
applied for an interim order guaranteeing him three things. First, he wanted
RC Liège and URBSFA to pay him BFR 100,000 a month whilst he found
alternative employment. Second, to facilitate his search for alternative
employment, Bosman wanted an order restraining RC Liège and URBSFA
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from claiming or levying any sum when appropriate work was found. Third,
he wanted the case to be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
On 9 November 1990, the Tribunal de Première ordered RC Liège to pay
Bosman BFR 30,000 a month, granted the restraining order and referred the
case to the ECJ seeking a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the trans-
fer system with Articles 6 and 39 of the Treaty. On 28 May 1991, on appeal,
the Cour d’Appel in Liège quashed the Tribunal de Première’s ruling relat-
ing to the preliminary reference to the ECJ. The first two orders relating to
a monthly salary and a free transfer were however upheld. In June 1991, in
response to this case, the ECJ withdrew Case-340/90 from its register.
Having been granted a free transfer, Bosman joined a French second divi-
sion club, Saint-Quentin in October 1990. At the end of the season, that con-
tract was terminated. In February 1992, Bosman signed for Saint-Denis de
la Réunion, a contract also terminated after a short period. In May 1993, he
then signed for a third division Belgian team, Royal Olympic Club de
Charleroi. Suspicion grew that Bosman had been blacklisted by most
European clubs.
In the main proceedings in August 1990, also brought before the Tribunal
de Première, Bosman claimed damages against RC Liège. This related not
only to breach of contract but also to the legality of the transfer system. In
August 1991, Bosman brought action against UEFA as well attempting to
have UEFA’s transfer rules declared null and void and in breach of Articles
39, 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty. In April 1992, Bosman amended his claim
against RC Liège and UEFA and brought a separate action against URBSFA.
In these further applications, Bosman sought further compensation and
attempted to reactivate the preliminary reference to the ECJ.
On 11 June 1992, the Tribunal de Première Instance ruled that RC Liège
had acted unlawfully in causing Bosman’s transfer to US Dunkerque to col-
lapse. For this, Bosman was to be compensated. In addition, the national
court made a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpre-
tation of Articles 39, 81 and 82 of the Treaty in relation to the operation of
the transfer system. A further appeal was held before the Cour d’Appel in
Liège in October 1993. The findings of the Tribunal de Première Instance
were upheld and the Cour d’Appel made its own reference to the ECJ. Acting
on a suggestion from Bosman, the national court also requested an examina-
tion of the rules relating to restrictions on foreign players. The Cour d’Appel
submitted the following questions to the ECJ:
Are Articles 39, 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome of March 1957 to be inter-
preted as: (1) prohibiting a football club from requiring and receiving payment
of a sum of money upon the engagement of one of its players who has come
to the end of his contract by a new employing club; and (2) prohibiting the
national and international sporting associations or federations from including
in their respective regulations provisions restricting access of foreign players
from the European Community to the competitions which they organise?
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These two questions relate to two UEFA sanctioned practices regarding
transfer fees and restrictions on foreign players. First, under the UEFA inter-
national transfer rules, a club selling a player is entitled to compensation for
training and development from the acquiring club, even if the player was no
longer under contract with the vendor. Only the first club is entitled to com-
pensation for training whereas each subsequent club is only entitled to a
development fee. If the club’s valuation of the player differs, a board of
experts established by UEFA fixes the fee having taken into account the gross
income of the player in the preceding season multiplied by a factor depend-
ing upon the player’s age.
The second question related to the widely employed practise in European
football of restricting the number of foreign players able to play for a club.
After protracted consultations between the European Commission and
UEFA, the 3+2 rule was adopted (see above). The ECJ handed down its full
judgement on 15 December 1995. By doing so, the ECJ supplied the defini-
tive answers to the questions posed by the national court. 
Transfer rules
In relation to the application of Article 39 concerning transfer rules, the ECJ
did not significantly diverge from the opinion of Advocate General Lenz. The
ECJ dismissed the claims of URBSFA, UEFA and some national governments
that Article 39 was not applicable. URBSFA had claimed that only the major
clubs are economic units and that rules on transfers relate only to the rela-
tionship between clubs. UEFA had claimed that EU authorities have always
respected the autonomy of sport and to change the transfer system would
fundamentally affect the whole organisation of sport.27 The German govern-
ment had claimed that football is not an economic activity at all and sport
should be seen in the same light as culture. In addition, the German govern-
ment, referring to freedom of association and subsidiarity, argued that the
EU must limit their involvement in this area to what is strictly necessary.28
The ECJ repeated the findings of the Advocate General in relation to the
definition of sport as an economic activity.29 Furthermore, the ECJ agreed
with Advocate General Lenz in relation to the issue of transfer rules only
concerning the relationship between clubs and not the relationship between
club and player. If a player’s employment opportunities are restricted by this
relationship between clubs, then Article 39 is relevant.30 In relation to
UEFA’s claim that an adverse ruling would have huge consequences for the
organisation of football, the ECJ held that the consequences of a judgement
cannot be allowed to interfere with the principle of law, nor its application.31
On the question of the cultural analogy, the ECJ argued that this cannot be
accepted because the original reference from the national court did not relate
to the conditions under which EU powers of limited extent may be exercised
but on the scope of the freedom of movement of workers guaranteed by
Article 39.32 Regarding the issue of freedom of association, the ECJ held that
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the rules laid down by sporting associations cannot be seen as necessary to
ensure enjoyment of that freedom by those associations, by the clubs or
players.33 Finally, in relation to the claim that the principle of subsidiarity
applies, the ECJ held that this principle cannot be used to restrict the exer-
cise of rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty.34 On the question as to
whether the dispute between Bosman and URBSFA was wholly internal, the
ECJ ruled that, although case law had established that Article 39 cannot be
applied to situations that are wholly internal to member state, the cross
border requirement had been in evidence as Bosman was seeking to move
abroad.35
Accordingly, the ECJ held that Article 39 does apply to the rules laid
down by URBSFA, FIFA or UEFA, thus confirming the horizontal direct
effectiveness of Article 39. Having established this fact, the ECJ proceeded
to assess the extent to which transfer rules form an obstacle to freedom of
movement for workers. In this connection the ECJ agreed with Bosman and
the Advocate General that these rules did constitute such an obstacle.36 This
point is not affected by the fact that UEFA’s 1990 transfer rules state that the
business relationship between the two clubs is to exert no influence on the
activity of the player, who is free to play for his new club. Despite this refer-
ence, the purchasing club must still pay a fee to the vendor. As such the
vendor maintains a financial interest in the player, even though they hold no
contractual interest in him. This is an obstacle to the freedom of movement
of workers. Furthermore, the fact that these rules are equally applied is irrel-
evant. 
The ECJ held that the ‘public interest’ justification for the maintenance of
the transfer system claimed by the defendants should also be dismissed.
URBSFA, UEFA and the governments of France and Italy had claimed that
transfer rules are justified by the need to maintain a financial and competi-
tive balance between clubs and to support the search for talent and the train-
ing of young players.37 In this connection, the ECJ agreed with the Advocate
General that this aim was legitimate but less-restrictive measures could
achieve the same aims as the transfer system.38
In answer to the first question posed by the national court, the ECJ there-
fore clearly answered that Article 39 precludes the application of transfer
rules which permits payment for an out-of-contract player wishing to move
between clubs in different member states.
Nationality restrictions
The ECJ drew the same conclusion in relation to the application of Article 39
to rules restricting the number of foreign players eligible to play for clubs. The
ECJ held that Article 39(2) guarantees freedom of movement for workers and
the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality. Nationality quotas
clearly represent a breach of these provisions even though the rules relate to
the fielding of players and not to their employment.39 It is after all unlikely,
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although not unheard of, for clubs to employ players they are incapable of
fielding. Having established the existence of an obstacle to free movement,
the ECJ reviewed the arguments presented by UEFA, URBSFA and some
national governments justifying such restrictions on the grounds that they
were non-economic sporting rules. The ECJ rejected this justification in
accordance with the Opinion of the Advocate General. First, on the question
that nationality restrictions maintain the link between club and country, the
ECJ held that no rule has been established linking a club to a locality, there-
fore none should exist linking a club to a country. Second, on the issue relat-
ing to nationality restrictions being necessary to ensure a pool of players
eligible to play for the national team, the ECJ argued that no rules exist lim-
iting a national team’s choice of players to one association. National teams
can still pick eligible players who play abroad. Third, the ECJ held that
nationality restrictions do not maintain a competitive balance between clubs
because the richer teams can still recruit the best national players regardless.
Finally, in relation to UEFA’s argument that nationality restrictions were sanc-
tioned by the European Commission, the ECJ held that the Commission does
not possess the power to authorise practices that are contrary to the Treaty.40
To the second question posed by the national court, the ECJ therefore
once again held that Article 39 had been breached, this time in relation to
the use of nationality restrictions. In relation to the application of Articles
81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86), the ECJ simply remarked, ‘since both types of rule
to which the national Court’s questions refer are contrary to Article 48 (now
39), it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty’.41 On the grounds mentioned above, the ECJ answered the ques-
tions posed by the Cour d’Appel, Liège in the following way:
1 Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down
by sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a
national of one member state may not, on the expiry of his contract with
a club, be employed by a club of another member state unless the latter
club has paid the former club a transfer, training or development fee.
2 Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down
by sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which
they organise, football clubs may field only a limited number of profes-
sional players who are nationals of other member states.
3 The direct effect of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty cannot be relied upon in
support of claims relating to a fee in respect of transfer, training or devel-
opment which has already been paid on, or is still payable under an obli-
gation which arose before the date of this judgement, except by those who
have brought proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the appli-
cable national law before that date.
The imposition of the temporal limitation on the judgement concern-
ing the transfer system avoided the inevitable chaos a retroactive ruling on
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transfers would have created. Nevertheless, the impact of Bosman on sport
had immediate effects (see for instance Morris et al. 1996, Miller 1996,
Gardiner et al. 1998, Beloff et al. 1999 and Caiger and Gardiner 2000). 
First, clearly the international transfer system and nationality rules had to
be re-modelled.Nevertheless, the rulingdoesnotdirectlyaffect transferswhen
a player is in contract. The ruling only affects players who are out of contract.
Second, internal transfer rules remain only theoretically untouched by
Bosman because the ECJ decided to base the ruling on Article 39, not Article
81 relating to restrictive agreements. Article 39 applies only to the interna-
tional transfer system and not to situations that are wholly internal. As such,
national transfer rules continue to apply to cases where a player moves
between two clubs in the same association. However, following Bosman, the
Commission held the opinion that certain aspects of national transfer
systems violate Article 81. Although the indirect consequence of the ruling
saw most internal transfer rules being reformulated in Europe, the
Commission continued their investigation into such rules leading to the total
reformulation of transfer rules in 2001 (see next chapter). 
Third, the ruling does not affect transfers of non-EU nationals from one
EU/EEA state to another. Furthermore, the ruling does not concern transfers
from the EU to third countries. However, although non-EU/EEA players
cannot rely on the ruling in relation to transfers, players who are nationals
of a country that has concluded an association or co-operation agreement
with the EU prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality cannot
be excluded from playing in a team because of their nationality. This also
assumes that the free movement provisions have direct effect. Such countries
include Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are
part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and are thus fully covered by the
ruling. As such the ruling fully applies to 18 European countries.42 The appli-
cation of Article 81 may however alter the situation regarding the transfer
of players from third countries.43
Fourth, the ruling does not affect the composition of national teams. This
is because Article 39 relates only to economic activity and national teams are
not deemed as such.44 Is this view still defensible? In modern international
sport many sportsmen and women have entered into appearance contracts
with their national associations (Hoskins 1999: 10–11). As Leeds United and
Rio Ferdinand discovered, participation in the Football World Cup can have
an enormous influence on a player’s value.45
Fifth, the ruling was not restricted to football. Sport, in so far as it con-
stitutes an economic activity, is subject to EU law. This means that all sports
in Europe operating restrictions on EU citizens and similar transfer rules to
football, must comply. The main sports to be affected are ice hockey, basket-
ball, handball and rugby. Clearly not all sports are as commercially devel-
oped as football. 
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Comment on Bosman
The ECJ first had to establish the applicability of Treaty rules to sports
bodies. In this connection the ECJ did not break new ground by merely con-
firming the findings in Walrave and Donà which established that sport is
subject to EU law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity. In addition
the ECJ confirmed the horizontal direct effectiveness of Article 39. The reach
of Article 39 (and for that matter 43 and 49) went beyond the acts of public
authorities to cover the actions of private individuals and firms. Article 39
therefore covers any rules aimed at regulating employment in a collective
manner. If Article 39 was not horizontally directly effective, private actors
could effectively re-construct restrictions previously abolished between
states. 
The ECJ then needed to establish whether the rules on eligibility criteria
and international transfer constituted restrictions. In this connection, the
ECJ went beyond a mere confirmation of previous sports-related case law by
suggesting that all restrictions to free movement (and not just discriminatory
ones) are caught within the scope of Article 39. 
Nationality rules The ECJ found that UEFA’s 3+2 nationality rules clearly
placed foreign nationals at a disadvantage in comparison to home nationals.
However, the ECJ held that nationality rules were not simply an example of
discrimination, but were an obstacle to free movement as they restricted
access to the employment market. This represents ‘a significant change of
emphasis’ and one which potentially has far-reaching consequences for sport
(O’Keefe and Osbourne 1996: 119). By taking this stance, the ECJ has estab-
lished a much stronger link between sport and the EU. If nationality restric-
tions are not to be simply considered an issue of discrimination but rather
an obstacle to free movement, then potentially a much greater range of sport-
ing rules will be caught by the scope of Article 39. Therefore, rather than
‘contracting’ into the Treaty, sport must now justify why it should ‘contract’
out of it. 
Transfer system On transfers, the ECJ held that the nature of the transfer
rules imposed non-discriminatory restrictions on players, even though such
rules govern business relations between clubs. The ECJ decided to view the
transfer rules as a restriction despite the fact that the existence of the trans-
fer rule did not make it more difficult for a player to move between clubs in
different member states than between clubs in the same state. As such, the
ECJ held that the application of Article 39 went beyond a mere prohibition
of discrimination, but extended to all restrictions. This extension had first
been made in Ramrath and in Kraus, two cases unconcerned with sport.46
However, Bosman differed from these cases because the restriction was not
created in the host state but the home state, i.e. Bosman’s own state of
Belgium. Bosman’s freedom of movement was restricted by the actions of
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parties within his own country, not the host country. Although previous cases
prohibited restrictions being placed on an individual leaving a state (as
opposed to entering) in relation to Article 43, this was the first occasion it was
extended to Article 39. This broadening took place despite the ruling in
Keck47 in which the ECJ held that Article 28 (free movement of goods) does
not apply to rules on certain selling arrangements provided that they apply
to all relevant traders within the national territory and that they affect in same
manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic and imported goods.
A case can therefore be made to apply Keck to Bosman given that transfer
rules applied equally to all clubs in all member states and affected foreign and
domestic transfers equally. The ECJ chose not to extend Keck beyond the free
movement of goods, instead relying on the Alpine Investments ruling.48
Alpine concerned restrictions within the host state affecting access to the
market of another member state. Keck concerned the rules of the ‘importing’
state. The ECJ therefore made a distinction between the two cases equating
Bosman with Alpine and not Keck (O’Keefe and Osbourne 1996: 116–118).
Having established that nationality rules and transfer rules constitute restric-
tions on mobility, the ECJ had to examine the question of justified restric-
tions and proportionality. At issue here was the sporting exception.
Restrictions of a discriminatory nature can only be justified if covered by
Article 39(3) relating to grounds of public policy, public security or public
health. Non-discriminatory measures can only be justified by ‘imperative
reasons’ such as the need to protect sports social function. However, as indi-
cated above, these justifications do not take sport outside the scope of EU
law. This is a significant finding and one which distinguishes Bosman from
earlier sports-related case law. The ECJ indicated that sport possesses par-
ticular features that mark it out from other ‘normal’ industries. However, the
justifications submitted to the ECJ in support of the maintenance of nation-
ality rules and the transfer system were rejected, thus placing further limits
on concept of a sporting exception. Such restrictions were not considered
proportionate to the aims submitted. Basing their judgement on the opinion
of the Advocate General, the ECJ argued that alternative measures such as
collective wage agreements and financial redistribution between the clubs
were more proportionate measures. Both mechanisms contain features that
would arguably be considered illegal in ‘normal’ industries. Whilst, there-
fore, the ECJ’s ruling represented a damning condemnation of traditional
sporting practices, it is incorrect to assume that the Court treated sport in
the same manner as any other industry. Arguably, therefore, the birth of EU
sports law had its roots in Bosman. Nevertheless, Bosman had more to do
with the Single Market project and the scope of Article 39 than it did sport.
The sweeping condemnation of all out-of-contract payments rejected any
notion of a reformed transfer system – a possibility raised by the Advocate
General.49
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Nevertheless, Bosman has far-reaching consequences for sport. Sport is
clearly subject to EU law and Article 39 is horizontally directly effective.
Furthermore, Article 39 extends beyond the prohibition of discriminatory
practices to include non-discriminatory practices which restricts free move-
ment. By adopting such an approach the argument is now less concerned
with whether sport falls outside the Treaty but under what circumstances are
sports rules justifiable under the Treaty. However, the key implication of
Bosman related to enforcement. The full consequences of Walrave and Donà
did not occur because the Commission did not rigorously enforce the rulings.
Following Bosman the Commission became more energetic in enforcing the
competition policy implications of the ruling. This has had a profound effect
on how sport is being regulated in the twenty-first century.
The Deliège and Lehtonen cases
As indicated above, in Bosman the ECJ recognised ‘the considerable social
importance of sporting activities’.50 However, it went on to explain why
nationality restrictions and the operation of the international transfer system
could not be justified and as such exempted from the application of Article
39. Nevertheless, as Foster explains, ‘in retrospect this paragraph can be seen
as the genesis of the Court’s attempt to formulate a policy of non-
intervention in sport’ (Foster 2000a: 47). The ECJ has recently been
requested to consider two further sports-related disputes, one concerning
judo, the other basketball. 
Christelle Deliège v. Asbl Ligue Francophone de Judo and Others51
In Deliège, the ECJ heard a case concerning a Belgian judoka who claimed
that her career had been impeded by the refusal of the Belgium judo author-
ity to allow her to participate in the 1992 Olympic Games held in Barcelona
and the 1996 Games held in Atlanta. In order to participate in these events
potential participants needed the authorisation from the relevant national
federation. Although considered a very good judoka, Miss Deliège failed to
make the Belgian Olympic team, having failed to achieve the necessary qual-
ification criteria. Failure to gain selection would undoubtedly inhibit her
career. Miss Deliège believed that, although judo is considered an amateur
pursuit, she was carrying out an economic activity and as such had economic
rights guaranteed by Articles 49, 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The case was
referred to the ECJ by the Tribunal de Première de Namur who asked:
Whether or not it is contrary to the Treaty of Rome, in particular Articles 49,
81 and 82 of the Treaty, to require professional or semi-professional athletes
or persons aspiring to professional or semi-professional activity to be author-
ised by their federation in order to be able to compete in an international
competition which does not involve national teams competing against each
other.
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As in Bosman, the ECJ did not address the question of competition law.
On the question of the freedom to provide services, the ECJ confirmed that
the activities of athletes (even amateur athletes) are capable of falling within
the scope of Article 49. Organising the sporting contest allows the organis-
ers to commercially exploit the secondary features of the contest such as
broadcasting and sponsorship rights. Furthermore, Deliège received a grant
to train and compete. Despite giving clear guidance in this matter, the ECJ
did not form an opinion on whether Miss Deliège’s activities were economic
in nature. This was for the national court to decide. The ECJ did however
acknowledge the ‘considerable social importance of sport’52 and did refer to
the Amsterdam Treaty’s Declaration on the social significance of sport.53 In
this connection, the ECJ considered the selection rules derived from a need
inherent in the organisation of the sport and as such were not to be consid-
ered a restriction on the ability to provide services. Allowing anyone to
compete in competitions is clearly unworkable. However, the ECJ held that
sports organisations must be able to demonstrate that selection rules are
based on objective justifiable principles. On 11 April 2000, the ECJ deliv-
ered its judgement. It held:
A rule requiring professional or semi-professional athletes or persons aspiring
to take part in a professional or semi-professional activity to have been author-
ised or selected by their federation in order to be able to participate in a high-
level international sports competition, which does not involve national teams
competing against each other, does not in itself, as long as it derives from a
need inherent in the organisation of such a competition, constitute a restric-
tion on the freedom to provide services prohibited by Article 49 of the EC
Treaty.
Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v. Fédération Royale 
des Sociétés de Basketball and Ligue Belge-Belgische Liga54
The second case concerned transfer deadlines in Belgian Basketball. Jyri
Lehtonen, a Finnish Basketball player was transferred from a Finnish to a
Belgian basketball team. However, the Belgian basketball federation refused
to register him on the grounds that the transfer had not taken place within
the specified ‘transfer window’. Un-registered players are prevented from
competing in Belgian competitions. In Belgium, players are unable to be
transferred outside these transfer seasons. This is a common practise in
European sport. To make matters worse for Castors Braine, the Belgian team
who had acquired Lehtonen, they had already played him in a winning game
only to have the result over-turned due to the breach of transfer rules.
Lehtonen and Castors Braine applied to the Court of First Instance in
Brussels for an interim order on the over-turned match and the sanctions
imposed on Lehtonen. The national court referred the following question to
the ECJ:
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Are the rules of a sports federation which prohibit a club from playing a player
in the competition for the first time if he has been engaged after a specified date
contrary to the Treaty of Rome (in particular Articles 12, 39, 81 and 82) in the
case of a professional player who is a national of a member state of the
European Union, notwithstanding the sporting reasons put forward by the fed-
erations to justify those rules, namely the need to prevent distortion of the com-
petitions?
In answering the above question, the ECJ was guided by Walrave, Donà
and Bosman in deciding that the activities of sport are subject to EU law and
that employees of sports clubs are to be considered workers. However, as in
Deliège, the ECJ acknowledged the ‘considerable social importance of sport’
and made further mention of the Amsterdam Treaty’s Declaration on the
social significance of sport.55 On the question of whether the rules on trans-
fer deadlines constituted a restriction on free movement, the ECJ found that
the rule in question was such an obstacle even though the restriction related
to fielding players and not employing them. The ECJ then had to decide
whether such restrictions were justifiable and proportionate. Could the rule
be justified as non-economic in nature and as such of sporting interest only?
In the Opinion of the Advocate General, the protection of a sporting com-
petition against distortion is in the public interest. As such public interest jus-
tifications could be employed to protect transfer deadlines. The ECJ agreed
with the submissions of the Basketball Federation that rules on transfer
deadlines were sporting rules which were necessary for the organisation of
the game. Late transfers could substantially alter the sporting strength of
teams in the course of the championship thus calling into question the proper
functioning of sporting competition. However, the ECJ argued that such
rules must not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the desired aim.
The differential treatment of players from inside and outside Europe, which
the rules promoted, went beyond what was necessary and as such were pro-
hibited by Article 39.56 Again, the ECJ did not address the question of com-
petition law. Therefore in answer to the questions referred by the Tribunal
de Première Instance, Brussels, on 13 April 2000, the ECJ held:
Article 39 EC precludes the application of rules laid down in a member state
by sporting associations which prohibit a basketball club from fielding players
from other member states in matches in the national championship, where they
have been transferred after a specified date, if that date is earlier than the date
which applies to transfers of players from certain non member countries, unless
objective reasons concerning only sport as such or relating to differences
between the position of players from a federation in the European zone and that
of players from a federation not in that zone justify such different treatment.
Comment on Deliège and Lehtonen
Deliège and Lehtonen bring a degree of respite for sport without undermin-
ing previous sports case law. As Bell and Turner-Kerr remark, ‘at a time when
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it seems that the legality of nearly every sports regulation is being called into
question, it is at least welcome for the ECJ to recognise that there are certain
areas where sports governing bodies retain the authority and competence to
regulate the disciplines for which they are responsible’ (Bell and Turner-Kerr
2002: 260). In essence the rules which sports bodies retain competence over
concern those which are inherent in the conduct and/or organisation of
sporting events.
The significance of Deliège lies in the ECJ’s view that selection criteria do
not necessarily constitute a restriction under Article 49. This places a small
limit on the application to sporting contexts of the freedom to provide ser-
vices provisions. In Lehtonen, the significant finding is that, even though
transfer windows do constitute a restriction to free movement, they are able
to be justified on sporting grounds and as such are capable of being exempt
from the application of Article 39.57 The Opinion of the Advocate General
who equated such sporting interest arguments not with sporting autonomy
justifications but with the ‘public interest’ justification is potentially signifi-
cant. If sports bodies are able to connect sporting interest arguments with
public interest justifications, this could act as a vehicle for the protection of
the remaining autonomy sports organisations possess. Given that the purpose
of Articles 39 and 49 is to protect workers and not the organisation of sport,
the public interest finding could prove a significant precedent for sports
bodies, particularly given that the Commission are beginning to draw similar
findings in connection with their sports-related competition law case load.
The Bosman ruling demonstrated that the ECJ was sensitive to the eco-
nomic context surrounding the recently completed Single Market project.
The Deliège and Lehtonen rulings also need placing in context. First, the
rulings took place within the context of an on-going discussion in the EU on
how best to reconcile the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of sport
within the EU structure.58 Significantly, in both cases the ECJ made mention
of the Amsterdam Treaty’s Declaration on Sport, even though it carries no
legal force. The reference to the Declaration indicates that the ECJ has been
sensitive to this debate. Although the ECJ has consistently refused to answer
referred questions concerning competition law, the reference to the
Declaration has undoubtedly informed the Commission’s approach to sport. 
Second, Bosman allowed the ECJ to clarify and extend some important
issues relating to the scope of Article 39. The legal broadening that took
place in Bosman was arguably as significant to the free movement of workers
as the wide definition of restriction adopted in Dassonville was to the free
movement of goods.59 As such, following Bosman, Lehtonen placed limits
on the scope of Article 39 in a manner similar to Keck’s limitation of Article
28 following Dassonville. 
Nevertheless, as Foster argues, there are limits to the rulings. In Lehtonen,
the ECJ made specific mention of the impact transfer deadlines have on play-
off games.60 Does this justification extend to all-play-all leagues? Some
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sports prevent a player from competing for two separate sides in a knock-
out competition but allow this in a league format. As such, ‘the general legal-
ity of transfer deadlines per se cannot safely be assumed by the judgment’
(Foster 2000a: 49). Furthermore, in Deliège, it remains unclear exactly what
objective standards for selection are. Objective criteria is apparent in sports
such as tennis and golf where rankings and handicap determine competition
entrance. However, subjective criteria is apparent in other team sports where
picking players who ‘blend’ is more important than picking the best players.
Deliège also avoided the question of selection for national teams. The ECJ
held that it was affiliation to the appropriate national federation that was
the basis for selection to international tournaments and not nationality
(Foster 2000: 51). In a wider sense, the key limit to the rulings is that very
little sport has been taken outside the scope of the Treaty. In fact, by finding
that unpaid amateur sports men and women are workers, the rulings have
effectively further undermined the concept of sport as a non-economic activ-
ity. 
Conclusions
The value of an actor-centred institutional analysis is demonstrated when
observing the impact of ECJ jurisprudence on the sports policy subsystem.
An ‘old’ institutional analysis would tend to confirm the privileged position
the Court enjoys in terms of interpreting and applying the law. A ‘new’ insti-
tutional analysis reveals the extent to which informal practices and complex
institutional relationships have affected the development of EU sports law
and policy. 
The ECJ is clearly an important agenda setter in the EU in that it not only
defines the content of the EU’s systemic agenda, it also specifies the condi-
tions under which an issue is transferred to the institutional agenda for active
policy development. The role of the ECJ in this respect should not however
be viewed as deterministic. The relationship between the ECJ and the other
EU institutions is crucial for policy definition. Sufficient sports-related case
law exists to illustrate this point. ECJ rulings in Walrave and Donà estab-
lished sport as an item on the EU’s systemic agenda. The rulings established
that sport was subject to EU law whenever practiced as an economic activ-
ity. The rulings should be seen in the context of the time. The 1970s have
been characterised as a period of stagnation for the EU. Economic and polit-
ical crisis contributed to a slowing of ‘ever-closer union’. In the absence of a
political impetus, the ECJ ensured the original Treaty of Rome bargain was
continued. Hence, Walrave and Donà served to widen the scope of the
Treaty and afford greater protection to workers. The impact of the rulings
on sport was however limited. The Commission did little to enforce the
central findings in the cases, preferring instead a negotiated settlement with
the sports authorities. As such, sport remained in a largely latent regulatory
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space and the transfer of sport from the EU’s systemic to the institutional
agenda remained incomplete.
The major impetus for sports eventual passage on to the institutional
agenda for active EU consideration came with Bosman. Bosman destroyed
the Commission’s negotiated settlement approach. The changed economic
status of sport contributed to the ECJ’s forceful ruling and the Commission’s
more energetic use of competition law to enforce Bosman. Despite the sub-
missions of various governments in Bosman, the ECJ’s ruling was also a
response to a political impetus. Although a legal and bureaucratic exercise of
immense proportions, the newly completed Single Market represented a
triumph of political will. The ECJ’s extension of the scope of Article 39 was
consistent with the broad thrust of the Single European Act/Single European
Market project. As such, sports functional link to the Single Market was an
unanticipated consequence of the wider Single Market project. Sport now
operated within a EU regulatory environment. The legal consequence of
Bosman was that the EU no longer had to justify why sport was subject to EU
law, but rather sport would have to justify why it should be exempt from the
Treaty. Even so, the acknowledgement by the ECJ that sport was different to
other ‘normal’ industries may be interpreted as the genesis of EU sports law.
Items on the EU’s systemic agenda are often transferred on to the institu-
tional agenda with definitional bias. Sport, for instance, was transferred
through a legal/regulatory venue involving a close relationship between the
ECJ and the Commission. However, the EU’s institutional agenda is very
open. As an item for active policy consideration, sport has proved a relatively
malleable item. The rulings in Deliège and Lehtonen again reflect the polit-
ical context of the day. The ECJ has confirmed that sport is subject to EU
law but has given clearer guidelines on sporting justification arguments. In
this connection, the ECJ has been sensitive to the post-Bosman political
debate on how to reconcile EU law with sports social status. Deliège and
Lehtonen represent the ECJ’s contribution to the construction of the separ-
ate territories approach and, therefore, the development of EU sports law.
The member states, the European Parliament and the Education and Culture
Directorate General have been active in promoting this message. Deliège and
Lehtonen have also informed the activities of the Directorate General for
Competition Policy. Whereas the ECJ has responded to the political debate
by being sympathetic to the ‘inherent sporting rule’ justification when decid-
ing cases, the Commission has recently indicated that exemptions from com-
petition law may be an appropriate way of reconciling EU law with sports
social status. It is to this that the next chapter turns. 
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5
Sport and EU competition law
In applying EU competition law to sport, the Directorate General for
Competition Policy (herein referred to as the Commission) has been caught
between three powerful forces. First, the Commission has a constitutional
commitment to promote and protect the free market principles on which
much of the Treaty of Rome is based. In this capacity it shares a close rela-
tionship with the ECJ. The ECJ’s rulings in Walrave, Donà and Bosman have
played an important role in placing sport on the EU’s systemic agenda in a
regulatory form. The Commission has a constitutional obligation to follow
the ECJ’s line of reasoning on sport, given its role in enforcing ECJ rulings.
As such, sport has passed on to the EU’s institutional agenda through the
regulatory venue, the prevailing definition stressing sports commercial sig-
nificance over and above its social, cultural and educational dimensions. 
The second major influence on Commission jurisprudence in the sports
sector is administrative. Although primary and secondary legislation has
equipped the Commission with the necessary legal powers to execute this
commitment, it lacks the necessary administrative means to carry out formal
investigations into abuses in all sectors of the economy. In the face of a large
and growing caseload, the Commission has had to adopt creative means in
order to turn over cases. In particular, the Commission has resorted to the
use of informal procedures to settle cases rather than adopting formal deci-
sions. For some time it has been felt by Commission officials that the proce-
dures for applying competition law are in need of reform. It is within this
context that in September 2000, the Commission proposed a regulation to
devolve its competition powers to national courts and regulatory agencies.1
The proposed Regulation seeks to establish a system whereby ‘both the pro-
hibition rule set out in Article 81(1) and the exemption rule contained in
Article 81(3) can be directly applied by not only the Commission but also
national courts and national competition authorities’.2 This would in effect
end the Commission’s monopoly over the application of Article 81(3).
Whilst the Commission’s proposal acknowledges that the system worked
well with six member states, the monopoly has created difficulties for the
uniform application of competition powers in an enlarged EU. However, the
very reason for needing reform may hinder the viability of the Commission’s
proposal. For national regulatory bodies to play a more active role in apply-
ing competition law requires familiarity with existing practice in case law.
Due to the resource problem, the Commission has however settled many
cases through negotiation rather than formal channels. In areas such as
sport, where the use of soft law is most pronounced, case law precedents are
thin. 
The third pressure is political. Although the Commission has been fairly
successful in shielding itself from close member state control, it does not
operate in an environment immune from the wider political context. The
EU’s institutional agenda is very open and affords actors the opportunity to
exploit a multiplicity of venues in order to influence policy. As such, once an
item reaches the institutional agenda a range of actors can become involved
in the policy debate. In the case of sport, not all have accepted the definition
of sport adopted by the ECJ and the Commission. The application of EU
competition law has evolved in the context of an on-going debate in the EU
as to the real nature of sport. Should sport merely be seen as an economic
activity or does sport possess social, cultural and educational values worthy
of protection from law? The member states have emerged as a powerful
advocate of this more broad-based approach to sport. This has involved the
construction of the separate territories approach for sport. The Commission
is central to the construction of this approach, although, as is discussed
below, the proposal to devolve competition powers (particularly the exemp-
tion procedure) to national regulatory authorities may pose some difficulties
for the construction of the separate territories. 
The Commission’s constitutional obligation to safeguarding the funda-
mentals of the Single Market has therefore had to be balanced by adminis-
trative and political pragmatism. The Commission has generally adopted a
two-fold strategy. On the one hand it has consistently followed the ECJ’s line
that sport is subject to EU law whenever practiced as an economic activity.
This allows the Commission to claim that the fundamentals of the Single
Market have not been compromised. On the other hand, the Commission
has been willing to recognise sports social, cultural and educational values
when considering the applicability of exemptions. In this connection, the
Commission has to make a distinction between rules that are of sporting
interest only and rules which have commercial implications. As the
Commission has acquired more experience in these matters so it has been
more active in formulating a competition law separate territories approach.
The Commission hopes that this approach will add more legal certainty to
what is a relatively new area of Commission activity. 
This chapter explores these issues in six sections. The first section reviews
EU competition law, concentrating in particular on restrictive practices and
abuses of dominant positions in the Single Market. The second section
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examines the generic relationship between sport and competition law.
Should sports rules fall within the scope of competition law? Sections three,
four and five analyse the specific relationships between sport and competi-
tion law. The sports market comprises three markets (Egger and Stix-Hackl
2002: 85–87). The exploitation market, in which clubs and federations
exploit secondary features of their performances such as broadcasting rights,
exclusive distribution networks for ticket sales and merchandising arrange-
ments, is considered in section three. Section four analyses the contest
market where the actual product, the sporting contest, is made. Rules con-
cerning the organisation of sport are addressed in this section. Section five
examines the supply market – the market in the buying and selling of players.
The final section examines the Commission’s general approach to sport by
reviewing the sports-related case law within the context of the Commission’s
paper on the development of a framework for the application of competi-
tion law to sport, the first formal exploration of the viability of constructing
separate territories of sporting autonomy and competition law. 
European Union competition policy
Article 3 of the EC Treaty states that the activities of the Community should
include the establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Single
Market is not distorted. Following the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the
precise nature of this system was set out in Articles 85–94 of the Treaty (now
81–89). The two Articles most relevant to the sports sector in Europe are
Articles 81 (ex 85), dealing with restrictive practices by undertakings and
Article 82 (ex 86), concerning the abuse of a dominant position by an under-
taking. 
Despite the Treaty base for competition policy being established by the
Treaty of Rome, a fully fledged competition policy did not come into oper-
ation until the passing of Regulation 17/62 establishing the procedures for
applying the competition provisions contained in the Treaty. Although this
body of primary and secondary legislation granted the Commission consid-
erable scope for applying competition law, it was not until the 1980s that it
began to fully exercise the full potential of their powers. Doern and Wilks
identified three reasons accounting for this. First, the EU entered a new phase
of development in the 1980s as domestic neo-liberal ideas found expression
at the European level through the exercise of tighter rules of competition.
Second, the political leadership of Sutherland and Brittan contributed to the
visibility and the maturation of the Directorate General for Competition
Policy. Third, through this leadership, the Commission sought innovative
ways of expanding the scope of European competition policy, the creation
of the Merger Regulation being the highlight of this activity (Doern and
Wilks 1996: 232). By the 1990s the Commission had established a strong
reputation for itself. However, the problem of a lack of resources persists.
Sport and EU competition law 111
This problem has resulted in a slow turnover of cases and the increased use
of administrative procedures rather than formal decisions to decide cases. 
Today, competition policy is exercised with both economic and political
objectives in mind. In economic terms, the competition provisions are con-
sistent with the free market ethos that underpinned much of the Treaty. Only
in selected areas such as agriculture can an overtly protectionist agenda be
detected. The belief in the market mechanism was clear, but only by enforc-
ing strict rules of competition can the EU hope to establish many buyers and
sellers within the market which would help improve the allocation of
resources and in turn benefit consumers. As competition policy has evolved,
so these rules have been central to the establishment of a more economically
and politically cohesive Single European Market and increasingly a tool for
helping European undertakings compete in the global marketplace. 
Article 81
Article 81 comprises three paragraphs:
1 The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
a directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
b limit or control production, markets, technical development, or invest-
ment;
c share markets or sources of supply;
d apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
e make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts.
2 Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3 The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
• any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
• any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
• any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
a impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives;
b afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
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Accordingly, for Article 81 to apply a number of conditions must be met.
First, it must be determined by the Commission that an agreement between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted prac-
tices has taken place. Although the term agreement is not defined in the
Treaty, the Commission has usually adopted a wide interpretation of it.
Similarly, the term undertakings is not defined and again the Commission’s
wide interpretation brings into the definition any entity engaged in economic
or commercial activity involving the provision of goods and services.
Undertakings whose activity only generates a small profit and even non-
profit undertakings are included in this definition. Should such entities
co-ordinate their activities they may be described as associations of under-
takings. Anti-competitive effects stemming from decisions by associations of
undertakings also fall within the scope of Article 81. Such decisions need not
be formally constituted. For example codes of conduct have been regarded
as decisions. If undertakings co-ordinate activity between themselves in such
a way as to fall short of an agreement, then this behaviour may amount to
a concerted practice. 
The second condition required for Article 81 to apply concerns the nature
of the agreement. Article 81 seeks to prevent agreements which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Single Market. Article 81 itself lists some agreements which
distort competition. The definition of anti-competitive agreements has
widened through the jurisprudence of the Commission and the ECJ. For
instance in the Consten case the ECJ extended the scope of Article 81 beyond
horizontal agreements (for instance, agreements between undertakings oper-
ating at the same level in the system of distribution) to vertical agreements
(for instance, agreements at different levels such as between producers and
distributors).3 Furthermore in Consten, the ECJ argued that if it can be deter-
mined that the object of the agreement was the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition, the agreement can be condemned without further
market analysis of its impact. Therefore such an analysis is only required in
circumstances where the agreement in question has the effect (and not the
original intention) of being anti-competitive. Agreements which are of minor
significance will not be caught by the provisions of Article 81 and will there-
fore be subject to the de minimis limitation. In such circumstances and others
where the agreement falls outside the scope of Article 81(1), the Commission
will issue a negative clearance. Negative clearances constitute a formal deci-
sion. 
The third condition relates to the requirement that the agreement must
affect trade between member states. Agreements which only affect trade
within one member state or agreements the impacts of which lie outside the
EU are unlikely to be caught by the scope of Article 81. The ECJ has given
guidance concerning the calculation as to whether an agreement affects inter-
state trade patterns.4
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The Commission can become aware of potential illegalities in a number
of ways. First, it can launch its own investigation. The Commission’s powers
of investigation are considerable and are detailed in Regulation 17/62. These
include the power to request information, the ability to scrutinise documen-
tation and ask on the spot questions and the right to enter premises. Second,
as the Commission currently has a monopoly over the right to issue exemp-
tions, a self-notification system is in operation for undertakings to inform
the Commission of agreements and practices. Finally, individual complai-
nants bring potential abuses to the attention of the Commission. 
Having become aware of potential competition violations, the
Commission must resolve the case. Again, a number of options are available
to it. First, due to the political and administrative pressures the Commission
works under, many cases are settled through informal channels. Under-
takings seeking a negative clearance or exemption from Article 81 will notify
the agreement in question to the Commission. Following the notification, a
series of informal consultations between the relevant party and the
Commission takes place. Aspects of the agreement which the Commission
objects to are removed. The Commission then usually issues a ‘comfort
letter’ informing the party that the agreement does not infringe Article 81(1)
or that an exemption is suitable. These letters do not hold the legal force of
a Commission decision but are a useful way of communicating the
Commission’s views. Frequently, the undertakings themselves favour this
negotiated settlement. The problem with the informal soft law approach is
that the legal environment is not clarified. Firms are not guided by the legal
certainty formal decision making creates. Particularly in relation to the reg-
ulation of new sectors such as sport, the lack of legal principles often creates
confusion (see below). The Commission is aware of this and has introduced
a more formal comfort letter which it publishes in the Official Journal. This
gives them a more formal appearance and notifies interested third parties of
the ‘decision’. This allows third parties to submit observations prior to the
Commission formally closing the file. In addition, the Commission has relied
heavily on other informal tools to communicate their position. These include
press releases, notices and annual reviews. As with comfort letters, these
tools hold no legal effect. The cumulative impact of them in establishing de
facto precedents is however considerable. 
The second method of resolving cases involves the Commission taking a
formal decision to grant negative clearance. The Commission follows this
course of action if it believes that the agreement or practice falls outside the
scope of Article 81. The third method involves the Commission finding that
an agreement infringes Article 81. In these circumstances it will send a state-
ment of objections to the relevant parties outlining the case against them.
Once the parties have responded to the statement of objections a hearing is
convened. In effect the Commission acts as prosecutor and judge. A formal
decision of a finding of infringement may result from this procedure in which
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case the Commission can declare the agreement void (Article 81(2)). The
Commission also has the power to issue interim orders. 
The final method involves applying the exemption criteria outlined in
Article 81(3). Agreements which contribute to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, may be exempted
from the application of Article 81(1). Under the provisions of Regulation
17/62, the Commission has the power to grant individual and block exemp-
tions. An individual exemption can only be granted if the agreement in ques-
tion has been notified to the Commission. Formal individual exemptions
issued by the Commission can only be granted if the four conditions con-
tained in Article 81(3) are applied. Exemptions are published in the Official
Journal and are reviewable by the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the ECJ
on further appeal. The formal process of issuing individual exemptions is
however time consuming. A lack of resources and the requirement to issue
speedy decisions has contributed to the wider use of the Commission’s infor-
mal procedures for communicating their thoughts on a particular agreement.
For these reasons, the Commission has also made more use of the block
exemption procedure. Block exemptions are more generic in nature and
cover particular agreements in a whole sector. In addition to the
Commission, the Council has the legal right to issue block exemptions under
the authority of Article 87 (State Aid). Examples of block exemptions
include Liner shipping agreements and motor vehicle distribution agree-
ments (Goyder 1998: 131).5 The Commission’s proposal to amend the pro-
cedures for applying competition law by replacing the current system of
self-notification with a devolved competition regime involving national
courts and national regulatory authorities will, if accepted, affect the current
system for granting individual exemptions (see above).6
Article 82
The focus of Article 82 concerns: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompat-
ible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between member
states. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
a directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
b limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
c applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
d making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
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To establish whether Article 82 applies to any given context, the
Commission must identify the existence of two conditions. First, it must
establish whether an undertaking has a dominant position. Second, it then
has to decide whether it has abused this dominance. It is the abuse of dom-
inance and not the sheer existence of dominance that is illegal. In this con-
nection, the Commission must demonstrate that the abuse has had an
appreciable impact on trade between member states. Unlike Article 81, there
is no provision for negative clearance or exemptions under Article 82.
A position of dominance is potentially anti-competitive because within
the relevant market, an undertaking may have such power that its behavi-
our has a negative impact on competitors and consumers. In order for the
Commission to establish whether an undertaking has a dominant position it
must define the ‘market’. This involves determining the relevant product
market and the geographical market. The definition of the market is impor-
tant because if effective competition exists within the market, the effect of
an anti-competitive agreement would be limited and even self-defeating for
the offending undertaking. The product market refers to ‘all those products
and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer, by reason of the product’s characteristics, their prices and their
intended uses’.7 The wider the product market is defined the more difficult
it is to identify dominance. Substitutability refers to the ability of consumers
to obtain similar goods within the relevant market (demand substitutability)
and the ability of undertakings to supply similar goods (supply substitutabil-
ity). The Commission often employs the ‘SSNIP’ test to determine substitut-
ability (Weatherill 2000: 275). According to this test the Commission must
decide whether consumers would switch to other goods in response to an
increase in the range of 5–10 per cent in the price of the good in question.
Defining the geographical market is important as Article 82 is only breached
where dominance occurs within the common market or a substantial part of
it. In this instance the wider the market is defined, the easier it is to apply
Article 82. Various tests exist for determining dominance within the market.
These include identifying the market share of the undertaking and of com-
petitors, examining the financial and technical resources at the undertakings
disposal, analysing the ability of undertakings to control production and dis-
tribution and examining the actual conduct and performance of an under-
taking (Kent 2001: 256).
Having defined the market in order to determine dominance, the
Commission must then identify whether an undertaking has abused its dom-
inant position. Abuse essentially refers to conduct which influences the struc-
ture of a market in a way which weakens competition. Article 82 provides
guidance as to the types of agreement that might be considered abusive. As
with Article 81, the abuse must affect trade between member states. 
The procedures available to the Commission for the enforcement of
Article 81 and 82 are contained in Regulation 17/62. The Commission has
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wide powers of investigation and has the ability to fine undertakings up to
1 million euros or 10 per cent of the undertaking’s global turnover – which-
ever is greater. Decisions of the Commission are reviewable before the CFI
and on further appeal the ECJ. Alternatively, complainants can bypass the
public enforcement procedures of the Commission and rely on private
enforcement before national courts to challenge alleged anti-competitive
practice. As the Commission proposal to amend competition law procedures
outlined above illustrates, the Commission is keen to extend the use of
private enforcement. However, as is examined below, the proposal to also
devolve the exemption procedures outlined in Article 81(3) to national
authorities raises important questions concerning the future definition of the
separate territories concept for sport. 
Sport and competition law
The discussion of the above general principles of competition policy gives
rise to more specific questions concerning the applicability of such principles
to sport. A number of questions arise in relation to the applicability of
Article 81.
First, are sports organisations considered ‘undertakings’? Amateur and
professional sports organisations and individuals will be considered under-
takings if they are engaged in economic or commercial activity involving the
provision of goods and services even if this activity generates little profit or
indeed their activity is not for profit. On first appearance, sports organisa-
tions are primarily concerned with regulating sporting conduct. Rules con-
cerning the operation of the off-side rule in football are clearly of sporting
interest only. However, sports organisations have a wider responsibility to
ensure the commercial success of their sport. Frequently, international fed-
erations gather receipts from national associations and are centrally involved
in a range of economic activities including exploiting broadcasting and spon-
sorship rights. National associations also have a responsibility for market-
ing broadcasting rights on behalf of participants. Similarly, clubs are to be
considered commercial undertakings. Such commercial activity ranges from
ticket sales to transfer dealings. In some cases clubs are quoted on the stock
exchange in the form of public limited companies. Finally, players are paid
for their services. Some football clubs are prepared to pay large sums to
secure the services of the better players. This desire to attract the best not
only improves sporting performance, it also contributes to the commercial
potential of a club. Given that this activity need not generate profit, it is clear
that sports organisations should be considered undertakings. 
Second, do sports rules constitute ‘agreements’? Given the broad defini-
tion of agreements employed by the Commission and the ECJ, it is of little
doubt that rules relating to, for example, the transfer of players are agree-
ments by undertakings or associations of undertakings. The relevant
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strength of the international federation must be taken into account when
deciding whether an agreement has been reached between undertakings
(such as clubs) or by an association of undertakings (such as the interna-
tional federation). Organisations such as FIFA and UEFA have statutes
whose nature clearly indicates regulatory strength. However, not all rules
contained in these statutes are commercially based. The difficulty for the
Commission lies in distinguishing between rules which are inherent to the
sport and rules which have commercial implications. The distinction is not
always clear-cut. Furthermore, the Commission need not be convinced by
the assertion by sports organisations that the object of a particular rule was
sporting in nature as they can examine the effect of this rule. Rules which
initially were designed for sporting reasons may have assumed greater eco-
nomic importance due to developments in the sector (Pons 1999: 7).
Therefore sporting rules having commercial implications can still be caught
within the scope of competition law.
Third, do sports rules have the potential to prevent, restrict or distort
competition in the EU? Rules which have a minor impact on competition are
not subject to EU competition law. Nevertheless, as in any other sector, hor-
izontal and vertical sporting agreements do have the potential to be caught
within the scope of competition law. Of course competition in the sports
sector is not necessarily the same as in other sectors due to the unique inter-
dependence within the sector. This leads to a supplementary question con-
cerning the overall place of sport within competition law. The business of
sport is different to other businesses in one important respect – participants
in the sports market rely on each other for their success, they do not seek to
eliminate competition. Oligopoly would not serve the interests of the
remaining powerful participants who rely on competition to make the game
in question interesting and unpredictable. Furthermore, in many sports, such
as football, large clubs benefit from the available pool of talent cultivated by
smaller clubs. The Commission is therefore faced with returning to the ques-
tion of what constitutes a sports rule and what is a commercial rule. Case
law is beginning to provide some answers to this question (see below). 
Fourth, do sports rules affect trade between member states? Much
European sport is based on a single structure model. An international feder-
ation controls the activities of the national associations who in turn regulate
competition within their jurisdiction. It is clear therefore that many sports
rules have international implications. This is most clearly demonstrated in
relation to rules governing the transfer of players. Again, not all rules have
international implications. Stevenage Borough’s claim against the Football
League failed because the League ruling preventing the club entering the
Football League from the non-leagues did not affect trade between member
states.8 Stevenage had argued that membership of the Football League would
enable them to compete for a place in European competitions – a remote
prospect (Beloff et al. 1999: 146). 
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Finally, if the activities of sport are covered by Article 81, should sport
qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3)? Individual agreements could
be exempt or agreements pertaining to the wider sports sector could qualify
for a block exemption. This issue is dealt with more fully below and in the
concluding section of this text. 
Much of the reasoning advanced above supporting the view that the activ-
ities of sport’s organisations are subject to Article 81 also applies to Article
82. Nevertheless, further questions remain concerning the issue of domi-
nance in sport. In particular, are sports organisations capable of assuming a
position of dominance within the relevant market? The answer to this ques-
tion lies in the definition of the market. Egger and Stix-Hackl argue that,
although the relevant product market for sport differs from other sectors, a
market (three altogether) still exists (Egger and Stix-Hackl 2002: 86). The
first is the exploitation market in which clubs and federations exploit secon-
dary features of their performances such as broadcasting rights, exclusive
distribution systems for ticket sales and merchandising arrangements. The
second is the contest market where the actual product, the sporting contest,
is made. To stage an effective contest, rules regulating competition between
participants and rules limiting access to sporting competitions are formed by
sports governing bodies. The third market is the supply market where clubs
buy and sell players. 
A potential for a finding of dominance is enhanced due to a number of
factors. First, the European model of sport necessitates international sports
federations to assume considerable (even monopolistic) control over the
activities of members. The ‘market share’ of organisations such as UEFA is
therefore considerable. Potentially compounding this dominance is the
restrictive rules often employed by governing bodies to maintain the single
structure model. Clubs could also be regarded as having a dominant posi-
tion should they co-ordinate their activities. It is less likely an individual club
would be found to have a position of dominance although the definition of
the relevant market may show otherwise. Second, if it is to be accepted that
the sports market consists of three markets, undertakings operating within
them are more likely to assume a position of dominance than if the market
was defined in a wider sense. This links into the third reason – the potential
for a finding of dominance is enhanced by the limited scope for demand- and
supply-side substitutability in the sector. These issues are further developed
in the review of case law below. 
The definition of the geographical market flows from that of the product
market. It is difficult to argue against the whole EU being considered the rel-
evant geographical market for agreements concerning the sale of broadcast-
ing rights, rules on international transfer and even ticketing arrangements
for major international sporting events such as the football World Cup. Of
course the finding of dominance is not in itself illegal. As such, the
Commission must establish whether an abuse of this dominance has taken
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place. The development of Commission jurisprudence in this field is begin-
ning to identify examples of abuse in the sports sector (see below). 
The case law of the ECJ and Commission confirms sport’s relationship
with EU law. The Walrave and Donà cases established that sport is subject
to EU law whenever practiced as an economic activity. Nevertheless in the
immediate aftermath of these rulings, the Commission did little to enforce
the central findings. As a result, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
Commission took little interest in the operation of sport. At that time the
Commission was not best placed to apply the competition implications of
these rulings due to its own status and indeed the status of sport. A number
of factors changed this. 
First, it was not until the maturation of the Directorate General for
Competition Policy in the 1980s that the link between sport and competi-
tion law became more likely. Second, this maturation coincided with an
accelerated push to complete the Single Market. The powerful logic of neg-
ative integration served to enmesh new economic sectors within the Single
Market. Third, sport began to practice as a truly economic activity in the late
1980s/early 1990s. This coincided with an influx of money into sport, espe-
cially football, partly as a consequence of technological advances in broad-
casting. Fourth, the ruling in Bosman served as an important watershed in
the thinking of Commission officials and served to confirm sport’s status as
an economic activity subject to EU law. Whilst the ECJ chose to apply Article
39 to the case, the Commission exploited the competition dimension of the
case in order to fully enforce the ECJ’s central findings. 
Following Bosman, rules devised by European sports bodies in order to
maintain a competitive balance between participants were increasingly
attracting the regulatory interest of the Commission. Given the broad defi-
nition of anti-competitive behaviour adopted by the Commission and ECJ,
it is clear to see the ease by which sporting rules, many of which were devised
in an amateur age, may infringe competition law whenever sport is practised
as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty.
Sporting self-regulation has thus become increasingly challenged from above
and below. From below, individual complainants frustrated by the lack of
redress within sporting circles used the Commission and the ECJ as a new
legal venue. From above, the EU institutions, keen to extend legal rights to
all EU citizens, including sports men and women, accommodated such com-
plaints. The Commission has investigated cases relating to the operation of
sport in each of the three product markets identified above. 
The exploitation market: the marketing of sport
The broadcasting of sport 
Sport, and in particular football, has become of critical importance to broad-
casters. In Britain, sports broadcasting has been the cornerstone of BSkyB’s
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success and the reason for the failure of ITV Digital. Whilst BSkyB prospered
following the conclusion of successive contracts to broadcast English
Premiership games, ITV digital went into administration and returned its
broadcasting licence following the signing in 2000 of the £315 million con-
tract to broadcast lower league games in England, a contract left unfulfilled
and ultimately re-negotiated by BSkyB.9 Just as sport is of critical importance
to broadcasters, so the exploitation of broadcasting rights is a major source
of revenue for sports clubs, national associations and international federa-
tions. Agreements concluded between sports organisations and broadcasters
must, ingeneral, complywithArticle81.As such, theCommissionhasbecome
centrally involved in questions relating to how these rights are exploited.
The precise relationship between sports broadcasting and competition
law will depend on the definition of the market. Although the geographical
broadcasting market is normally considered national due to linguistic and
cultural factors, the universal appeal of sport indicates that a wider geo-
graphical market exists. The product market is more complex. Beloff et al.
identify three issues relevant to the definition of this market (Beloff et al.
1999: 150). First, the market needs dividing into pay-TV and free-to-air
broadcasters. In this sense sport is more substitutable on free-to-air televi-
sion than it is on pay-TV due to the direct relationship between viewing sport
and the money paid to watch it. 
Second an analysis needs making of the market relevant to the sport in
question. Do separate markets exist for separate sports? It is traditionally
argued that football should be considered a market separate from other
sports. The contrasting fortunes of BSkyB and ITV Digital point to argu-
ments on both sides. Whereas BSkyB’s experiment with pay-per-view broad-
casting of Premiership matches has proved satisfactory, ITV Digital’s
attempt to do the same with lower league football was disastrous. The sub-
stitutability of football therefore varies. Only top-flight football and perhaps
major boxing encounters can truly be considered a separate market from
other sports. Such questions are becoming more significant in the new world
of multi-channel specialist television. 
Third, do separate markets exist in the broadcasting of live sport and
recorded sport? The picture once again varies. In the Netherlands, the com-
petition authority has argued that a separate market did exist for broadcast-
ing highlights of sports events. One of the reasons for the failure of Dutch
pay-TV channel Sport in 1997, which broadcast live football, was the avail-
ability of highlights on free-to-air television (Van Den Brink 2000a:
361–362). The non-substitutability of football in this instance was therefore
questionable. However, as Beloff et al. explain in the case of Britain, ‘BSkyB’s
success in using live football coverage to sell pay-TV subscriptions indicates
that comprehensive highlights programmes such as Match of the Day do not
constrain their pricing ability for live football’ (Beloff et al. 1999: 152). 
Although any aspect of a broadcasting contract may fall within the scope
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of EU competition law, four particular themes have emerged in terms of the
sports broadcasting cases to have come before the Commission. The first
concerns the practice of collective selling of rights. The second relates to the
sale of exclusive rights, a practice often linked to collective selling. The third
theme is concerned with the nature in which rights are acquired and the
fourth is how events are transmitted. 
Collective selling
An established commercial practice in the European sports sector is the
central marketing and joint sale of broadcasting rights on behalf of the par-
ticipants. Participation in the league is often conditional on the acceptance
of this practice. Accordingly there is little doubt that collective selling is to
be considered an ‘agreement’ in the context of competition law. Collective
selling is considered vital by sports organisations as it allows them to maxi-
mise revenues, thus enhancing their re-distributive capabilities. 
National law will determine who owns the broadcasting rights in the first
instance and national regulatory agencies have become involved in central
marketing issues. For instance, in Germany, the Federal High Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) concluded that the central marketing of European Cup
football matches by the national football association was a cartel for which
no exemption could be justified.10 This ruling has since been overturned by
legislation with effect from 1 January 1999 due to the addition of section 31,
dealing with sport, to the German Competition Act legislation. In Britain,
the Restrictive Practices Court held that the £743 million ‘bundled’ contract
between BSkyB and the BBC to show Premier League football was not in vio-
lation of the 1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act.11
If inter-state trade in broadcasting services is affected, the Commission
becomes the relevant regulatory agency. A number of competition concerns
may stem from collective selling. First, does the prevention of clubs from
entering into individual agreements with broadcasters amount to a restric-
tion of competition and fall within the scope of Article 81(1)? If the central
marketing of broadcasting rights is necessary to ensure the survival of the
smaller participants in the league (the so-called solidarity argument) should
an exemption under Article 81(3) be granted? Second, does collective selling
affect competition between broadcasters by reducing the number of avail-
able rights on offer? Clearly if clubs could market their own rights more
broadcasters could enter the market for them. This may have implications
for the creation of a single European market in broadcasting. Finally, does
collective selling constitute an abuse of a dominant position by the vendor?
In this connection, leagues themselves can be considered undertakings.
Given that sports clubs cannot realistically operate outside a league struc-
ture and a condition for league membership is the acceptance of broadcast-
ing rules, it follows that a position of dominance on the part of the league
can be deduced. Article 82 may therefore also be relevant. 
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Collective selling in sport has only recently been addressed by the
Commission. In the Deutscher Fubßball-Bund (DFB) case the German
National Football Association has requested a negative clearance or an
exemption from the application of Article 81 in respect of the collective sale
of the television and radio broadcasting rights for professional football
matches in Germany.12 The DFB organises football competitions in Germany
and collectively sells the broadcasting rights to the games on behalf of the
participants. The DFB redistributes the revenues gained from these broad-
casting contracts back to the participants. The contracts in question con-
cerned the rights to show first and second division Bundesliga games
primarily on a free-to-air basis but with some provision for a limited number
of games to be shown on a pay-TV basis. The DFB claims authority to enter
into such contracts as chief organiser of the events. Furthermore, the DFB
claim that central marketing performs an important solidarity function in
German football in that money is redistributed fairly between participants.
The pro-competitive effects of central marketing therefore outweighs the
anti-competitive effects. At time of writing, the Commission has yet to form
an opinion on this matter. 
In the UEFA Champions League case, UEFA applied for a negative clear-
ance or an exemption from Article 81 in respect of the central marketing of
commercial rights to the UEFA Champions League.13 ‘Commercial rights’
refer to the television rights, sponsorship rights, supplier rights, licensing
rights and intellectual property rights. UEFA organises the Champions
League, a prestigious tournament involving teams finishing in the highest
places of domestic leagues. UEFA centrally markets the broadcasting rights
to these games on behalf of the participants and allocates most of the reve-
nues to these teams (hence the financial importance for clubs to qualify for
the Champions League).14 Smaller amounts are redistributed to grass roots
football. The rights were sold as a bundle on an exclusive basis for up to four
years to one broadcaster in each member state. Although the broadcaster is
normally a free-to-air operator, they could sub-license some games to pay-
TV operators. UEFA justified central marketing by claiming that without it
there would be a diminution of the UEFA Champions League brand. This
would have the effect of making the competition less visible and attractive
and therefore have a consequential impact on sponsors, clubs, broadcasters
and spectators. Furthermore, central marketing serves a solidarity function
and hence enhances competition rather than restricts it. 
In July 2001, the Commission opened proceedings against UEFA concern-
ing the collective marketing of the television rights for the Champions
League.15 In particular, the Commission objected to UEFA’s practice of
selling the rights exclusively to a single broadcaster in each state. It is
the Commission’s contention that this practice restricts competition in the
market for such rights, as only larger operators are able to afford the
rights. This may have a consequential impact on broadcasters and viewers.
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Less-established broadcasters are unable to penetrate the market. This may
have the effect of slowing down the use of new technologies such as internet
and mobile phone use. Furthermore, the Commission believes that viewers
are denied wide access to televised matches. Due to the nature of the exclu-
sive contracts, some live games remained unexploited therefore denying fans
the ability to view live games. Other broadcasters (such as regional broad-
casters or broadcasters embracing new technology) willing to broadcast
these games were denied the opportunity by the exclusive contract. In the
statement of objections the Commission made it clear that, although the final
decision will be informed by the Nice Declaration on Sport, if less-restrictive
means are available to secure UEFA’s objectives, a negative clearance or an
exemption will not be granted. 
In light of the Commission’s objections, UEFA re-worked their selling
policy leading to a more favourable response from the Commission.16 In the
revised plans from 2003/2004, UEFA retains the right to sell live television
rights and highlights for a period of no more than three years. However,
delayed television rights and new media rights will be co-exploited by UEFA
and the clubs. In essence, the media rights are exploitable in 14 packages.
For instance package 1 (the ‘gold’ package for broadcasting live games) sells
the rights, including highlights, for the first and third pick of games on match
day. Package 2 (the silver package) does the same for the second and fourth
pick of games. These packages are to be sold by UEFA to free-to-air and/or
pay-TV. In other packages involving less-attractive games, delayed transmis-
sion, archives and radio and internet broadcasting, the clubs are given
greater freedom to exploit the rights. The Commission has agreed that
UEFA’s amendments will allow for new market opportunities for a wider
number of operators, both broadcasters and clubs, and viewers will benefit
by being able to view a larger number of games. The Commission has given
its preliminary approval of the modified arrangements and has invited inter-
ested third parties to submit observations. This informal decision will be
published in the Official Journal in the form of a notice. Should no further
objections arise from the market-testing procedure, the Commission has
committed itself to taking a formal decision in the form of an exemption
under Article 81(3). 
The significance of the Commission’s approach lies in their (conditional)
willingness to acknowledge the specificity of sport. In a Competition Policy
Newsletter, the Commission stated,
the special characteristics of the sport in question have to be taken into
account. These could include, for example, the need to ensure solidarity
between weaker and stronger participants or the training of young players,
which could only be achieved through redistribution of revenue from the sale
of broadcasting rights. Such aims would have to be a genuine and material part
of the objectives and ones which could not be achievable under less restrictive
arrangements. (Commission of the European Communities 1998: 26)
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As such, the Commission has indicated that in some circumstances collective
selling does have a place in sport. This view was confirmed in the Formula
One investigation (see below) in which the Commission indicated that col-
lective selling was appropriate due to the specific characteristics of motor
sport and in particular Formula One.17
Exclusivity
Exclusivity is closely connected to collective selling. By denying a competi-
tor access to broadcast a particular sporting event, the purchaser of the
exclusive rights can maximise viewing figures thus helping the operator to
either honour public service commitments or maximise advertising and/or
subscription revenues. New subscription-based TV operators have increased
competition in the broadcasting market and have undoubtedly served to
increase the price of such rights through their subscription-based ability to
bid high. Although this may have increased revenues for sporting organisa-
tions, free-to-air access to sporting events is limited. The Television Without
Frontiers Directive is partly concerned with this issue of public access to
sporting events.18 However, there are also competition policy considerations
to be taken into account. Exclusivity may have market foreclosure implica-
tions by denying broadcasters the opportunity to develop commercially
through the acquisition of rights. Given the importance of sport to new
broadcasters, exclusivity may result in the stifling of attempts to establish a
single European market in broadcasting. 
Nevertheless, in previous case law concerning the granting of copyright
licences the Commission and the ECJ have indicated that they are not
opposed to exclusivity per se.19 However, the Commission will investigate
such arrangements if they unduly restrict competition in the broadcasting
sector. This is consistent with the Commission’s desire to realise a free
market in broadcasting requiring the reduction of barriers to market entry.
The sale of exclusive broadcasting rights, sold on long-term contracts, may
be viewed as one such barrier to market entry. The Commission believes that
exclusive deals may be exempt from competition rules when they are granted
for a brief time and are limited in their scope and effect. The market power
of the buyer and seller must be taken into consideration as must the poten-
tial for market foreclosure. Long contracts may be acceptable if the pur-
chaser is a new market entrant requiring a substantial contract to become
established. Occasionally, new entrants invest heavily in new technology
necessitating longer contracts in order to counterbalance the risk of market
entry. An exemption under Article 81(3) may be granted in such circum-
stances. An exemption may be granted if exclusive rights are reasonably sub-
licensed, thus allowing wider access to the rights to other market players.
However, ‘sublicensing is not by itself either a satisfactory or a convenient
way of solving the competition problems of sports broadcasting’
(Commission of the European Communities 1998: 27). The cost of the
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sub-licensing and the nature of the material offered (edited/unedited for
example) are considerations. The licensees must genuinely benefit from the
arrangement. 
The Commission is gathering more experience in these matters. The first
example concerns the agreement between British Satellite Broadcasting
(BSB), now British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) following a merger in 1990,
and the English Football Association to show live English football matches
between 1988 and 1993 to a subscription audience.20 The Commission
exempted the agreement, even though the contract was for five years,
because the Commission felt that as a new operator, embracing new technol-
ogy, BSB needed a long-term contact to establish its operations. However, as
(now former) Commissioner Van Miert announced in 1997, ‘looking back
. . . the five year period approved by the Commission was probably too long
because the broadcasting technique in question became established more
rapidly than had been expected’ (Van Miert 1997).
Van Miert’s more hard-line stance on long exclusive contracts was dem-
onstrated in KNVB case.21 On this occasion the Commission did not sanc-
tion what it regarded to be an anti-competitive agreement between the Dutch
Football Association and Sport 7, a Dutch television channel. Under the
terms of the agreement the KNVB granted Sport 7 exclusive rights to Dutch
football over a seven-year period. The agreement was notified to the
Commission in May 1996. The Commission objected on two counts. First,
seven years was deemed to be excessively long for an exclusive contract that
denied competitors broadcasting access. This could act as a potential barrier
to entry for new operators in the market. Second, the Commission objected
to a renewal clause in the contract that would have unfairly privileged Sport
7 in the tendering procedure at the end of the term.
Collective purchasing 
The widely used system of collective selling and the high costs associated
with the acquisition of exclusive rights has contributed to the practice of
broadcasters grouping together to collectively purchase sports rights. Sports
rights are often out of the financial reach of individual broadcasters.
Collective purchasing agreements allow broadcasters to not only spread the
cost of rights but also to share the risk for broadcasting events. 
Collective purchasing is a tool employed by the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU). In order to improve the collective bidding power of the public
service broadcasters, the EBU was established in 1950. Since the trend
towards the deregulation of the broadcasting market and the rise of new
commercial operators in the 1980s, the work of the EBU has become more
important to public service operators attempting to keep pace with the rising
cost of broadcasting rights. Historically, membership of the EBU has only
been open to broadcasters with a public service obligation. Commercial
operators cannot join and the EBU has no commercial aim, although a few
126 Sports law and policy in the European Union
commercial operators have achieved membership due to ‘various anomalies
and historical accidents’ (Collins 1994: 121). Based in Geneva and Brussels
the EBU operates the Eurovision network of programme exchanges and acts
as a collective purchasing agent for its members. This form of collaboration
is clearly aimed at securing a competitive advantage for EBU members at the
expense of commercial operators. However, with the evolution of a EU
broadcasting and audio-visual policy, the activities of the EBU have become
increasingly called into question (Humphreys 1996).
In both the Screensport v. EBU Members case and the EBU-Eurovision
System case, the Commission identified a restriction of competition stem-
ming from the EBU’s collective purchasing arrangements. In the Screensport
case the Commission refused to grant an exemption because the nature in
which the EBU provided exclusive sports rights to Eurosport effectively fore-
closed the market to Screensport, Eurosports main competitor.22 In the EBU-
Eurovision System case concerning the EBU’s Eurovision programme
sharing arrangements, the Commission believed that once acquired, the EBU
were unfairly denying non-EBU members access to sporting rights. In order
to qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty the
Commission imposed strict sub-licensing conditions.23 The Commission
decision was however annulled by the CFI following an appeal by a com-
mercial broadcaster.24 The CFI considered that the Commission had not ade-
quately considered the anti-competitive consequences of the EBU’s
membership rules when granting an exemption. The EBU subsequently
amended their membership rules and the Commission formally approved the
EBU-Eurovision system in May 2000.25 The exemption is granted until 31
December 2005. 
In a further case concerning collective purchasing, the Commission raised
objections to an agreement between Telefónica and Sogecable to exploit
rights to broadcast football in Spain. The Commission was concerned that
such collaboration could foreclose the market to cable and digital competi-
tors of Telefónica and Sogecable. Following the issuing of a statement of
objections to Telefónica and Sogecable in April 2000, improvements to the
arrangements were made by the two parties.26
Broadcasting restrictions
UEFA not only has responsibility for marketing broadcasting rights, it also
controls the cross-border transmission of football matches through the pro-
visions of Article 14 of its Statute.27 The reason for this is that UEFA fears
that attendances at ‘live’ matches and indeed participation at all levels,
would be adversely affected by broadcasting matches played at the same
time. Since being introduced in 1988, UEFA’s broadcasting regulations have
however been challenged by various broadcasters. The Commission’s inves-
tigations into them have centred on their compatibility with Article 81 of the
Treaty. The cross-border trade in the broadcasting of football matches
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between member states could be restricted by their application. In addition,
the regulations prevent national football federations from freely marketing
their transmission rights in the Single Market. As a result of Commission
scrutiny and after consultations between UEFA and the Commission, the
broadcasting regulations have been amended, first in 1993 and most recently
July 2000 following the 1998 issuing of a statement of objections by the
Commission outlining the breach of Article 81. In April 2001, the
Commission decided that UEFA’s new rules on the broadcasting of football
matches as amended in July 2000 fall outside the scope of EU competition
rules as no appreciable restriction of competition could be identified and
neither was inter-state trade appreciably affected by these arrangements. The
rules allow national football associations to block the broadcasting on tele-
vision of football during two and a half hours either on Saturday or Sunday
to protect stadium attendance and amateur participation in the sport. The
Commission closed the case with a formal decision in April 2001.28
Ticketing arrangements
Ticketing arrangements for major sporting events arguably falls between the
exploitation market and the contest market. On the one hand ticketing is a
method of marketing the game whereas on the other it is an essential com-
ponent of organising the competition. As ticketing arrangements for major
sporting events are linked to exclusive distribution networks, it is dealt here
within the context of the exploitation market. It has become an established
commercial practice for the organising committees of sporting events to
enter into agreements with ticket distributors, guaranteeing for the distrib-
utor, often for a high price, the exclusive right to distribute the tickets within
each of the member states. Rather than being one single market for ticket
sales in the EU, nationally tied exclusive agreements create fifteen different
markets (based on EU15). Very often, only residents of the country in which
the exclusive ticket distributor is based can purchase tickets. In effect, there-
fore, each country is given a ticket quota which the exclusive distributor then
sells to the public. The alleged benefit of this system is two-fold. First, it guar-
antees a fair and equitable distribution of tickets to fans of all countries,
large and small, who want to purchase tickets. Second, it ensures spectator
separation along national lines. This is considered an important safety
feature. 
The ticket distribution system for the 1990 World Cup finals held in Italy
was investigated by the Commission, the first example of Commission
involvement in ticketing arrangements for sporting events.29 In November
1989, the Commission received a complaint from travel agent Pauwels
Travel against the FIFA Local Organising Committee Italia ’90, 90 Tour
Italia SpA and NV CIT Belgique. In this case, the organising committee of
the World Cup entered into agreements with a range of tour operators guar-
anteeing them the exclusive right to sell tickets within the country they were
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based. Pauwels Travel wanted to put together and sell a package deal for
Belgian fans wishing to travel and stay in Italy and also to gain entrance to
the stadiums. However, Pauwels was not the exclusive tour operator author-
ised to sell package deals in Belgium. When Pauwels attempted to purchase
tickets by other sources, the authorised agent in Belgium initiated legal
action against them before the Belgian courts. The Commission objected to
this arrangement arguing that it contravened Article 81(1). The use of exclu-
sive agents effectively foreclosed the market to other travel agents. No fine
was imposed on the organisers as the offence was the first of its kind to be
investigated by the Commission and the Commission noted that ensuring
spectator separation and hence safety was a legitimate aim. As such, the deci-
sion did not establish a free market for tickets. It simply prohibited exclu-
sive arrangements from being disproportionately restrictive. 
The most high-profile Commission investigation into ticketing arrange-
ments for a major sports tournament came with France ’98 World Cup case.
After being chosen as host for the 1998 World Cup Finals in July 1992, the
French World Cup organising committee, the Comité Français
d’Organisation (CFO), began consultations in 1994 on the mechanism by
which the 2,666,500 available tickets were to be distributed (Weatherill
2000a). Most of the tickets were distributed amongst national football fed-
erations, official tour operators and sponsors, although 749,700 were dis-
tributed by the CFO to the public. These tickets were only available to those
with a French address.
The CFO gained approval from the Commission for its distribution
system in June 1997. The Commission claim that at this time they were
unaware of the nationality requirement even though the CFO had informed
the Commission of the details outside the scope of the official notification
and the France ’98 web-site had been opened since May 1997. Furthermore,
in June, prior to the clearance, the Commission received a complaint regard-
ing the discriminatory arrangements (Weatherill 2000a: 278). Nevertheless,
the consequence of withholding a percentage of the tickets exclusively for
the French market soon became clear as football federations, fans and even
some governments complained that the distribution system had discrimi-
nated against non-French fans resulting in insufficient tickets being available
to foreign fans. The Commission’s response was to issue a warning letter to
the CFO on 20 February 1998 requesting an adaptation of its sales policy.
By that time only a small number of tickets remained. The basis of the
request was that the ticket distribution system adopted by the CFO had
breached Article 82 of the Treaty dealing with abuse of a dominant position.
In a news release on 23 March the CFO made clear it was prepared only to
distribute 50,000 of the 160,000 remaining tickets to the foreign federations
with the other 110,000 being sold directly by the CFO to citizens of the 15
EU states plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.30 These tickets went on
sale in April.
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Articulating the concerns of many European football fans, 32 Members
of the European Parliament (MEP’s) and 41 Belgian football fans brought a
case against the CFO before the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris
(Corbett 1998).31 The basis for the complaint was that the distribution of
World Cup tickets not only breached Article 82 of the Treaty but also
breached Articles 12 (ex 6) and 49 (ex 59). Article 12 prohibits any measure
within the scope of the Treaty that discriminates on the grounds of nation-
ality. Article 49 prohibits restrictions on freedom to provide services within
the EU. The case was considered as inadmissible by the French court and as
such failed. 
On 20 July the Commission issued a formal legal decision against the
CFO.32 The Commission concluded that the CFO’s discriminatory ticketing
practises amounted to an abuse of a dominant position and as such were con-
trary to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (and Article 54 of the European
Economic Area Agreement). Given the popularity of football and the large
demand for tickets, the CFO had a dominant position with respect to dis-
tributing tickets. Not only were consumers unlikely to substitute the World
Cup ‘product’ for another event, but the Commission found the relevant geo-
graphic market was the entire EU/EEA. Given such a dominant position the
organisers should have ensured that they did not abuse this by instituting a
discriminatory distribution system. The discrimination against non-French
residents was reinforced by the CFO advising such people that tickets could
only be obtained from national football federations and tour operators. As
the ticketing arrangements were similar to those adopted in previous World
Cups, the Commission chose to fine the CFO a symbolic sum of just 1,000
euros. In addition, the Commission acknowledged that the CFO did not have
case law guidelines to guide them in their decision to establish such a system.
Also, the Commission noted that the CFO had been co-operative and had
made more tickets available to non-French customers. In the formal decision,
the Commission concluded that future breaches of EU competition law in
relation to ticketing arrangements would be dealt with more seriously.
Merchandising 
EU case law on merchandising issues in sport is limited even though this
activity is becoming an essential component of any sports organisations busi-
ness strategy. Clubs, players and even competitions are considered market-
able commodities. The growth in the market for replica club kits illustrates
the merchandising potential of some sports. Generally, national laws con-
cerning trademarks, passing-off and copyright apply to disputes arising from
merchandising issues. Occasionally such laws have a EU dimension. For
instance in Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, the ECJ has been
requested by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales to decide
whether or not non-trademark use can constitute infringement of the regis-
tered trademark rights.33 The Advocate General in the case concluded that
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Article 5(1)(a) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December
1988 relating to trademarks allows the proprietor of a trademark to prevent
it being used for commercial purposes by a third party, even if it is perceived
as a badge of support, loyalty or affiliation to its proprietor.34 In a further
(pending) case the ECJ is examining whether advertising restrictions at
sports venues stemming from French law (the Loi Evin) are contrary to the
principle of freedom of services.35
The question of the application of competition law to merchandising
agreements in sport is equally nascent. As yet, the Commission has only
raised specific objections to agreements in the field of product distribution
and sponsorship. The Commission has established that the distribution of
sporting goods falls within the scope of Article 81. Commission case law
in this field concerns restrictions designed to protect exclusive distribution
networks. In 1992 a fine was imposed on Dunlop Slazenger International
and All Weather Sports for blocking exports of tennis balls to other EU
countries in order to protect its sole distributors in those states.36 Similarly,
in 1994, Tretorn was fined for a breach of Article 81(1) relating to an
export ban Tretorn had placed on their exclusive distributors of tennis
balls.37 Both cases illustrate the Commission’s desire to ensure fair compe-
tition between the manufacturers of sports goods and the protection of con-
sumer choice.
Sponsorship arrangements have also been investigated by the Commis-
sion. Sponsors are prepared to pay the organisers of sports events significant
sums to use the term ‘official’ (such as ‘official ball’) in competitions. One
example of a Commission investigation into this practice is the Danish
Tennis Federation (DTF) case.38 The DTF entered into agreements with three
tennis ball manufacturers which resulted in their make of ball being labelled
‘official’. A parallel importer complained to the Commission about market
foreclosure. Furthermore, the Commission thought that the term official was
misleading for consumers who may assume that the term represents a badge
of quality rather than an indication of sponsorship. This was considered
inappropriate for items such as tennis balls. Following negotiations between
the DTF and the Commission amendments were made to the sponsorship
arrangements for tennis competitions in Denmark. Under the new arrange-
ment a more open tendering process is held every two years to decide spon-
sorship. The term ‘official’ has also been replaced by ‘sponsor’. The case was
closed by negative clearance.39
Given the commercial importance of marketing in sport, the competition
case law is expected to expand. In protecting the rights of market competi-
tors and consumers, the Commission will once again need to distinguish
between commercial rules and sporting rules. Rules placing restrictions on
sports equipment may for instance be justified. Technological advances in
the manufacture of sports equipment can result in the games in question
becoming too easy, boring or even dangerous. Technical restrictions on
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equipment is essential for all sports. Such rules cannot, however, act as a
mask for the maintenance of anti-competitive rules. 
The contest market: organising the game
Traditionally, sports organisations have operated a system of self-regulation.
They have, by and large, remained free to determine the structural and
organisational issues surrounding their existence. After all, for sport to be
entertaining it needs to be highly organised and restrictions need to be placed
on who competes in the sports sector. However, the commercialisation of
sport has contributed to the erosion of this autonomy and has served to
increase the penetration of EU competition law into sport. Furthermore, as
has been established above, the definition of an economic undertaking
adopted by the EU institutions is wide. Sports organisations at all levels are
commercially active. Restrictions placed on their sporting freedom also
affect their commercial freedom. Competition law may therefore have rele-
vance for organisational issues in sport, although once again it must care-
fully distinguish between justifiable sporting restrictions and unjustifiable
commercial restrictions. 
Maintaining the single structure model of sport
The first category of competition law interventions concerns the mainte-
nance of the traditional single structure model of sport. Most sport in Europe
is organised on this basis. One international federation (in the case of
European football, UEFA) controls the activities of its constituent members
(single structure national associations such as the English Football
Association). UEFA is one regional federation affiliated to the world’s gov-
erning body FIFA. The federations expect affiliates to participate only in
competitions organised by the federations. Single structure arrangements are
however by no means universal in sport. Boxing, for example, is organised
by a range of bodies. For the EU, the main areas of interest are two-fold.
First, the Commission must decide whether restrictive practices employed by
federations to maintain the single structure organisation of sport are to be
tolerated. Second, if alternative or ‘breakaway’ structures are established,
how best to regulate competition between them. The Commission has been
asked to investigate the conduct of competing sporting federations. One of
the first cases was a jurisdictional dispute concerning an indoor football
league in Belgium. In 1994, the Commission rejected the complaint in ques-
tion on the grounds that intra-Community trade was not seriously affected
(Coopers and Lybrand 1995: 78). 
In a similar, but much more high profile case in 1998, Media Partners
International Limited, an Italian marketing firm, complained to the
Commission about rules adopted by UEFA designed to prevent the establish-
ment of a breakaway league. Media Partners notified the Commission of
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their intention to establish a new European Football League, independent of
UEFA.40 The new ‘super-league’ was to consist of 18 founder clubs who
would be given three years exclusive participation – a break from the tradi-
tional merit-based open model of promotion and relegation practiced in
Europe. Other clubs would have to qualify. Those clubs with the largest
potential to attract television viewers were invited to become founder
members. To entice club participation, Media Partners offered a very large
financial inducement totalling £1.2 billion to the participants (Van den Brink
2000a: 365). UEFA rules designed to prevent the establishment of alterna-
tive competitions by placing heavy sanctions on participants amounted, it
was claimed, to an abuse of a dominant position (Ratliff 1998: 5).41 The
Commission must decide whether it is acceptable to require clubs to leave
their national leagues if they participate in an alternative pan-European
breakaway league. A precedent exists which may guide Commission action
in this area. In the Danish Co-operatives case, an agricultural co-operative
was permitted to prohibit their members from participating in alternative
agricultural co-operatives as the restriction benefited competition.42 Sport
could therefore claim that ancillary restrictions such as UEFA’s rule is imper-
ative to the effective operation of the competition in question (Van Den
Brink 2000b: 421). 
Even if competition law could be relied on to break open UEFA’s organ-
isational monopoly, the Media Partners proposal or any future similar pro-
posal would still require Commission approval. It is questionable that any
proposal seeking to challenge the single structure model of sport in Europe
would pass Commission scrutiny unless the proposal maintains a compet-
itive balance between all participants, large and small. This would require
the new organisers to demonstrate a commitment to solidarity within the
sport. Should the single structure model be broken, it is unclear to see why,
other than to satisfy the Commission, the new league based on commercial
imperatives would wish to promote solidarity outside the league it organ-
ises. Further questions remain concerning the establishment of a breakaway
league. First, should entrance to a new league be based on founder
members being granted exclusive participation for three years as Media
Partners proposed, Article 81(1) could potentially be relied on as this
would foreclose the market to new entrants. Second, are clubs who enter
into an agreement to form a new league colluding in the market place, con-
trary to the provisions of Article 81(1)? Such parallel conduct can amount
to a concerted practice and can arguably also be considered an abuse of a
dominant position given that the new league would be composed of
Europe’s top clubs.
In the event, UEFA proposed a counter-measure resulting in the Football
Champions League being revamped to accommodate the views of the major-
ity of Europe’s top clubs. As the top clubs accepted UEFA’s proposal, the
Media Partners proposal collapsed. 
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Multiple club ownership
The second category of competition law interventions concerns the related
issue of multiple club ownership. It is becoming common for media compa-
nies to seek to own a share in some of Europe’s football clubs. In Italy for
instance media companies own a share or control AC Milan, Fiorentina,
Lazio, Parma and Roma. In Britain, media companies own a stake in
Manchester United, Leeds United, Sunderland, Chelsea, Manchester City
(all BSkyB), Newcastle United, Aston Villa and Middlesborough (NTL) and
Liverpool (Granada). A similar picture is emerging across Europe, although
in Britain the Competition Commission recommended the prohibition of
the proposed total merger between Manchester United and BSkyB.
Concerned at the possible impact on the integrity of its European competi-
tions, UEFA passed a new rule on club ownership in May 1998. In the new
rule notified to the Commission for a negative clearance or exemption,
UEFA proposed that: (1) no club should have a financial or management
interest in another club which participates in the same UEFA competition,
(2) no person should be involved in the management of more than one club
participating in the same UEFA competition and (3) no person or company
may control more than one club participating in the same UEFA competi-
tion. UEFA was particularly concerned about contrived results and strate-
gic player transfers although the Financial Times also noted that UEFA was
worried that multiple club ownership could lead to a challenge to their
monopoly over European football (Financial Times 1999b). Two football
clubs owned by the English National Investment Company (ENIC)
appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) for the rule to be
overturned. The clubs in question, AEK Athens and Slavia Prague had qual-
ified for the UEFA Cup Winners Cup along with Vicenza, an Italian club
also owned by ENIC. By the terms of the new UEFA rule, only one team
could participate in the competition. In August 1999 CAS found in UEFA’s
favour.43
ENIC subsequently lodged a compliant with the Commission in February
2000 arguing that the rule restricted competition. The Commission’s own
examination of UEFA’s multiple owner rule was concluded in July 2002 with
the formal rejection of ENIC’s complaint.44 The Commission found that
UEFA’s rule is a decision taken by an association of undertakings and as such
is theoretically caught within the scope of Article 81. However, the
Commission agreed with UEFA that the rule was a sporting rule and was
essential in order to maintain the integrity of competition. Although the
object of the rule was not to restrict competition, arguably that was its effect.
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that the rule was proportionate in
that it did not go beyond what was necessary to secure UEFA’s chief objec-
tive concerning the integrity of its competitions and it was applied in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
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Club relocation
The issue of club relocation is the third category to have appeared on the
Commission’s competition policy agenda. The tension between the commer-
cial and socio-cultural dimensions of football has been highlighted by the
Wimbledon, Clydebank and Mouscron cases. Both Wimbledon and
Clydebank were reported to have considered asking the Commission to test
rules preventing cross-border relocation against EU competition law (Duff
1998: 54). The Mouscron case concerned Belgian football club Excelsior
Mouscron’s request to stage the home leg of a UEFA Cup tie against French
side F.C Metz in a nearby Stadium just across the border in Lille, France.
UEFA imposed restrictions on Mouscrons ground limiting the normal capac-
ity of 10,000 to just 4,500 and Mouscron argued that, due to the nature of
the fixture, they required a larger stadium. UEFA blocked the move arguing
that the home-and-away structure of its competitions needed protecting.
UEFA maintained that the tie must go ahead in the stadium of the home host
(Financial Times 1999a). This rule led two public bodies representing Lille
and Mouscron to formally complain to the Commission. The Commission
rejected the complaint made against UEFA by arguing that, ‘the UEFA Cup
rule to the effect that each club must play its home match at its own ground
is a sports rule that does not fall within the scope of the Treaty’s competition
rules’.45 As such the case contains no EU interest. 
Formula One
The most high-profile investigation conducted by the Commission concerns
the organisation of Formula One motor racing. Not only did the Commis-
sion investigate the regulatory role of the sports governing body, it also
examined issues relating to the commercial exploitation of broadcasting
rights. For the sake of completeness both are considered in this section even
though the broadcasting provisions should be read within the context of the
discussion on the exploitation market. 
In September 1997, AETV, a German television company complained to
the Commission arguing that the Fédération Internationale de L’Automobile
(FIA) had abused a dominant market position by controlling the broadcast-
ing of motor sport.46 This complaint was followed in November 1997 by a
second complaint, this time by the BPR organisation (known later as GTR).
BPR claimed that it was forced out of business by the FIA’s regulatory dom-
inance in motor sport. BPR withdrew its complaint following a financial set-
tlement. On the basis of these complaints, the Commission launched an
investigation into the activities of the FIA. The Commission drew a prelim-
inary conclusion that Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty were being
infringed. 
In June 1999 the Commission opened formal proceedings into the com-
mercial practises employed by Formula One and other international motor
racing series. In particular, the Commission argued that the FIA has abused
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its dominant position and has restricted competition. The Commission also
communicated this opinion to Formula One Administration Ltd (FOA) and
International Sportsworld Communicators (ISC). The FIA organises inter-
national motor racing, FOA sells the Formula One television rights and ISC
markets broadcasting rights to a number of major international motor sport
events. 
The Commission identified four competition issues relating to the opera-
tion of Formula One.47 First, the Commission believed that the FIA uses its
power to block series which compete with its own events. As the FIA has sole
regulatory control over motor racing in Europe, it controls the licensing of
participants. The Commission believes that the FIA has used this regulatory
dominance to restrict FIA licensees from participating in non-FIA competi-
tions. Track owners, vehicle manufactures, organisers and drivers can be
stripped of their license if they participate in non-FIA events.
Second, the Commission claimed that the FIA has used this power to force
a competing series out of the market. To support this claim the Commission
has argued that a competing promoter, the GTR Organisation, was elimi-
nated from the motor racing market because of the FIA’s regulatory domi-
nance. The GTR’s series was then replaced with a FIA championship. The
Commission believes this amounts to an abuse of a dominant position.
Third, the Commission holds the opinion that the FIA uses its power to
acquire all the television rights to international motor sports events. In 1995,
the FIA introduced a rule stating that it owned the television rights to all
motor sport it authorised. These rights were then transferred to ISC, a
company owned by Bernie Ecclestone, also an FIA Vice-President. This
means that ISC gains the television rights to all competitions authorised by
the FIA. Although these rules were modified in 1998 the Commission still
views this as an abuse of a dominant position. Formula One rights are dealt
with under a separate agreement (the Concorde Agreement). However, the
Commission believes that the effect is the same in that the FIA’s dominant
position effectively forces rights to be transferred to it. The rights are then
transferred to FOA, another company controlled by Bernie Ecclestone. If the
FIA acquired the rights abusively, then neither ISC or FOA can be said to
have acquired the rights validly.
Fourth, the Commission also believes that FOA and the FIA protect the
Formula One Championship from competition by tying up everything that
is needed to stage a rival championship. In particular the Commission has
identified three examples of attempts to foreclose the market to competition.
First, the promoter’s contracts prevent circuits used for Formula One races
from being used for races that could compete with Formula One. Second,
the ‘Concorde Agreement’ prevents Formula One teams from racing in any
other series comparable to Formula One for a very long period of time.
Third, the agreements with broadcasters place a massive financial penalty on
them, ranging from between 33 per cent and 50 per cent of the price paid, if
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they televise anything deemed by FOA to be a competitive threat to Formula
One. 
Despite maintaining objections to the Commission’s analysis, the FIA and
FOA amended their internal rules in January 2001 leading to the publica-
tion of a notice in June 2001 indicating that the Commission took a positive
view of the proposed changes.48 The essentials of the changes agreed by FIA
and FOA include: 
1 FIA has amended its regulations to strengthen the rights of motor sport
organisers, circuit owners and participants, and to make it clear that FIA
will act impartially as between all forms of motor sport for which it is the
regulator.
2 FIA will no longer have a commercial interest in the success of Formula
One and the new rules will remove any obstacle to other motor sports
series competing with Formula One.
3 FIA will retain its rights over its championships and the use of the ‘FIA’
name and Trade Marks but has removed from its rules any claim over the
broadcasting rights to events that it authorises and has agreed to waive
any claim to broadcasting rights under the relevant clauses in the Formula
One agreement (the ‘Concorde Agreement’).
4 FIA has made it clear that its decisions will always be reasoned, and that
those decisions may be challenged before national courts.
5 The FOA group of companies has sold its interest in all forms of motor
sport including Rallying and will therefore only have an interest in
Formula One (Mr Ecclestone will no longer handle FIA’s promotional
affairs and will also reduce his role in FIA in other ways).
6 FOA has agreed to limit the duration of its free-to-air broadcasting con-
tracts (to five years in the case of host broadcasters and three years in
other cases) and has removed provisions which penalised broadcasters
who wanted to broadcast other forms of open wheeler racing.49
These Commission enforced changes have had the effect of stripping the
FIA of many of its commercial functions thus making the organisation essen-
tially a sports regulatory body. By insisting on a separation between com-
mercial rules and the rules of the game, the Commission has in effect sent a
clear message to the sports world on how it practically intends to apply com-
petition law to sporting situations. Given that no further objections were
raised by third parties following publication of the notice, the Commission
closed the case in October 2001.50 Privately, the FIA are ‘delighted’ with the
settlement.51
State aid
The issuing of state aid to sports clubs is an often overlooked aspect of EU
competition law, although one highlighted by the European Parliament as
early as 1994.52 State aid has the potential to affect competition between
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sporting participants and as such has relevance to the contest market. The
Commission has formed an opinion concerning the granting of aid from the
French government to professional sports clubs in France.53 The French
government proposed granting a subsidy of up to 2.3 million euro per year
to professional sports clubs with state-approved youth training centres. The
Commission concluded that the aid was of an educational nature and not
state aid. Article 87 of the Treaty prohibits aid granted by member states
which distorts competition in trade between member states 
The supply market: the transfer system
The supply market refers to the buying and selling of players. Transfer fees
have traditionally been a common feature of European sport. For many
years, football has operated a system whereby money is exchanged between
clubs in order to secure the services of a player. The alleged benefit of trans-
fer fees is that they compensate clubs for the training and development of
players. Not only do transfer systems regulate the conduct between clubs,
thus denying clubs from freely employing the services of workers they
choose, they also impose restrictions on the ability of players to seek alter-
native employment at another club. 
The Bosman ruling established that out of contract international transfer
payments and nationality quotas were incompatible with Article 39. EU law
therefore goes some way to protect the right of free movement for players in
the EU. The rights of clubs to freely employ labour was not however guar-
anteed and some restrictions on players remained after Bosman. Although
the ECJ did not answer the question concerning the compatibility of the
international transfer system and nationality restrictions with EU competi-
tion law, the Commission held the view in the aftermath of Bosman that ‘this
is not a reason for not taking into account the application of the competi-
tion rules’ (Commission of the European Communities 1996: 3).
Amendments to the international transfer system made by FIFA/UEFA in
light of the ruling in Bosman would therefore have to satisfy the
Commission. 
There can be little doubt that the functioning of international transfer
rules is subject to scrutiny by the Commission. International football feder-
ations (such as FIFA and UEFA), national associations and clubs are consid-
ered undertakings as they are engaged in economic or commercial activity
involving the provision of goods and services (see above). In the case of FIFA,
UEFA and the national football associations, the label association of under-
takings or grouping of associations of undertakings may be more appropri-
ate (Egger and Stix-Hackl 2002: 85). The precise definition of such
organisations matters little to the application of Article 81 as all are under-
takings. The definition is only of importance when considering issues of
liability. Furthermore the transfer system should be considered an agreement
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between undertakings or a decision of an association of undertakings in the
case of FIFA’s regulations. As is shown below, the regulations on transfer are
contained within FIFA’s constitution (statute). In addition, FIFA rules,
whether binding on national associations or merely recommendations, are
still caught by the scope of Article 81. 
Therefore, the transfer system clearly stems from an agreement of or
between undertakings. As the rules on transfer stem from FIFA they are the
relevant body to be investigated by the Commission. The Commission must
then decide if the object or effect of such rules is the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition. Two issues are of relevance in this connection.
First, transfer fees have the potential to restrict the clubs source of supply
(i.e. players). This strengthens the market position of the large clubs at the
expense of the smaller clubs who are unable to develop by attracting new
and better players. This limits not only their sporting performance but also
their commercial potential. Second, players are also disadvantaged by the
transfer system. The requirement to pay a fee for a player has the effect of
restricting that players wages and limiting his ability to find employment.
Clearly, when assessing these effects, the Commission must examine the pro-
competitive effects of transfer fees. These are discussed below and a wider
discussion on this matter is provided in the previous chapter. 
The Commission must also identify whether transfer rules affect inter-
state trade. In all three relevant markets discussed above, football is a highly
international game. As such, it is difficult to justify that transfer systems do
not have a cross-border impact. Accordingly, the operation of the transfer
system is caught by the provisions of Article 81. The difficulty in applying
Article 82 relates to the definition of the product market. It is the clubs and
not the international federation who compete for the services of players and
as such the relevant market is for players. 
It is within the context of the above discussion that the Commission has
conducted an investigation into transfer rules. In January 1996 the
Commission notified FIFA and UEFA that is was launching an infringement
procedure based on Article 81(1) against the continued use of their interna-
tional transfer system and the 3+2 restrictions on foreign players, a clear
breach of the Bosman ruling. In this letter of notification the Commission
informed FIFA and UEFA that following the ruling in Bosman, the interna-
tional transfer system, as notified by FIFA/UEFA to the Commission on 28
July 1995, could not be exempt under Article 81(3) and Article 53(1) of the
EEA Agreement. The Commission notified FIFA and UEFA that they must
fully comply with Bosman within six weeks. 
After failing to gain an exemption under Article 81(3), FIFA and UEFA
informed the Commission that both the international transfer system and
nationality restrictions would be abolished. In 1997 FIFA’s new Regulations
for the Status and Transfer of Players were adopted. Players would be able
to move to another club in a different EU/EEA state at the end of their
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contract without a transfer fee being payable. Furthermore, in UEFA com-
petitions, clubs were no longer restricted to fielding foreign players within
the terms of the 3+2 player rule. 
Despite the abolition of the international transfer system and nationality
restrictions by FIFA/UEFA, the Commission maintained an objection to
certain aspects of the remaining transfer system. In June 1996, the
Commission notified FIFA/UEFA that in their view Article 81(1) EC and
Article 53(1) EEA had been breached by the requirement for payment of fees
for international transfers within the EEA of players from third countries at
the end of their contracts and the FIFA instruction to national associations
in the EU/EEA to establish national transfer systems. On the issue of national
transfer systems, the Commission drew the following conclusion:
The effect of national transfers is normally limited to one member state.
However, one cannot exclude the possibility that continuing with national
transfer systems may limit the freedom of clubs to hire the players that they
want, or that their choice may be distorted by the maintenance of national
transfers. One can, therefore conclude that in principle national transfer
systems are also incompatible with Article 81 of the Treaty. (Commission of
the European Communities 1996: 5)
FIFA and UEFA responded to the Commission’s statement of objections
by informing them that they did not intend to alter aspects of the transfer
system not covered by the ruling in Bosman. The Commission informed
FIFA/UEFA that given their reluctance to respond satisfactorily to the objec-
tions, formal infringement proceedings would be initiated. Little progress
was made on the resolution of this issue although high-level talks did take
place during the 1997 Amsterdam Summit on the social significance of sport.
Although the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty only mentioned sport in a non-
legally binding Declaration, the involvement of the member states in sport-
ing issues demonstrated that a school of thought within the EU had emerged
which stressed the need to take the specific characteristics of sport into
account in the application of EU law in sports-related cases. Despite this
breakthrough for the sports world, the fact remained that sport was not
granted an exemption by the new Treaty, the Commission still had obliga-
tions to act as the guardian of the legal framework of the EU and, further-
more, FIFA/UEFA had yet to satisfactorily address the Commission’s
objections. 
Measures eventually proposed by FIFA/UEFA to alter the international
transfer system failed to satisfy the Commission’s objections. One measure
proposed by UEFA’s Executive Committee was the establishment of a stan-
dard player–club contract covering initially three years as a trainee and then
three years as a professional under contract. UEFA recommended that
national associations introduce this type of contract from July 1997. In the
initial part of the contract, a transfer fee would still be payable at the end of
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the term. FIFA/UEFA notified the Commission of this proposal but the
Commission took the preliminary view that the maintenance of the transfer
system at the end of the initial part of the contract would render the stan-
dard contract as being incompatible with Article 39 of the Treaty. In a second
proposal, FIFA Circular No. 616, paragraph 2 (adopted 4 June 1997) pro-
posed the introduction of a system whereby the issue of an international
transfer certificate could be refused if non-amateur players terminate their
contract of employment before its date of expiry. Paragraph 1 of the Circular
postponed until 1 April 1999 the abolition of the international transfer
system within the EEA to non-EU players reaching the end of their contract.
Both measures led to formal complaints being tabled to the Commission by
three football clubs and players’ organisations in Belgium.
Spurred by such complaints and frustrated by the attitude of FIFA/UEFA,
on 15 December 1998, the Commission launched a formal investigation into
the operation of the international transfer system. In the letter of objections
sent to FIFA/UEFA, the Commission objected to certain provisions within
the international transfer system which had the effect of:
1 prohibiting players from transferring to another club following their uni-
lateral termination of contract, even if the player has complied with
national law governing the penalties for breach of contract;
2 allowing a club to receive payment for a player leaving a club if the con-
tract has been terminated by mutual consent;
3 encouraging high transfer fees which bear no relation to the training costs
incurred by the club selling the player, a practice condemned by the Court
in Bosman and one which limits the ability of small clubs to hire top
players;
4 allowing for a transfer fee to be demanded for the transfer of players (both
in and out of contract) from a non-EU country to a member state of the
EU and vice versa.
The Commission indicated that the above points infringed Article 81(1)
and no exemption could be justified. Point 4 also breached Article 81,
although transfers from member state countries to non-EU states will only
be caught by the scope of Article 81(1) if the club concerned plays regularly
in competitions involving the participation of clubs from member countries.
In essence therefore, the Commission held the view in the formal statement
of objections that these provisions restrict the ability of clubs to recruit the
players they want whilst also limiting the freedom of movement of players. 
Once again the game’s governing bodies were slow to respond the
Commission’s statement of objections. The Commission’s response to
FIFA/UEFA’s inactivity came in the summer of 2000. Unless FIFA/UEFA sub-
mitted formal proposals to amend the international transfer system by 31
October 2000, the Commission would take unilateral action in the form of
a formal decision to secure the changes necessary. 
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Faced with the possibility of an end-of-year prohibition decision, FIFA
and UEFA established a joint transfer task force chaired by Per Ravn Omdal,
UEFA vice-president and member of the FIFA executive committee.
Throughout September 2000, the task force examined potential amend-
ments to the international transfer system in light of the Commission’s objec-
tions. In this connection, they received support not only from many of
Europe’s top clubs, but also from the German Chancellor and British Prime
Minister who in a joint statement expressed their support for the current
transfer system.54
The FIFA/UEFA Negotiation Document
Despite their hostility, the joint FIFA/UEFA transfer task force produced a
set a proposals that were duly submitted to the Commission by the imposed
October deadline. The proposals were outlined in the form of a ‘Negotiation
Document’.55 In the introduction, FIFA/UEFA continued to question the
validity of the Commission’s complaints, although they did acknowledge
that certain aspects of the transfer system needed revising. The document
explained that a revised transfer system would need to ensure: (1) that con-
tract stability was maintained, (2) that clubs were rewarded for the invest-
ment in the training of young players and (3) that the new system must
ensure the redistribution of income which would help maintain a balance
between the clubs. Using these principles as a starting point, the Negotiating
Document outlined the following proposed changes to the international
transfer system.
Prohibition of the international transfer of minors FIFA/UEFA justified
this move in order to avoid the economic exploitation of minors, although
this restriction would not apply to instances involving the relocation of the
player’s family to another state. 
Training compensation for young players Concerned at the deleterious
effect the abolition of transfer fees would have on the grass roots of football,
FIFA/UEFA proposed the maintenance of fees for the transfer of players up
to the age of 23, even if the player had come to the end of their contract with
the club. FIFA/ UEFA also noted that training compensation would be
financed through ‘solidarity mechanisms’ such as a levy on transfer fees and
a solidarity fund financed by income generated from the central marketing
of television rights. 
Respect for contracts FIFA/UEFA considered contract stability as an
essential part of professional football not only in terms of team building and
fan association with a club but also in terms of employment security for
players. As a consequence, the Negotiation Document proposed that
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contracts lasting up to three years should be respected by both club and
player. A maximum contract of five years was proposed. 
Transfer periods For the purposes of maintaining contract stability and
protecting the integrity of sporting competition, FIFA/UEFA proposed the
introduction of two unified transfer periods with players restricted to one
move per season.
An arbitration system The Negotiation Document proposed the establish-
ment of a new voluntary arbitration system for the resolution of breach of
contract disputes. Compensation payments would be agreed by the arbitra-
tion board in accordance with national labour laws. However, in order to
respect the ‘specificity of sport’, sporting sanctions could be imposed on
players breaching contract or for reasons of other ‘unethical behaviour’. If
the buying and selling clubs and the player agreed to a transfer fee, the use
of the arbitration board would not be required and hence sporting sanctions
not imposed. Although the Negotiation Document stressed that the arbitra-
tion system was designed for the international transfer system, it could act
as a model for national transfer regimes.
Transitional arrangements The Negotiation Document stressed that a
minimum necessity for the world of football is that alterations made to the
transfer system protect existing contractual arrangements between clubs and
players.
Following the submission of the revised transfer plans, negotiations
between FIFA/UEFA and the Commission on the acceptability of the propo-
sals were influenced by three key developments. The first was the rejection
of the Negotiation Document by FIFPro, the international football player’s
union. The second was a tactical dispute between FIFA and UEFA and the
third was the discussion of sport at the December 2000 Nice European
Council.
FIFPro’s objections
Despite being originally involved in the preparation of the FIFA/UEFA
Negotiation Document, FIFPro, the international football player’s union,
failed to support the position taken by FIFA/UEFA within it.56 FIFPro’s
objections to the Negotiation Document, outlined in an alternative submis-
sion to the Commission, were essential two-fold (FIFPro 2001). 
The first issue related to the rights of players to seek alternative employ-
ment at another club without undue restriction (FIFPro 2001: 6 and 13). In
this connection, FIFPro share the concerns of the Commission in relation to
the inability of players to unilaterally break a contract of employment with
a club and move freely to another once compensation for breach of contract
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has been paid in accordance with national labour law. In the alternative sub-
mission, FIFPro questioned the alleged benefits of this system of player
restraint. FIFA/UEFA claim that the restraint is needed in order to ensure
contract stability (point 3 of the Negotiation Document). FIFPro argued that
in the period between 1996/1997 and 1999/2000 both player mobility and
transfer spending have greatly increased.57 This is because the maintenance
of transfer fees gives clubs an incentive to sell contracted players. As such
‘stability of contract, therefore, cannot be seriously seen as a positive
symptom of the transfer system’ (FIFPro 2001). Consequently, the abolition
of transfer fees would eliminate this distortion and grant footballers equal
rights of freedom of movement enjoyed by other economically active
European citizens. 
The second main objection forwarded by FIFPro concerned the related
issue of the transfer system and the law (FIFPro 2001: 6). Although FIFPro
agreed with FIFA/UEFA that a balance between clubs needed maintaining
and clubs should be encouraged to recruit and train juniors, they argued that
less-restrictive means than the transfer system can achieve these objectives.
Whereas the FIFA/UEFA Negotiation Document stressed the economic
importance of the transfer system for small clubs, the FIFPro report claimed
that the distribution of income within football was in decline, primarily as a
result of the income generated by the sale of broadcasting rights. Similarly,
FIFA/UEFA claimed that the maintenance of the transfer system was
required in order to encourage clubs to recruit and train juniors. The FIFPro
report found no evidence to support this link, instead pointing out that due
to transfer fee inflation, most top clubs have invested heavily in youth acad-
emies in order to develop their own juniors. FIFPro pointed out that
FIFA/UEFA recognise the growing polarisation between rich and poor in
European football yet are misguided to believe that the maintenance of the
transfer system is required to prevent the gap growing further. FIFPro there-
fore questioned the validity of maintaining a system which is anti-
competitive and restricts the freedom of movement of players, particularly
given that it does not fulfil the objective of redistribution and training incen-
tive stated by FIFA/UEFA. 
In essence, FIFPro did not support the FIFA/UEFA Negotiation
Document because they identified a hidden agenda implicit within it. This
agenda sought not only to protect the transfer system, a system used by the
game’s governing bodies to ‘restrain players’ earnings and bargaining
power’, but also to enhance it and impose on players restraints more
onerous than previously existed (FIFPro 2001: 6). In the case of young
players (under 23) the FIFA/UEFA proposals could lead to a situation in
which a player, having come to the end of his contract, could not leave a
club without a transfer fee being paid. This, FIFPro argued, is a return to
the pre-Bosman days of player restraint and as such a retrograde move. In
the case of older players, the imposition of sporting sanctions for breach of
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contract also represents a restraint, particularly if the player has complied
with national labour laws governing breach of contract. Furthermore, the
FIFPro report claimed that the formula for calculating compensation fees
imposes a fixed fee that bears no relation between the amount of costs actu-
ally used in the training of a player and the fee to be paid. ‘History shows
that such fees operate as a significant and sometimes definitive restraint that
cannot only seriously undermine player earnings but also put players out of
the game’ (FIFPro 2001: 15). This formula would not even afford players
the protection of a negotiated transfer fee. FIFPro also rejected the notion
of a ‘multiplier’ within the transfer system which would have the result of
inflating fees depending on criteria not related to the ‘actual cost’ of train-
ing.58 One of these multiplier criteria is the quality of the clubs youth
section. Given the financial commitment of top clubs to youth academies,
the revised transfer system proposed by FIFA/UEFA would result in
resources flowing to these clubs and not from them. This defeats the redis-
tribution argument for the maintenance of the transfer system as the domi-
nant position of the top clubs is reinforced.
In short, the FIFPro report condemned proposals contained within the
Negotiation Document on the revised transfer system and arrangements
governing player contracts. In place of the revised transfer system, the
FIFPro report recommended the establishment of re-distributional solidarity
funds, a solution mooted by the Advocate General in Bosman. FIFPro sug-
gested that the solidarity ‘pool’ would be composed of items such as a pro-
portion of gate receipts, television revenues and merchandising. The
legitimate objectives expressed by FIFA/UEFA of ensuring a balance between
clubs and the encouragement of youth training would be better achieved
through these funds than the restrictive transfer system. The FIFPro report
expressed disappointment that both the national leagues and UEFA have
failed to fully maximise the potential of such revenue sharing, instead relying
on the questionable transfer system to do it for them. On the issue of player
contracts, the FIFPro report proposed the use of collective bargaining.
FIFPro General secretary, Theo Van Seggelen, threatened to ‘go to court in
every country’ if the FIFA/UEFA proposals were accepted, a threat UEFA
described as ‘totally unacceptable’.59
The FIFA–UEFA split 
The December 1999 Helsinki report on sport presented the Commission’s
position on the relationship between sport and the EU. In it, the Commission
stressed that it would take the ‘specific characteristics’ of sport into account
in the application of EU law if these characteristics could be adequately
defined by the sports world themselves. The report placed a heavy emphasis
on a partnership between the EU and a unified sports world. The dispute
between FIFA/UEFA on the one hand and FIFPro on the other did little to
communicate to the Commission the existence of a sports world with
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common concerns. In January 2001 the united front presented by FIFA and
UEFA in the Negotiation Document also began to crumble. 
The Commission’s initial response to the Negotiation Document was cau-
tious. In particular, in ongoing discussions with FIFA/UEFA, the Commis-
sion expressed concerns relating to the provisions on: the prohibition of the
international transfer of minors, the maintenance of transfer fees for players
under the age of 23 and the continued inability of players to end contracts
prematurely.
FIFA’s response to these concerns was to unilaterally issue a second set of
proposals to the Commission in January 2001. FIFA explained: ‘with a view
to making progress in the negotiations with the European Commission on
the reform of the international transfer system, FIFA has elaborated a docu-
ment, which contains new proposals’.60 The new FIFA document entitled
‘Proposals to Amend FIFA’s International Transfer Regulations’ contained
provisions which would have permitted players to serve three months notice
on a club prior to the termination of contract. 
UEFA issued a response to the new FIFA document in a media release on
the 17 January 2001.61 In essence, UEFA felt that the new FIFA proposals on
transfers undermined their efforts to resolve the dispute with the
Commission. Furthermore, UEFA criticised FIFA for the way the new pro-
posals were unilaterally submitted to the Commission. The mid-January
news headlines were dominated by reports of a possible formal split between
FIFA and UEFA unless the dispute between the two parties could be resolved.
For UEFA this split could only be avoided if FIFA declared their new trans-
fer proposals void. Given that FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro now all held compet-
ing visions for the future, a solution with the Commission seemed remote.
The Helsinki partnership approach had failed to be utilised by the key foot-
ball authorities. Clearly concerned at UEFA’s implied threat, FIFA formally
withdrew their transfer proposals on 19 January 2001. The October 2000
Negotiation Document reverted to the default document with which
FIFA/UEFA would conduct further negotiations with the Commission.
The Nice Summit 
In December 2000, the Heads of State and Government met in Nice to fin-
alise the work of the intergovernmental conference. In essence the leaders of
the 15 EU countries met to sign a new Treaty designed to strengthen the
internal structure of the EU prior to the enlargement of the Union to include
applicant Central and Eastern European countries and Malta and Cyprus.
In the run up to that meeting intense lobbying took place by the sports world
for a protective protocol on sport to be attached to the new Treaty. Despite
support for a protocol on sport from some of Europe’s major football-
playing nations, no additional mention was made of sport in the Treaty
beyond the Declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty. As with the
Amsterdam debate, the Commission opposed a legally binding mention of
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sport in the Treaty for fear of setting a precedent of allowing certain profes-
sions exemptions from the Treaty.
Despite this further setback for the game’s governing bodies, the member
states did release an unusually long Declaration on Sport in the form of a
Presidency Conclusion. The provisions relating to the transfer dispute read,
‘the European Council is keenly supportive of dialogue on the transfer
system between the sports movement, in particular the football authorities,
organisations representing professional sportsmen and -women, the
Community and the member states, with due regard for the specific require-
ments of sport, subject to compliance with Community law’.
The final transfer settlement
Despite the split that emerged between FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro, the Nice
Declaration offered football’s governing bodies an ideal opportunity to
secure a favourable settlement with the Commission. In March 2001 an
agreement was reached between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on the re-
structuring of the international transfer system for professional footballers.
The agreement represented a compromise between the interests of the two
parties and was widely interpreted as a favourable settlement for football’s
governing bodies. In July 2001 FIFA’s Executive Committee adopted a new
set of transfer rules in line with the principles agreed with the Commission
in March. The new rules came into effect in September 2001 and were based
on the following principles: 
1 The protection of minors: the international transfer of players under the
age of 18 is permitted subject to agreed conditions; the football author-
ities will establish and enforce a code of conduct to guarantee that train-
ing and sporting and academic education be provided.
2 Training compensation for young players: in the case of players
aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to
encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small
clubs.
3 Maintenance of contractual stability: contracts to be protected for a
period of three years up to 28; two years thereafter. Sporting sanctions
can be applied to players unilaterally terminating their contract within
this protected time. Financial compensation can be paid if a contract is
breached unilaterally whether by the player or the club. 
4 Solidarity mechanisms: the creation of solidarity mechanisms (based on a
proportion of compensation fees) is designed to redistribute a significant
proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of
a player, including amateur clubs.
5 Transfer windows: one transfer period per season, and a further
limited mid-season window, with a limit of one transfer per player per
season.
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6 Dispute resolution: a dispute resolution and arbitration body is estab-
lished which does not prejudice the ability of players to seek other forms
of legal redress.62
FIFPro’s threat to ‘go to court in every country’ began in Brussels in May
2001. FIFPro sought to question the authority of the Commission to sanc-
tion a revised transfer system which FIFPro regarded as deviating from EU
law. However prior to the hearing FIFPro applied for an adjournment. At
the FIFA Congress at Buenos Aires in July 2001, FIFA announced how it
intended to implement the new transfer system. FIFPro sought an adjourn-
ment in order to allow time to consider the details of FIFA’s new system and
include any new provisions in the proceedings. In particular, FIFPro
expressed concerns relating to the implementation of the transfer provisions
concerning sporting sanctions, the stability period and compensation pay-
ments for young players. Wishing the court case to be based on the 5 March
agreement with the Commission, FIFA objected to the application for
adjournment. In July the court granted the adjournment. In August, before
the hearing was re-convened, FIFA and FIFPro reached an agreement on
FIFPro’s participation in the implementation of the new transfer regime. As
part of the agreement, FIFPro agreed to halt their litigation in exchange for
FIFPro representatives being able to sit on FIFA’s Dispute Resolution
Chamber along with representatives of the clubs. FIFPro will also nominate
representatives for the new Arbitration Tribunal for Football, to which deci-
sions of the Dispute Resolution Chamber can be appealed. Furthermore
FIFA and FIFPro have clarified technical issues relating to the new transfer
system and have agreed a system of review and consultation concerning the
new system. The new transfer regulations accordingly came into force in
September 2001. 
The Commission now considers its scrutiny of the transfer system com-
plete. The agreement between the Commission and FIFA consisted of an
exchange of letters between the two parties in March 2001. In the
Commission letter to FIFA, Commissioner Monti stated, ‘your undertaking
contains sufficient elements for me to be able to confirm that I no longer have
the intention to propose that the Commission adopts a negative decision in
the procedure that is open against FIFA as regards the international transfer
rules’.63 In June 2002 the Commission released a press release in which it
announced the formal closure of its investigations into FIFA’s regulations on
international football transfers.64 Following the entry into force of the new
transfer procedure three complaints were withdrawn. Two remaining com-
plaints relating to the transfer system were then rejected by the Commission
thus allowing for the closure of the investigation. The two complainants
were challenging the prohibition on players unilaterally terminating a con-
tract. As complainants may have recourse to arbitration, national courts and
the ECJ (in the later case to challenge the Commission’s decision to reject the
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complaints), the Commission now considers its involvement over. FIFPro
described this claim as ‘premature’.65 Due to the informal nature of the set-
tlement, the Commission does still have the right to re-open its investigation
should it be dissatisfied with the implementation of the new transfer rules.
Furthermore, it is clear that transfer rules are not considered by the
Commission to be of purely sporting interest only. Future changes to the
rules will continue to require Commission approval. The approach adopted
by the Commission does not therefore settle the issue definitively. A chal-
lenge to the transfer rules before a national court and potentially the ECJ
must therefore remain a future possibility. 
In case C-264/98 Tiborbalog v. Royal Charleroi Sporting Club, the ECJ
was expected to hear a case concerning objections to the international trans-
fer system which mirror those of the Commission. Following the re-
modelling of FIFA/UEFA’s international transfer system in March 2001,
Tibor Balog (a non-EU player) and ASBL Royal Charleroi Sporting Club
(RCSC) reached a settlement meaning that a preliminary reference to the
ECJ was no longer required on the question of the movement of out-of-
contract non-EU players. Interestingly, before the case was withdrawn the
Advocate General (Stix-Hackl) published a negative opinion in which she
argued that such restrictions were incompatible with Article 81.66
The regulation of players’ agents
Of increasing importance to the supply and demand of players is the role of
their agents. Following a number of complaints and two petitions from the
European Parliament, in October 1999 the Commission launched an inves-
tigation into FIFA’s rules governing players’ agents.67 FIFA requires players
and clubs to use licensed agents who themselves must provide a non-
returnable bank guarantee of 200,000 Swiss Francs. The Commission con-
siders these rules as potentially anti-competitive as they may have the effect
of denying individuals access to the profession. It is questionable whether
the competitive-enhancing features of these rules outweigh their anti-
competitive features. As such a less-restrictive approach to regulating
player’s agents may be proposed by FIFA in the future. 
Comment: a competition policy framework for sport
The ruling in Bosman had profound consequences for sport. Not only did
sport have to adjust to the terms of the ruling, it found itself operating in a
new regulatory environment in which competition policy was central. Given
the newly acquired commercial status of sport in Europe, the Commission
found itself compelled to examine more closely the relationship between
sport and competition law. In general, the Commission has consistently held
that agreements between undertakings in the sports sector do fall within
the scope of competition law. Nevertheless, as the above review of case law
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illustrates, the Commission is seeking to adopt a more soft-touch approach
to dealing with the internal rules of sport. A number of factors explain this.
First, in a short space of time cases before the Commission mounted
rapidly. The Commission has had to deal with up to 60 sports-related cases
at any one time. This expansion of the Commission’s sports-related caseload
has placed a strain on the Commission’s already over-stretched resources. In
other sectors, this strain has resulted in a slow turnover of cases and the
increased use of administrative procedures rather than formal decisions to
decide cases. In two major cases concerning the operation of Formula One
motor racing and the international transfer system for footballers, the
Commission has followed an informal negotiated settlement approach
rather than taking formal decisions. 
Second, the increased involvement by the member states (and other actors
in the EU) has compelled the Commission to review their procedures for
applying competition policy to sport. The member states responded to post-
Bosman criticism of the EU’s approach to sport through the Amsterdam
Declaration. Although the Declaration disappointed those who wished to
see a legal competence for sport established within the Treaty, the
Declaration has proved extremely significant. In particular, it launched the
so-called new approach to sport – an approach which in terms of the appli-
cation of EU law to the sports sector stressed the need to balance commer-
cial calculations with a consideration for sports social, cultural and
educational qualities. The Commission’s 1999 ‘framework’ paper (see
below) was in effect an institutional response to the Declaration. 
Finally, as the Commission has gained more experience in sports-related
issues, so they are more able to formulate clearer guidelines on the applica-
tion of competition law to the sports sector. Although the causistic approach
by the Commission has appeared haphazard at times, an understanding of
the sports sector can only develop with time and through consultations with
interested parties. 
Faced with the above developments, the Commission has sought ways to
establish a new regulatory environment for sport, integrating sporting self-
regulation within a EU competition policy framework. However, this separ-
ate territories approach has been constructed through a mixture of hard
(formal) and soft (informal) law. As is explored below, this raises some
important questions about the future viability of the current separate terri-
tories approach. The Commission’s approach does nevertheless reject the
notion of a general block exemption for sport. The Commission is still com-
mitted to the development and consolidation of the internal market and is
keen to avoid setting a precedent for allowing certain professions exemp-
tions from the Treaty. After all, sport cannot be considered to be the only
sector with ‘special’ characteristics. 
The then Competition Policy Commissioner Van Miert signalled his
intention to establish such a competition framework for sport in November
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1997 at a meeting of the European Sport Forum held in Luxembourg. At this
meeting Van Miert stated that ‘positive action’ must be taken in respect of
sport. ‘By positive action I mean providing the sporting world with guide-
lines on what kind of restrictions would be acceptable, given the special fea-
tures of the sector concerned’ (Van Miert 1997). In March 1998, the
Competition Policy Director General Alexander Schaub made clear that
these guidelines would not include a general exemption for sport from EU
competition law. He argued that such an exemption is ‘unnecessary, unde-
sirable and unjustified’ (Schaub 1998). Furthermore, Schaub made clear that
the Commission still felt a strong sense of commitment to the realisation and
protection of the fundamental freedoms. In this connection he remarked, ‘it
would not be fair to consumers and it would not reflect the economic impor-
tance of sport if we were merely to sit back and refrain from applying the
competition rules. Where we receive legitimate complaints, we must take the
necessary action’ (Schaub 1998). 
In February 1999, the Commission released a paper on the application of
competition rules to sport.68 The paper was the first formal exploration of
the separate territories concept. The paper outlined the following principles
to be considered when applying EU competition rules to sport:
1 safeguarding the general interest in relation to the protection of private
interests;
2 restricting Commission action solely to cases which are of Community
interest;
3 applying the so-called de minimis rule, according to which agreements of
minor importance do not significantly affect trade between member
states;
4 applying the four authorisation criteria laid down in Article 81(3) of the
EC Treaty, but also refusing an exemption to any agreements which
infringe other provisions of the EC Treaty and in particular freedom of
movement for sportsmen;
5 defining reference markets pursuant to the applicable general rules
adapted to the features specific to each sport. 
To provide some guidelines for assessing potential breaches of EU com-
petition policy, the Commission has developed four categories concerning:
1 Rules to which, in principle, Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty does not apply,
given that such rules are inherent to sport and/or necessary for its organ-
isation.
2 Rules which are, in principle, prohibited if they have a significant effect
on trade between member states.
3 Rules which are restrictive of competition but which in principle qualify
for an exemption, in particular rules which do not affect a sportsman’s
freedom of movement inside the EU and whose aim is to maintain the
balance between clubs in a proportioned way by preserving both a certain
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equality of opportunities and the uncertainty of results and by encourag-
ing recruitment and training of young players.
4 Rules which are abusive of a dominant position under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty. It is not the power to regulate a given sporting activity as such,
which might constitute an abuse but rather the way in which a given
sporting organisation exercises such power. A sporting organisation
would infringe Article 82 of the EC Treaty if it used its regulatory power
to exclude from the market, without an objective reason, any competing
organiser or indeed any market player who, even meeting justified quality
or safety standards, failed not to obtain from said sporting organisation
a certificate of quality or of product safety. 
The paper makes clear that as guidelines the principles contained in the
paper do not prejudice the Commission’s existing sports-related investiga-
tions. The paper represents something of a shift in thinking by the
Commission and has had practical effects in connection with the application
of competition law to sport (see above and below). Nevertheless, the limits
of the competition law separate territories approach are apparent.
Essentially, the Commission’s line of reasoning on sport rests on the assump-
tion that the commercial and regulatory functions of sport can be separated.
Where sport is practiced as an economic activity, the Commission has indi-
cated that restrictive practices will be challenged unless they can be justified
on sporting grounds. In other words, if sports organisations can demonstrate
that the pro-competitive features of their rules outweigh the anti-competitive
features, the Commission should in principle have no objection. 
The Commission will need to distinguish between purely sporting situa-
tions which would be considered to be outside the remit of EU competition
law and wholly commercial situations, which are not. As the Commission’s
paper acknowledges, sport in Europe comprises two levels of activity,
on the one hand the sporting activity strictly speaking, which fulfils a social,
integrating and cultural role that must be preserved and to which in theory the
competition rules of the EC Treaty do not apply. On the other hand a series of
economic activities generated by the sporting activity, to which the competi-
tion rules of the EC Treaty apply, albeit taking into account the specific require-
ments of this sector.69
The difficulty clearly lies in situations in which it is difficult to separate
these two levels of activity. Furthermore, the difficulty in deciding which
rules are inherent to the operation of sport and which are commercially
based is apparent. As such any framework for applying competition policy
to sport must be very broad in order to accommodate the huge diversity in
the sports world. A case-by-case approach to sport is therefore likely to
persist, calling into question the usefulness of the framework. Nevertheless,
as case law develops so a clearer picture is emerging of the types of agree-
ments that are being considered anti-competitive. In this connection the
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Commission is following a dual strategy. On the one hand it has consistently
confirmed that sport is subject to competition law. On the other, it has then
considered more closely ways in which the specificity of sport can be taken
into consideration in the application of law. As such the Commission has not
only been able to fulfil its constitutional role as guardian of the legal frame-
work, it has also responded positively to political pressure for increased sen-
sitivity. A review of the case law confirms this approach. 
The exploitation market The Commission’s approach to broadcasting has
mainly centred on establishing competition within the broadcasting sector.
The Commission has recognised that sports rights often form an essential
part of any new broadcasting service being offered to consumers. Such rules
are therefore essentially commercial in nature. Accordingly, in all of the
broadcasting markets discussed above (collective selling, exclusivity, collec-
tive purchasing and transmission), the Commission has established that
broadcasting rules fall within the scope of Article 81. The Commission’s line
of reasoning must therefore be seen in the context of their commitment to
establish a single market in broadcasting services in which a range of oper-
ators, including those embracing new technology, play a full part. This is
consistent with the Commission’s line in other sectors. However, in each of
these broadcasting markets, the Commission has demonstrated a willingness
to make more use of exemptions than it has in other sectors. The
Commission has therefore explicitly acknowledged the specificity of sport.
In the case of Formula One for instance, the Commission acknowledged that
the collective sale of broadcasting rights was appropriate for the sport. On
ticketing arrangements, even though the Commission adopted a negative
decision in the France 1998 case, the size of the fine (a mere 1,000 euros)
indicated that the Commission had to once again balance commercial con-
siderations with the specific nature of sport. Finally, in the cases to come
before it concerning merchandising agreements, the Commission has consis-
tently sought to limit the anti-competitive impact of exclusive distribution
and sponsorship agreements. In this connection, the Commission has taken
the view that such rules could not be justified on sporting grounds. 
The contest market On first appearance, the issue of how sports bodies
organise themselves would appear to fall outside the scope of EU competi-
tion law. This has not happened. The Commission has scrutinised a growing
number of cases concerning the organisation of sport in Europe. Unlike with
broadcasting rights where competition law was employed to free up the
broadcasting market thus allowing for the entrance of new participants,
competition law is applied to organisational issues as a way of maintaining
a competitive balance between clubs. In both instances, the Commission
argues that consumers benefit from such interventions. Hence the
Commission has been sympathetic to rules which seek to maintain the single
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structure model of sport and rules restricting multiple club ownership and
club relocation. Furthermore, in the Formula One case the Commission
made a concerted effort to separate the FIA’s regulatory and commercial
functions. 
The supply market In terms of player mobility, the Commission’s line has
essentially concerned the rights of players as workers and the rights of clubs
as commercial undertakings. In terms of post-Bosman transfer rules, the
Commission initially adopted a hard line. It made it clear that it was not pre-
pared to accept alternatives to the transfer system that compromised EU law.
However, the impact of the Amsterdam and Nice Declaration’s on sport have
altered this view. The March 2001 settlement on transfers reflects a more
sympathetic approach to sport. The Commission has accepted the argument
that restrictions on player mobility and restrictions on the ability of clubs to
employ players without obstruction can be justified in terms of maintaining
a competitive balance between participants. Again, therefore, the Commis-
sion has acknowledged the specificity of sport within the context of EU com-
petition law.
In applying competition law to sport, the Commission has had to operate
within the context of three institutional pressures. First, the Commission is
committed (both ideologically and constitutionally) to the promotion and
protection of free and fair competition in the Single Market. It is an institu-
tion deeply committed to the principles of negative integration. Second, the
Commission faces administrative difficulties. The Competition Policy
Directorate suffers from a lack of resources and consequently struggles to
ensure the widespread application of competition law to all sectors of the
economy. It is for this reason that the Commission is committed to reform-
ing the procedures for applying competition law. Third, the Commission
must square its commitment to free market principles with the political pres-
sure being applied to it to recognise the specific characteristics of sport when
applying competition law to the sports sector. 
As a consequence of these pressures, the Commission’s approach to sport
has been shaped by the use of soft law – another institutional norm within
the Commission. Soft law settlement of cases takes the form of the issuing
of comfort letters, the publication of notices or even the publication of press
releases. The Commission has used these informal channels to resolve cases
involving Formula One motor racing, the operation of the international
transfer system for footballers, UEFA’s central selling of broadcasting rights
(which may in time harden with a formal decision) and the issue of club relo-
cation. The Commission has also made use of policy papers to communicate
their thoughts on the application of competition rules to sport. The use of
soft law allows the Commission to respond to political pressure for a softer
touch application of competition law to sport whilst not undermining their
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commitment to the free market. Soft law also allows for the speedier and less
costly turnover of cases. Furthermore sports bodies themselves favour the
informal negotiated settlement approach. With the relationship between
sport and competition law being a relatively new development, the use of
soft law can also be defended on the grounds of flexibility and sensitivity to
sport whilst the Commission build up experience of the sector.
Nevertheless, the use of soft law poses some important questions for
sports relationship with the EU. In areas where the Commission has resorted
to formal decision making such as in the case of UEFA’s broadcasting regu-
lations, ticketing arrangements and merchandising agreements, sport can
rely on hard law principles to guide them. However, by using soft law, the
Commission has in effect constructed legally fragile separate territories for
some crucial arrangements in sport. As the Commission’s role is central to
the success of the separate territories approach, the continued use of soft law
is potentially problematic. As the expanded territory of sporting autonomy
is not fully underpinned by hard case law, sport cannot readily rely on the
long-term soundness of the separate territories. Furthermore, should the
Commission’s proposals to amend the competition law procedure be
adopted, a new set of actors will play an important part in the development
of separate territories. 
Under the Commission’s proposals, in addition to the Commission,
national courts and regulatory authorities will also be able to apply the
exemption criteria outlined in Article 81(3). The devolution of the powers
to apply Article 81 will allow the Commission to concentrate on the most
serious abuses of competition law. Sport is unlikely to be considered such an
important sector. As such, the national courts and competition bodies will
play a more prominent role in the regulation of sport. However, the
Commission’s proposals assume that these bodies will be able to play a more
active part in applying competition law as they are familiar with the compe-
tition law procedures and case law. In the case of sport, the Commission’s
use of soft law has however resulted in a dearth of hard law measures which
could guide the national authorities. With the involvement of more, essen-
tially Single Market regulatory actors operating within the sports policy sub-
system, the number of available venues for litigants to exploit will also
increase. Single Market regulatory ‘venue shopping’ therefore has the poten-
tial to undermine the legally fragile principles of the separate territories
approach. As Kinsella and Daly argue, to compound the lack of ‘hard’ case
law guidance, the impending enlargement of the EU will further erode the
uniform application of competition law principles to sport (Kinsella and
Daly 2001: 13). As the exemption criteria (both formal and informal) forms
an essential tool in implementing the separate territories approach, the
future remains uncertain.
The soft law sporting principles contained with the separate territories
approach are therefore legally fragile. First, they can become undermined
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either by a change of approach by the Commission or through the impact of
the Commission proposal. In such circumstances, sports bodies are likely to
abandon their preference for soft law. They could, with some justification,
claim that their legitimate expectations have been eroded by changes in the
application of competition law. The Commission is to some extent bound by
its informal decision making. Second, the socio-cultural coalition could
exploit further institutional venues and themselves go ‘venue shopping’ in
order to secure a more legally robust regulatory environment. Further sub-
system activity in the form of coalition venue shopping will therefore
undoubtedly change the current separate territories landscape. 
The future definition of the separate territories therefore remains uncer-
tain. Pressures such as the expected downturn in television revenues for sport
may also impact upon the separate territories. Concerned at the financial
health of many of Europe’s football clubs, UEFA intends to introduce a club
licensing system in the 2004/2005 season. Under the terms of the system, all
clubs taking part in UEFA competitions must adhere to ‘good governance’
criteria. Given that high player salaries are at the root of football’s financial
problems, the system may act as a vehicle to administer the capping of sala-
ries. The leading clubs in Europe have already agreed in principle to salary
capping as a mechanism to control spiralling wage bills. As the details of the
salary cap have yet to be published, the Commission has not formed an
opinion on its compatibility with competition law. Salary caps are by defini-
tion restrictive. Depending on the form they take they restrict the amount
clubs can spend on wages thus restricting the supply and demand for players.
Capping is therefore likely to be caught within the scope of the EU’s compe-
tition rules. However, if the financial recession in sport threatens to under-
mine the game itself, capping may be considered inherent to sport and
essential to maintain a competitive balance between the clubs. The
Commission’s eventual treatment of salary capping will say much about
the future definition of the separate territories. As far back as 1997, the
Commission has however indicated its support for capping. As then
Commissioner Van Miert remarked, ‘another avenue which might be worth
exploring is that of the salary cap whereby the total expenditure of each club
on players’ salaries would be limited so as to prevent all the good players
joining the rich clubs, possibly with a levy on any clubs disregarding this
limit’ (Van Miert 1997).
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Reconciling sport and law
The EU has been characterised as a regulatory state (Majone 1996).
Embedded within the EU’s constitutional and normative structure is a pre-
disposition for the promulgation and enforcement of rules. In other words,
the forces of negative as opposed to positive integration have historically
driven the integration process (Pinder 1968, 1993). Knowledge about regu-
lation and not budgets or votes has been the key resource EU officials have
striven for. Yet knowledge has a ‘dark side’ – technocracy (Radaelli 1999b:
758) – and this essentially technocratic ‘path’ to integration has attracted
criticism (see for instance Featherstone 1994). Although defended on the
grounds of policy-making efficiency, technocratic integration raises impor-
tant questions of transparency, accountability, legitimacy and democracy. As
a consequence, in recent years evidence suggests that policy subsystems for-
merly dominated by technocratic and legal norms are becoming increasingly
politicised (Radaelli 1999a, b). Radaelli for example has identified the single
currency, tax policy and media ownership policy as three areas penetrated
by political arguments (Radaelli 1999a). 
As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, sport emerged on to the EU’s systemic
agenda through the ECJ rulings in Walrave, Donà and Bosman. It was then
transferred to the institutional agenda through the quasi-legal venue of the
Competition Policy Directorate. As such, the sports policy subsystem was
initially dominated by legal Single Market regulatory norms as opposed to
the essentially political socio-cultural arguments advanced by Adonnino (see
Chapter 1 and below). The Adonnino sporting agenda stressed the social,
educational and integrationist qualities of sport. For the EU to gain the more
widespread support of its citizens, supporters of Adonnino stress the need
for the EU’s policy remit to reflect more socio-cultural concerns as opposed
to narrow economic issues. The danger with the EU’s market-based defini-
tion of sport adopted by the ECJ and Commission is that it threatens to
undermine this agenda. This has contributed to the re-assertion of socio-
cultural ideas within the context of EU involvement in sport. As Rochefort
and Cobb remind us, ‘the uninterested [or in this case interested] become
engaged in response to the way participants portray their struggle’
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 5). 
In order to achieve the full or partial re-definition of sport, the socio-
cultural coalition needs to politicise the regulatory environment within
which sport operates. The successful politicisation of the sports policy sub-
system is an essential pre-requisite for policy change. Without it, the sub-
system will continue to be dominated by legal norms and the economic
definition of sport will prevail. However, to achieve politicisation the socio-
cultural coalition require two conditions to be met. 
First, they need to form a cohesive advocacy coalition in order to act as a
counterweight to the dominant coalition. Evidence presented in Chapter 3
suggests that the socio-cultural coalition is a coalition of convenience and as
such is not such a cohesive force. Within the coalition exist actors with dif-
fering visions of the future. For instance, members of the European
Parliament’s Culture Committee and Legal Affairs Committee are opposed
to moves to re-impose sporting restrictions prohibited by Bosman whereas
other actors such as sports bodies are keen to challenge the ruling. In
addition, the Parliament wants to root sport within the Treaty as a way of
underpinning EU action in the social and cultural aspects of sport,
whereas the desire of sports organisations for sport to have Treaty status is
a tactic to limit EU involvement in sport and thus safeguard the autonomy
of sport. 
The second requirement for the re-definition of sport is the ability to
operate successfully in numerous institutional venues. As indicated in
Chapter 3, this condition is broadly met. The Commission has the right of
legislative and policy initiative, the Parliament has enhanced budgetary and
legislative powers and the member states possess the ability to amend the
Treaty and to agree politically persuasive soft law. The socio-cultural advo-
cacy coalition therefore possesses considerable institutional resources in
order to effect policy re-definition. The effective use of these resources is
however problematic. Changes to primary legislation requires the unani-
mous support of the member states and changes to secondary legislation and
budgetary lines requires considerable support within and between the EU
institutions. Nevertheless, the lack of cohesion within the socio-cultural
coalition and the absence of a Treaty base for sport represent significant
obstacles to the fulfilment of the socio-cultural agenda. 
This chapter examines the approach adopted by the socio-cultural coali-
tion in six sections. The first examines the birth and development of socio-
cultural ideas between 1984 and 1995. The second section analyses the
impact of Bosman on the nature, organisation and approach of the socio-
cultural coalition. Section three examines the first major breakthrough for
the socio-cultural coalition – the annexing of a Declaration on Sport to the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The fourth section analyses the impact of the
Declaration and examines the birth of the ‘new approach’ to sports policy
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established throughout 1998 and 1999. The fifth section examines the 2000
Nice Declaration on Sport. Section six provides the concluding comment. 
The birth of socio-cultural ideas 1984–1995
The birth of a socio-cultural sporting agenda can be traced to the 1984
Fontainebleau Summit. With economic and political integration stagnating
and the legitimacy of the EU in the mind of the public faltering, the member
states needed to ‘re-launch’ European integration. In response, two commit-
tees were established to examine the possible avenues for this re-launch. The
Dooge Committee reported on political reform and, although the measures
were not directly acted upon, the Dooge proposals acted as the basis for dis-
cussion on Treaty reform at the 1985 intergovernmental conference. The
Single European Act eventually emerged from these discussions.
The second committee (the Adonnino Committee) reported on measures
that could strengthen the image of the EU in the minds of its citizens, thus
addressing the legitimacy crisis. The creation of the Adonnino Committee
marked the formal launch of an institutional commitment to the concept of
a people’s Europe and the first acknowledgement of the potential political
uses of sport. The Adonnino Committee’s report suggested a series of short-
and long-term proposals that would contribute to the establishment of a
people’s Europe.1 The Committee identified eight categories of proposals,
one of which concerned youth, education, exchanges and sport. The
Committee’s recommendations relating to sport are consistent with the
general theme of the report. Interventionism and symbolism are evident
throughout the Committee’s recommendations. The main problem encoun-
tered by the Committee in relation to the ‘use’ of sport for the purposes of
advancing the aim of a people’s Europe, concerns the organisation of sport
itself. The report recognised the autonomy of sporting organisations and was
careful not to appear to challenge that autonomy. As a result, the
Committee’s sporting recommendations merely sought to encourage the
sports sector to adopt measures, rather than requesting the European
Council or Commission to act. The report’s sports-related recommendations
read:
Since ancient times sport has been an important forum for communication
among people’s. It is an important part of the lives of a large number of people
within the Community. That is why it is all the more regrettable that the enjoy-
ment of international competitive sport has been drastically marred recently
by hooliganism. The Committee has therefore considered both of the these
important aspects below.
5.9.1. The administration of sport is predominantly the responsibility of sports
associations independent of government. The Committee proposes that the
sports associations be invited to encourage action where it is consistent with
their responsibilities, along these lines:
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i for certain sectors of sport, organisation of European Community events
such as cycle and running races through European countries;
ii creation of Community teams for some sports to compete against joint
teams from geographical groupings with which the Community has special
links;
iii inviting sporting teams to wear the Community emblem in addition to their
national colours at major sporting events of regional or worldwide interest;
iv exchanges of sportsmen, athletes and trainers between the different
Community countries, to be encouraged by programmes at the level of the
Community and the member states;
v support for sporting activities especially for particular categories of
persons, such as the handicapped. Student sport activities should be organ-
ised in conjunction with the twinning of schools and towns.2
The acceptance of the Adonnino Committee’s recommendations marked
more of a commitment to the concept of a people’s Europe than it did to the
development of a sports policy. Nevertheless, the spirit of Adonnino lived on
within the EU, with the Parliament emerging as the new natural home for
such a movement.
The Parliament’s sporting agenda has a strong socio-cultural tradition.
The Parliament has acknowledged that, above all, sport is a social pursuit.
It not only carries health, educational, cultural and social implications, it can
also be used for political purposes. In this connection, sport can aid the
implementation of policy goals in other fields and can act as a vehicle
through which the EU can connect itself to its citizens through the establish-
ment of a people’s Europe. For the Parliament, the expression of these goals
is therefore generally considered a priority. Nevertheless, difficulties remain
for the Parliament in their desire to advance the Adonnino agenda.
The most obvious barrier is the lack of a Treaty base for sport. This
creates practical legislative and budgetary difficulties for the Parliament in
terms of developing and funding sports-related initiatives. Elements within
the Parliament’s Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and
Sport have been active in advancing the case for a Treaty Article on sport
which would provide a legal base for legislation and guarantee a budgetary
line. 
The second major difficulty concerns the prevailing definition of sport
adopted by the EU. Walrave, Donà and Bosman established sports economic
link to the Treaty. As such, sport became a Single Market issue rather than
a social issue. As the Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs con-
cluded,
although, it is a good idea that the Union should intervene to tackle a number
of very specific problems in the sphere of sport, such as the fight against doping,
it is absurd that such measures should be based on the Union’s responsibility
for the internal market, which results, for example, in ill advised case law such
as the Bosman judgement.3
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The difficulty in attempting to achieve the wider goal of constructing a
European federation based solely on economic integration without a com-
mitment to socio-cultural (political) integration is widely acknowledged by
many MEPs.
Third, along with the other EU institutions, the Parliament has also had
to confront the issue of how to disentangle sports economic function from
its social function. Whilst the Parliament primarily sees sport as a social
pursuit, it has acknowledged that sport carries out an economic function.
The Parliament has had to balance the desire to protect sporting structures
from the scope of EU law with the need to protect the rights of workers and
consumers within the EU. For example in 1989 the Van Raay report con-
demned the use of nationality restrictions and the international transfer
system.4
The Larive report on the European Community and sport5 
The 1994 Larive report was the result of a number of sports-related reports
stemming from the Parliament. These reports included ‘Sport and the
Community’, ‘Women in Sport’, ‘Vandalism and Violence in Sport’ and
‘Sport in the European Community and a People’s Europe’.6 The Committee
on Culture, Youth, Education and Media was responsible for the report with
Mrs J. Larive MEP as rapporteur. The catalyst for the report was a motion
for a resolution proposed by Mrs Ewing MEP on the protection of popular
sporting traditions in Europe. This motion for a resolution sought ways to
protect traditional sports from the deleterious consequences of the break up
of local communities. Ewing called for the implementation of a framework
of law to assure the legal recognition of these traditional games in Europe
and the establishment of a body to study, safeguard and promote Europe’s
sporting traditions.7
The report included within its terms of reference a number of motions for
resolutions that had been referred to it. The first motion for a resolution,
written by Mrs Banotti MEP on the ‘Need to Reappraise the EC’s Sports
Policy’ called on the Commission to rethink its approach to sport in the wake
of the approved Adonnino report, 1985. In particular, Banotti called into
question funding priorities and asked for greater emphasis to be placed on a
‘Sport For All’ policy that could contribute to the creation of a true ‘people’s
Europe’.8 The second motion for a resolution was provided by Mr Gutiérrez
Díaz MEP in October 1991 on safety in professional boxing.9 The third
motion suggested that a common logo should be worn by athletes from the
12 Community member states taking part in the Barcelona Olympic
Games.10 Written by Mrs Muscardini MEP, the motion recognised the sym-
bolic significance of sport and sought to use this to promote European inte-
gration. The common logo would, according to Muscardini, symbolise the
athletes membership of the EU as an ideal and unified homeland and as an
appeal for democracy for all the people’s of Europe. The fourth motion for
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a resolution related to the outlaw of symbols that incite violence in sport.11
The authors of the text called on the Commission to assess the situation
relating to anti-social practises in sport such as the actions of abusive and
racist supporters and the use of totalitarian symbols in sport and take the
necessary steps to promote effective legislation that will restore the full
harmony and value of sport. The motion sought measures to protect those
values in sport that encourages coexistence, understanding and tolerance
among peoples, races and cultures. The final motion for a resolution con-
cerning safety of sports installations was written by Mrs Muscardini MEP
following the death of a number of fans due to the collapse of a temporary
stand in Bastia, France.12
The Larive report clearly links the active or passive participation in sport
with the social and cultural identity of people. Additionally, this participa-
tion has generated significant amounts of economic activity. Accordingly, the
report argued that sport should receive political attention in the EU, first in
relation to underpinning the process of European integration and secondly
in connection to the operation of the Single Market.
The first area covered by the report concerned the relationship between
EU legislation and the internal rules of sports organisations. The report chal-
lenged the mismatch between the rhetoric of the fundamental freedoms and
the practise of sports organisations. Many of the issues raised in the report
relating to restrictive practices in sport were dealt with in Bosman. Four sub-
divisions of legislative activity were identified. First, in relation to free move-
ment of persons and services legislation, the report sought to ensure sport
for all EU citizens regardless of nationality (a challenge to the use of nation-
ality quotas in sport), the freedom to join and leave sports clubs (a challenge
to the rules on transfer of players), the mutual recognition of coaches’ diplo-
mas and the freedom to conclude cross-border insurance contracts. Second,
concerning free movement of goods legislation, the report commented that
the internal market had clarified the position with regard to the cross-border
movement of sports goods through VAT Directives, standardisation of tech-
nical specifications and issues relating to the composition of sports food.
Third, the report commented on how EU rules on competition greatly affect
the operation of sport in Europe. Fourth, the application of other general
legislative provisions were examined including legislation on animals in
sport and the protection of minors. Despite a concern for sportspersons to
be afforded the same level of protection under EU law as any other EU
citizen, the report was clear that the liberalisation of sporting rules should
be accompanied by more socio-cultural measures. 
The second main area dealt with by the Larive report concerned the role
of the EU in encouraging active participation in sport. The report highlights
the job-creation potential of sport, suggesting over 60 million people in the
EU (12) belong to sports clubs with tens of million more taking part in sport
in a recreational, non-organised way. However, the report suggested that this
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participation is highly uneven. In this connection, the report urged the EU to
encourage a wider participation in sport to include the underprivileged, the
disabled and women. Furthermore, participation in sport was identified as a
useful tool for counteracting crime, health problems and worker absentee-
ism. School sport was therefore encouraged, as was the participation of the
wider working and non-working population.
Third, the report addressed the issue of combating hooliganism in sport.
In addition to raising the profile of fair play campaigns in sport in order to
combat ‘on-the-field’ problems, the report suggested that ‘off-the-field’ prob-
lems such as hooliganism can be dealt with via legislation. In particular,
stadium structure and layout specifications can help minimise disorder.
Support was given to national measures designed to minimise hooliganism,
although it was stressed that nationality should not be used as a reason for
refusing or impeding access to sporting events.
The final area dealt with by the report concerned the use of sport in fos-
tering a European identity. The report criticised the EU approach of spon-
soring large-scale sporting events with high media interest, questioning the
appropriateness of the use of financial resources. Implicitly, the report sug-
gested that this amounts to marketing the EU, whereas the EU should be
involved in smaller, more specific projects that are of more relevance to EU
citizens. In this respect, the report welcomed the Commission’s policy shift
on sport which proposed a change in this direction. The report argued that
funding priority should be given to small-scale, cross-border projects as this
heightens people’s awareness of other cultures. In addition, support for
national and regional traditional sports should be encouraged as means of
protecting traditional sports. The report suggested that one mechanism for
advancing the aim of fostering a European identity through sport is to inte-
grate sport into the operation of other Community projects such as the
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, town
twinning schemes, the Interreg programme and the Youth for Europe initia-
tive. The report also stressed the importance of European support for
sports facilities, European training programmes and sports research/
management initiatives. To help co-ordination in these areas, the report
also suggested that sport should be included as an area of formal compe-
tence in the Treaty.
The Bosman setback 1995–1997
The 1995 Bosman ruling represented a set back for many socio-cultural
actors despite the Larive report’s desire to see the lifting of restrictions placed
on the movement of sportsmen and women. Bosman confirmed the predom-
inance of the EU’s market-based definition of sport at the expense of the
social definition. In short, the Bosman approach was inconsistent with the
Adonnino agenda. 
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The Pack report on the Role of the European Union in the Field of Sport13
In June 1996, the Parliament’s Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and
the Media, appointed Doris Pack as rapporteur to a report on the role of the
EU in the field of sport. Additionally, it was decided to include in the report
a motion for a resolution on setting up a European youth sport fund. As with
the Larive report, the report reviewed the significance of the sports sector to
Europe’s society and economy. In terms of participation in sport, the report
claimed that over 100 million European citizens participate in sporting activ-
ity and that tens of thousands of sports associations organise these activities.
As such, sport ‘constitutes a basic cultural and social phenomena’.14 Sport is
therefore crucial to European society given that access to it promotes ‘per-
sonal development and a well balanced personality’.15 In this connection the
report therefore draws similarities between the sports sector in Europe and
the cultural world. Furthermore, the report argues that the love of sport
extends beyond participation to those who are not actively involved. As
such, the report recognises the importance of ensuring citizens gain access to
sporting events and information on them. The emphasis on social interac-
tion is supplemented with a focus on sport as a method of countering the
deleterious effects of smoking, alcohol and drug abuse and a preventative
weapon against potential health problems such as cancer and cardio-
vascular problems. Sport therefore has a role to play in the field of physical
and mental health and social interaction.
The report also emphasised the economic significance of the sports sector
in Europe. According to the report sport generates an estimated 1.5 per cent
of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) and plays a significant role as a
source of employment. Even though the report welcomed the ECJ’s lifting of
restrictions on the mobility of sports men and women in Bosman, it claimed
that,
although the European Union has taken an interest in professional sport as an
activity, it has, to date, only taken account in a very marginal fashion of the
cultural, educational and social dimension of sport, and whereas such neglect
stems basically from the fact that there is no explicit reference to sport in the
Treaty.16
Accordingly, activity in the sports sector has been economically motivated
and not specifically directed at sport. The report therefore called on the inter-
governmental conference (at the time still sitting) to include a reference to
sport in Article 128 (Culture) of the revised Treaty (the Amsterdam Treaty)
or to establish a separate Article for sport. The report does, however, express
the opinion that sport should not be exempt from EU law and places a degree
of pressure on sports organisations to ensure that the solidarity of sport is
maintained. In this connection, the report suggests financial redistribution
between sports organisations as an effective mechanism to achieve this soli-
darity. 
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This general lack of interest in the socio-cultural dimensions of sport is
illustrated by the size of the Community budget for sport. The ECU 3 million
‘Sport in Europe’ programme (Article B3-305 in the 1997 Community
budget) was created by the Parliament and (at the time) financed pro-
grammes such as the Eurathlon programme and sports initiatives for the dis-
abled. Only through the activities of the Committee on Culture, Youth,
Education and Media and the Committee on Budgets in the Parliament was
this expenditure included in the budget. The report criticises the Commission
for continually failing to include this programme in its preliminary draft
budget. The Commission included Article B3-305 in the chapter entitled
‘Information and Communication’ within the preliminary draft budget. The
report argues that this is ‘symbolic of the subsidiary, workaday role ascribed
to it by the Commission, which sees it simply as a means of communica-
tion’.17 Furthermore, the report argues that this attitude demonstrates that
sport is not considered by the EU on its own merits, but rather as a means
of implementing other policies. The report sees a clear division between the
rhetoric of a people’s Europe and the practise of how sport is dealt with by
the EU. 
The report recommended that the Commission should establish a task
force to examine more closely the relationship between the EU and the
European sports sector. A Green Paper should then be produced with a view
to elaborate the themes stemming from this task force. The report expressed
the view that all dimensions of sport, not just those relating to it as an eco-
nomic activity, should be taken into consideration. The report also com-
mented that pending the implementation of that action plan, sports
initiatives could be promoted through other channels such as the EU’s
regional and social policies, those concerning education, training and youth
exchanges, equal opportunities policy, anti-racist policies and research poli-
cies. To ensure some action in these directions, the report also called for the
convening of a Council of Ministers for Sport and, to ensure visibility, called
for a European Year of Sport.
The Motion for a Resolution relating to the establishment of a European
youth sport fund called on the Commission to enter a specific appropriation
in the forthcoming budget for youth sport and also to oversee the establish-
ment of a youth sport fund, a solidarity fund paid into by sporting organisa-
tions. Additionally, the Resolution called on the Commission to co-operate
with member states and European sports bodies to draw up an action pro-
gramme for youth sport.
In essence the Pack report reflects the more socio-cultural tendencies
within the Parliament. The report stresses the multi-dimensional nature of
sport, rather than the narrowly economic interpretation applied by the ECJ
and the Competition Policy Directorate. In effect, the report seeks the estab-
lishment of a European sports policy. First, the report wants sport to be
granted a Treaty base. Second, the report wants a more co-ordinated
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approach to sport to be adopted by the Commission through the adoption
of a Green Paper. Third, the report seeks more creative ways of feeding
sports initiatives into other programmes. Fourth, the report calls for more
funding for sports initiatives and, finally, the report seeks the establishment
of a Council of Ministers for Sport. The Parliament is therefore attempting
to act as a counterweight in the European policy process to the more market-
based motivations of the Commission. Furthermore, the Parliament has sig-
nalled, through its budgetary powers and the report that it intends to
creatively promote the socio-cultural elements of sport through other policy
means. A clear example of this was demonstrated by the inclusion in the
revised Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive of Article 3a dealing
with the broadcasting of sporting events on free-to-air television. This con-
forms to the general approach of the Parliament, which has traditionally
sought to expand the EU’s agenda through the creative exploitation of insti-
tutional powers.
The Television Without Frontiers Directive
It has already been established by the ECJ that television broadcasts are to
be defined as tradable services within the meaning of Articles 49 and 50 of
the Treaty.18 The primary mechanism through which the EU has sought to
establish the legal conditions necessary to establish a common market for
these broadcasting services in Europe has been through the TWF project.
Based on Articles 47 (2) and 55 of the Treaty, the project’s provisions on
sporting broadcasts represent something of a contradiction. In theory,
member states cannot restrict the transmission of services emanating from
another member state, yet the amended TWF Directive permits the establish-
ment of such restrictions in sports broadcasting through the creation of
national lists to protect major events. Article 3a of the Directive permits
member states to draw up lists of protected sporting events that will have to
be made available to the public on free-to-air television. Such a restriction
on broadcasting services has been defended on the grounds of public inter-
est but must be of non-discriminatory nature and must be proportionate to
their objectives. The ECJ has confirmed the validity of public interest argu-
ments in the broadcasting sector.19
The TWF Directive resulted from a series of measures adopted by the EU
institutions in the field of broadcasting and audio-visual policy (Collins
1994, Humphreys 1996). EU involvement in broadcasting and audio-visual
policy had its roots in the early 1980s. The 1982 Hahn report expressed the
view that television and the mass media in general could aid the process of
European integration through its ability to shape public opinion. Hahn, a
German Christian Democrat MEP, argued that political integration in
Europe would be difficult to achieve whilst the media remained nationally
controlled. The report emphasised how new technology would radically
transform the nature of broadcasting in Europe, calling into question
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traditional nation state forms of broadcasting. The Parliament adopted the
Hahn report through a resolution (the Hahn Resolution). As a result of this
resolution, the Commission produced an interim report titled, ‘Realities and
Tendencies in European Television: Perspectives and Options’. A year after
the publication of DG X’s interim report, the Commission produced a 1984
Green Paper on the ‘Establishment of the Common Market for
Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable’, better known as Television
Without Frontiers.20 Significantly, responsibility for preparing the Green
Paper lay, this time, with the more liberal DG III and references to the cul-
tural dimension of broadcasting were kept to a minimum. In light of the
Commission’s overtly economic justifications, the TWF proposal repre-
sented a significant break with the Hahn report and ‘Realities and
Tendencies’.
In order to realise a common market in broadcasting, the Commission’s
Green Paper proposed harmonisation in three areas: advertising, copyright
and public order, personal rights and the right of reply. The TWF Directive
was agreed in Council by a qualified majority in October 1989 and came
into operation two years later. However, many supporters of the Hahn
report and ‘Realities and Tendencies’ were disappointed with the new TWF
Directive as it was not a true reflection of the spirit of Hahn. Similar argu-
ments were advanced a number of years later concerning the compatibility
of Bosman with the Adonnino sporting agenda. 
Built into the Directive was provision for review after five years (Article
26). The Commission presented their proposals for review on 31 May 1995.
This review gave the Parliament an opportunity to not only re-kindle some
of the spirit of Hahn, but also to seek to balance the economic definition of
sport adopted in Bosman with a socio-cultural sporting measure. The
Parliament’s ability to do this was enhanced by the new co-decision proce-
dure for agreeing legislation.21 In accordance with this procedure the
Parliament completed its first reading of the proposal on 14 February 1996
by approving the Commission’s proposal subject to amendments. The
Council adopted a common position on 8 July 1996 and the Parliament held
its second reading on 12 November 1996. A final text was agreed between
the Parliament and Council in April 1997 after discussions in the concilia-
tion committee. Member states had until December 1998 to transpose the
new Directive into national law.
The new Directive made some minor definitional amendments to the orig-
inal Directive in order to make it more workable. However, the most signif-
icant change came in the form of a Parliament amendment designed to
guarantee public viewing access to major sporting events on television.
Amendment number 20 was agreed by the Parliament during its second
reading of the revised Directive.22 To give effect to the Parliament’s amend-
ment, Article 3a was included in the new Directive. The purpose of Article
3a (full text below) was explained in recital 18 of the new Directive. 
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Recital 18: ‘Whereas it is essential that member states should be able to take
measures to protect the right to information and to ensure wide access by the
public to television coverage of national or non-national events of major
importance for society, such as the Olympic games, the football World Cup
and European football Championship; whereas to this end member states
retain the right to take measures compatible with Community law aimed at
regulating the exercise by broadcasters under their jurisdiction of exclusive
broadcasting rights to such events’.
Article 3a
1 Each member state may take measures in accordance with Community law
to ensure that broadcasters under its jurisdiction do not broadcast on an
exclusive basis events which are regarded by that member state as being of
major importance for society in such a way as to deprive a substantial pro-
portion of the public in that member state of the possibility of following
such events via live coverage or deferred coverage on free television. If it
does so, the member state concerned shall draw up a list of designated
events, national or non-national, which it considers to be of major impor-
tance for society. It shall do so in a clear and transparent manner in due and
effective time. In so doing the member state concerned shall also determine
whether these events should be available via whole or partial live coverage,
or where necessary or appropriate for objective reasons in the public inter-
est, whole or partial deferred coverage. 
2 Member states shall immediately notify to the Commission any measures
taken or to be taken pursuant to paragraph 1. Within a period of three
months from the notification, the Commission shall verify that such meas-
ures are compatible with Community law and communicate them to the
other member states. It shall seek the opinion of the Committee established
pursuant to Article 23a. It shall forthwith publish the measures taken in the
Official Journal of the European Communities and at least once a year the
consolidated list of the measures taken by member states. 
3 Member states shall ensure, by appropriate means, within the framework of
their legislation that broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not exercise the
exclusive rights purchased by those broadcasters following the date of pub-
lication of this Directive in such a way that a substantial proportion of the
public in another member state is deprived of the possibility of following
events which are designated by that other member state in accordance with
the preceding paragraphs via whole or partial live coverage or, where nec-
essary or appropriate for objective reasons in the public interest, whole or
partial deferred coverage on free television as determined by that other
member state in accordance with paragraph 1.23
Article 3a of the Directive therefore permits member states to draw up
lists of protected sporting events that will have to be made available to the
public on free-to-air television. These lists are then notified to the
Commission who must seek the opinion of the so-called ‘Contact
Committee’ composed of representatives of all member states and assess the
compatibility of the national measures with EU law. Measures approved by
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the Commission are published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities.
In Britain, the Broadcasting Act of 1996, as amended by the Television
Broadcasting Regulations 2000, implements the Directive. Part 4 of the Act
governs the listing of ‘Sporting and Other Events of National Interest’.
Section 97 allows the Secretary of State to establish a list of sporting (or
other) events of national interest. Sections 98–101 ensure public viewing
accessibility to these listed events. Currently in Britain the following events
are listed: (Group A): The Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup Finals
Tournament, the FA Cup Final, the Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland), the
Grand National, the Derby, the Wimbledon Tennis Finals, the European
Football Championship Finals Tournament, the Rugby League Challenge
Cup Final, the Rugby World Cup Final. (Group B): Cricket Test matches
played in England, non-finals play in the Wimbledon Tournament, all other
matches in the Rugby World Cup Finals Tournament, Six Nations Rugby
tournament matches involving home countries, the Commonwealth Games,
the World Athletics Championship, the Cricket World Cup – the Final, Semi-
finals and matches involving home nations’, the Ryder Cup, the Open Golf
Championship.
The justifications in support of Article 3a tend to reflect socio-cultural ten-
dencies inherent within the Parliament. Furthermore, they represent an
exception to the general principle of free movement of services in trans-
frontier broadcasting enshrined in the TWF Directive. The first justification
relates to the concern that the drift towards pay-TV television denies the
sporting public the opportunity to watch sport on television. As such major
sporting events that are of particular significance to society should be pro-
tected (the ‘public interest’/‘national heritage’ argument). 
Second, as the original TWF Directive recognised, national media sove-
reignty no longer fully exists. As such purely national measures designed to
ensure unencrypted access would be prone to circumvention by operators
external to national jurisdiction. If it is the wish of national authorities to
ensure public access to televised major events, then the EU offers an appro-
priate level of protection given technology driven developments in trans-
frontier broadcasting. 
Third, given the high level of competition between broadcasters and the
small size of potential lists, income to sporting clubs will not be excessively
restricted by regulation.
Fourth, as commercial television operators have identified, sport is an
important component to schedules due to its popularity. If public service
broadcasters are denied major sporting events it may threaten their overall
survival in the market place. If this happens, a source of competition will be
denied. This argument may however over emphasise the importance of sport
to public service broadcasters.
Fifth, by protecting the broadcasting of major sporting events, the EU can
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demonstrate a degree of visibility and relevance to Europe’s public in a
manner compatible with historical attempts to create a ‘people’s Europe’.
This approach would be consistent with the general theme of the Hahn
report relating to information, media and European integration and indeed
the Adonnino Committee’s central thrust. It reflects a socio-cultural inspired
attempt to redress the market-based approach adopted in the first TWF
Directive and the ruling in Bosman. 
Nevertheless, the Directive goes against a trend in European sport favour-
ing a free market in broadcasting. The arguments are essentially economic.
Although free-to-air broadcasting increases viewing numbers, it denies the
sporting organisations the ability to realise the full value of their rights. The
(as then) Sports Council of Great Britain changed its policy on sports broad-
casting to embrace the free market. Until February 1996 the Sports Council
supported the listing of designated sporting events. Since this date they have
favoured a free market in sports rights thus allowing them to maximise
income from their sale. The English football Premier League shares these
concerns pointing to the unsatisfactory state of terrestrial broadcasting of
sport in the 1980s which limited competition for rights and restricted sports
broadcasting income. Revenue generated from television money has enabled
English football to invest in new and improved stadiums, better facilities for
fans and players and grass roots investment into youth football. As such, it
is the view of many European sporting organisations that they are in the best
position to make distributional decisions concerning investment in sport and
so should be left free to negotiate appropriate broadcasting contracts with a
range of operators. The case against regulation of sporting broadcasts is nat-
urally shared by the cable and satellite operators who often require exclu-
sive sporting broadcasts to attract new subscribers.
The Amsterdam breakthrough 1997
The Parliament’s response to the ruling in Bosman proved influential in high-
lighting and articulating the concerns of the socio-cultural advocacy coali-
tion. In particular, the Parliament emerged as an important forum through
which demands for the incorporation of sport into the Treaty emerged.
Although the Parliament’s activity pressurised the member states into taking
action, the Parliament’s socio-cultural agenda tapped into a thread of
concern already evident within some national capitals. Not only had the
member states agreed to the Adonnino proposals, but following unsuccess-
ful governmental submissions to the ECJ in Bosman, a growing number of
member states including the Italian, Belgian, French and German govern-
ments gave their support to sport’s Treaty incorporation. As such, the
Parliament’s role must be placed in context. Alone, the Parliament lacked the
legislative powers to pursue a more holistic approach to sport. Therefore
without member state support, the Parliament would have been unable to
force the issue of sport on to the European Council’s agenda. 
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Although the TWF Directive was a success for the Parliament, the ECJ’s
ruling in Bosman and the approach adopted by the Commission in applying
competition law demonstrated to the socio-cultural coalition the insensitiv-
ity with which the EU dealt with sporting issues. The perception was that the
EU was not only failing to recognise the social importance of sport, but it
was also curtailing sporting ‘autonomy’. A Treaty Article was therefore
required in order to address these two concerns. As a result, in the run to the
Amsterdam Summit, intense lobbying took place for the adoption of an
Article for sport in the newly revised Treaty. In particular, the maximalist
members of the socio-cultural coalition hoped to ensure greater protection
for sports rules from the application of EU law whilst also granting sport a
legal base to exploit funding opportunities. 
Calls for an Article for sport came to a head at the 6th European Sports
Forum where representatives of the National Olympic Committees of the 15
member states and 30 international and European sports federations sup-
ported sport’s inclusion into the Treaty. Support was also forthcoming from
the Parliament, yet crucially not the Commission who wanted to avoid the
setting of a precedent for allowing certain professions exemptions from the
Treaty and also for fear of sparking inter-DG conflict over the approach to
sports policy (European Voice 1996). A draft for an Article on sport in the
Treaty was agreed by representatives of ENGSO and the EOC’s. Its contents
give an insight into the objectives of the drafters.
1 The European Community contributes to the development of sport in its
member states, taking strict account of the diversity of its public and private
structures as well as of the competence of its member states and of the auton-
omy of sporting organisations with regard to the organisation of sport and
its rules. The Community’s activities (proceedings) take into account the
integrationist qualities of sport within the framework of Europe, its citizens
and social dimension.
2 The Community’s activities (proceedings) encourage co-operation between
organisations responsible for sport in the member states, and fulfil their
activities in the following domains:
• promotion of exchanges between European citizens through the integra-
tionist qualities of sport. These exchanges should contribute to a better
knowledge and acceptance of the social and cultural differences between
member states.
• encouragement of participation in sport, as a means of promoting the
health of European citizens.
• support of sporting activities for social ends, aiming to combat unem-
ployment and discrimination, racism and violence, by promoting equal
opportunities between men and women. 
• help for sporting initiatives in the realm of education, as much at the level
of management training and sports technicians as in the creation of
exchange programmes for professions linked to sport. European sporting
co-operation founded on sporting institutions and mutual information
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on training systems and sporting organisations will be particularly
encouraged.
• support for projects aimed at the states of Central and Eastern Europe
and projects aimed at co-operation for development. 
3 The Community and its member states encourages co-operation with coun-
tries outside the Community and with international organisations respon-
sible for sporting matters, particular the Council of Europe.
4 The Community takes into account aspects related to sport in policies con-
ducted on the basis of other clauses of the present Treaty.
5 In order to contribute to the realisation of the objectives set out in the
present article, the Council:
• acting according to the procedures of articles 189b (co-decision) and
after consultation with the Committee of the Regions, adopts measures
of encouragement to the exclusion of all harmonisation of legal and
administrative clauses of the member states. The Council decides by una-
nimity according to article 189b.
• adopts by unanimity the recommendations, as proposed by the
Commission.
This ENGSO/EOC memorandum was sent to all representatives on the
Reflection Group (the group responsible for managing the Amsterdam IGC
process and consisting of representatives of national administrations, the
Parliament and Commission). Such an Article would ensure that EU action
in the field of sport would reflect the social dimension of sport whilst secur-
ing the right for sport to be taken into consideration in the framing of other
EU policies. Furthermore, by ensuring that the co-decision procedure
applied, the widest possible consultation would have been guaranteed. The
independent Treaty Article approach was just one approach considered by
members of the socio-cultural coalition. Alternatives included adding sport
to the list of EU activities outlined in Article 3 of the Treaty, adding sport to
Article 151 (ex 128) dealing with cultural policy and the greater use of soft
law measures by the member states. The next chapter examines these pro-
posals in greater depth. 
The eventual appearance of sport in the Amsterdam Treaty came as a sur-
prise despite the prevailing political climate in which Amsterdam was nego-
tiated. Following the traumatic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, it was
widely expected that the EU would adopt measures in the new Treaty that
would attempt to bring Europe’s citizen’s closer to the EU. Sport was con-
sidered one such issue through which the EU could achieve this objective.
Despite this, sport was not mentioned in draft versions of the Treaty and was
not included on the formal agenda of the Reflection Group. It was reported
that when challenged on the omission of sport in an early draft of the Treaty,
Irish officials (at the time holding the Presidency) claimed that no member
state had raised the issue (European Voice 1996). Furthermore, the
Commission was also reluctant. Nevertheless, following the conclusion of
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the 1996/1997 intergovernmental conference process, the Heads of State
and Government of the member states meeting in Amsterdam attached a
non-binding Declaration to the Treaty. The Declaration read:
The conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role
in forging identity and bringing people together. The conference therefore calls
on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations when
important questions affecting sport are at issue. In this connection, special con-
sideration should be given to the particular characteristics of amateur sport.24
Through the Declaration, the EU has formally acknowledged the social
and integrationist qualities of sport even though, as a soft law measure, it
has not legally committed itself to supranational action and therefore expen-
diture. The EU has however given a commitment that sport is to be taken
into account when other EU policies are being adopted. To facilitate this, the
EU has also committed itself to consult with sporting bodies. This has had
the effect of further formalising and institutionalising the relationship
between sport and the EU. Nevertheless, the result disappointed those who
wanted the EU to adopt more formal measures. However, although
Declarations have no formal legal status in the EU, their significance must
not be underestimated. Soft law refers to rules of conduct which, in princi-
ple have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have a signifi-
cant effect on policy development. Soft law has the potential to produce
significant effects. First, it is not uncommon for soft law to be used as quasi-
legal justification by EU institutions for the development of policy initiatives.
The Amsterdam Declaration was subsequently referred to by all the EU insti-
tutions, including the ECJ, in connection with sporting activity. Soft law
therefore has the potential to harden over time. Second, the use of soft law
is often a tactic used by the European Council and Council of Ministers
when they are unable to agree upon binding measures but nevertheless wish
to place political pressure on the EU institutions for a change in policy direc-
tion. Soft law can be employed by the member states as an implied threat of
taking further harder measures unless EU institutions change their approach.
As such, it has offered some guidance as to the interpretation and scope of
application of EU law.
The re-assertion of socio-cultural ideas: the birth of the new approach
1998–
The Amsterdam Declaration added impetus to the socio-cultural agenda
whilst also equipping them with an additional institutional venue to exploit.
Their agenda took giant strides after 1998. Out of the confusion and ambi-
guity of the Bosman ruling emerged (is emerging) a more holistic and co-
ordinated approach to sports policy. This ‘new approach’ has been forged
through an alliance between the member states and the Education and
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Culture Directorate. The member states have responded to pressure for a
change of approach promoted by the Parliament by piecing together a series
of policy guidelines on sports policy through a combination of soft law meas-
ures. In addition to Treaty Declarations, soft law refers to Presidency
Conclusions and intergovernmental political guidelines. The Education and
Culture Directorate has responded to these soft law developments by estab-
lishing a framework for the development of a EU sports policy. At the heart
of this framework lies a more broad-based definition of sport which has
brought into the development of EU sports policy many ideas supported by
the socio-cultural coalition. 
Initial Council Presidency conclusions 1997–1998
Prior to the Amsterdam Declaration, it was rare for the European Council
to discuss sport. Since Amsterdam, it is rare for the member states not to
discuss it in some intergovernmental forum. Initially, following the
Amsterdam Treaty, sport was discussed as a vehicle through which unem-
ployment could be tackled. This was partly the concern of Luxembourg’s
Presidency in the second half of 1997 and reflected a desire to follow up the
employment provisions contained within the Treaty.
The British Council Presidency in the first half of 1998 continued the
theme of examining sport in conjunction with employment but expanded its
scope to examine the wider issue of how sport in Europe could be used to
combat social exclusion and regenerate communities. A paper was prepared
on this issue and discussed at a troika meeting of EU Sports Ministers in
Twickenham in April 1998. Present at the meeting were representatives from
the British, Luxembourg and Austrian governments and two representatives
from DG X of the European Commission (now the Education and Culture
Directorate).
The meeting discussed two topics. The first was how to build on the
Amsterdam Declaration on Sport. In this connection, the Ministers identified
four important issues for the Commission to take into consideration. First,
a clear distinction needs to be made between amateur and professional sport.
Second, this needs to inform the debate on the relationship between employ-
ment and EU law, particularly given the nature of the (as then) unresolved
Deliège case. Third, this also feeds into the issue of freedom of movement
for sportspersons between EU member states. Finally, the Declaration has
implications for EU funding to professional, as opposed to, amateur sport. 
The second topic for discussion concerned the Commission’s preparation
of a Green Paper on Sport. The Commission anticipated the Paper to include
a focus on the structure (‘model’) of European sport, the role and importance
of television in sport, the social dimension of sport and, following the
Commission’s ‘First Report on Local Employment and Development
Initiatives’, the relationship between sport and employment. The Ministers
indicated a number of themes that they believed the Paper should address.
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These included improved co-ordinating mechanisms between bodies
involved in sport, measures designed to tackle social exclusion and unem-
ployment and an examination of the way European law affects sports organ-
isations throughout Europe.25 In the event, the Green Paper idea was
replaced with a Commission working paper and consultation exercise (see
below).
In a wider forum at the Cardiff European Council meeting of 15/16 June
1998, sport was mentioned in the Presidency Conclusions. Under the
heading of ‘Bringing the Union Closer to the People’, the European Council
invited the Council and member states ‘to consider ideas to promote more
contacts between young people, e.g. through the internet, and the scope for
tackling social exclusion among young people, including sport’.26 The spirit
of Adonnino had returned.
Commission working paper: ‘The Development and Prospects for
Community Action in the Field of Sport, September 1998’29
In addition to intergovernmental developments, 1998 also saw the emer-
gence of a more co-ordinated Commission response to the Amsterdam
Declaration. The main contribution made by the Education and Culture
Directorate to the establishment of a EU sports policy has come in its capac-
ity as the initiator of sporting proposals and consultation documents. In
essence, it has attempted to steer a middle course between the post-Bosman
forces of Single Market regulation and the socio-cultural agenda. 
In September 1998 as part of its response to the Declaration on Sport
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, DG X published a Commission
working paper entitled ‘The Development and Prospects for Community
Action in the Field of sport’. The paper identified sport as performing an edu-
cational, a public health, a social, a cultural and a recreational function.
Although the paper addressed the economic function of sport, it represents
an attempt to advance socio-cultural goals. In this connection, the paper rep-
resents a continuation in thinking from the Adonnino, Larive and Pack
reports.
The introduction to the paper tentatively raises the underlying problem
facing the EU in relation to the sports sector. Whilst sport accounts for 3 per
cent of world trade, one European in three is actively involved in a sport and
there are 545,000 sports clubs in the Community. In other words, sport rep-
resents a significant element of the European economy, but it also performs
a crucial social role in European society. The more sport, in particular pro-
fessional sport, is practised as a truly economic activity, so general EU legis-
lation will become applied to the sports sector. 
The working paper identifies three major areas of EU activity that partic-
ularly affects sport. The first is freedom of movement. The application of
Article 39 in the Bosman case is the clearest example of this relationship. The
second area relates to competition policy and audio-visual policy. These
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areas have an impact on how sport is televised in Europe. The third area con-
cerns the application of other general EU policies such as health, education,
vocational training and the environment. The paper also stresses how sport
can be used as a tool for combating social exclusion and a source of volun-
tary work in Europe. 
In the second section of the working paper, a general review of EU insti-
tutional involvement in sport is provided. The activities of the Court,
Commission, Parliament and Council have all had an affect on the opera-
tion of sport in Europe.
The third section examines the ‘positive effects’ of sport and some prob-
lems facing European Sport. The paper acknowledges the difficulties in
attempting to define sport. In the paper, the Commission employs the
Council of Europe’s definition of sport contained in the European Sports
Charter. This defines sport as ‘all forms of physical activity which, through
casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical
fitness and mental well being, forming social relationships or obtaining
results in competition at all levels’28 The paper argues that sport performs
an educational function, a public health function, a social function, a cultu-
ral function and a recreational functional. However, the paper then proceeds
to define sport in economic terms as well. Sport sponsorship generates
US$15 billion, the sale of television rights US$42 billion and ticket sales
US$50 billion. Furthermore, the European share of sports trade is 36 per
cent, second only to the USA with 42 per cent.29 Faced with these twin def-
initions of sport, the working paper represented a first significant realisation
that the EU must find a satisfactory way of regulating the economic dimen-
sion of sport through the application of general EU policy to the sports
sector, whilst recognising and indeed harnessing the ‘positive effects’ of
sport.
Before addressing the specifics of EU involvement in sport, the working
paper reviewed some of the problems and challenges facing European sport.
Three issues are covered; the risk of excessive commercialisation, the lack of
protection for young people taking part in top-level competitions and the
ineffectiveness of anti-doping measures. In relation to commercialisation,
the International Olympic Committee’s decision in the 1980s to remove the
distinction between amateurs and professionals at the Olympic Games and
to allow the Games to be commercially sponsored, was a significant move
towards commercialising sport. Commercialisation can potentially break
the solidarity between professional and amateur sport. 
In the fourth section, the paper addressed the specifics of EU action in
sport. In particular, the issue of the economic regulation of sport was dealt
with. The paper identified three key relationships between the EU and the
sports sector in this regard. The first is the relationship between sport and
television. The second relates to sport and competition policy and the third
concerns matters relating to the ‘freedoms’ enshrined in the Treaty.
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Having reviewed how EU policies affect the operation of sport, the paper
examined how sport can be applied to general policy as ‘various Community
policies are excellent instruments for demonstrating to sporting interests
the additional benefits of Community action’30 Using the Declaration in the
Amsterdam Treaty as justification for greater targeted action in sport, the
paper called for a strategy on sport. Areas targeted by the paper included;
public health, protection of young workers, safety at sports facilities, stan-
dards for sports equipment, the free movement of sports equipment, veteri-
nary regulations concerning animals in sport, scientific and technological
research, tourism, taxation and sport, sport and the environment, education
and vocational training and sport for people with disabilities. 
The paper also argued that sport could be integrated into the EU’s wider
external relations ‘policy’. In this connection, sport can either be used to put
pressure on third countries in the form of sanctions, or be used to help
support developing countries. In the case of the latter, the paper sees the
Lomé Convention as an appropriate mechanism to achieve this aim.
The paper’s conclusion confirms the dual approach embodied in the doc-
ument. On the one hand the EU, and in particular the Commission, will con-
tinue to implement EU law whilst on the other, sport will be increasingly
integrated into other EU policies. As the EU lacks a Treaty competence to
formulate a sports policy, the latter approach may be used as a framework
for a future EU policy in sport. 
‘The European Model of Sport’, Commission Consultation Document,
November 199831
Following the working paper on sport released by DG X in September 1998,
the Commission (DG X) published a consultation document on the same
subject later in the same year. The document reveals that at the time of pub-
lication, the Commission had received 55 sports-related complaints. In
accordance with the guidelines contained in the Declaration on Sport
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission stated that its central
aim was to provide assistance to sports organisations seeking to re-frame
sporting rules in line with EU law. To achieve this, the Commission published
the consultation document as a mechanism through which the European
sports sector could express their opinions on the nature of the rapidly devel-
oping relationship between sport and the EU. The results of this consulta-
tion exercise were to be used first to prepare for the European Conference
on Sport (Assises Européennes du sport) held in May 1999 and second to
identify more clearly the ‘real’ features of European sport and to preserve
them.
The Commission used the exercise as a stock-taking measure. As the
working paper identified, not only is sport practised as a significant eco-
nomic activity, but sport possesses socio-cultural and integrationist qual-
ities that may well be worth preserving. A framework flexible enough to
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accommodate both characteristics yet compatible with EU law thus was
being prepared. The consultation document comprises three chapters. First,
the document attempts to describe the organisation of sport in Europe.
Second, the document reviews sport’s economic context by examining the
relationship between sport and television. Third, the document examines the
social policy dimension to sport. 
The chapter on the ‘European Model of Sport’ examined how sport in
Western Europe has traditionally been organised on a ‘mixed’ model basis
where the actions of governmental and non-governmental organisations
have existed side by side. In addition, sport has operated in an environment
dominated by public service television. Developments in broadcasting in the
1980s have fundamentally changed this environment. The document
describes the model of sport in Europe as a ‘pyramid structure’. This struc-
ture describes both the organisational and competitive dimensions to
European sport. In organisational terms, the structure comprises European
federations, national federations, regional federations and the clubs.
At the pinnacle of the pyramid exist the European federations. Usually,
European federations will attempt to maintain their regulatory dominance
by only permitting one national federation per country to be affiliated to it.
Below the European federations lie the national sporting federations who are
affiliated to the European federation. A national federation organises and
regulates the sport in question within the national territory. The national fed-
erations represent their members within the European or international fed-
eration. In addition, they organise national championships. Below the
national federations lie the regional federations who are responsible for
organising regional championships or co-ordinating sport on a regional
level. Underpinning the pyramid are the sports clubs. Dominating this level
are amateur sports men and women and administrators who are unpaid. The
sports clubs offer the opportunity to local people to become involved in
sport. As such, the clubs perform an important social function.
The pyramid structure also describes the competitive balance in European
sport. Movement up and down the pyramid is an essential part of sport in
Europe. This is achieved through promotion and relegation. In many sports,
qualification for European competitions is achieved through championship
or cup performance. In essence therefore, the pyramid structure implies con-
siderable interdependence between the levels. This ‘open’ model contrasts
with the ‘closed’ procedures in the USA where championships are closed and
sport is governed by many federations.
The European ‘model’ has emerged out of the traditional culture of ama-
teurism in European sport whilst the US ‘model’ represents professionalism.
In this respect, European sport has traditionally not been practised as an
overtly economic activity whilst sport in the US has. However, this tradition
is changing. Sport in Europe has been greatly internationalised and commer-
cialised. This has led to a number of problems. First, due to the growing
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importance of negotiating television rights, sports federations have assumed
the role of a commercial company. This may conflict with their role as a
regulatory body. Second, clubs regulated by the federations are beginning
to demand a greater share of television rights. This may in time lead to some
clubs leaving the federation and establishing a breakaway structure. Third,
a tension exists between the requirement of federations to act as commer-
cial bodies whilst at the same time promoting grassroots sport. Fourth, the
commercial developments in sport have resulted in sports organisations
changing internal rules to accommodate EU competition law. Fifth, some
investment companies have expressed an interest in purchasing foot-
ball clubs. Federation rules regulating multiple ownership may conflict
with EU competition rules. Finally, due to the rapid commercialisation of
sport in Europe it is feared that only the commercially viable sports will
survive. 
Chapter 2 of the consultation document reviews the relationship between
sport and television in Europe. Most of the issues raised in this connection
have already been addressed elsewhere in this text. The chapter examines the
importance of broadcasting rights to sports bodies and reviews some themes
relating to this. First, who should own broadcasting rights, the federations
or the clubs? Second, how should rights be sold, individually or collectively?
Third, should rights be sold on an exclusive basis? Fourth, should television
companies be able to purchase football clubs thus owning and exploiting
broadcasting rights? Fifth, should some sports be broadcast on free-to-air
television and, relating to this point, what is to be the future role of public
television in Europe?
Chapter 3 examined the social dimension to sport. Six themes were iden-
tified. First, sport performs an educational function. In particular, sport pro-
motes both competition and sense of fair play. Second, sport can be used as
a means of social integration. In particular sport can act as a tool to promote
more tolerant attitudes towards specific groups in European society such as
ethnic minorities and the disabled. Third, sporting platforms can help
promote an awareness of the environment. Fourth, sport is inextricably
linked to public health as participation in sport is an important preventative
weapon in the fight against ill health. Fifth, a major issue in European and
world sport is doping. The document argues that the EU lacks competence
to act in doping matters but action can be taken in the context of other policy
areas (such as health) and in the forum of Justice and Home Affairs co-
operation. Finally, sport plays a significant role in creating employment
opportunities yet this needs to be balanced with the need to protect young
participants in sport.
Both the working paper and the consultation document represent an
attempt by the Commission to steer a middle course between Single Market
and socio-cultural forces. Although competition rules are still to apply to
the sports sector, a more soft touch approach is implied. At the same time,
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the socio-cultural dimensions of sport are being recognised through the
integration of sport into other EU policies. As such, the Commission sig-
nalled a desire to develop a more broad-based approach to sport policy. This
theme was continued by the member states at the end of 1999 and through-
out 2000.
The Committee of Regions (COR) opinion on the Commission’s report
welcomed the broad thrust of the report, particularly the Commission’s call
to examine how the concerns of sport can be taken into account in the EU
Treaty.32 Without an EU commitment to the social dimension of sport, the
COR argued that sports role in forging a people’s Europe risks being over-
looked. As such, ‘the COR considers that a European policy for sport should
be developed with greater emphasis on the vital cultural and socio-economic
role of sport in Europe’.33 Such a policy should involve introducing and
developing ‘by suitable changes to European legislation, a framework of
conditions which will enable sport in European regional and local authority
areas to fulfil its socially valuable tasks’.34
The Austrian Presidency (July–December 1998) 
The Austrian Council Presidency continued discussions on the relationship
between sport and the EU. Once again sport appeared in the Presidency
Conclusions following the Vienna European Council meeting of 11/12
December 1998. Point XII read:
Recalling the Declaration on Sport attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam and
recognising the social role of sport, the European Council invites the
Commission to submit a report to the Helsinki European Council with a view
to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function
of sport within the Community framework. The European Council underlines
its concern at the extent and seriousness of doping in sports, which undermines
the sporting ethic and endangers public health. It emphasises the need for
mobilisation at European Union level and invites the member states to examine
jointly with the Commission and international sports bodies possible measures
to intensify the fight against this danger, in particular through better co-
ordination of existing national measures.35
The Austrian Presidency broadened the scope of the discussion on sport
to include an examination of ways sporting structures and the social dimen-
sion of sport could be safeguarded within the EU framework. This statement
is significant in that the member states hinted that the EU should be adopt-
ing a more soft touch application of EU law to the sports sector. It is also
possible that the member states were hinting at a possible future hardening
of the Amsterdam Declaration. The onus was placed on the Commission to
examine these issues via the presentation of a report on sport to the Helsinki
European Council to be held in December 1999. In addition to the issue of
sport and EU law, the Presidency Conclusions are also significant for the first
real signs of a EU commitment to fighting doping in sport. 
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The first European Union Conference on Sport (the Assises), May 1999
Attached to the Commission consultation document, The European Model
of Sport, were a series of questionnaires designed to canvass opinion on the
future structure of European sport, the future relationship between sport and
television and the social dimension of sport, including doping issues. The
Commission used the 100 replies to prepare the first EU conference on sport. 
The conference was held in Greece in May 1999. The decision to hold it
stemmed from a decision taken at the November 1998 European Sports
Forum. The Amsterdam Declaration invited the Commission to establish a
dialogue between sports organisations and the EU institutions. At the
December 1998 Vienna European Council, the member states reaffirmed this
desire by requesting the Commission to submit a report to the December
1999 Helsinki European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports
structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the EU frame-
work. The convening of the conference represents the Commission’s
response to these requests. Although the Commission’s working paper and
the consultation document also form part of this strategy, they also repre-
sent an ‘in-house’ attempt by the Commission to review the relationship
between sport and the EU.
The conference participants were drawn from a wide range of back-
grounds.36 The participants were divided into three main working parties
each of which discussed one issue relating to sport. The three working parties
were each presented with a discussion paper covering, ‘The European Model
of Sport, Including the Social Dimension of Sport’, ‘Relations Between Sport
and Television’ and ‘The Fight Against Doping in Sport’.
The group discussing the ‘European Model of Sport’ drew a number of
conclusions. First, they argued that sporting ‘autonomy’ should be safe-
guarded from economic and political influences and that a balance between
these pressures needs establishing. Second, they argued that the federal struc-
ture of sport (described above) should be maintained and protected. As such,
the participants wanted potentially restrictive rules deterring the formation
of breakaway structures to be maintained. Third, the participants wished to
see young sportspersons being afforded greater protection. In this connec-
tion, the participants invited bodies such as the EU to take sport into con-
sideration in the fields of policies on social integration, anti-doping
measures, anti-racism measures, environmental policy, public health policy,
education policy and youth policy. Fourth, the participants re-affirmed the
importance of equal opportunities in sport and the importance of sport for
promoting the integration of disabled persons. Finally, the participants
attempted to persuade the EU of the importance of supporting regional
sport, particularly in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region and in devel-
oping countries.
The group examining the relationship between sport and television
acknowledged the increased competition in the broadcasting sector but
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argued that the autonomy of sport should be maintained. In particular, they
argued that sport should not be used by broadcasters simply to attract audi-
ences, and broadcasters should not interfere or exercise control over the
organisation and scheduling of sport. Many participants expressed opposi-
tion to attempts by media companies to acquire an interest in sports clubs.
Furthermore, most of the participants expressed the view that the collective
sale of sports rights by federations was the best system for ensuring effective
redistribution and maintaining the solidarity of sport. Whilst the working
group acknowledged the competition policy implications of long exclusive
broadcasting contracts, they argued that the duration of such rights should
be ‘sufficient’. They concluded by suggesting that a single rule on this issue
would not benefit sport given the wide variety of sporting disciplines. Finally,
on the issue of public access to sports broadcasts, the working group
acknowledged the public interest argument that was at the heart of Article
3a of the TWF Directive, but argued that a balance needed to be struck
between the need to exploit the new commercial developments in the broad-
casting sector and the need to guarantee public access to events on television. 
The final working group examined the Commission discussion paper on
the fight against doping in sport. The group argued that sports organisations,
national governments and EU institutions should co-ordinate efforts in order
to eliminate doping. In particular, the participants drew attention to the need
for effective out-of-competition controls and the need for the harmonisation
of lists of banned substances, procedures and penalties. It was also recom-
mended that EU action in this field should be co-ordinated with that of the
Council of Europe.
The German Presidency (January–June 1999)
The German Presidency convened an informal meeting of EU Sports
Ministers to discuss the growing debate on the relationship between sport
and the EU. Meeting in Paderborn (31 May–2 June 1999), the Ministers
added to the Austrian Presidency’s calls for more anti-doping measures in
sport. In addition, they discussed the use of sport as a potential source of
employment and the portrayal of sport for the disabled in the media. A dis-
cussion relating to sporting contacts with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the provision of sport possibilities for refugees from Kosovo in the
refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia also took place. The significant
discussion related to the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport. In this connec-
tion the Ministers drew the following conclusions: 
So as to safeguard the ethics and the social significance of sport, the particular
concerns of sport should be supported especially in the following areas:
• the application of competition law and internal market rules; 
• the EU measures relating to sport and television; 
• Community actions in the field of sport; 
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• the assistance programmes of the EU, in order to achieve greater transpa-
rency as regards the taking into account of sports;
• in light of the interest that the EU attaches to the campaign of the member
states and of the sports organisations relating to the protection of minor
athletes, the training of young persons, the social significance and the soli-
darity functions of sport. 
The Sport Ministers invite the European Commission to set up a working
group composed of representatives of the member states of the EU and of the
Commission, which is to work out how the concerns of sport can be taken into
account in the EU Treaty. In doing so, the Working Group will consult sport
organisations.37
The conclusions relating to the Declaration have a strong socio-cultural
character. The member states once again expressed the view that the rela-
tionship between sport and the EU Treaty should be further clarified without
expressing a view as to how this should be achieved. Once again, the
Ministers expected the Commission to propose such measures. However, the
conclusions firmly indicate that the member states wish to see EU sports
policy develop in a socio-cultural direction, be that in the way of a more sym-
pathetic application of EU law to sport or through more formal Treaty meas-
ures. These conclusions have given considerable impetus to those
socio-cultural actors who want the EU to adopt more formal Treaty meas-
ures in order to ‘protect’ sport from EU law. 
The Finnish Presidency (July–December 1999)
In launching the priorities for the six-month term of office, the Finnish
Presidency, in addition to carrying on discussions concerning anti-doping
measures in sport, expressed the desire to, ‘carry on the discussion on the
status of sports in Community law, emphasising the social significance of
sports and the need to take the special characteristics of sports into account
in the application of legislation’.38
The Sports Directors of the EU member states met in Helsinki on the
18–20 October 1999 to discuss the sports-related Presidency priorities.
Again, the conclusions of the meeting reflect a desire on the part of the
member states to see the EU adopt a more holistic approach to sport. This
naturally involves the EU promoting and safeguarding the socio-cultural
dimension of sport in addition to recognising the economic dimension of
sport. The Directors concluded, ‘sport is an important resource that pro-
motes people’s well-being and health, the cultural dimension and social
cohesion. Therefore, sport in its social significance should be seen as a broad-
based sector’.39 The Directors also discussed the establishment of the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the use of sport for the social integration of
young people, the use of sport as a source of employment, the use of sport
as a civic activity promoting democracy in order to implement the Northern
Dimension strategy of the EU, the use of sporting sanctions as a tool of
186 Sports law and policy in the European Union
foreign policy, the use of sport as a means of bringing the EU closer to EU
citizens and mechanisms for improving the dialogue between the EU and the
sports world. Following the meeting of the Directors, the Ministers for Sport
met informally on 25 October in Vierumäki. At this meeting the Ministers
agreed on the participation in the World Anti-Doping Agency for a two-year
transitional period. Also at the meeting, the Commission submitted the
Helsinki report on sport, a report requested by the member states during the
Austrian Presidency. 
The Helsinki report on sport, December 199940
The conclusions of the May 1999 Conference on Sport were used by the
Commission to respond to the member states request, made at the December
1998 Vienna European Council that the Commission should ‘submit a
report to the Helsinki European Council with a view to safeguarding current
sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the
Community framework’. Accordingly, in December 1999 the Commission
submitted the Helsinki Report on Sport to the member states meeting in
Finland. The bulk of the report is contained within three sections.
In the first section, the report claimed that the ‘the development of sport
in Europe risks weakening its educational and social function’.41 In particu-
lar, the report claimed that the ‘European approach’ to sport has recently
been affected by several important developments. These developments
include the growth in the popularity of sport, the increasing international-
isation of sport and the unprecedented development of the economic dimen-
sion of sport. The advantages of these developments for the European
economy are considerable. The number of jobs created directly or indirectly
by the sports industry has risen by 60 per cent in the past ten years to reach
nearly two million. However, the above developments have also led to some
‘tensions’. First, doping may be a bi-product of increased competition stem-
ming from commercial developments. Second, commercialism may be
squeezing traditional sporting principles out of sport. In particular, the social
function of sport is being threatened. Third, commercial pressures may lead
to the current single structure for sport being fragmented as some partici-
pants seek a more lucrative future in breakaway leagues. This may jeopar-
dise financial solidarity between professional and amateur sport. Finally, the
above developments are putting an increasingly physical and mental strain
on young sports people, thus risking their subsequent switch to alternative
employment. 
The second part of the report argued that ‘the Community, its member
states and the sporting movement need to reaffirm and strengthen the edu-
cational and social function of sport’.42 In this connection the report makes
two sets of recommendations. First, in relation to enhancing the educational
role of sport, the report suggests that EU educational and training pro-
grammes could focus on (1) improving the position of sport and physical
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education at school through Community programmes; (2) promoting the
subsequent switch to other employment and future integration on to the
labour market of sportsmen and women; (3) promoting convergence
between the training systems for sports workers in each member state.43
Second, concerning doping in sport, the report outlines the measures
adopted by the Commission in relation to anti-doping policy. Doping issues
have been referred to the European Group on Ethics and a World Anti-
Doping Agency has been established, following co-operation with the
Olympic movement. Measures to improve legislative co-ordination with
national anti-doping measures have also been explored.
The final section of the report, ‘Clarifying the Legal Environment of
Sport’, examined the thorny issue of the relationship between sport and EU
law. The report examined how the commercialisation of the sports sector has
contributed to an increase in the number of conflicts involving EU law. These
conflicts have ranged from disputes concerning the sale of television rights
to issues of club ownership and geographical location. Quoting the conclu-
sions of the first EU Conference on Sport organised by the Commission held
in Olympia in May 1999, the paper argued that ‘sport must be able to assim-
ilate the new commercial framework in which it must develop, without at
the same time losing its identity and autonomy, which underpin the func-
tions it performs in the social, cultural, health and educational areas’.44
To enable the sports world to achieve this, the report identified a need for
a ‘new approach’ for dealing with sports-related issues in the EU. As the
report explains, ‘this new approach involves preserving the traditional
values of sport, while at the same time assimilating a changing economic and
legal environment’.45 Action at three levels was recommended. 
At the Community level, central to this ‘legal environment’, is the appli-
cation of EU competition law. The report argues that ‘the application of
Treaty’s competition rules to the sports sector must take account of the spe-
cific characteristics of sport, especially the interdependence between sport-
ing activity and the economic activity that it generates, the principle of equal
opportunities and the uncertainty of results’.46 In this connection, the report
provided examples of (1) practices which do not come under the competi-
tion rules, (2) practices that are, in principle, prohibited by the competition
rules and (3) practices likely to be exempted from the competition rules.
Nevertheless, the report did not confront the issue of how the special char-
acteristics of sport could be more widely safeguarded in the absence of a
Treaty base for sport. At the national level, the report proposed measures
designed to protect the national single structure ‘model’ of sporting organ-
isation. In particular, the report suggests that ‘one way of safeguarding the
national federal structures could be to provide for them to be recognised by
law in each member state of the Union’.47 Finally, at the level of sporting
organisations, the report suggested that sporting federations should more
clearly define their ‘missions and statutes’. This recommendation clearly
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places the emphasis on the federations to define the particular characteris-
tics of sport and the measures they themselves have taken to protect and
nurture such characteristics. Where sporting operations have a commercial
dimension, the report argues that such operations must be ‘founded on the
principles of transparency and balanced access to the market, effective and
proven redistribution and clarification of contracts, while prominence is
given to the specific nature of sport’. Furthermore, regulatory measures
should be ‘objectively justified, non-discriminatory, necessary and propor-
tional’48 If sporting rules conform to these ‘tests’, they should not conflict
with Treaty provisions. 
At the heart of the Helsinki report on sport lies the concept of ‘partner-
ship’, a concept widely employed by EU officials. In this context partnership
means the knitting together of the macro (EU institutions), meso (member
states) and micro (sub-national groups and non-state actors) levels of activ-
ity to ensure a more structured and co-ordinated approach to sport.
Simultaneously of course, partnership also draws a wide range of actors into
the regional integration process and serves to legitimise EU involvement in
policy areas. The report clearly links commercialisation with the ‘juridifica-
tion’ of sport. As sporting operations practice increasingly on a commercial
basis, so EU law seeps into the internal laws of sport. The clearest example
of this, other than the Bosman ruling is the application of EU competition
law to the sports sector. The danger is that the ‘special characteristics’ of
sport become squeezed between these commercial and legal developments.
The paper makes clear that action at EU level alone will be insufficient to
protect current structures and the social function of sport. Hence a ‘part-
nership’ approach is recommended.
In their response to the Helsinki report, the Parliament’s Committee on
Culture, Youth, the Media and Sport broadly supported the Commission.49
In particular, the so-called Mennea report welcomed the Commission’s focus
on the social dimension of sport and their desire to clarify the legal environ-
ment within which sport operates in the EU. The report argues that the prin-
ciples established in the Bosman ruling should be considered part of this legal
environment and as such should not be undermined. The report therefore
represents a continuation of Parliamentary thinking regarding the impor-
tance of extending the right of free movement to all EU citizens.
Nevertheless, the report argues that the Amsterdam Declaration should be
replaced with a Treaty Article for sport. Mennea supports the Pack recom-
mendation of linking sport with cultural policy. 
The road to Nice and beyond
Discussions on the fight against doping in sport and the social dimension of
sport were continued by the Portuguese Presidency in the first half of 2000.
The Sports Directors met in Lisbon in May in preparation for the informal
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meeting of Sports Ministers held on 10 May. At this meeting the Ministers
recommended five developments in the field of EU sports policy. First, the
establishment of an informal working group with the aim of proposing to
the member states forms of participation with the WADA. Second, the
Ministers argued that, ‘the specific aspects of sport, namely its social dimen-
sion, should be taken into consideration in the implementation of
Community policies’.50 Third, the Ministers recommended ‘the creation of
a joint working group with representatives of the EU and the Commission,
charged with studying the harmonisation of the specific aspects of sport
within the Treaty of the Union’.51 In a footnote below this passage it was
noted that the United Kingdom had refused to approve the establishment
of a working group for the inclusion of a new paragraph in the Treaty.
Fourth, the Ministers recommended the creation of training and exchange
programmes for young sportspersons and, finally, the Ministers recom-
mended the creation of a sports information network between member
states that would act as a mechanism for the dissemination of information.
Following the Santa Maria da Feira European Council meeting, the
Presidency Conclusions relating to sport read, ‘the European Council
requests the Commission and the Council to take account of the specific
characteristics of sport in Europe and its social function in managing
common policies’.52
The Portuguese discussions took place within the context of an on-going
IGC process. The Amsterdam Treaty was designed to prepare the EU for the
necessary deepening that was to take place prior to the successful widening
of the organisation. In the event, the summit postponed many of the difficult
decisions relating to the institutional reform of the EU. As a result, through-
out much of 1999 and the first half of 2000, the EU embarked upon another
IGC process in preparation for another revision to the Treaty (agreed
December 2000 in Nice). This process has provided the socio-cultural coali-
tion with another opportunity to push for more formal measures concern-
ing the Treaty status of sport. In particular, the current debate on the Treaty
status of sport has been heavily influenced by the debate within European
football on how to mitigate the deleterious effects of Bosman. The
Parliament once again emerged as an important forum through which such
demands have been articulated. 
Twenty national associations met at a joint FIFA/UEFA conference in
Amsterdam in March 2000 to discuss the possibility of persuading the EU
to adopt a protocol for sport within the newly revised Treaty. In April 2000,
a FIFA/UEFA delegation floated the idea before the before the Parliament
and met with the troika of EU Sports Ministers in Lisbon, Portugal. It was
reported that FIFA/UEFA wanted sport to be granted a ‘special status’ within
the Treaty. The meeting with the troika yielded two conclusions. First, a
working committee was established by the Portuguese Presidency to discuss
the proposal. Following the meeting, the Portuguese Minister for Sport
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remarked that there was a ‘need to safeguard sport, notably soccer, from the
perverseness that has emerged from the (Bosman) ruling’.53 Second, the
Ministers committed themselves to examining the merits of a protocol for
sport being adopted in the newly revised Treaty and that this issue would be
discussed at the meeting of all 15 member state Sports Ministers in May
2000.54 A sporting protocol, if adopted could allow sport a derogation from
certain aspects of EU law without the need to re-write the provisions on free
movement and competition law. At this meeting, UEFA President claimed
that the protocol idea had met with ‘understanding’ from MEP’s.55
The negotiation of the Nice Treaty, gave the French Presidency
(June–December 2000) the opportunity to present their sports-related ideas
to a wider forum whilst offering the European Council an opportunity to
formally respond to the Helsinki report on Sport. In particular, the French
Presidency expressed the desire that the conclusions of the working group
should form the basis of discussions at the 9th European Sports Forum held
in Lille on 26 and 27 October 2000 and that the conclusions of this meeting
would lead to the adoption of ‘significant’ steps by the Nice European
Council on 7 and 8 December 2000. 
In the event, at Nice the protocol approach advocated by UEFA and FIFA
was rejected by the member states in favour of a further Declaration on Sport
presented as a Presidency Conclusion. The Declaration, reproduced in full
below, is significant in that the member states offered some guidance as to
the immediate resolution of (as then) pending disputes (notably the transfer
issue) whilst also laying down some signposts for the longer-term future of
EU involvement in sport. The Declaration read:
DECLARATION ON THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SPORT
AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION IN EUROPE, OF WHICH ACCOUNT
SHOULD BE TAKEN IN IMPLEMENTING COMMON POLICIES 
Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting, 7, 8, 9 December
2000
1 The European Council has noted the report on sport submitted to it by the
European Commission in Helsinki in December 1999 with a view to safe-
guarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of
sport within the European Union. Sporting organisations and the member
states have a primary responsibility in the conduct of sporting affairs. Even
though not having any direct powers in this area, the Community must, in
its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social,
educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special,
in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preserva-
tion of its social role may be respected and nurtured.
2 The European Council hopes in particular that the cohesion and ties of sol-
idarity binding the practice of sports at every level, fair competition and
both the moral and material interests and the physical integrity of those
involved in the practice of sport, especially minors, may be preserved.
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Amateur sport and sport for all
3 Sport is a human activity resting on fundamental social, educational and
cultural values. It is a factor making for integration, involvement in social
life, tolerance, acceptance of differences and playing by the rules.
4 Sporting activity should be accessible to every man and woman, with due
regard for individual aspirations and abilities, throughout the whole gamut
of organised or individual competitive or recreational sports.
5 For the physically or mentally disabled, the practice of physical and sport-
ing activities provides a particularly favourable opening for the develop-
ment of individual talent, rehabilitation, social integration and solidarity
and, as such, should be encouraged. In this connection, the European
Council welcomes the valuable and exemplary contribution made by the
Paralympic Games in Sydney.
6 The member states encourage voluntary services in sport, by means of
measures providing appropriate protection for and acknowledging the eco-
nomic and social role of volunteers, with the support, where necessary, of
the Community in the framework of its powers in this area.
Role of sports federations
7 The European Council stresses its support for the independence of sports
organisations and their right to organise themselves through appropriate
associative structures. It recognises that, with due regard for national and
Community legislation and on the basis of a democratic and transparent
method of operation, it is the task of sporting organisations to organise
and promote their particular sports, particularly as regards the specifically
sporting rules applicable and the make-up of national teams, in the way
which they think best reflects their objectives.
8 It notes that sports federations have a central role in ensuring the essential
solidarity between the various levels of sporting practice, from recreational
to top-level sport, which co-exist there; they provide the possibility of access
to sports for the public at large, human and financial support for amateur
sports, promotion of equal access to every level of sporting activity for men
and women alike, youth training, health protection and measures to
combat doping, acts of violence and racist or xenophobic occurrences.
9 These social functions entail special responsibilities for federations and
provide the basis for the recognition of their competence in organising
competitions.
10 While taking account of developments in the world of sport, federations
must continue to be the key feature of a form of organisation providing a
guarantee of sporting cohesion and participatory democracy.
Preservation of sports training policies
11 Training policies for young sportsmen and -women are the life blood of
sport, national teams and top-level involvement in sport and must be
encouraged. Sports federations, where appropriate in tandem with the
public authorities, are justified in taking the action needed to preserve the
training capacity of clubs affiliated to them and to ensure the quality of
192 Sports law and policy in the European Union
such training, with due regard for national and Community legislation and
practices.
Protection of young sportsmen and -women
12 The European Council underlines the benefits of sport for young people
and urges the need for special heed to be paid, in particular by sporting
organisations, to the education and vocational training of top young
sportsmen and -women, in order that their vocational integration is not
jeopardised because of their sporting careers, to their psychological
balance and family ties and to their health, in particular the prevention of
doping. It appreciates the contribution of associations and organisations
which minister to these requirements in their training work and thus make
a valuable contribution socially.
13 The European Council expresses concern about commercial transactions
targeting minors in sport, including those from third countries, inasmuch
as they do not comply with existing labour legislation or endanger the
health and welfare of young sportsmen and -women. It calls on sporting
organisations and the member states to investigate and monitor such prac-
tices and, where necessary, to consider appropriate measures.
Economic context of sport and solidarity
14 In the view of the European Council, single ownership or financial control
of more than one sports club entering the same competition in the same
sport may jeopardise fair competition. Where necessary, sports federations
are encouraged to introduce arrangements for overseeing the management
of clubs.
15 The sale of television broadcasting rights is one of the greatest sources of
income today for certain sports. The European Council thinks that moves
to encourage the mutualisation of part of the revenue from such sales, at
the appropriate levels, are beneficial to the principle of solidarity between
all levels and areas of sport.
Transfers
16 The European Council is keenly supportive of dialogue on the transfer
system between the sports movement, in particular the football authorities,
organisations representing professional sportsmen and -women, the
Community and the member states, with due regard for the specific
requirements of sport, subject to compliance with Community law.
17 The Community institutions and the member states are requested to con-
tinue examining their policies, in compliance with the Treaty and in accor-
dance with their respective powers, in the light of these general principles.56
Through the Declaration, the member states continued to insist on the
special place of sport with the EU’s legal framework without committing
themselves to formal legal means to secure this. This point was picked up on
by the Parliament’s Draft Opinion of the Committee on Culture, Youth,
Education, the Media and Sport for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs
on the Nice Treaty.57 In the draft opinion the Parliament remarked:
Reconciling sport and law 193
the Committee has always emphasised the important health, educational and
social aspects to sport; and has consistently called for the introduction of a
legal basis making possible Community action in the field of sport . . . The
Amsterdam Treaty included a Declaration on Sport and the Treaty of Nice
includes an Annex (Annex IV) on sport: neither of these, however, constitutes
a legal basis for Community action.’ In this connection the Committee ‘regrets
that its long-standing appeal for the inclusion in the Treaty of a legal basis for
Community action in the field of sport has once again been rejected; and calls
for the creation of such a legal base in any future revision of the Treaty’.58
Presidency follow-up discussions on sport took place throughout 2001
and 2002. In a series of meetings throughout the first half of 2001, the
Swedish Presidency conducted a review of attitudes towards the Nice
Declaration and carried on discussions on the fight against doping and the
operation of WADA. These issues were continued by the Belgian Presidency
in the second half of 2001. In October 2001, the Commission presented a
proposal for the establishment of the European Year of Education through
sport (2004).59 This issue along with the question of the implementation of
the Declaration and doping are now the key sports-related issues in the EU.
However, also in 2004, the EU is committed to a revision of the Treaty. This
is likely to be the fourth major sporting issue to appear on the Presidency’s
agenda. 
The 10th annual European Sports Forum meeting in Brussels in October
2001 provided a forum for a review of EU sports policy at a crucial time for
the sports world. The Forum established four working groups:
Implementation of the Nice Declaration, Fight Against Doping, Social
Economy, Sport for Disabled People. The discussion paper prepared for the
Nice Declaration working group identified the following as key issues:60
• The place of sports federations in the organisation of sport today. Should
they have an exclusive role? Should other forms of organisation of sport
be examined? Should other structures independent of the federations have
a role to play in the organisation of sport and competitions? 
• Internal organisation of the sports organisations. How do they or should
they take account of the new economic environment? Seek transparency
and more democracy? Ensure that all categories of members are repre-
sented in the ruling bodies? 
• Does not the emergence and success of international and European cham-
pionships jeopardise the national base of sports’ organisation? Is the
national framework sometimes not too narrow for the organisation of
certain championships? What should be done in the light of these devel-
opments? 
• How should television rights be managed? How can the rights of each
club and the principle of solidarity at the heart of federal organisations be
reconciled? What are the national and Community approaches to this? 
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• How should the professionalisation of sport and its ever-increasing eco-
nomic impact be analysed? Is this a favourable, unavoidable trend?
Should it be brought under control? How? Where does voluntary activ-
ity fit into this context? 
• Is there a Community-level social dialogue between the various partners
involved in sport? Should it be supported? What should it be seeking to
achieve? 
• Protection of young people. What dangers lurk for young people? How
can they be protected? Who should be responsible for implementing this
protection? The federations? The public authorities? How? 
• What place should sport have in Community policies? A specific place?
Better consideration within other policies? 
In the Nice working group’s conclusions, the participants welcomed the
political involvement of the members states through the release of the Nice
Declaration.61 Describing the Declaration as a ‘breakthrough’, the EU was
urged to follow up the Declaration through the promotion of the ethical and
social values of sport. The group also welcomed the outcome of competition
law cases following the Declaration. The group noted that the sports-related
cases had ‘been dealt with in a way which respects Community law and the
uniqueness of sport, and in line with the spirit advocated by the Nice
Declaration’.62 However, the group expressed the view that whilst the auton-
omy of sport should be respected, sport should be more closely integrated
into a range of EU policies. 
Comment
In attempting to challenge the dominance of the market-based approach of
the ECJ and Competition Policy Directorate in order to redefine sport as a
more social pursuit, the socio-cultural actors have encountered a number of
difficulties. First, the EU has enshrined its market-based definition of sport
in law. ECJ jurisprudence clearly links EU law to the practice of sport.
Second, the EU lacks a Treaty base for sport. This limits the ability of the
socio-cultural coalition to address sporting issues in non-Single Market
policy venues. Third, the socio-cultural coalition is a coalition of conven-
ience. It lacks unanimous agreement on policy strategy. Despite having
access to numerous institutional venues, this lack of cohesion forecloses
many legislative venues. As a result of these constraints, the activity of the
socio-cultural coalition has been largely confined to the use of soft law.
Although soft law is not legally binding it does still carry weight in the EU. 
European Parliament initiatives The European Parliament’s sporting
initiatives are consistent with the people’s Europe project. However, the
Parliament has not attempted to overturn the Bosman ruling because the
Reconciling sport and law 195
establishment of a people’s Europe requires discriminatory practices in sport
to be abolished. As such, whilst both the Larive and Pack reports seek to
establish a more socio-cultural definition of sport, they also support EU
action to prohibit restrictive practises in sport. Due to the lack of a Treaty
base for sport, the Parliament has attempted to assert its agenda through
essentially ad hoc ventures into sports policy. In particular, the Parliament
has used its budgetary, legislative and scrutiny powers to press for more EU
involvement in sport. The Parliament’s exploitation of its budgetary powers
to keep the sports budgetary line afloat and its exploitation of legislative
powers to revise the Television Without Frontiers Directive represent the
most effective use of its formal powers. 
Member state initiatives Member state involvement in sports policy inten-
sified post-Bosman following concerns raised by some governments on the
direction of sports policy. The member states responded by establishing
political guidelines for the future direction of sports policy. The most signif-
icant of these guidelines was the Amsterdam Treaty’s Declaration on Sport.
Previously at Milan in 1985 and at Maastricht in 1992, the member states
had recognised the importance of social and cultural measures to the foun-
dations of European integration. The Maastricht Treaty contained provi-
sions on social, cultural and tourism policy. The inclusion of sport within the
Treaty at Amsterdam was therefore a natural progression, particularly given
the problematic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent
desire on the part of the member states to bring Europe closer to the citizens.
The Amsterdam Declaration has proved important, not only in guiding the
application of EU law to sport, but also in progressively hardening sports
policy. The contribution of soft law to policy development is an area fre-
quently overlooked by researchers, yet one almost always in evidence in the
history of the establishment of a new policy sector. Following Amsterdam,
sports policy developed from a narrow examination of the relationship
between sport and employment (2nd half 1997) to the adoption and imple-
mentation of the Nice Declaration on Sport (2nd half of 2002). The relative
freedom of the Council Presidency to push individual agendas is significant
in this respect (Kirchner 1992). Furthermore, the troika system allows for
the preceding Presidency’s agenda to be continued by the successor whilst
also being coupled with the agenda of the successor Presidency. 
Commission initiatives The Commission’s response to member state
promptings has also come largely in the form of policy papers. Using its right
of policy initiative, the Education and Culture Directorate has pieced
together a series of measures, which, when taken together, represent a ‘new
approach’ to sports policy. The two 1998 policy papers, ‘The development
and prospects for Community action in the field of sport’, and ‘The
European model of sport’ were used to prepare for the first EU conference
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on sport, held in Greece in May 1999. The conclusions of this exercise were
used by the Commission to respond to the member states request, made at
the December 1998 Vienna European Council that the Commission should
write the Helsinki report on sport. This report states the current state of play. 
Despite the predominance of soft law as a tactic with which to influence the
definition of sport in the EU, the activities of the socio-cultural coalition have
had some practical effects. Above all, the sports policy subsystem has been
politicised. Previously dominated by legal norms, the subsystem has become
penetrated by essentially political arguments concerning the social signifi-
cance of sport. This politicisation has been aided by the high political sali-
ence of sport in Europe. Sport is an issue carrying very high public interest.
Politicisation is an essential pre-requisite for policy change.
Policy change is evident within the sports policy subsystem. The key con-
sequence of subsystem politicisation has been a change in the regulatory con-
ditions within which sport operates. In other words the regulation of sport
in the EU has been politicised. This politicisation of sports regulation has
resulted in a drift from a Single Market model of sports regulation towards
a socio-cultural model. Single Market regulation refers to regulation
designed to protect and enhance the four fundamental freedoms. Socio-
cultural regulation refers to a more sympathetic/soft touch application of
this logic in which the specific and possibly unique characteristics of the
sector are taken into consideration. The ECJ rulings in Deliège and Lehtonen
and the Competition Directorate’s post-Amsterdam approach for dealing
with sport illustrates the extent to which political arguments have influenced
the application of the EU law to sport. As such, these rulings/decisions are
significant in that they mark the birth of an area of EU law called ‘EU sports
law’. It is to this issue that the final chapter now turns.
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7
The future of EU
sports law and policy
A central objective of this text was to place some order on the seemingly
random and ad hoc impulses of EU activity in the sports sector. The book
claims that today’s EU sports policy has developed out of a policy tension
within the EU. The tension between the Single Market regulatory impulses
of EU activity in sport and the EU’s political policy objectives for sport has
contributed to the birth of a EU sports policy defined by the construction of
the separate territories approach. In other words a distinct legal approach to
sport has emerged. This implies the birth of EU sports law, which has had
the result of shifting the nature of sports regulation towards a socio-cultural
model of regulation. EU interventions in sport do not simply reflect a desire
to correct market distortions or restrictions. Judicial intervention is sensitive
to the requirements of current EU sports policy. As such, it is no longer
appropriate to refer to the EU’s regulation of sport as an example of sport
and the law. Rather, by defining separate territories of sporting autonomy
and judicial intervention, the EU has constructed a discrete body of law relat-
ing specifically to sport, hence the term sports law. 
Why is the distinction between sport and the law and sports law impor-
tant? On the face of it this may appear another one of those semantic and
essentially pointless distinctions that is of academic interest only. Analysing
the relationship between these concepts is however fundamental for under-
standing the future direction of EU sports policy. Academics, legal practi-
tioners and sports administrators can trawl through EU case law and
sports-related policy papers in order to form a view of where the relation-
ship between sport and the EU currently stands. Although a rather time-
consuming exercise, it is nonetheless a worthwhile exercise. However, in
order to understand how the relationship between sport and the EU emerged
and in what direction EU sports law and policy is heading, some further
analysis is required. 
Theoretical contributions
As explained in Chapter 2, an obvious gap in the sports law literature is the
lack of theoretical investigation. This poses some problems for the credibil-
ity of the sports law thesis. Not only will a lack of theoretical underpinning
inhibit the development of sports law as an academic discipline, it also leaves
more practical questions about the future either unexplored or directionless.
The concept of sports law is in its infancy. The sub-branch of EU sports law
is even more nascent. The search for theory is therefore inhibited by a lack
case law. 
The prudent or more cautious could make a case for taking further time
to reflect on developments in the EU. The task of attempting to construct an
approach offering insights into the sports law phenomenon is not however
a premature exercise. First, although not vast, sufficient empirical material
exists to allow for the construction of ideas. The small amount of ‘hard’ law
since 1999 combined with the proliferation in ‘soft’ law is sufficient to iden-
tify the emergence of EU sports law and policy. Second, EU involvement in
new sectors offers political scientists and lawyers an excellent opportunity
to test and refine existing theories of European integration. Third, if it is
accepted that the EU’s approach to sports regulation has changed in favour
of a socio-cultural model, then it must remain a possibility for the future that
the approach will change again. Greater theoretical investigation will illumi-
nate the possible future contours of EU sports law and policy. Finally, the
debate on the relationship between sport and the EU is a current one. The
way in which the EU deals with sport tells us much about the type of organ-
isation the EU wants to be. A major constitutional review of the EU’s activ-
ities is currently under way with a view to further Treaty revision in 2004.1
Sports location within the EU’s constitutional structure post-2004 will be
dependent on the activities of the two advocacy coalitions working within
the sports policy subsystem. The sports policy subsystem is not a non-neutral
arena existing simply to process inputs into outputs in an apolitical manner.
Rather activity within it will determine sports future legal and constitutional
status. The need to construct better empirical and theoretical understandings
of the subsystem is therefore paramount. 
The main theoretical contribution advanced in this book is the need for
subsystem analysis. The approach presented here rejects the notion of mono-
lithic EU institutions slugging it out between themselves for control over
policy. Rather, it is argued that the EU is best characterised as a multi-level
organisation in which a myriad of policy-specific subsystems exist. Activity
within subsystems determines the nature of the policy output. The analysis
therefore centres on the nature of the subsystem. If a better understanding
of the subsystem can be developed, more accurate hypotheses about the
future direction of policy can be advanced. Subsystem analysis requires two
focuses. First, the actors within the subsystem need identifying and their
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belief systems specifying. Second, the institutional resources at the disposal
of the actors need identifying.
Actors 
The actors within the sports policy subsystem are organised into two advo-
cacy coalitions. The belief system of the Single Market coalition is imbued
with the logic of negative integration and Single Market regulation. In other
words, the manner in which law is applied to sport should not allow the prin-
ciples of the four freedoms to be undermined. The belief system of the socio-
cultural coalition is held together by the logic of positive integration and a
commitment to the socio-cultural model of sports regulation. Sport possesses
social and cultural characteristics which necessitates a soft touch application
of law. Furthermore, the market-based definition of sport adopted by the
Single Market regulators conflicts with the socio-cultural coalition’s concern
to develop a people’s Europe. Membership of the two advocacy coalitions is
wide. The term ‘actor’ refers to those who are actively involved in the policy
debate. This includes EU institutions either acting as discrete entities such as
the ECJ, the Commission or the Parliament, or as individual components
within institutions such as individual Directorates General within the
Commission, individual committees within the Parliament and individual
Presidencies within the context of intergovernmental forums. However, as
previously explained, the term ‘actor’ should not be confused with ‘institu-
tion’. The ECJ, Commission and Parliament are considered to be actors within
the subsystem. The institutionalist element of the otherwise actor-centred
approach stems not from their mere involvement within the subsystem as
actors, but from the characteristics they bring to the subsystem. Institutions
not only bring formal policy instruments and procedures to the subsystem,
they also bring informal, cultural and normative resources to it (see below).
The Single Market coalition, consisting primarily of the ECJ and the
Competition Policy Directorate, do not pursue a specific sports-related
agenda. Their policy interest in sport is regulatory. Their key concern is for
the protection of the four freedoms. The socio-cultural coalition was formed
with particular sporting goals in mind. The key actors include the
Parliament, the Education and Culture Directorate, the member states and
a wide range of sports bodies. However, the coalition is a coalition of con-
venience given the differences within the secondary aspects of the belief
system. In particular, strategic differences exist over (1) the extent to which
sport should seek protection from EU law; (2) the method of achieving pro-
tection; and (3) the wider (and more controversial) issue of the desirability
of a legally rooted common EU sports policy. 
Institutional resources
The ability of the rival advocacy coalitions to achieve policy results
consistent with their belief system depends on the extent to which they are
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institutionally well resourced. In other words, do they possess the ability to
re-direct policy? Coalitions seek to re-direct policy through the exploitation
of institutional venues – hence the need for an actor-centred brand of insti-
tutionalism. If actors are unsuccessful in one venue, a well-resourced coali-
tion will go venue shopping in another. The term institutional venue refers
not only to the formal administrative, legal and political dimensions of insti-
tutions, but also the informal arenas of political systems such as informal
rules, norms, symbols, beliefs and codes of conduct. 
The Single Market coalition is well resourced. Their belief system is strongly
rooted, both legally and culturally, within the Treaty. Legally, the logic of neg-
ative integration is underpinned by the EU’s legal system, particularly the pro-
visions relating to the four freedoms and competition policy. The ECJ and the
Commission also have a strong role in implementing and enforcing these pro-
visions. Furthermore, the principles of direct applicability, direct effect and
supremacy, combined with the preliminary reference procedure (Article 234)
and the Commission’s complaints procedure, creates a strong link between EU
law and national law. Culturally, the SEM project has established a strong
ideological commitment to guaranteeing the four freedoms. The extent to
which the Single Market coalition is institutionally powerful equips them with
the means through which they could undermine the deep and policy core belief
system of the socio-cultural coalition. For example, the ruling in Bosman
struck at the heart of the socio-cultural coalition’s belief system.
The socio-cultural advocacy coalition is a coalition of convenience. This
restricts their ability to act as a cohesive force but it does allow them to
exploit a wider range of institutional venues. In particular, the coalition has
exploited (1) the right of policy initiative within the Education and Culture
Directorate; (2) the Parliament’s legislative, scrutiny and budgetary powers;
(3) the primary and secondary law-making functions of member states; (4)
soft law including Treaty Declarations, Presidency Conclusions, political
guidelines and Commission policy papers; (5) Council Presidency agenda
setting; (6) the use of formal sports forums/sports conferences such as the
European Sports Forum and the EU Conference on Sport; (7) the strength of
positive (socio-cultural) integration post-Maastricht; and (8) related policy
subsystems such as the health, audio-visual, education and youth. The
involvement of the member states within the coalition has been significant.
This has equipped the coalition with the power of political pressure and
Treaty revision. Accordingly, the socio-cultural coalition also possesses the
ability to adopt measures which could undermine the deep and policy core
belief system of the Single Market regulators. A revision to the Treaty grant-
ing sport an exemption from EU law would undermine the uniform applica-
tion of the four freedoms and create a precedent for further claims of special
treatment by a range of commercial sectors. In circumstances where both
coalitions possess the ability to undermine the belief system of their rival,
coalition mediation is likely (see below). 
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Empirical contributions
The tension between the EU’s regulatory and political policy ambitions for
sport has driven the development of today’s EU sports policy. This policy is
not however legally rooted in the Treaty. In other words, sport is not men-
tioned in the legally binding chapters of the Treaty. As such, EU sports policy
lacks a legislative framework even though the development of one remains
a possibility for the future (see below). The defining characteristic of modern
EU sports policy is judicial not legislative. The construction of separate ter-
ritories and hence EU sports law is at the heart of the EU’s policy towards
sport. This allows both the regulatory and political policy strands of EU
sporting activity to co-exist. The above analysis, focusing on subsystem
politics, actors and institutional resources allows us to piece together the
relationship between these themes and establish a methodology for under-
standing how changes in EU sports law will affect the future direction of EU
sports policy and vice versa. 
Sport and EU law: Single Market sports regulation
Within national legal systems established general legal principles deriving
from criminal law, contract law, the law of torts, public law, administrative
law, property law, competition law, company law and fiscal law have gradu-
ally impinged upon the operation of sport. This process of juridification
appears to be closely associated with the commercialisation of sport,
although the relationship between sport and the law has a long history. Issues
such as public order and sport, drugs and sport, safety in sport, disciplinary
measures in sport, conduct in sport and wider issues relating to restraint of
trade and anti-competitive behaviour in sport are today common features
of the national legislative and judicial landscape. The internationalisation of
sporting competition and finance combined with the development of the EU
has internationalised juridification. Article 3 of the EU’s founding Treaty
specified that the activities of the Community shall include ‘an internal
market characterised by the abolition, as between member states, of the
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’ and ‘a
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted’.
Further Treaty Articles elaborated these goals, as did the passing of secondary
legislation and the case law decision making of the ECJ. Although the Treaty
did not refer to sport with the list of Community activities contained in Article
3, the consequences of sports commercialisation became felt as EU provisions
on the free movement of persons, services and competition law became
applied to sport. The ECJ rulings in Walrave, Donà, Heylens and Bosman
firmly established sports relationship to EU law whenever it was practised as
an economic activity. The cases involved the application of established legal
principles to sporting situations. As such, the rulings, based on a Single
Market model of regulation, did not create a discrete area of sports law.
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The politics of sports regulation: re-asserting socio-cultural values
The relationship between sport and EU law has been forged through the
strength of negative integration within the EU’s constitutional structure.
Observing the first decade of European integration, Pinder argued that the
‘free trade ideology is firmly built into the system, but the planning ethic is
no more than a possibility for the future’ (Pinder 1968: 98). In other words,
the socio-cultural dimension to European integration was considered a sec-
ondary goal to that of securing economic integration. As Featherstone
observes, this economic path to integration has undermined popular support
for the integration project (Featherstone 1994). The sheer existence of the
Adonnino report was a formal acknowledgment by the EU that it had
neglected the social and cultural dimensions of European integration. The
growing legitimacy crisis within the EU would, unless addressed, fundamen-
tally undermine the market-based achievements of integration. The people’s
Europe project was an attempt by the EU to address this issue by ‘recon-
necting’ with its citizens. 
The 1986 Single European Act and subsequent Single European Market
project significantly advanced economic integration and laid the foundations
for the birth of the single European currency. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty
was a turning point for the EU. The completion of the SEM and the collapse
of Communism offered the EU an opportunity to push for the launch of the
single currency. However, the legitimacy question had not been tackled,
potentially calling into question the viability of major EU projects such as
the launching of a new currency. The Treaty adopted a series of measures
designed to confront the legitimacy question. The Treaty expanded its range
of social and cultural activities by granting a new legal base for culture, edu-
cation, public health and consumer protection. Existing policies with a social
expression such as environmental and cohesion policy were strengthened.
The concept of European citizenship was created and the powers of the
directly elected Parliament were increased. The name of the organisation
also changed – from European Community to European Union. The name
change reflected a shift in emphasis away from a Community established on
economic foundations to a Union underpinned by social values. In short,
Maastricht represented an attempt to change the cultural context of integra-
tion. 
The Maastricht ratification crisis demonstrated the extent to which the
EU’s attempt to connect with its citizens had failed. The 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty again re-visited the socio-cultural context of integration. However,
wracked with division over the extent to which the EU needed reforming in
preparation for enlargement, the EU adopted a cautious approach.
Provisions on openness, employment, the image of EU, respect for human
rights, the simplification of the Treaty, bringing the EU closer to the people,
sex equality, environmental protection and anti-discrimination measures
were agreed. The Declaration on Sport was also annexed to the Treaty. More
206 Sports law and policy in the European Union
concrete decisions on institutional reform were delayed until the 2000 Nice
Treaty. 
Treaty revisions have altered the cultural context of integration. The list
of activities contained within Article 3 now extends beyond the scope of neg-
ative integration. The Treaty also contains a commitment to promote posi-
tive integration. In this connection, Article 3 includes activities of a more
social and cultural nature, even though sport is not explicitly mentioned. The
relationship between sport and the EU has been affected by the forces of neg-
ative and positive integration – the twin engines of European integration.
The imbalance in favour of negative integration contributed to the emer-
gence of a specific sports policy subsystem within the EU. In particular, the
formation of the socio-cultural coalition with specific political sports policy
objectives linked to the Adonnino agenda has greatly influenced the nature
of EU involvement in sport. Since Bosman members of the socio-cultural
advocacy coalition have used a variety of legal, semi-legal and non-legal
measures to challenge the essentially economic and market-based definition
of sport adopted by the Single Market coalition. By co-opting institutionally
powerful members (such as the member states) into the socio-cultural coali-
tion, it has been able to exploit a growing range of institutional venues in
order to seek re-definition. In circumstances where two advocacy coalitions
operating within the subsystem are both institutionally privileged, mediation
is likely. The result of this mediation has seen the birth of a discrete area of
sports law operating within the context of a more holistic EU sports policy. 
EU sports law and policy
The Bosman ruling was a turning point for sport. It led to the creation of the
sports policy subsystem. Actors unhappy at the economic Single Market
approach the ECJ adopted in relation to sport, co-ordinated their activity to
seek greater protection for sport from the application of EU law. As each
coalition possessed the ability to undermine each other other’s deep and
policy core belief systems, coalition mediation took place. Past experience,
perceptions of future losses and the cultural norm within the EU of mutual
adjustment facilitated mediation. In other words, the unsatisfactory prospect
of potential coalition confrontation led to a learning process taking place
within the subsystem. The Education and Culture Directorate emerged as a
key venue through which mediation between the two advocacy coalitions
has occurred. In 1999, the Commission organised the first EU Conference
on Sport to complement the annual European Sports Forum. The
Directorate has also been active in elaborating the general policy of the
member states in the form of policy papers. The Helsinki report on Sport
represents the Commission’s current position and the birth of a de facto if
not de jure EU sports policy. From within the mediation and learning process
has emerged compromise between the coalitions. The goal of mediation was
to find grounds for compromise without undermining the deep and policy
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core beliefs of both coalitions. As such, compromise has taken place within
the secondary aspects of the coalitions belief systems. Coalition compromise
has resulted in the following developments. 
First, coalition compromise has resulted in the birth of a more co-
ordinated EU sports policy located within secondary aspects of both coali-
tions belief systems. It is not a policy which is legislatively rooted. In other
words there is no Article or protocol on sport within the Treaty. This move
is resisted by the Single Market coalition as it would undermine their deep
and policy core beliefs. Therefore sports policy is still essentially regulatory
in nature. Although the socio-cultural aspects of sport can be harnessed to
implement other policy goals in the EU, the lack of a Treaty base for sport
inhibits the development of a redistributive strand in sports policy.
Disagreement over the merits of this development exist within the socio-
cultural coalition.
Second, the cornerstone of EU sports policy is the separate territories
concept. Separate territories refers to the creation of spheres of jurisdiction
for sports bodies and the law. One territory is sporting autonomy. Within this
territory the EU will either not intervene judicially or accept justifications for
exemptions from the application of law. The other territory is judicial inter-
vention. Within this territory, EU law will continue to be applied.
Third, the development of the separate territories approach marks the
birth of EU sports law. As Beloff et al. argue, ‘the cornerstone of what could
be called the founding principles of sports law is the definition of respective
territories of the courts and the bodies which govern sport’ (Beloff et al.
1999: 4). The construction of separate territories necessitates sport being
treated differently to other sectors, another defining characteristic of sports
law. Even though historically both the ECJ and the Commission have
acknowledged the special characteristics of sport in their case law, EU sports
law is a very recent phenomenon. 
Finally, the above developments have had practical effects on the nature
of EU sports regulation. Previously based on the Single Market model, the
separate territories approach has introduced greater socio-cultural values
into the approach. Again, this new approach to sports regulation is confined
to the secondary aspects of the coalitions belief systems. Nevertheless, by
compromising in this area both coalitions are protecting the fundamentals
of their deep and policy core beliefs. 
The above developments are the product of activity within the sports
policy subsystem – hence the need for subsystem analysis. Four strands of
EU activity illustrate how the construction of this approach has occurred. 
Bureaucratic measures The activities of the Education and Culture
Directorate have been instrumental in elaborating the policy objectives of the
member states and establishing an embryonic separate territories frame-
work. By establishing dialogue with the sports world through the organising
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of the first EU Conference on Sport in 1999 and managing the annual
meeting of the European Sports Forum, the Commission has been able to
prepare the Helsinki report on Sport for the member states. The paper
argued that ‘sport must be able to assimilate the new commercial framework
in which it must develop, without at the same time losing its identity and
autonomy, which underpin the functions it performs in the social, cultural,
health and educational areas’.2 The concept of separate territories has there-
fore received Commission approval. 
Legislative measures Separate territories has also received legislative and
quasi-legislative attention. The Parliament’s revision of the Television
Without Frontiers Directive represents the most formal attempt to have
sport treated differently to other sectors. By permitting the establishment of
protected national lists, the Directive has granted sport an exception from
the general principle of free movement of services in trans-frontier broad-
casting.3 Member state activity in the legislative field has been confined to
soft law. The Declaration on Sport annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty and
subsequent soft law measures culminating in the Nice Declaration on Sport
demonstrate the member state’s desire to see the separate territories concept
more widely employed. The Nice Declaration argued that ‘even though not
having any direct powers in this area, the Community must, in its action
under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational
and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in order that
the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of its social
role may be respected and nurtured’. The Declaration represents the clear-
est indication yet from the member states that the rules of sport bodies which
are designed to maintain a competitive balance between participants should
be treated differently by EU law to similar restrictions in other sectors. Until
the member states have had time to observe the impact of the separate terri-
tories approach, they have shied away from adopting harder measures. 
ECJ jurisprudence The ECJ’s involvement in the construction of the sep-
arate territories concept is potentially most significant. The ECJ has in pre-
vious sports related case law acknowledged the social significance of sport.
For instance in Bosman the ECJ argued that ‘in view of the considerable
social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the
Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving
a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging
the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legiti-
mate’.4 Nevertheless, the rulings in Deliège and Lehtonen mark a more sub-
stantial application of the view expressed in Bosman. In Bosman, the ECJ
defined the operation of the international transfer system for football and
the use of nationality quotas in sport as falling within the EU judicial terri-
tory. In Deliège and Lehtonen the ECJ has identified selection criteria and
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transfer windows as falling within the territory of sporting autonomy. In
essence Deliège and Lehtonen establish that the rules which sports bodies
retain competence over concern those which are inherent in the conduct
and/or organisation of sporting events. Despite the limitations to the rulings
examined in Chapter 4, they do open up the possibility for sports bodies to
connect sporting interest arguments with public interest justifications. This
was the conclusion of the Advocate General in Lehtonen. If sports bodies
can be successful in this connection, this could act as a vehicle for the expan-
sion of the sporting autonomy territory and the contraction of the judicial
intervention territory. 
Commission quasi-jurisprudence The concept of separate territories is
also beginning to establish itself in the field of competition law. The February
1999 paper on the application of competition rules to sport was the
Commission’s first significant exploration of the separate territories
approach.5 The paper has informed subsequent Commission analyses of
alleged restrictive practices in sport. A review of the case law within sports
exploitation, contest and supply markets illustrates the development of the
separate territories approach within competition law. The exploitation
market concerns the collective sale of sports rights, exclusive contracts, the
purchase of sports rights, the transmission of the rights, ticketing practices
and merchandising arrangements. The Commission’s general approach to
the exploitation market has been two-fold. First, it has generally held that
sports rules are covered by the scope of Article 81 and 82. Second, it has
however been willing to recognise the specificity of sport by informally clear-
ing or formally exempting such rules. The contest market refers to the organ-
isation of the sporting contest. The Commission has been sympathetic to
rules which seek to maintain the single structure model of sport and rules
restricting multiple club ownership and club relocation. In the Formula One
case the Commission separated the FIA’s regulatory and commercial func-
tions. Commission investigations into sport’s supply market have essentially
concentrated on the operation of the international transfer system for foot-
ball. The Commission initially made it clear that it was not prepared to
accept alternatives to the transfer system that compromised EU law.
However, the March 2001 settlement on transfers reflects a more sympa-
thetic approach to sport. The Commission has accepted the argument that
restrictions on player mobility and restrictions on the ability of clubs to
employ players without obstruction can be justified in terms of maintaining
a competitive balance between participants. The Commission has therefore
acknowledged the specificity of sport within the context of EU competition
law and further defined the separate territories concept. 
Taken as a whole, the body of ‘hard’ sports law reviewed above does not
amount to a great deal – hence the need to refer to the ‘birth’ of EU sports
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law and policy. Nevertheless, a system of law governing the practice of sport
is emerging in the EU of which the use of soft law is a particular feature.
Within the context of mediation between coalitions, the use of soft law
allows both coalitions to protect their deep and policy core belief systems.
For the Single Market coalition, soft law does not legally challenge
entrenched Treaty principles. Harder measures such as the use of Treaty
exemptions for sport runs the risk of undermining the fundamentals of their
belief system. For the socio-cultural coalition, soft law, although less satis-
factory, allows for the construction of the separate territories approach
which, if defined favourably, can safeguard sports autonomy. Of course, the
use of soft law by the EU is not without its critics (Kinsella and Daly 2001). 
The future of EU sports law and policy
Current EU sports policy based on the separate territories concept is there-
fore located within the secondary aspects of the coalitions belief systems. Is
this reconciliation between coalitions and hence current EU sports policy
sustainable? Might EU sports policy break out of the confines of the medi-
ated approach? The answer lies not only in the extent to which the separate
territories approach has satisfied and will continue to satisfy the objectives
of both coalitions but also the feasibility of the coalitions exploiting further
institutional venues in order to affect further policy change. The separate ter-
ritories approach allows the socio-cultural coalition to claim some special
status for sport within the Treaty framework without compromising the line
of reasoning developed by the Single Market coalition in relation to the eco-
nomic status of the sector. As such, the separate territories approach has the
potential to satisfy the objectives of both coalitions. However, whilst the
current approach offers a degree of short-term stability, is more strategic
thinking required?
First, due to the predominance of soft law, the separate territories
approach is not fully enshrined in law. As such, the definition of the separ-
ate territories is fluid. This leaves the regulatory environment within which
the socio-cultural coalition operates confusing and prone to legal challenge.
Even if the Commission employs the exemption criteria more widely to the
sports sector, the ECJ still remains a venue for litigation. Competition law
exemptions will still need to satisfy the requirements of Article 39. The sep-
arate territories approach is therefore legally fragile and susceptible to being
undermined. This may encourage members of the socio-cultural coalition to
venue shop for a hardening of the separate territories approach. In this con-
nection tactical differences within their secondary aspects of their belief
system may yet hamper them (see below). 
Second, does the case-by-case approach satisfy the Single Market coali-
tion’s (in particular the Commission’s) desire to reduce the number of sports-
related cases coming before them? Only by providing clear guidelines on
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exemptions can the Commission hope to avoid the resource sapping case-
load that has burdened it throughout the late 1990s.
The future of sports law and policy is likely to be influenced by develop-
ments external and internal to the EU. Externally, a change in the economic
status of sport will affect the policy debate. Just as Bosman was influenced
by (and indeed promoted) the commercialisation of sport, a downturn in the
economic wealth of sport could strengthen public interest and solidarity
arguments for the expansion of the sports autonomy territory. However, the
post-ITV Digital financial crisis within the English Football League does not
seem to have advanced these arguments. The case for a Division One break-
away is increasingly being made which, if successful, would undermine the
concept of solidarity between all members of the Football League.
Within the context of the EU, the forthcoming 2004 intergovernmental
conference offers the socio-cultural coalition a possible venue for harder
measures to be entrenched within a new Treaty. The year 2004 is likely to be
influenced by the staging of major sporting events in Europe. The Olympic
Games are to be held in Greece and the football European Championships
will also be staged. Furthermore, 2004 is due to be declared European Year
of Education Through Sport, thus giving sport a high profile during the IGC
discussions.6 Following the Year of Education through Sport initiative, the
Commission intends to prepare a proposal implementing a December 1999
Council resolution on education and sport.7 In previous reports, the EU has
identified the excessive commercialisation of sport as an actual and poten-
tial threat to sports social, cultural and educational values.8 The socio-
cultural coalition therefore has a strong case in arguing that current sporting
rules which are designed to maintain a competitive balance within the sector
but which prima facie contravene EU law require a greater level of protec-
tion than that offered by the current approach. In this connection, the sep-
arate territories approach could develop in a number of directions.
The option closely related to the status quo is for the Commission to make
greater use of the individual exemption procedure outlined in Article 81(3).
The current soft law approach could harden with the adoption of formal
decisions to close cases. Failing that, guidance in the form of notices could
provide further guidelines to sport. For the Commission, this approach
would help reduce its sports-related caseload whilst also lessening the threat
of the member states adopting harder Treaty measures – an option tradition-
ally resisted by the Commission. For the socio-cultural coalition, the use of
individual exemptions offers the potential for sport to incrementally gain a
partial exemption from EU law through the expansion of the sporting auton-
omy territory.
The second option would be for the member states to use soft law to place
added pressure on the ECJ and the Commission to extend the sporting
autonomy territory within the separate territories approach. In particular,
the member states could strengthen the Amsterdam Declaration through the
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use of Presidency Conclusions at the end of European Council summits or
through a new Declaration annexed to a revised Treaty. As with the first
option, this relatively uncontroversial move is likely to be favoured as it not
only offers the socio-cultural coalition the most realistic prospect of progress
but it also allows the Single Market coalition scope to compromise with
socio-cultural actors without undermining the fundamental principles on
which the Single European Market is based.
A third option would be for the Commission to issue a block exemption
Regulation for sport which would exempt particular sporting practices from
the application of Article 81. For such a move to be effective sufficient case
law experience must first be gained and a wide consultation process estab-
lished. As this is a very lengthy process, the establishment of such a
Regulation is therefore a longer-term possibility. For some ‘moderate’ socio-
cultural actors (particularly the sports governing bodies) this option is
favoured as it offers sport’s specific characteristics legal protection from the
application of competition law. It is however an option unlikely to be sanc-
tioned by the Competition Policy Directorate. Previously the Commission
has argued that such an exemption is ‘unnecessary, undesirable and unjusti-
fied’ (Schaub 1998). Furthermore, wide consensus on the need for block
exemptions is preferred by the Commission. Such consensus is absent.
However, precedents for block exemptions do exist and potentially such
exemptions, if carefully conceived, can reduce the number of individual
exemption requests. The under-resourced Commission would welcome any
significant reduction. The longer-term prospect of a block exemption for
sport should therefore not be discounted. As EU sports law develops, so a
line of reasoning on sport will emerge which could potentially persuade the
Commission to explore the feasibility of an exemption. 
Fourth, the member states could attach a protocol on sport to the Treaty.
The EU has adopted such protocols to: (1) address specific member state con-
cerns (as with the social protocol); (2) to provide exemptions to Treaty prin-
ciples (as with the Danish Second Homes protocol); or (3) to limit the effects
of a Court ruling (as with the Barber protocol). Clearly, all three instances
pose problems. In the first instance a precedent for a more flexible a la carte
Europe is set. In the second instance, a precedent is set for allowing a range
of industries to claim ‘special status’. In the third, a potentially undemocratic
precedent is established whereby member states interfere in Court rulings.
The protocol approach is supported by the moderates within the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition and has gathered some support within member
state capitals. A joint FIFA/UEFA task force examined the protocol propo-
sal. UEFA Chief Executive, Gerhard Aigner explained, ‘we are not seeking
to change EU law by having the Bosman ruling repealed but what we do
want is a sporting protocol to the European Treaty which would allow the
EU to apply certain exemptions in sport’.9 UEFA’s support for a sports proto-
col was further elaborated in their brochure, ‘A Vision for European Sport:
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The Case for a Sports Protocol’ (Blackshaw 2002). UEFA sees a protocol as
a method of legally rooting the expansion of the sporting autonomy terri-
tory whilst maintaining distance from the Treaty. An Article for Sport would
entail much greater supranational involvement in sport. However, the proto-
col option is not favoured by the Single Market coalition. The Commission
is concerned that such a move would undermine the legal foundations of the
Single Market. It is uncertain whether the member states could muster the
required unanimous support for such a move. 
Fifth, sport could be added to the list of EU activities outlined in Article
3 of the Treaty. Article 308 of the Treaty states that, ‘if action by the
Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation
of the market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has
not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament, take the appropriate measures’. Combining Article 3 with this
‘catch-all’ Article would permit action by the EU in sports matters if it was
felt appropriate for the attainment of one of the objectives of the Treaty. 
The sixth option involves the member states placing limits on the freedom
of movement for workers (sportsmen and women) by amending Articles 39,
43 and 49. In addition, partial or full exemptions from the Treaty’s
Competition Policy provisions could be established by amending Articles 81
and 82. Both options are resisted by the Single Market coalition as they
would undermine their deep and policy core beliefs. Furthermore, the many
socio-cultural actors, including the Parliament, are reluctant to restrict the
free movement of sports men and women. The rights afforded to EU citizens
are seen as universal rights. The chances of success are therefore limited. 
The seventh option involves including sport within the remit of Cultural
policy (Article 151). The assumption underlying this approach is that sport
can be equated with culture, even though this analogy was rejected by the
ECJ in Bosman.10 Furthermore, sport could be incorporated within Article
149 on Education, Vocational Training and Youth. Whilst this option has
some maximalist support, it fails to address the sports specific concerns of
the socio-cultural coalition. The cultural option is traditionally supported by
the Parliament. 
A related eighth option would be for the member states to create a new
protective Article for Sport in a revised Treaty. Not all members of the socio-
cultural coalition agree on this option. The maximalists favour the develop-
ment of a common sports policy through the establishment of a legal base
for sport (although see option seven). An Article for sport would not only
shape and stabilise the legal environment in which sport operates, it would
also provide a legal base for the development of sports funding programmes.
These programmes could assist in the implementation of maximalist policy
goals whilst providing sports bodies with an alternative source of income.
The moderates do not support the development of a common sports policy
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but do wish to see the legal environment clarified through the adoption of a
Treaty protocol on sport which would place a legal obligation on the EU to
recognise the specificity of sport within its legal framework. Finally, the mini-
malists (particularly the Governments of Britain, Sweden and Denmark) do
not see a greater role for the EU in sport as Treaty incorporation for sport
would contradict the EU’s claims of subsidiarity. Sufficient flexibility exists
within the EU’s legal framework for the EU to recognise the specificity of
sport. As options seven and eight require Treaty revision, they require the
unanimous support of the member states. This is a significant hurdle.
A ninth option lies within the wording of Article 86(2) of the Treaty.
Article 86(2) potentially allows for an exemption from Treaty principles if
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly can dem-
onstrate that the application of the competition rules would obstruct the per-
formance of tasks assigned to it. The prospects of such a move are however
remote. Member states would have to take legal steps to create these
entrusted sporting undertakings, as undertakings created by private initia-
tive would be excluded. It is not only unlikely that member states would be
willing to take such a step, it is also unlikely that sports organisations would
see this move as desirable. 
Finally, parallels can be drawn with the experience of sports treatment
under US law. The debate concerning the application of competition rules to
sport has also taken place in the USA. In the USA, two arguments have been
advanced to support sports claim for an exemption from competition law.
The rule of reason approach ‘is based on the assumption that the efficiency
promoting effects of certain agreements (amateur, junior sport, solidarity,
competitive balance) are more important than the possible competitive dis-
torting effects of the restrictions that arise from the agreement or behav-
iour’.11 The rule of reason approach does not sit comfortably with EU
competition law as the Commission can achieve the balance between pro-
and anti-competitive rules through the exemption criteria. The second argu-
ment concerns the so-called single entity theory. This theory rests on the
assumption that sport is a single economic entity. This means that anti-
competitive measures may be tolerated within the sector. In the USA the US
soccer federation has succeeded with this classification (Gray 2000: 281,
Cairns 2002: 74). The Danish Co-operatives case provides a European par-
allel of sorts. Here an agricultural co-operative was permitted to prohibit
their members from participating in alternative agricultural co-operatives as
the restriction benefited competition. The logic of the single entity has not,
as yet, been transferred to sport. In the view of Egger and Stix-Hackl,
‘although sporting contests cannot be carried out by one club alone, but only
by several clubs, nevertheless there is no ‘single entity’. This particularity of
football sport does not change the fact the individual clubs are undertakings.
That the clubs are not to be regarded as a unit is shown precisely by their
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behaviour in connection with transfers of players, where the different inter-
ests of the individual clubs are especially clearly visible. It follows from the
independence of the clubs that there is thus no question of ‘internal’ compe-
tition within a group of undertakings’ (Egger and Stix-Hackl 2002: 86). 
Conclusions
The application of the actor-centred institutional methodology employed
throughout this text allows the researcher to judge with greater, although not
total, certainty the future direction in which EU sports law and policy will
develop. The methodology has asserted the need for subsystem analysis. By
identifying actors and their belief systems and the institutional resources
available to them, the researcher can better understand coalition strategy
and the chances of strategic success. The Single Market coalition and the
socio-cultural coalition are relatively evenly matched in terms of institu-
tional resources. The socio-cultural coalition is however hampered by the
diversity of opinion within the coalition. Nevertheless, both coalitions
possess the institutional resources to undermine each other’s deep and policy
core belief systems. 
Deeply embedded within the EU is the institutional norm of mediation.
As a diverse multi-competence, multi-national and multi-level organisation,
the EU has developed channels for mediation. However, unlike as is com-
monly portrayed in the media, the EU is not simply a venue in which all
beliefs are sacrificed. The methodology employed in this text indicates the
extent to which the coalitions will compromise. It has been claimed that the
coalitions will seek to protect their deep and policy core beliefs above any-
thing else. To fundamentally compromise these beliefs would be to call in
question their reason for existing. Nevertheless, some under-resourced coali-
tions may be faced with having to accept compromise in their deep and
policy core belief system. In the case of the sports policy subsystem, both
coalitions are well resourced. As such, it is to the secondary aspects of their
belief systems that the analysis must turn. The future direction of policy is
likely to be confined to this field. 
In the case of sport, the mediation resulted in the construction of the sep-
arate territories approach, an essential characteristic of EU sports policy. In
order to protect their deep and policy core beliefs, both coalitions accepted
the tactic of defining a territory of sporting autonomy and a territory of legal
intervention. This distinct legal approach to sport marks the birth of EU
sports law. The separate territories approach is quite a simple concept. The
rules of sport are either sporting in nature and as such are not in breach of
EU law (either falling outside the scope of EU law or are able to be justified
and as such exempted from it) or they are commercial in nature and could
potentially fall foul of EU law. However, as the book has already discussed,
the precise definition of what constitutes sporting rules and commercial rules
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is problematic. Nevertheless, the future of EU sports law will be concerned
with exactly this definitional issue. Where will the boundaries of the separ-
ate territories lie?
The ten policy options outlined above tend to stress strategies to expand
the sporting autonomy territory. However, as has been demonstrated above,
the socio-cultural coalition is a coalition of convenience. It lacks a cohesive
approach to sport. Whilst the diversity of the coalition allows for the greater
potential for venue exploitation, it also poses practical problems of co-
ordinated action. The lack of consensus over Treaty incorporation for sport
illustrates such divisions. It is therefore possible that the separate territories
approach can be undermined through the contraction of the sporting auton-
omy territory and the expansion of the territory for judicial intervention.
However, in the short to medium term, the sporting autonomy territory is
unlikely to contract. By accepting the principle of separate territories, the
Single Market coalition has in effect sanctioned the modest expansion of the
sporting autonomy territory. 
As changes in EU sports law are likely to be confined to the secondary
aspects of the coalitions belief systems, only options one and two are likely
to be pursued in the short to medium term. The Commission is therefore
likely to continue to make use of the negative clearance and individual
exemption criteria outlined in Articles 81 and 82. This allows the
Commission to respond to socio-cultural pressure for an acknowledgement
of sports special characteristics whilst not undermining the concept of free
competition in the Single Market. Such case law will allow for greater clarity
over the definition of the separate territories, although the likely continued
use of soft law may undermine this. The member states are also likely to
confirm their desire to see the sporting autonomy territory expanded. Again,
soft law in the form of Presidency Conclusions or Treaty Declarations is
likely to be the preferred option. Such an approach does not fundamentally
challenge the deep and policy core beliefs of the Single Market coalition and
it avoids the problematic question of how to secure consensus within the
socio-cultural coalition over the relationship between sport and the Treaty.
Member state soft law is also likely to guide the jurisprudence of the ECJ
without the need to take Treaty bound measures. The ECJ’s role is crucial to
the development of EU sports law. Recent ECJ case law has contributed to
the separate territories approach by making a distinction between sports
rules which are inherent to the game and rules which are of a commercial
nature. With further political pressure, the ‘sporting’ justification argument
may develop into a ‘public interest’ justification. Finally, soft law could be
used as justification for sport to be integrated into a range of other EU activ-
ities as a way of safeguarding the special characteristics of sport and promot-
ing wider socio-cultural policy goals. The Commission has identified doping
and youth activities as two such areas in which sport plays a significant role
(see below).12 By recognising the social, cultural, educational and health
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qualities of sport, the EU can implement sports policy goals in these neigh-
bouring subsystems. This can be achieved without the problematic option of
developing a fully fledged common sports policy. 
The tactic of dispersing sports policy within neighbouring subsystems is
however problematic. As illustrated above (and below), maximalist
members of the socio-cultural coalition argue that a sports policy unattached
to the Treaty leaves the legal environment uncertain. In addition, it does not
grant sport a specific budgetary line. Any extension of the EU’s involvement
in sports policy must therefore be carefully conceived. In UK v. Commission,
the ECJ held that each budget item must have a legal base.13 This ruling
resulted in the Commission abandoning its sports-related Eurathlon pro-
gramme. Subsequent developments in sports policy requiring a budgetary
line have had to navigate within the EU’s rigorous budgetary rules. On these
grounds, the Commission’s 2002 call for proposals concerning the develop-
ment of a Community policy in the field of sport appears legally fragile.14
However, it relates to preparatory measures falling within the meaning of the
Interinstitutional Agreement on legal bases and the implementation of the
budget.15 This agreement stipulates that any budgetary initiative must be
supported by a ‘basic act’ of secondary legislation. As sport is not legally
rooted in the Treaty, the EU has not passed sports specific legislation and as
such the basic act requirement has not been fulfilled. The soft law initiatives
which have characterised much of the development of EU sports policy are
not considered ‘basic acts’. However, appropriations relating to preparatory
measures intended to prepare proposals with a view to the adoption of future
Community actions are permitted subject to certain limitations. These pre-
paratory measures must still however fall within the competence of the EU.16
The Commission has interpreted this as justification for their call for prepar-
atory measures concerning how sport relates to doping and youth activities.
Should this activity fail to gain a legal base within three years, the funding
would however have to cease. The budgetary ‘rules of the game’ therefore
place further limits on the future scope of EU sports policy. Nevertheless, the
extent to which the EU has acquired a greater socio-cultural expression in
its policy remit since Maastricht means that sport now sits more comfort-
ably within the EU’s policy architecture. 
Effectively, an expanded separate territories approach affords sports
organising bodies considerable influence over the sport which they organise.
Previously this power has not been exercised wisely – hence the juridifica-
tion of sport. As Weatherill observes, it has been the choices made by sport
that has driven juridification, not the EU (Weatherill 2000b). The Helsinki
report on sport has already made a plea for reform at the level of the sports
organisations. In particular, the report suggested that sporting federations
should more clearly define their ‘missions and statutes’ in order to demon-
strate that they themselves have taken measures to protect and nurture those
special characteristics of sport that they are asking the EU to protect. Sports
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bodies need to address a number of issues. First, the rights of players need
greater protection within the constitutions of sports bodies. This also refers
to their ability to appeal the decisions of sports bodies. Not all sportsmen
and women conform to the multi-millionaire stereotype. Without such pro-
tection, the EU will continue to be regarded as a venue for legal redress.
Second, sports bodies need to demonstrate a greater commitment to solidar-
ity in sport. By doing so, sport can rely more satisfactorily on the sporting
justifications argument when issues of a commercial nature are being exam-
ined. Finally, the interests of fans should be safeguarded. Although sports
bodies have an obligation to maximise the commercial potential of sport, the
extent of permitted commercialisation should be proportionate to the
requirements of the solidarity function of the sports bodies. As Foster argues,
‘without these minimum conditions for limited autonomy, sports federations
should expect further legal regulation to ensure that sport as a business is
still run partly for the love of the game and not just for the love of money’
(Foster 2000a: 64). Above all, sport should finally recognise that the EU is
remarkably receptive to claims of special treatment. Working within the
sports policy subsystem has allowed sports governing bodies to make these
claims more coherently. It has also alerted sport to what is and what is not
possible. Subsystem analysis demonstrates that currently the mediated
approach taking place within the secondary aspects of both coalition’s belief
systems offers sport the best venue for protecting sports rules. This accep-
tance requires sport to abandon the rather feeble ‘we know best’ claim. It
requires a psychological jump on the part of both sport and the EU institu-
tions to acknowledge that increasingly the ECJ and the Commission are
emerging as a supranational sports regulator – not in the sense of establish-
ing a legislative framework for sport but as a clearing-house for sports rules.
It is arguable that the EU’s role as a sports regulator extends beyond even
that of a clearing-house for sports rules. Although the Helsinki report’s
‘model of sport’ cannot be imposed on sport, measures adopted by sport
which undermine its principles are unlikely to be cleared by the EU.
Although all parties reject the desirability of a supranational sports regula-
tor, it is surely difficult to argue that current EU sports policy is not based on
this reality. 
The trend towards supranational sports regulation may in future be com-
plicated by the Commission’s proposal to amend the procedures for apply-
ing competition law.17 This will undoubtedly affect the future definition of
the separate territories. The proposal to devolve the exemption system out-
lined in Article 81(3) to national courts and national competition authorities
will draw into the sports policy subsystem many more actors. Although the
current separate territories landscape will inform their judgements, the lack
of hard law within the subsystem and the lingering shadow of Bosman casts
doubt on the longer-term viability of separate territories in its current form.
Although private enforcement of competition law is not new, the wider
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involvement of national authorities could result in increased venue shopping
from litigants. Any contraction in the territory of sports autonomy as a result
of the involvement of national regulatory authorities is likely to lead to
further venue shopping by the socio-cultural coalition as well. As further
subsystem activity remains a possibility for the future, the construction of
the separate territories approach may not therefore establish a settled legal
environment for sport. Law will undoubtedly play a prominent feature
within the sports policy subsystem in the future. However, as Weatherill con-
cludes these issues should not mask the central question which involves ‘the
short sightedness of (some) clubs in pursuing commercialisation without
adequate respect for the nature and purpose of sport in society’ (Weatherill
2000b). Although sport has so often been portrayed as a victim of European
integration, it has been sports own actions (or lack of them) which has driven
the internationalisation of sports law.
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Appendix 1: The Bosman ruling
Judgment of the Court of 15 December 1995. 
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, Royal club Liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman.
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Cour d’Appel de Liège – Belgium. Freedom of
movement for workers – Competition rules applicable to undertakings – Professional
footballers – Sporting rules on the transfer of players requiring the new club to pay
a fee to the old club – Limitation of the number of players having the nationality of
other Member States who may be fielded in a match. 
Case C-415/93.
European Court reports 1995, page I-4921.
Judgment
(1) By judgment of 1 October 1993, received at the Court on 6 October 1993,
the Cour d’Appel (Appeal Court), Liège, referred to the Court for a preliminary
ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty a set of questions on the interpretation of
Articles 48, 85 and 86 of that Treaty. 
(2) Those questions were raised in various proceedings between (i) Union
Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL (‘URBSFA’) and Mr Bosman,
(ii) Royal Club Liégois SA (‘RC Liège’) and Mr Bosman, SA d’Économie Mixte
Sportive de l’Union Sportive du Littoral de Dunkerque (‘US Dunkerque’), URBSFA
and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) (‘UEFA’) and, (iii)
UEFA and Mr Bosman. 
The rules governing the organization of football
(3) Association football, commonly known as ‘football’, professional or
amateur, is practised as an organized sport in clubs which belong to national associ-
ations or federations in each of the Member States. Only in the United Kingdom are
there more than one (in fact, four) national associations, for England, Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. URBSFA is the Belgian national associ-
ation. Also dependent on the national associations are other secondary or subsidiary
associations responsible for organizing football in certain sectors or regions. The
associations hold national championships, organized in divisions depending on the
sporting status of the participating clubs.
(4) The national associations are members of the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (‘FIFA’), an association governed by Swiss law, which organizes
football at world level. FIFA is divided into confederations for each continent, whose
regulations require its approval. The confederation for Europe is UEFA, also an asso-
ciation governed by Swiss law. Its members are the national associations of some 50
countries, including in particular those of the Member States which, under the UEFA
Statutes, have undertaken to comply with those Statutes and with the regulations and
decisions of UEFA. 
(5) Each football match organized under the auspices of a national association
must be played between two clubs which are members of that association or of sec-
ondary or subsidiary associations affiliated to it. The team fielded by each club con-
sists of players who are registered by the national association to play for that club.
Every professional player must be registered as such with his national association and
is entered as the present or former employee of a specific club. 
Transfer rules 
(6) The 1983 URBSFA federal rules, applicable at the time of the events giving
rise to the different actions in the main proceedings, distinguish between three types
of relationship: affiliation of a player to the federation, affiliation to a club, and reg-
istration of entitlement to play for a club, which is necessary for a player to be able
to participate in official competitions. A transfer is defined as the transaction by
which a player affiliated to an association obtains a change of club affiliation. If the
transfer is temporary, the player continues to be affiliated to his club but is registered
as entitled to play for another club. 
(7) Under the same rules, all professional players’ contracts, which have a term
of between one and five years, run to 30 June. Before the expiry of the contract, and
by 26 April at the latest, the club must offer the player a new contract, failing which
he is considered to be an amateur for transfer purposes and thereby falls under a dif-
ferent section of the rules. The player is free to accept or refuse that offer.
(8) If he refuses, he is placed on a list of players available, between 1 and 31
May, for ‘compulsory’ transfer, without the agreement of the club of affiliation but
subject to payment to that club by the new club of a compensation fee for ‘training’,
calculated by multiplying the player’s gross annual income by a factor varying from
14 to 2 depending on the player’s age. 
(9) 1 June marks the opening of the period for ‘free’ transfers, with the agree-
ment of both clubs and the player, in particular as to the amount of the transfer fee
which the new club must pay to the old club, subject to penalties which may include
striking off the new club for debt. 
(10) If no transfer takes place, the player’s club of affiliation must offer him a
new contract for one season on the same terms as that offered prior to 26 April. If
the player refuses, the club has a period until 1 August in which it may suspend him,
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failing which he is reclassified as an amateur. A player who persistently refuses to sign
the contracts offered by his club may obtain a transfer as an amateur, without his
club’s agreement, after not playing for two seasons. 
(11) The UEFA and FIFA regulations are not directly applicable to players but
are included in the rules of the national associations, which alone have the power to
enforce them and to regulate relations between clubs and players. 
(12) UEFA, URBSFA and RC Liège stated before the national court that the pro-
visions applicable at the material time to transfers between clubs in different Member
States or clubs belonging to different national associations within the same Member
State were contained in a document entitled Principles of Cooperation between
Member Associations of UEFA and their Clubs , approved by the UEFA Executive
Committee on 24 May 1990 and in force from 1 July 1990. 
(13) That document provides that at the expiry of the contract the player is free
to enter into a new contract with the club of his choice. That club must immediately
notify the old club which in turn is to notify the national association, which must
issue an international clearance certificate. However, the former club is entitled to
receive from the new club compensation for training and development, to be fixed,
failing agreement, by a board of experts set up within UEFA using a scale of multi-
plying factors, from 12 to 1 depending on the player’s age, to be applied to the
player’s gross income, up to a maximum of SFR 5 000 000.
(14) The document stipulates that the business relationships between the two
clubs in respect of the compensation fee for training and development are to exert no
influence on the activity of the player, who is to be free to play for his new club.
However, if the new club does not immediately pay the fee to the old club, the UEFA
Control and Disciplinary Committee is to deal with the matter and notify its decision
to the national association concerned, which may also impose penalties on the debtor
club.
(15) The national court considers that in the case with which the main proceed-
ings are concerned URBSFA and RC Liège applied not the UEFA but the FIFA regu-
lations. 
(16) At the material time, the FIFA regulations provided in particular that a pro-
fessional player could not leave the national association to which he was affiliated so
long as he was bound by his contract and by the rules of his club and his national
association, no matter how harsh their terms might be. An international transfer
could not take place unless the former national association issued a transfer certifi-
cate acknowledging that all financial commitments, including any transfer fee, had
been settled. 
(17) After the events which gave rise to the main proceedings, UEFA opened
negotiations with the Commission of the European Communities. In April 1991, it
undertook in particular to incorporate in every professional player’s contract a clause
permitting him, at the expiry of the contract, to enter into a new contract with
the club of his choice and to play for that club immediately. Provisions to that
effect were incorporated in the Principles of Cooperation between Member
Associations of UEFA and their Clubs adopted in December 1991 and in force from
1 July 1992. 
(18) In April 1991, FIFA adopted new Regulations governing the Status and
Transfer of Football Players. That document, as amended in December 1991 and
December 1993, provides that a player may enter into a contract with a new club
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where the contract between him and his club has expired, has been rescinded or is to
expire within six months.
(19) Special rules are laid down for ‘non-amateur’ players, defined as players
who have received, in respect of participation in or an activity connected with foot-
ball, remuneration in excess of the actual expenses incurred in the course of such par-
ticipation, unless they have reacquired amateur status. 
(20) Where a non-amateur player, or a player who assumes non-amateur status
within three years of his transfer, is transferred, his former club is entitled to a com-
pensation fee for development or training, the amount of which is to be agreed upon
between the two clubs. In the event of disagreement, the dispute is to be submitted
to FIFA or the relevant confederation.
(21) Those rules have been supplemented by UEFA regulations ‘governing the
fixing of a transfer fee’, adopted in June 1993 and in force since 1 August 1993,
which replace the 1991 ‘Principles of Cooperation between Member Associations of
UEFA and their Clubs’. The new rules retain the principle that the business relation-
ship between the two clubs are to exert no influence on the sporting activity of the
player, who is to be free to play for the club with which he has signed the new con-
tract. In the event of disagreement between the clubs concerned, it is for the appro-
priate UEFA board of experts to determine the amount of the compensation fee for
training or development. For non-amateur players, the calculation of the fee is based
on the player’s gross income in the last 12 months or on the fixed annual income guar-
anteed in the new contract, increased by 20% for players who have played at least
twice in the senior national representative team for their country and multiplied by
a factor of between 12 and 0 depending on age.
(22) It appears from documents produced to the Court by UEFA that rules in
force in other Member States also contain provisions requiring the new club, when
a player is transferred between two clubs within the same national association, to pay
the former club, on terms laid down in the rules in question, a compensation fee for
transfer, training or development.
(23) In Spain and France, payment of compensation may only be required if the
player transferred is under 25 years of age or if his former club is the one with which
he signed his first professional contract, as the case may be. In Greece, although no
compensation is explicitly payable by the new club, the contract between the club
and the player may make the player’s departure dependent on the payment of an
amount which, according to UEFA, is in fact most commonly paid by the new club. 
(24) The rules applicable in that regard may derive from the national legislation,
from the regulations of the national football associations or from the terms of col-
lective agreements.
Nationality clauses 
(25) From the 1960s onwards, many national football associations introduced
rules (‘nationality clauses’) restricting the extent to which foreign players could be
recruited or fielded in a match. For the purposes of those clauses, nationality is
defined in relation to whether the player can be qualified to play in a country’s
national or representative team. 
(26) In 1978, UEFA gave an undertaking to Mr Davignon, a Member of the
Commission of the European Communities, that it would remove the limitations on
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the number of contracts entered into by each club with players from other Member
States and would set the number of such players who may participate in any one
match at two, that limit not being applicable to players established for over five years
in the Member State in question.
(27) In 1991, following further discussions with Mr Bangemann, a Vice-
President of the Commission, UEFA adopted the ‘3+2’ rule permitting each national
association to limit to three the number of foreign players whom a club may field in
any first division match in their national championships, plus two players who have
played in the country of the relevant national association for an uninterrupted period
of five years, including three years as a junior. The same limitation also applies to
UEFA matches in competitions for club teams. 
Facts of the cases before the national court 
(28) Mr Bosman, a professional footballer of Belgian nationality, was employed
from 1988 by RC Liège, a Belgian first division club, under a contract expiring on
30 June 1990, which assured him an average monthly salary of BFR 120 000, includ-
ing bonuses. 
(29) On 21 April 1990, RC Liège offered Mr Bosman a new contract for one
season, reducing his pay to BFR 30 000, the minimum permitted by the URBSFA
federal rules. Mr Bosman refused to sign and was put on the transfer list. The com-
pensation fee for training was set, in accordance with the said rules, at BFR 11 743
000. 
(30) Since no club showed an interest in a compulsory transfer, Mr Bosman
made contact with US Dunkerque, a club in the French second division, which led to
his being engaged for a monthly salary in the region of BFR 100 000 plus a signing-
on bonus of some BFR 900 000.
(31) On 27 July 1990, a contract was also concluded between RC Liège and US
Dunkerque for the temporary transfer of Mr Bosman for one year, against payment
by US Dunkerque to RC Liège of a compensation fee of BFR 1 200 000 payable on
receipt by the Fédération Française de Football (‘FFF’) of the transfer certificate
issued by URBSFA. The contract also gave US Dunkerque an irrevocable option for
full transfer of the player for BFR 4 800 000. 
(32) Both contracts, between US Dunkerque and RC Liège and between US
Dunkerque and Mr Bosman, were however subject to the suspensive condition that
the transfer certificate must be sent by URBSFA to FFF in time for the first match of
the season, which was to be held on 2 August 1990. 
(33) RC Liège, which had doubts as to US Dunkerque’s solvency, did not ask
URBSFA to send the said certificate to FFF. As a result, neither contract took effect.
On 31 July 1990, RC Liège also suspended Mr Bosman, thereby preventing him from
playing for the entire season. 
(34) On 8 August 1990, Mr Bosman brought an action against RC Liège before
the Tribunal de Première Instance (Court of First Instance), Liège. Concurrently with
that action, he applied for an interlocutory decision ordering RC Liège and URBSFA
to pay him an advance of BFR 100 000 per month until he found a new employer,
restraining the defendants from impeding his engagement, in particular by requiring
payment of a sum of money, and referring a question to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling. 
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(35) By order of 9 November 1990, the judge hearing the interlocutory appli-
cation ordered RC Liège and URBSFA to pay Mr Bosman an advance of BFR 30 000
per month and to refrain from impeding Mr Bosman’s engagement. He also referred
to the Court for a preliminary ruling a question (in Case C-340/90) on the interpre-
tation of Article 48 in relation to the rules governing transfers of professional players
(‘transfer rules’). 
(36) In the meantime, Mr Bosman had been signed up by the French second-
division club Saint-Quentin in October 1990, on condition that his interlocutory
application succeeded. His contract was terminated, however, at the end of the first
season. In February 1992, Mr Bosman signed a new contract with the French club
Saint-Denis de la Réunion, which was also terminated. After looking for further
offers in Belgium and France, Mr Bosman was finally signed up by Olympic de
Charleroi, a Belgian third-division club. 
(37) According to the national court, there is strong circumstantial evidence to
support the view that, notwithstanding the ‘free’ status conferred on him by the inter-
locutory order, Mr Bosman has been boycotted by all the European clubs which
might have engaged him. 
(38) On 28 May 1991, the Cour d’Appel, Liège, revoked the interlocutory deci-
sion of the Tribunal de Première Instance in so far as it referred a question to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. But it upheld the order against RC Liège to
pay monthly advances to Mr Bosman and enjoined RC Liège and URBSFA to make
Mr Bosman available to any club which wished to use his services, without it being
possible to require payment of any compensation fee. By order of 19 June 1991, Case
C-340/90 was removed from the register of the Court of Justice. 
(39) On 3 June 1991, URBSFA, which, contrary to the situation in the interloc-
utory proceedings, had not been cited as a party in the main action before the
Tribunal de Première Instance, intervened voluntarily in that action. On 20 August
1991, Mr Bosman issued a writ with a view to joining UEFA to the proceedings which
he had brought against RC Liège and URBSFA and bringing proceedings directly
against it on the basis of its responsibility in drafting the rules as a result of which he
had suffered damage. On 5 December 1991, US Dunkerque was joined as a third
party by RC Liège, in order to be indemnified against any order which might be made
against it. On 15 October and 27 December 1991 respectively, Union Nationale des
Footballeurs Professionnels (‘UNFP’), a French professional footballers’ union, and
Vereniging van Contractspelers (‘VVCS’), an association governed by Netherlands
law, intervened voluntarily in the proceedings.
(40) In new pleadings lodged on 9 April 1992, Mr Bosman amended his initial
claim against RC Liège, brought a new preventive action against URBSFA and elab-
orated his claim against UEFA. In those proceedings, he sought a declaration that the
transfer rules and nationality clauses were not applicable to him and an order, on the
basis of their wrongful conduct at the time of the failure of his transfer to US
Dunkerque, against RC Liège, URBSFA and UEFA to pay him BFR 11 368 350 in
respect of the damage suffered by him from 1 August 1990 until the end of his career
and BFR 11 743 000 in respect of loss of earnings since the beginning of his career
as a result of the application of the transfer rules. He also applied for a question to
be referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
(41) By judgment of 11 June 1992, the Tribunal de Première Instance held that
it had jurisdiction to entertain the main actions. It also held admissible Mr Bosman’s
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claims against RC Liège, URBSFA and UEFA seeking, in particular, a declaration that
the transfer rules and nationality clauses were not applicable to him and orders pen-
alizing the conduct of those three organizations. But it dismissed RC Liège’s applica-
tion to join US Dunkerque as a third party and indemnifier, since no evidence of fault
in the latter’s performance of its obligations had been adduced. Finally, finding that
the examination of Mr Bosman’s claims against UEFA and URBSFA involved consid-
ering the compatibility of the transfer rules with the Treaty, it made a reference to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Articles 48, 85 and
86 of the Treaty (Case C-269/92). 
(42) URBSFA, RC Liège and UEFA appealed against that decision. Since those
appeals had suspensive effect, the procedure before the Court of Justice was
suspended. By order of 8 December 1993, Case C-269/92 was finally removed from
the register following the new judgment of the Cour d’Appel, Liège, out of which the
present proceedings arise. 
(43) No appeal was brought against UNFP or VVCS, who did not seek to inter-
vene again on appeal. 
Grounds continued under DOC.NUM: 693J0415.1
(44) In its judgment ordering the reference, the Cour d’Appel upheld the judg-
ment under appeal in so far as it held that the Tribunal de Première Instance had juris-
diction, that the actions were admissible and that an assessment of Mr Bosman’s
claims against UEFA and the URBSFA involved a review of the lawfulness of the
transfer rules. It also considered that a review of the lawfulness of the nationality
clauses was necessary, since Mr Bosman’s claim in their regard was based on Article
18 of the Belgian Judicial Code, which permits actions ‘with a view to preventing the
infringement of a seriously threatened right’, and Mr Bosman had adduced factual
evidence suggesting that the damage which he fears . . . that the application of those
clauses may impede his career . . . will in fact occur. 
(45) The national court considered in particular that Article 48 of the Treaty
could, like Article 30, prohibit not only discrimination but also non-discriminatory
barriers to freedom of movement for workers if they could not be justified by imper-
ative requirements. 
(46) With regard to Article 85 of the Treaty, it considered that the FIFA, UEFA
and URBSFA regulations might constitute decisions of associations of undertakings
by which the clubs restrict competition between themselves for players. Transfer fees
were dissuasive and tended to depress the level of professional sportsmen’s pay. In
addition, the nationality clauses prohibited foreign players’ services from being
obtained over a certain quota. Finally, trade between Member States was affected, in
particular by the restriction of players’ mobility.
(47) Furthermore, the Cour d’Appel thought that URBSFA, or the football clubs
collectively, might be in a dominant position, within the meaning of Article 86 of the
Treaty and that the restrictions on competition mentioned in connection with Article
85 might constitute abuses prohibited by Article 86. 
(48) The Cour d’Appel dismissed UEFA’s request that it ask the Court of Justice
whether the reply to the question submitted on transfers would be different if the
system permitted a player to play freely for his new club even where that club had
not paid the transfer fee to the old club. It noted in particular that, because of the
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threat of severe penalties for clubs not paying the transfer fee, a player’s ability to
play for his new club remained dependent on the business relationships between the
clubs. 
(49) In view of the foregoing, the Cour d’Appel decided to stay the proceedings
and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Are
Articles 48, 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 to be interpreted as: 
i prohibiting a football club from requiring and receiving payment of a sum
of money upon the engagement of one of its players who has come to the
end of his contract by a new employing club; 
ii prohibiting the national and international sporting associations or federa-
tions from including in their respective regulations provisions restricting
access of foreign players from the European Community to the competi-
tions which they organize?’ 
(50) On 3 June 1994, URBSFA applied to the Belgian Cour de Cassation (Court
of Cassation) for review of the Cour d’Appel’s judgment, requesting that the judg-
ment be extended to apply jointly to RC Liège, UEFA and US Dunkerque. By letter
of 6 October 1994, the Procureur Général (Principal Crown Counsel) to the Cour de
Cassation informed the Court of Justice that the appeal did not have suspensive effect
in this case. 
(51) By judgment of 30 March 1995, the Cour de Cassation dismissed the
appeal and held that as a result the request for a declaration that the judgment be
extended was otiose. The Cour de Cassation has forwarded a copy of that judgment
to the Court of Justice.
The request for measures of inquiry 
(52) By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 16 November 1995, UEFA
requested the Court to order a measure of inquiry under Article 60 of the Rules of
Procedure, with a view to obtaining fuller information on the role played by trans-
fer fees in the financing of small or medium-sized football clubs, the machinery gov-
erning the distribution of income within the existing football structures and the
presence or absence of alternative machinery if the system of transfer fees were to dis-
appear. 
(53) After hearing again the views of the Advocate General, the Court consid-
ers that that application must be dismissed. It was made at a time when, in accor-
dance with Article 59(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the oral procedure was closed.
The Court has held (see Case 77/70 Prelle v. Commission [1971] ECR 561, para-
graph 7) that such an application can be admitted only if it relates to facts which may
have a decisive influence and which the party concerned could not put forward before
the close of the oral procedure. 
(54) In this case, it is sufficient to hold that UEFA could have submitted its
request before the close of the oral procedure. Moreover, the question whether the
aim of maintaining a balance in financial and competitive terms, and in particular
that of ensuring the financing of smaller clubs, can be achieved by other means such
as a redistribution of a portion of football takings was raised, in particular by Mr
Bosman in his written observations. 
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Jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the questions submitted 
(55) The Court’s jurisdiction to give a ruling on all or part of the questions sub-
mitted by the national court has been challenged, on various grounds, by URBSFA,
by UEFA, by some of the governments which have submitted observations and,
during the written procedure, by the Commission. 
(56) First, UEFA and URBSFA have claimed that the main actions are procedu-
ral devices designed to obtain a preliminary ruling from the Court on questions which
meet no objective need for the purpose of settling the cases. The UEFA regulations
were not applied when Mr Bosman’s transfer to US Dunkerque fell through; if they
had been applied, that transfer would not have been dependent on the payment of a
transfer fee and could thus have taken place. The interpretation of Community law
requested by the national court thus bears no relation to the actual facts of the cases
in the main proceedings or their purpose and, in accordance with consistent case law,
the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the questions submitted. 
(57) Secondly URBSFA, UEFA, the Danish, French and Italian Governments
and, in its written observations, the Commission have claimed that the questions
relating to nationality clauses has no connection with the disputes, which concern
only the application of the transfer rules. The impediments to his career which Mr
Bosman claims arise out of those clauses are purely hypothetical and do not justify a
preliminary ruling by the Court on the interpretation of the Treaty in that regard. 
(58) Thirdly, URBSFA and UEFA pointed out at the hearing that, according to
the judgment of the Cour de Cassation of 30 March 1995, the Cour d’Appel did not
accept as admissible Mr Bosman’s claims for a declaration that the nationality clauses
in the URBSFA regulations were not applicable to him. Consequently, the issues in
the main proceedings do not relate to the application of nationality clauses and the
Court should not rule on the questions submitted on that point. The French
Government concurred in that conclusion, subject however to verification of the
scope of the judgment of the Cour de Cassation. 
(59) As to those submissions, it is to be remembered that, in the context of the
cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by
Article 177 of the Treaty, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute
has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial
decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the
need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the rele-
vance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the ques-
tions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law,
the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-
125/94 Aprile v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-0000, par-
agraphs 16 and 17).
(60) Nevertheless, the Court has taken the view that, in order to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, it should examine the conditions in which the case was
referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in
the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have
regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the
administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions
on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, Case C-83/91 Meilicke v.
ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 25). 
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(61) That is why the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a prelim-
inary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious
that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to
the actual facts of the main action or its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-143/94
Furlanis v. ANAS [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12) or where the problem is hypo-
thetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary
to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Meilicke, cited
above, paragraph 32). 
(62) In the present case, the issues in the main proceedings, taken as a whole,
are not hypothetical and the national court has provided this Court with a clear state-
ment of the surrounding facts, the rules in question and the grounds on which it
believes that a decision on the questions submitted is necessary to enable it to give
judgment. 
(63) Furthermore, even if, as URBSFA and UEFA contend, the UEFA regulations
were not applied when Mr Bosman’s transfer to US Dunkerque fell through, they are
still in issue in the preventive actions brought by Mr Bosman against URBSFA and
UEFA (see paragraph 40 above) and the Court’s interpretation as to the compatibil-
ity with Community law of the transfer system set up by the UEFA regulations may
be useful to the national court. 
(64) With regard more particularly to the questions concerning nationality
clauses, it appears that the relevant heads of claim have been held admissible in the
main proceedings on the basis of a national procedural provision permitting an
action to be brought, albeit for declaratory purposes only, to prevent the infringe-
ment of a right which is seriously threatened. As is clear from its judgment, the
national court considered that application of the nationality clauses could indeed
impede Mr Bosman’s career by reducing his chances of being employed or fielded in
a match by a club from another Member State. It concluded that Mr Bosman’s claims
for a declaration that those nationality clauses were not applicable to him met the
conditions laid down by the said provision. 
(65) It is not for this Court, in the context of these proceedings, to call that
assessment in question. Although the main actions seek a declaratory remedy and,
having the aim of preventing infringement of a right under threat, must necessarily
be based on hypotheses which are, by their nature, uncertain, such actions are none
the less permitted under national law, as interpreted by the referring court.
Consequently, the questions submitted by that court meet an objective need for the
purpose of settling disputes properly brought before it. 
(66) Finally, the judgment of the Cour de Cassation of 30 March 1995 does not
suggest that the nationality clauses are extraneous to the issues in the main proceed-
ings. That court held only that URBSFA’s appeal against the judgment of the Cour
d’Appel rested on a misinterpretation of that judgment. In its appeal, URBSFA had
claimed that that court had held inadmissible a claim by Mr Bosman for a declara-
tion that the nationality clauses contained in its regulations were not applicable to
him. However, it would appear from the judgment of the Cour de Cassation that,
according to the Cour d’Appel, Mr Bosman’s claim sought to prevent impediments
to his career likely to arise from the application not of the nationality clauses in the
URBSFA regulations, which concerned players with a nationality other than Belgian,
but of the similar clauses in the regulations of UEFA and the other national associa-
tions which are members of it, which could concern him as a player with Belgian
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nationality. Consequently, it does not appear from the judgment of the Cour de
Cassation that those latter nationality clauses are extraneous to the main proceed-
ings. 
(67) It follows from the foregoing that the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the
questions submitted by the Cour d’Appel, Liège. 
Interpretation of Article 48 of the Treaty with regard to the transfer rules 
(68) By its first question, the national court seeks in substance to ascertain
whether Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a national of one
Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be employed by a
club of another Member State unless the latter club has paid to the former a trans-
fer, training or development fee. 
Application of Article 48 to rules laid down by sporting associations 
(69) It is first necessary to consider certain arguments which have been put
forward on the question of the application of Article 48 to rules laid down by sport-
ing associations.
(70) URBSFA argued that only the major European clubs may be regarded as
undertakings, whereas clubs such as RC Liège carry on an economic activity only to
a negligible extent. Furthermore, the question submitted by the national court on the
transfer rules does not concern the employment relationships between players and
clubs but the business relationships between clubs and the consequences of freedom
to affiliate to a sporting federation. Article 48 of the Treaty is accordingly not appli-
cable to a case such as that in issue in the main proceedings. 
(71) UEFA argued, inter alia, that the Community authorities have always
respected the autonomy of sport, that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between
the economic and the sporting aspects of football and that a decision of the Court
concerning the situation of professional players might call in question the organiza-
tion of football as a whole. For that reason, even if Article 48 of the Treaty were to
apply to professional players, a degree of flexibility would be essential because of the
particular nature of the sport. 
(72) The German Government stressed, first, that in most cases a sport such as
football is not an economic activity. It further submitted that sport in general has
points of similarity with culture and pointed out that, under Article 128(1) of the EC
Treaty, the Community must respect the national and regional diversity of the cul-
tures of the Member States. Finally, referring to the freedom of association and
autonomy enjoyed by sporting federations under national law, it concluded that, by
virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, taken as a general principle, intervention by
public, and particularly Community, authorities in this area must be confined to what
is strictly necessary. 
(73) In response to those arguments, it is to be remembered that, having regard
to the objectives of the Community, sport is subject to Community law only in so far
as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty (see
Case 36/74 Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph
4). This applies to the activities of professional or semi-professional footballers,
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where they are in gainful employment or provide a remunerated service (see Case
13/76 Donà v. Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, paragraph 12).
(74) It is not necessary, for the purposes of the application of the Community
provisions on freedom of movement for workers, for the employer to be an under-
taking; all that is required is the existence of, or the intention to create, an employ-
ment relationship.
(75) Application of Article 48 of the Treaty is not precluded by the fact that the
transfer rules govern the business relationships between clubs rather than the
employment relationships between clubs and players. The fact that the employing
clubs must pay fees on recruiting a player from another club affects the players’
opportunities for finding employment and the terms under which such employment
is offered. 
(76) As regards the difficulty of severing the economic aspects from the sport-
ing aspects of football, the Court has held (in Donà, cited above, paragraphs 14 and
15) that the provisions of Community law concerning freedom of movement of
persons and of provision of services do not preclude rules or practices justified on
non-economic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context of
certain matches. It stressed, however, that such a restriction on the scope of the provi-
sions in question must remain limited to its proper objective. It cannot, therefore,
be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope of the
Treaty.
(77) With regard to the possible consequences of this judgment on the organ-
ization of football as a whole, it has consistently been held that, although the prac-
tical consequences of any judicial decision must be weighed carefully, this cannot go
so far as to diminish the objective character of the law and compromise its applica-
tion on the ground of the possible repercussions of a judicial decision. At the very
most, such repercussions might be taken into consideration when determining
whether exceptionally to limit the temporal effect of a judgment (see, inter alia, Case
C-163/90 Administration des Douanes v. Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625,
paragraph 30). 
(78) The argument based on points of alleged similarity between sport and
culture cannot be accepted, since the question submitted by the national court does
not relate to the conditions under which Community powers of limited extent, such
as those based on Article 128(1), may be exercised but on the scope of the freedom
of movement of workers guaranteed by Article 48, which is a fundamental freedom
in the Community system (see, inter alia, Case C-19/92 Kraus v. Land Baden-
Wuerttemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 16). 
(79) As regards the arguments based on the principle of freedom of association,
it must be recognized that this principle, enshrined in Article 11 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, is one of
the fundamental rights which, as the Court has consistently held and as is reaffirmed
in the preamble to the Single European Act and in Article F(2) of the Treaty on
European Union, are protected in the Community legal order. 
(80) However, the rules laid down by sporting associations to which the
national court refers cannot be seen as necessary to ensure enjoyment of that freedom
by those associations, by the clubs or by their players, nor can they be seen as an inev-
itable result thereof.
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(81) Finally, the principle of subsidiarity, as interpreted by the German
Government to the effect that intervention by public authorities, and particularly
Community authorities, in the area in question must be confined to what is strictly
necessary, cannot lead to a situation in which the freedom of private associations to
adopt sporting rules restricts the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the
Treaty. 
(82) Once the objections concerning the application of Article 48 of the Treaty
to sporting activities such as those of professional footballers are out of the way, it is
to be remembered that, as the Court held in paragraph 17 of its judgment in Walrave,
cited above, Article 48 not only applies to the action of public authorities but extends
also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collec-
tive manner. 
(83) The Court has held that the abolition as between Member States of obsta-
cles to freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide services would
be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralized by obstacles
resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organizations
not governed by public law (see Walrave, cited above, paragraph 18). 
(84) It has further observed that working conditions in the different Member
States are governed sometimes by provisions laid down by law or regulation and
sometimes by agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons.
Accordingly, if the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty were confined to acts of a public
authority there would be a risk of creating inequality in its application (see Walrave,
cited above, paragraph 19). That risk is all the more obvious in a case such as that
in the main proceedings in this case in that, as has been stressed in paragraph 24
above, the transfer rules have been laid down by different bodies or in different ways
in each Member State. 
(85) UEFA objects that such an interpretation makes Article 48 of the Treaty
more restrictive in relation to individuals than in relation to Member States, which
are alone in being able to rely on limitations justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health.
(86) That argument is based on a false premises. There is nothing to preclude
individuals from relying on justifications on grounds of public policy, public security
or public health. Neither the scope nor the content of those grounds of justification
is in any way affected by the public or private nature of the rules in question.
(87) Article 48 of the Treaty therefore applies to rules laid down by sporting
associations such as URBSFA, FIFA or UEFA, which determine the terms on which
professional sportsmen can engage in gainful employment. 
Whether the situation envisaged by the national court is of a purely internal nature 
(88) UEFA considers that the disputes pending before the national court concern
a purely internal Belgian situation which falls outside the ambit of Article 48 of the
Treaty. They concern a Belgian player whose transfer fell through because of the
conduct of a Belgian club and a Belgian association. 
(89) It is true that, according to consistent case law (see, inter alia, Case 175/78
Regina v. Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, paragraph 11; Case 180/83 Moser v. Land
Baden-Wuerttemberg [1984] ECR 2539, paragraph 15; Case C-332/90 Steen v.
Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9; and Case C-19/92 Kraus,
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cited above, paragraph 15), the provisions of the Treaty concerning the free move-
ment of workers, and particularly Article 48, cannot be applied to situations which
are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words where there is no factor con-
necting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law. 
(90) However, it is clear from the findings of fact made by the national court
that Mr Bosman had entered into a contract of employment with a club in another
Member State with a view to exercising gainful employment in that State. By so
doing, as he has rightly pointed out, he accepted an offer of employment actually
made, within the meaning of Article 48(3)(a). 
(91) Since the situation in issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified as
purely internal, the argument put forward by UEFA must be dismissed. 
Existence of an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers 
(92) It is thus necessary to consider whether the transfer rules form an obstacle
to freedom of movement for workers prohibited by Article 48 of the Treaty. 
(93) As the Court has repeatedly held, freedom of movement for workers is one
of the fundamental principles of the Community and the Treaty provisions guaran-
teeing that freedom have had direct effect since the end of the transitional period. 
(94) The Court has also held that the provisions of the Treaty relating to
freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by
Community citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the
Community, and preclude measures which might place Community citizens at a dis-
advantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another
Member State (see Case 143/87 Stanton v. INASTI [1988] ECR 3877, paragraph 13,
and Case C-370/90 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh
[1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 16).
(95) In that context, nationals of Member States have in particular the right,
which they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their country of origin to enter
the territory of another Member State and reside there in order there to pursue an
economic activity (see, inter alia, Case C-363/89 Roux v. Belgium [1991] ECR I-273,
paragraph 9, and Singh, cited above, paragraph 17). 
(96) Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from
leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement
therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to
the nationality of the workers concerned (see also Case C-10/90 Masgio v.
Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR I-1119, paragraphs 18 and 19). 
(97) The Court has also stated, in Case 81/87 The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and
Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc [1988]
ECR 5483, paragraph 16, that even though the Treaty provisions relating to freedom
of establishment are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and compa-
nies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State,
they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in
another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its
legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 58. The rights guar-
anteed by Article 52 et seq. of the Treaty would be rendered meaningless if the
Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to estab-
lish themselves in another Member State. The same considerations apply, in relation
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to Article 48 of the Treaty, with regard to rules which impede the freedom of move-
ment of nationals of one Member State wishing to engage in gainful employment in
another Member State. 
(98) It is true that the transfer rules in issue in the main proceedings apply also
to transfers of players between clubs belonging to different national associations
within the same Member State and that similar rules govern transfers between clubs
belonging to the same national association. 
(99) However, as has been pointed out by Mr Bosman, by the Danish
Government and by the Advocate General in points 209 and 210 of his Opinion,
those rules are likely to restrict the freedom of movement of players who wish to
pursue their activity in another Member State by preventing or deterring them from
leaving the clubs to which they belong even after the expiry of their contracts of
employment with those clubs. 
(100) Since they provide that a professional footballer may not pursue his activ-
ity with a new club established in another Member State unless it has paid his former
club a transfer fee agreed upon between the two clubs or determined in accordance
with the regulations of the sporting associations, the said rules constitute an obsta-
cle to freedom of movement for workers. 
(101) As the national court has rightly pointed out, that finding is not affected
by the fact that the transfer rules adopted by UEFA in 1990 stipulate that the busi-
ness relationship between the two clubs is to exert no influence on the activity of the
player, who is to be free to play for his new club. The new club must still pay the fee
in issue, under pain of penalties which may include its being struck off for debt, which
prevents it just as effectively from signing up a player from a club in another Member
State without paying that fee. 
(102) Nor is that conclusion negated by the case law of the Court cited by
URBSFA and UEFA, to the effect that Article 30 of the Treaty does not apply to meas-
ures which restrict or prohibit certain selling arrangements so long as they apply to
all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect
in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of
those from other Member States (see Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and
Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraph 16). 
(103) It is sufficient to note that, although the rules in issue in the main proceed-
ings apply also to transfers between clubs belonging to different national associations
within the same Member State and are similar to those governing transfers between
clubs belonging to the same national association, they still directly affect players’
access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus capable of
impeding freedom of movement for workers. They cannot, thus, be deemed compar-
able to the rules on selling arrangements for goods which in Keck and Mithouard
were held to fall outside the ambit of Article 30 of the Treaty (see also, with regard
to freedom to provide services, Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van
Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, paragraphs 36 to 38). 
(104) Consequently, the transfer rules constitute an obstacle to freedom of
movement for workers prohibited in principle by Article 48 of the Treaty. It could
only be otherwise if those rules pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty
and were justified by pressing reasons of public interest. But even if that were so,
application of those rules would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the
aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see, inter alia,
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the judgment in Kraus, cited above, paragraph 32, and Case C-55/94 Gebhard
[1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37). 
Existence of justifications 
(105) First, URBSFA, UEFA and the French and Italian Governments have sub-
mitted that the transfer rules are justified by the need to maintain a financial and com-
petitive balance between clubs and to support the search for talent and the training
of young players.
(106) In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in
particular football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between
clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legit-
imate. 
(107) As regards the first of those aims, Mr Bosman has rightly pointed out that
the application of the transfer rules is not an adequate means of maintaining finan-
cial and competitive balance in the world of football. Those rules neither preclude
the richest clubs from securing the services of the best players nor prevent the avail-
ability of financial resources from being a decisive factor in competitive sport, thus
considerably altering the balance between clubs.
(108) As regards the second aim, it must be accepted that the prospect of receiv-
ing transfer, development or training fees is indeed likely to encourage football clubs
to seek new talent and train young players. 
(109) However, because it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young
players with any certainty and because only a limited number of such players go on
to play professionally, those fees are by nature contingent and uncertain and are in
any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training both future profes-
sional players and those who will never play professionally. The prospect of receiv-
ing such fees cannot, therefore, be either a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment
and training of young players or an adequate means of financing such activities, par-
ticularly in the case of smaller clubs. 
(110) Furthermore, as the Advocate General has pointed out in point 226 et seq.
of his Opinion, the same aims can be achieved at least as efficiently by other means
which do not impede freedom of movement for workers. 
(111) It has also been argued that the transfer rules are necessary to safeguard
the worldwide organization of football. 
(112) However, the present proceedings concern application of those rules
within the Community and not the relations between the national associations of the
Member States and those of non-member countries. In any event, application of dif-
ferent rules to transfers between clubs belonging to national associations within the
Community and to transfers between such clubs and those affiliated to the national
associations of non-member countries is unlikely to pose any particular difficulties.
As is clear from paragraphs 22 and 23 above, the rules which have so far governed
transfers within the national associations of certain Member States are different from
those which apply at the international level. 
(113) Finally, the argument that the rules in question are necessary to compen-
sate clubs for the expenses which they have had to incur in paying fees on recruiting
their players cannot be accepted, since it seeks to justify the maintenance of obstacles
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to freedom of movement for workers simply on the ground that such obstacles were
able to exist in the past. 
(114) The answer to the first question must therefore be that Article 48 of the
Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by sporting associations, under
which a professional footballer who is a national of one Member State may not, on
the expiry of his contract with a club, be employed by a club of another Member
State unless the latter club has paid to the former club a transfer, training or devel-
opment fee. 
Interpretation of Article 48 of the Treaty with regard to the nationality clauses 
(115) By its second question, the national court seeks in substance to ascertain
whether Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations, under which, in matches in competitions which they organize,
football clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who are
nationals of other Member States. 
Existence of an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers 
(116) As the Court has held in paragraph 87 above, Article 48 of the Treaty
applies to rules laid down by sporting associations which determine the conditions
under which professional sports players may engage in gainful employment. It must
therefore be considered whether the nationality clauses constitute an obstacle to
freedom of movement for workers, prohibited by Article 48. 
(117) Article 48(2) expressly provides that freedom of movement for workers
entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of
the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and conditions of work
and employment. 
(118) That provision has been implemented, in particular, by Article 4 of
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom
of movement for workers within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition,
1968(II), p. 475), under which provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action of the Member States which restrict by number or percent-
age the employment of foreign nationals in any undertaking, branch of activity
or region, or at a national level, are not to apply to nationals of the other
Member States. 
(119) The same principle applies to clauses contained in the regulations of
sporting associations which restrict the right of nationals of other Member States to
take part, as professional players, in football matches (see the judgment in Donà,
cited above, paragraph 19).
(120) The fact that those clauses concern not the employment of such players,
on which there is no restriction, but the extent to which their clubs may field them
in official matches is irrelevant. In so far as participation in such matches is the
essential purpose of a professional player’s activity, a rule which restricts that par-
ticipation obviously also restricts the chances of employment of the player con-
cerned.
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Existence of justifications 
(121) The existence of an obstacle having thus been established, it must be
considered whether that obstacle may be justified in the light of Article 48 of the
Treaty. 
(122) URBSFA, UEFA and the German, French and Italian Governments argued
that the nationality clauses are justified on non-economic grounds, concerning only
the sport as such. 
(123) First, they argued, those clauses serve to maintain the traditional link
between each club and its country, a factor of great importance in enabling the public
to identify with its favourite team and ensuring that clubs taking part in international
competitions effectively represent their countries. 
(124) Secondly, those clauses are necessary to create a sufficient pool of national
players to provide the national teams with top players to field in all team positions. 
(125) Thirdly, they help to maintain a competitive balance between clubs by
preventing the richest clubs from appropriating the services of the best players. 
(126) Finally, UEFA points out that the ‘3+2’ rule was drawn up in collabora-
tion with the Commission and must be revised regularly to remain in line with the
development of Community policy. 
(127) It must be recalled that in paragraphs 14 and 15 of its judgment in Donà,
cited above, the Court held that the Treaty provisions concerning freedom of move-
ment for persons do not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding foreign
players from certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which
relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting
interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from different
countries. It stressed, however, that that restriction on the scope of the provisions in
question must remain limited to its proper objective. 
(128) Here, the nationality clauses do not concern specific matches between
teams representing their countries but apply to all official matches between clubs and
thus to the essence of the activity of professional players. 
(129) In those circumstances, the nationality clauses cannot be deemed to be in
accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty, otherwise that Article would be deprived
of its practical effect and the fundamental right of free access to employment which
the Treaty confers individually on each worker in the Community rendered nugatory
(on this last point, see Case 222/86 UNECTEF v. Heylens and Others [1987] ECR
4097, paragraph 14). 
(130) None of the arguments put forward by the sporting associations and by
the governments which have submitted observations detracts from that conclusion. 
(131) First, a football club’s links with the Member State in which it is estab-
lished cannot be regarded as any more inherent in its sporting activity than its links
with its locality, town, region or, in the case of the United Kingdom, the territory
covered by each of the four associations. Even though national championships are
played between clubs from different regions, towns or localities, there is no rule
restricting the right of clubs to field players from other regions, towns or localities in
such matches. 
(132) In international competitions, moreover, participation is limited to clubs
which have achieved certain results in competition in their respective countries,
without any particular significance being attached to the nationalities of their players. 
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(133) Secondly, whilst national teams must be made up of players having the
nationality of the relevant country, those players need not necessarily be registered
to play for clubs in that country. Indeed, under the rules of the sporting associations,
foreign players must be allowed by their clubs to play for their country’s national
team in certain matches. 
(134) Furthermore, although freedom of movement for workers, by opening up
the employment market in one Member State to nationals of the other Member
States, has the effect of reducing workers’ chances of finding employment within the
Member State of which they are nationals, it also, by the same token, offers them
new prospects of employment in other Member States. Such considerations obviously
apply also to professional footballers. 
(135) Thirdly, although it has been argued that the nationality clauses prevent
the richest clubs from engaging the best foreign players, those clauses are not suffi-
cient to achieve the aim of maintaining a competitive balance, since there are no rules
limiting the possibility for such clubs to recruit the best national players, thus under-
mining that balance to just the same extent. 
(136) Finally, as regards the argument based on the Commission’s participation
in the drafting of the ‘3+2’ rule, it must be pointed out that, except where such
powers are expressly conferred upon it, the Commission may not give guarantees
concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty (see also Joined
Cases 142/80 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Essevi and
Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, paragraph 16). In no circumstances does it have the
power to authorize practices which are contrary to the Treaty.
(137) It follows from the foregoing that Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the
application of rules laid down by sporting associations under which, in matches in
competitions which they organize, football clubs may field only a limited number of
professional players who are nationals of other Member States. 
Interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
(138) Since both types of rule to which the national court’s question refer are
contrary to Article 48, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty. 
The temporal effects of this judgment
(139) In their written and oral observations, UEFA and URBSFA have drawn
the Court’s attention to the serious consequences which might ensue from its judg-
ment for the organization of football as a whole if it were to consider the transfer
rules and nationality clauses to be incompatible with the Treaty. 
(140) Mr Bosman, whilst observing that such a solution is not indispensable,
has suggested that the Court could limit the temporal effects of its judgment in so far
as it concerns the transfer rules. 
(141) It has consistently been held that the interpretation which the Court, in
the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 177 of the Treaty, gives
to a rule of Community law clarifies and where necessary defines the meaning and
scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from
the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted can, and
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must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established
before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other
respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action
relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case 24/86 Blaizot
v. University of Liège and Others [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 27). 
(142) It is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general
principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to
restrict the opportunity for any person concerned to rely upon the provision as thus
interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good
faith. Such a restriction may be allowed only by the Court, in the actual judgment
ruling upon the interpretation sought (see, inter alia, the judgments in Blaizot, cited
above, paragraph 28, and Legros, cited above, paragraph 30). 
(143) In the present case, the specific features of the rules laid down by the sport-
ing associations for transfers of players between clubs of different Member States,
together with the fact that the same or similar rules applied to transfers both between
clubs belonging to the same national association and between clubs belonging to dif-
ferent national associations within the same Member State, may have caused uncer-
tainty as to whether those rules were compatible with Community law. 
(144) In such circumstances, overriding considerations of legal certainty mili-
tate against calling in question legal situations whose effects have already been
exhausted. An exception must, however, be made in favour of persons who may have
taken timely steps to safeguard their rights. Finally, limitation of the effects of the
said interpretation can be allowed only in respect of compensation fees for transfer,
training or development which have already been paid on, or are still payable under
an obligation which arose before, the date of this judgment. 
(145) It must therefore be held that the direct effect of Article 48 of the Treaty
cannot be relied upon in support of claims relating to a fee in respect of transfer, train-
ing or development which has already been paid on, or is still payable under an obli-
gation which arose before, the date of this judgment, except by those who have
brought court proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable
national law before that date. 
(146) With regard to nationality clauses, however, there are no grounds for a
temporal limitation of the effects of this judgment. In the light of the Walrave and
Donà judgments, it was not reasonable for those concerned to consider that the dis-
crimination resulting from those clauses was compatible with Article 48 of the Treaty.
Costs
(147) The costs incurred by the Danish, French, German and Italian
Governments and the Commission of the European Communities, which have sub-
mitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are,
for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the
national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.
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On those grounds, 
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by the Cour d’Appel, Liège, by judgment of
1 October 1993, hereby rules: 
(1) Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a national of one
Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be employed by a
club of another Member State unless the latter club has paid to the former club a
transfer, training or development fee. 
(2) Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which they organize,
football clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who are
nationals of other Member States. 
(3) The direct effect of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty cannot be relied upon in
support of claims relating to a fee in respect of transfer, training or development
which has already been paid on, or is still payable under an obligation which arose
before, the date of this judgment, except by those who have brought court proceed-
ings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law before that date.
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Appendix 2: The Helsinki report on sport
Commission of the European Communities
Brussels, 10.12.1999
COM (1999) 644 final
Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding
current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the
Community framework – The Helsinki report on sport.
1 Introduction
‘Recalling the Declaration on Sport attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam and recog-
nising the social role of sport’, the European Council, meeting in Vienna on 11 and
12 December 1998, invited ‘the Commission to submit a report to the Helsinki
European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and main-
taining the social function of sport within the Community framework’. This report
by the Commission is the response to the European Council’s invitation.
Following this invitation and in accordance with the Amsterdam Declaration,
numerous consultations were held (Olympic movement, sporting federations, sports
industries, media, governments and Community institutions), especially at the
‘European Union Conference on Sport’ organised in Olympia from 20 to 23 May
1999. Sport is one of the areas of activity that most concerns and brings together the
citizens of the European Union, irrespective of age and social origin. More than half
of them regularly do sport, either in one of the 700 000 clubs that exist in the Union
or outside these clubs. Almost two million teachers, instructors and voluntary
workers spend their working or leisure time organising sporting activities. 
This social function of sport, which is in the general interest, has for some years
been affected by the emergence of new phenomena which sometimes call into ques-
tion the ethics of sport and the principles on which it is organised, be they violence
in the stadiums, the increase in doping practices or the search for quick profits to the
detriment of a more balanced development of sport.
This report gives pointers for reconciling the economic dimension of sport with
its popular, educational, social and cultural dimensions.
2 The development of sport in Europe risks weakening its educational and social
function
There are many common features in the ways in which sport is practised and organ-
ised in the Union, in spite of certain differences between the Member States, and there
is therefore possible to talk of a European approach to sport based on common con-
cepts and principles.
For several years, the European approach to sport has been affected by several
phenomena:
• the rise in the popularity of sport in terms of the number of people doing
and watching sport. A total of 37 billion television viewers watched the
matches of the most recent football World Cup, which is nearly 600 million
television viewers per match;
• the internationalisation of sport, with the increase in the number of inter-
national competitions. In 1999, 77 world championships and 102
European championships were organised in Europe;
• the unprecedented development of the economic dimension of sport, with,
for example, the spectacular increase in television rights: the value of the
television rights negotiated by the IOC has risen from USD 441 million in
1992 (Barcelona Olympic Games) to an expected USD 1.318 billion for the
2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.
These phenomena provide certain advantages for sport and society. Accordingly,
the number of jobs created directly or indirectly by the sport industry has risen by
60% in the past ten years to reach nearly 2 million. It has to be recognised, however,
that these phenomena may also cause tension.
One of the first signs of these developments is the overloading of sporting calen-
dars, which, linked to the need to produce results under the pressure of sponsors,
may be considered to be one of the causes of the expansion of doping.
A second consequence is the increase in the number of lucrative sporting events,
which may end up promoting the commercial approach, to the detriment of sporting
principles and the social function of sport.
A third symptom is the temptation for certain sporting operators and certain large
clubs to leave the federations in order to derive the maximum benefit from the eco-
nomic potential of sport for themselves alone. This tendency may jeopardise the prin-
ciple of financial solidarity between professional and amateur sport and the system
of promotion and relegation common to most federations.
Another consequence that has been observed is the hazardous future facing young
people who are being led into top-level competitive sport at an increasingly early age,
often with no other vocational training, with the resulting risks for their physical and
mental health and their subsequent switch to other employment.
3 The Community, its Member States and the sporting movement need to reaffirm
and strengthen the educational and social function of sport
The Declaration on Sport annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty ‘emphasises the social
significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people
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together’. Physical and sporting activities need to find their place in the education
system of each Member State.
The values that they represent (equal opportunities, fair play, solidarity, etc.) must
also be passed on by sports associations. Sport affects all social classes and age groups
and is an essential tool for social integration and education.
3.1 Enhancing the educational role of sport
The Commission’s White Paper on Education and Training1 stresses that ‘knowledge
is defined as an acquired corpus of fundamental and technical knowledge and social
skills’ that concern ‘relational skills, such as the ability to cooperate and work as part
of a team, creativeness and the quest for quality’, all of which are values conveyed
by sport. With this in mind, Community action, within the context of its educational
and training programmes, could focus on the following objectives:
• improving the position of sport and physical education at school through
the Community programmes;
• promoting the subsequent switch to other employment and future integra-
tion onto the labour market of sportsmen and women;
• promoting convergence between the training systems for sports workers in
each Member State.
Moreover, the Council of Europe rightly stressed that sport is also ‘an ideal plat-
form for social democracy’.2 It is therefore important for the existing Community
programmes to make use of sport in combating exclusion, inequalities, racism and
xenophobia.
Furthermore, the violence that sometimes develops at sporting events is unaccept-
able. As part of the European Union’s objective to provide its citizens with a high
level of protection in an area of freedom, safety and justice, the responsible
authorities will have to step up their cooperation in order to prevent this type of vio-
lence.
3.2 Joining forces to combat doping
The Vienna European Council also wished to underline ‘its concern at the extent and
seriousness of doping in sports’. It mentioned the need for mobilisation at European
Union level and invited the Member States and the Commission ‘to examine possible
measures to intensify the fight against this danger’, together with the sports bodies.
The measures implemented by the Commission,3 in close cooperation with the
Member States, have focused on three fronts:
• Referring this matter to the European Group on Ethics. The opinion issued
by this Group suggests a number of avenues that could be explored by the
State authorities and sporting organisations;
• Cooperating with the Olympic movement to create a world anti-doping
agency and to make sure that it works independently and transparently; 
• Mobilising Community instruments to supplement and strengthen the work
already carried out by the Member States in the areas of research, public
health, education and youth, but also cooperation, as provided for by the
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third pillar. Further work needs to be done to improve legislative coordina-
tion.
However, this work will come to nothing unless the public authorities and the sport-
ing organisations tackle the root causes of the rise in doping. The development of the
fight against doping also depends on the general development of sport.
4 Clarifying the legal environment of sport
As underlined by the conclusions of the European Union Conference on Sport organ-
ised by the Commission in Olympia in May 1999, ‘sport must be able to assimilate
the new commercial framework in which it must develop, without at the same time
losing its identity and autonomy, which underpin the functions it performs in the
social, cultural, health and educational areas’.
While the Treaty contains no specific provisions on sport, the Community must
nevertheless ensure that the initiatives taken by the national State authorities or
sporting organisations comply with Community law, including competition law, and
respect in particular the principles of the internal market (freedom of movement for
workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, etc.).
In this respect, accompanying, coordination or interpretation measures at
Community level might prove to be useful, for example in the area of the fight against
doping. They would be designed to strengthen the legal certainty of sporting activ-
ities and their social function at Community level. However, as Community powers
currently stand, there can be no question of large-scale intervention or support pro-
grammes or even of the implementation of a Community sports policy.
4.1 The increase in the number of conflicts
The economic developments observed in the area of sport and the responses of the
various State authorities and sporting organisations to the problems that they raise
do not go far enough to guarantee that the current structures of sport and its social
function can be safeguarded. The increase in the number of court proceedings is the
sign of growing tension.
• Certain clubs contest the collective sale of television rights. Several com-
plaints have been submitted to national courts, and the judgments delivered
at national level have come to differing conclusions. The question of the col-
lective sale of such rights is also raised in certain cases pending before the
Commission;
• the Bosman judgment, delivered by the Court of Justice in December 1995
on the basis of the principle of freedom of movement for workers, has had
major repercussions on the organisation of sport in Europe. It has done
much to eliminate certain abuses and to promote the mobility of sportsmen
and women. However, the sporting federations – which, incidentally, have
not set up a new alternative system to the one condemned by the Court –
consider that it has widened the economic gap between clubs and between
players and has caused problems for the training of young people in clubs.
Certain clubs which have established training centres for professional
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sportsmen and women have seen their best people leave, without them
receiving any compensation for the investment they have made in training;
• there are differences in fiscal legislation, and hence in the taxation of pro-
fessional sportsmen and women or of sporting clubs, within the European
Union. This situation is a source of inequality between countries and clubs
and contributes to the phenomenon of ever higher offers;
• several Member States of the European Union have recently announced
measures to limit or manage the effects of the commercialisation of sport.
While these measures obviously help to preserve the principles and social
function of sport, they may increase the disparities between Member States
of the European Union and cause problems in the area of Community law;
• certain complaints also concern the monopoly of federations on the organ-
isation of sporting competitions, the ownership of several clubs by one
person (multiple ownership), the rules on the geographical organisation of
sport, the statutes of professional clubs and certain commercial operations
carried out by the federations.
On the other hand, other measures have been taken at the Community level, in
keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, which are strengthening the legal frame-
work while preserving the ‘common interest’ dimension of sport. One example is the
decision taken at the time of the 1997 revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers’
Directive. Under the terms of the revised text, the Member States may take measures,
in keeping with Community law, to ensure that the general public has access to major
sporting events.
4.2 The need for convergent endeavours
If it is advisable, as wished by the European Council, but also the European
Parliament4 and the Committee of the Regions,5 to preserve the social function of
sport, and therefore the current structures of the organisation of sport in Europe,
there is a need for a new approach to questions of sport both at European Union level
and in the Member States, in compliance with the Treaty, especially with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, and the autonomy of sporting organisations.
This new approach involves preserving the traditional values of sport, while at the
same time assimilating a changing economic and legal environment. It is designed to
view sport globally and coherently. This overall vision assumes greater consultation
between the various protagonists (sporting movement, Member States and European
Community) at each level. It should lead to the clarification, at each level, of the legal
framework for sports operators.
The European Union would have an essential part to play in implementing this
new approach, given the increasing internationalisation of sport and the direct
impact of Community policies on European sport.
4.2.1 The Community level
In terms of the economic activity that it generates, the sporting sector is subject to
the rules of the EC Treaty, like the other sectors of the economy. The application of
the Treaty’s competition rules to the sporting sector must take account of the specific
characteristics of sport, especially the interdependence between sporting activity and
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the economic activity that it generates, the principle of equal opportunities and the
uncertainty of the results.
With a view to an improved definition of the legal environment, it is possible to
give examples, without prejudice to the conclusions that the Commission could draw
from the in-depth analysis of each case, of practices of sports organisations.
4.2.1.1 Practices which do not come under the competition rules The regulations
of sporting organisations drawing up rules without which a sport could not exist, or
which are necessary for its organisation or for the organisation of competitions, might
not be subject to the competition rules. The rules inherent to sport are, first and fore-
most, the ‘rules of the game’. The aim of these rules is not to distort competition.
4.2.1.2 Practices that are, in principle, prohibited by the competition rules These
are restrictive practices in the economic activities generated by sport. They may
concern, in particular, restrictions on parallel imports of sports products and the sale
of entrance tickets to stadiums that discriminate between users who are resident in a
particular Member State and those who live outside that Member State. 
Sponsoring agreements that close a market by removing other suppliers for no
objective reason are prohibited. The systems of international transfers based on arbi-
trarily calculated payments which bear no relation to training costs seem to have been
prohibited, irrespective of the nationality of the player concerned. 
Lastly, it is likely that there would be a ban on the practice of a sporting organ-
isation using its regulatory power to exclude from the market, for no objective
reason, any economic operator which, even though it complies with the justified
quality or safety standards, has not been able to obtain a document from this organ-
isation certifying to the quality or safety of its products.
4.2.1.3 Practices likely to be exempted from the competition rules
• The Bosman judgment mentioned above recognised as legitimate the objec-
tives designed to maintain a balance between clubs, while preserving a
degree of equality of opportunity and the uncertainty of the result, and to
encourage the recruitment and training of young players. Consequently, it
is likely that agreements between professional clubs or decisions by their
associations that are really designed to achieve these two objectives would
be exempted. The same would be true of a system of transfers or standard
contracts based on objectively calculated payments that are related to the
costs of training, or of an exclusive right, limited in duration and scope, to
broadcast sporting events. It goes without saying that the other provisions
of the Treaty must also be complied with in this area, especially those that
guarantee freedom of movement for professional sportsmen and women;
• It is likely that short-term sponsoring agreements based on an invitation to
tender and with clear and non-discriminatory selection criteria would be
authorised;
• any exemptions granted in the case of the joint sale of broadcasting rights
must take account of the benefits for consumers and of the proportional
nature of the restriction on competition in relation to the legitimate objec-
tive pursued. In this context, there is also a need to examine the extent
to which a link can be established between the joint sale of rights and
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financial solidarity between professional and amateur sport, the objectives
of the training of young sportsmen and women and those of promoting
sporting activities among the population. However, with regard to the sale
of exclusive rights to broadcast sporting events, it is likely that any exclu-
sivity which, by its duration and/or scope, resulted in the closing of the
market, would be prohibited.
4.2.2 The national level
The national State authorities also need to clarify the legal rules in order to safeguard
the current structures and the social function of sport. One way of safeguarding the
national federal structures could be to provide for them to be recognised by law in
each Member State of the Union. Other ways of achieving this objective would be
the partnership agreements between the State and the sporting federations and to
grant the representative sporting federations a specific status which could be based
on that of the professional associations. There is also a need to examine, in legal
terms, the legal status of clubs, their purchase or the participation of commercial or
financial groups in their equity.
4.2.3 The level of sporting organisations
In order to clarify the legal environment of sport, it is also necessary for the federa-
tions to make an effort to define their missions and statutes more precisely. The
pyramid structure of the organisation of sport in Europe gives sporting federations a
practical ‘monopoly’. The existence of several federations in one discipline would
risk causing major conflicts. Indeed, the organisation of national championships and
the selection of national athletes and national teams for international competitions
often require the existence of one umbrella organization bringing together all the
sports associations and competitors of one discipline.
The federations should also perform tasks such as the promotion of amateur and
professional sport and carry out a role of integration into society (young people, the
disabled, etc.). Their statutes should explicitly state these missions. These responsibil-
ities should be translated effectively into practice by financial mechanisms of inter-
nal solidarity and the structural and solidarity-based relationship between
competitive sport and amateur sport. Operations with an economic dimension
should be founded on the principles of transparency and balanced access to the
market, effective and proven redistribution and clarification of contracts, while
prominence is given to the ‘specific nature of sport’.
It must be stressed that the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty do not gener-
ally conflict with the regulatory measures of sports associations, provided that these
measures are objectively justified, non-discriminatory, necessary and proportional.
There is also a need to find solutions, in partnership with the sporting federations,
in order to develop alternatives to the transfer systems condemned by the Bosman
judgment.
5 Conclusion
If the Commission is asked whether it can guarantee that the current development of
sport will not jeopardise the current structures and social function of sport, its
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unequivocal answer is that it cannot. It is indeed important to remember that the
Commission has no direct responsibility for sport under the Treaty.
In order to safeguard the current sports structures and maintain the social func-
tion of sport, there is a need for a new approach to questions of sport. The first step
towards such a new approach is for the various protagonists involved to respect a
common foundation of sporting principles:
• The European Union recognises the eminent role played by sport in
European society and attaches the greatest importance to the maintenance
of its functions of promoting social integration and education and making
a contribution to public health and to the general interest function per-
formed by the federations;
• The integrity and autonomy of sport must be preserved. The purchase of
sporting clubs by commercial bodies (communication groups etc.) must, if
permitted, be governed by clear rules, out of a concern for the preservation
of sporting structures and ethics; 
• The system of promotion and relegation is one of the characteristics of
European sport. This system gives small or medium-sized clubs a better
chance and rewards sporting merit;
• Doping and sport are diametrically opposed. There can be no let-up in the
fight against doping;
• The ‘trade’ in young sportsmen and women must be combated. Each young
sportsman or woman trained by a club for top-level competition must
receive vocational training in addition to sports training.
On the basis of these principles, there is a need for a new partnership between the
European institutions, the Member States and the sports organisations, all moving in
the same direction, in order to encourage the promotion of sport in European society,
while respecting sporting values, the autonomy of sporting organisations and the
Treaty, especially the principle of subsidiarity.
Insufficient coordination between the protagonists of sport (federations, Member
States and the European Community), all of them working in isolation, would risk
thwarting the efforts to achieve these shared principles. However, the convergent
efforts of the European Community, the Member States and the sporting federations
could make an effective contribution to the promotion in Europe of sport that is true
to its social role, while ensuring that its organisational aspects assimilate the new eco-
nomic order.
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